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Abstract 
This research uses a transactions costs approach to examine recent developments 
in the public sector organisational arrangements. It explores the extent to which 
transactions costs or other factors drive the institutional choices that legislators 
make about policy implementation. The area of application is the adoption of 'new 
public management' (NPM) reforms in Catalonia for the governance of the public 
health care sector in the period from the eady 1 980s to the mid-1 990s. 
The methodology used combines qualitative and quantitative approaches in the 
analysis of data from both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources 
used here include thirty-eight in-depth and semi-structured interviews with key 
informants, non-published internal reports from major organisations and an annual 
survey of all health providers carried out by the Department of Health and Social 
Security of the Catalan government. The secondary sources include official 
publications and relevant academic journals and books on the subject. 
The study analyses both the policy formulation process leading up to a particular 
institutional design and the nature of the further implementation process in the 
Catalan health sector. First, policy precedents are identified and the resources and 
interests of the policy elites analysed as a basis for understanding the output of the 
reform formulation in 1990. Second, the analysis shows how transactions costs 
considerations shaped the stances taken by legislators and influenced the final 
institutional design. Third, a number of subsequent implementation short-falls are 
traced to some efforts at minimising transactions costs which turned out to be 
incompatible with NPM postulates. The analysis shows that the impact of politics, 
that is, the repeated interactions among policy elites controlling compleme,, itary 
resources, shape the way in which transactions costs and other considerations are 
approached in both policy formulation and implementation processes. 
A central theoretical lesson drawn from this research is that although transactions 
costs are difficult to measure, they are useful heuristic tools for analysing the 
rationale driving decision-making processes on institutional design. However, both 
the theoretical definition of transactions costs and their actual impact on decision- 
making are mediated by power relations, that is, by politics. 
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Chapter 1 
Explaining institutional choice 
in the health sector. 
The politics of institutional choice is the process by which interest groups and 
public officials (both elected politicians and bureaucrats) make decisions about the 
structure of government, that is, about the rules governing the relations between 
different actors in each policy domain. These rules are important because they 
allocate to different actors decision rights of a public authority nature, together with 
costs and benefits, which then affects both policy outputs and outcomes (Moe, 
1990a, 1990b). In this respect, the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 
1990s saw a widespread reform trend affecting the structure of government across 
many OECD countries, namely, new public management' (NPM). The changes 
prescribed by NPM involve a shift in the governance structure of different policy 
domains, that is, in the set of rules governing the relationship between relevant 
actors. Two main components of a governance structure are the institutional form 
of the public authority and the policy tools it is entitled to use. The NPM shift is from 
traditional public administration, where integrated hierarchical structures and 
command-and-control policy tools are commonplace, to a governance structure 
inspired on market transactions. In a NPM governance structure functional roles 
are differentiated (financing, purchasing, provision, regulation, consumption); 
organisational structures are accordingly disaggregated; and incentive-based 
contracts are the main instrument for governing the relations between the actors 
assuming those roles (Dunleavy, 1994). 
Most mainstream research on NPM reforms has focused on pioneering 
experiences in 'Anglo-Saxon' countries such as the United Kingdom, New Zealand, 
Australia, United States and Canada; or on specific relevant cases elsewhere, such 
as Sweden, where reforms are taking a relatively comprehensive approach not only 
to the core public administration but also to policy domains which are central to the 
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welfare state'. This body of NPM research has been mostly concerned with 
describing the content of the reforms in relation to both the new institutional forms 
of public authorities and the policy tools being developed. Only recently have some 
implementation analyses started to assess the impact of those reforms in terms of 
efficiency, effectiveness and equity2. In fewer cases researchers have tried to 
explain why NPM, as a policy reversal, came about. As Hood (1994) concludes, 
different theories provide insight to this question but they remain incomplete. In 
fact, Hood classifies them into different sorts of 'complementary' explanations such 
as: the power and/or packaging of NPM ideas (Aucoin, 1990); a shift of 
government officials' interests reflected in a 'bureau-shaping' behaviour (Dunleavy, 
1991) or the emergence of a new ruling elite within public service bureaucracies 
(Pusey, 1991; Yeatman, 1987); a change in habitat as a result of the configuration 
of a 'post-fordist' society (Osborne, Gaebler, 1992; Taylor, Williams, 1991); and a 
'natural' process of policy self-destruction in ageing institutions (Painter, 1990). 
However, although these theories provide great insight, their very formulation 
implicitly assumes that NPM is a particular kind of public sector reform which 
requires a particular, tailor-made explanation. Therefore, the potential application of 
these theories may appear as limited when trying to explain any other kind of public 
sector reform. By contrast, if NPM is defined just as one form of governance 
structure in the public sector (among other possible ones), the question of why 
legislators chose this particular govemance structure? requires an explanation 
based on a more general theory of institutional choice in the public sector. 
Moreover, this approach would have to be applicable not only to reforms occurring 
I As Metcalfe (1993) points out, NPIVI does not only affect individual organisations at the 
core of public administration, but it is gradually involving structural reorganisations of the 
public service delivery system, affecting networks of organisations. In the United Kingdom 
areas such as local government, the NHS, education, police services are being affected by 
these reforms. The main elements of this trend are: decentralisation of operational 
management responsibilities to individual units, creation of a business management ethos, 
cost consciousness, management by objectives, financial accountability, competition 
between providers in health and education, the public as consumer rather than client in a 
purchaser-provider contracting system, centralised financial control over local management 
discretion, centrally established policy parameters. 
2 See for example: Le Grand, Bartlett, (1993); Robinson, Le Grand (1993); Glennerster et a/. 
(1994); Maynard (1994); Ranade (1995); Saltman, Otter (1995); Ferlie et a/, (1996); Flynn 
and Williams (1997); Hughes et aL (1997); Lane (1997); Mulholland and McAlister (1997); 
Robinson and Steiner (1998). 
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in the core public administration but also those found in different policy domains 
and sectors. 
The formulation of such a theory has not proved an easy task. As Moe 
argues (1990a, 1990b, 1991), the 'sociological' and 'economic' organisational 
theories developed within new institutionalism in the seventies and eighties, have 
not integrated politics and organisation into a theory which endogenises the 
political dimension of public administration into the analysis of its organisational 
components. Instead, they have consolidated the separation between the study of 
the political and administrative spheres. Building on this criticism, Hom (1995) 
elaborated a 'political' organisation theory of institutional choice in the public sector. 
It tries to integrate the defining features of the political level and the public authority 
system into the choices legislators make conceming the organisation of the public 
sector. 
In this research Horn's (1995) theory is taken as a first step to answering two 
questions: 'Why did the Catalan legislators choose a NPIVI governance structure for 
the health sector*? ' and 'why was there a divergence between policy formulation 
and its implementation, despite the favourable conditions for realising a NPM 
solution in Catalonia's health sector7 In answering both questions Horn's decision- 
making theory is extended and complemented in some relevant respects 
concerning the role of non-institutional policy elites and the implementation 
process. In the following, some key concepts from advocacy coalition theory are 
assumed (Sabatier, Jenkins-Smith, 1993), so as to explain the choice of a 
particular institutional form of the new health authority. In addition, insightful 
concepts from institutional rational choice (Dunleavy, 1991), transactions costs 
economics (Williamson, 1975,1985) and resource dependence theory (Pfeffer, 
Salancik, 1978) are introduced in order to analyse the actual use made of the 
policy tools with which that health authority was provided. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first focuses on the defining 
features of the NPM reform trend affecting both the public sector in general in 
many countries, and the health sector in particular. The second section develops 
the focal theory within which this research has been carried out, drawing on a 
general theory of institutional choice in the public sector and on specific concepts 
from different organisational theories. Finally, the third section introduces the 
theoretical and empirical interest of the Catalan reforms during the 1985-95 period. 
As an Autonomous Community in quasi-federal Spain, Catalonia does not appear 
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in the international statistical sources as a country nor has it a relevant presence in 
intemational research venues. Therefore, although Catalonia scores high on NPM, 
it implicitly falls in the same category as Spain, that is, as a 'low-scorer on NpM3, 
together with Germany, Greece, Switzerland, Japan and Turkey (Hood, 1995) -a 
classification which tends to put off researchers in the field. In this study, the 
Catalan case is taken as an example of NPM reform. 
1.1. 'New public management' reforms. 
According to Dunleavy and Hood (1994), NPM involves a shift in the two basic 
design co-ordinates of public sector organisation, moving it 'down-grid' and 'down- 
group'. The former means reducing the extent to which discretionary power is 
limited by rules of procedures, the latter means blurring the distinctiveness of the 
public sector as a differentiated unit from the private sector. Following this 
approach, Hood (1994) identifies six main components of NPM. A'down-grid' shift 
is achieved through: (1) hands-on top management, requiring a clear assignment 
of responsibilities so as to allow more 'freedom to manage'; (2) setting explicit 
standards and measures of performance in order to enhance accountability by 
reference to stated goals; and (3) designing output or result controls as a basis for 
linking resources and payment to performance. A 'down-group' movement is 
pursued through: (4) splitting up purchasing and provision functions to avoid 
producer bias, and the corresponding disaggregation of previously integrated 
provider structures into corporatised, product-focused units which hold devolved 
budgets and do not need to rely on single service employment; (5) the introduction 
of contract-based competition for the provision of services in order to cut down 
3 For an overview and analysis of the successive reform proposals (even in the line of 
NPM) and of the reforms actually implemented in the Spanish central, autonomous and 
local administrations from the late seventies to date, together with the increasing 
intertwinning of these administrative reforms with the process of European integration, see 
Subirats and Gallego-Calder6n (1998). 
4 
costs through more efficient performance; and (6) the adoption of a private sector 
management-style. 
Table 1.1. 'New public management' components. 
'Down-grid' movement 'Down-group' movement 
1. Hands-on top 1. Disaggregation. 
management. 
2. Explicit standards and 2. Competition. 
performance measures. 
3. utput/result controls. 3. Private sector 
I management-style. 
Source: Adapted from Hood (1994: 130). 
Pollit's (1993) distinction between the neo-Taylorist administrative reforms in 
the eighties and the NPM reforms in the nineties may respectively apply to each 
co-ordinate. Neo-Taylorism, with its emphasis on tight control and supervision, cost 
reduction, efficiency, economy, performance measurement and related pay, 
concentrated on the 'grid dimension'. In turn, the NPM of the nineties with its stress 
on quality, effectiveness and consumer responsiveness, focused on the 'group 
dimension'. That is, the profound structural reforms derived from NPM have blurred 
the separation between private and public sector. In Dunleavy's (1994) analysis, 
neo-Taylorism fits the 'incentivisation' component of the early NPM, while the NPM 
of the nineties uncovers its 'disaggregation' and 'competition' components. 
Drawing on Dunleavy's (1994) concepts, it could be argued that NPM reforms 
are based on disaggregation as a way to induce competition for public services 
provision, which in turn could only arise from incentivisation mechanisms. 
Competition has been sought through mechanisms such as a purchaser/provider 
split, compulsory competitive tendering, govemment-to-government contracting 
and intra-governmental contracting, consumer-tagged financing and vouchers 
(both involving I exit P options), user control through the exercise of 'voice, and a 
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public/private sector polarisation of consumpfion patterns. In turn, disaggregation 
has been pursued by several means, such as corporatising large and complex 
organisations into product-focused units under the figure of a manager-leader, 
creating quasi-governmental and micro-local agencies, developing independent 
institutions, creating agencies within central government departments, decoupling 
related policy systems, corporatising privatised industries, introducing market 
testing, yardstick competition and league tables, measuring performance, and 
limiting professional power. As for incentivisation, the main components have 
included the privatisation of asset ownership, the respecification of property rights, 
'light touch' regulation, the involvement of capital markets, the unification of rates of 
return and discounting criteria across the public and private sectors, the 
development of charging technology in direct relation to new information 
technology, the valuation and management of public sector equity, the definition of 
mandatory 'efficiency dividends', and the development of anti-rent-seeking policies 
through, for example, deprivileging professions and public sector workers, and 
linking pay to performance and increasing pay differentiation (Dunleavy, 1994). 
According to Aucoin (1990), two major strands of ideas converge upon these 
NPM developments. First, public choice theory, concerned with re-establishing the 
primacy of political-representative government and expanding control over 
bureaucracy through centralisation and close supervision. Second, the 
'managerialist' school, which is concerned with re-establishing the primacy of 
managerial principles over bureaucratic rules and procedures through freedom to 
manage. Apparently, there is a conflict between these two sets of ideas. In the 
case of the United Kingdom, this conflict led to three basic inter-locking strategies 
of control by the mid 1990s (Hogget, 1996): the creation of corporatised 
operational units was accompanied by an increase in the centralised control over 
strategy and policy; competition became the main co-ordinating method among 
those decentralised units; and there was a substantial development of systems for 
performance management and monitoring, as a new form of power - one 
concentrated within more remote and less visible centres of corporate and state 
governance. 
In this sense, strengthening the political control over these fragmented, 
managerially driven scenarios requires a refinement of certain tools of government, 
particularly those concerned with bridging strategies among organisations. 
According to Hood (1983), the tools of government may be classified into four 
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types: organisation, nodality, authority and treasury. Thus, it could be argued that 
in the current NPM reforms, using organisation as a government's basic tool (in the 
form of publicly provided services) has declined in favour of the reinforcement of 
other tools such as nodality (exploiting government's role at the centre of 
information networks and communication flows). On the one hand, nodality is 
becoming essential for exerting authority (the capacity to legitimately coerce or 
regulate or legislate against other social actors). On the other hand, nodality is the 
basis for using 'treasure' (essentially finance and other requisitioned resources, 
such as property) in a policy-oriented manner, because policy implementation is 
increasingly taken over by other organisations. Control over such providers 
requires these reinforced tools either to support the enforcement of contracts or to 
build those tools into the contracts themselves. 
Both these changes in tools and the idea of a small government controlling a 
network of contracted arms' length provider units, introduce some features of a 
divisionalised bureaucracy (Mintzberg, 1983). Here a central agency (the 
headquarters) manages the strategic portfolio (formulates policy), allocates overall 
financial resources (makes budgetary allocations), replaces and appoints the 
managers of the divisions (quasi-autonomous loosely coupled together by that 
central administration), and designs the performance control system as the base 
for an ex-post co-ordinating mechanism focusing on standardisation of outputs. 
However, according to Mintzberg (1983), the divisional form of organisation tends 
to drive its component divisions towards the machine bureaucracy form. An ex-post 
performance control system requires that each division be considered as single, 
integrated actor with a consistent set of operational isable goals, easily translated 
into quantitative measures. The machine bureaucracy is the only configuration that 
meets both requirements, hence the pressure to centralise and formalise divisions' 
internal structures. Moreover, at the system level (the whole multidivisional 
organisation) there is a tendency to centralise power at the level of the 
headquarters, going beyond its supposedly limited strategic role. 
Mintzberg identifies two main obstacles for the divisional form to be 
successfully introduced in the public sector: the hiring and firing of subordinates 
should be under middle line managers' control, and artificial performance standards 
should be devised to measure social goals. These two points are particularly 
relevant when, as in the health sector, the provider organisations to be 'managed' 
are professional organisations. Within professional organisations the realisation of 
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the central activities and the achievement of primary purposes depend on 
professional employees' competence: they form the organisation's 'operating core' 
which essentially determines the organisations' success of failure. The NPIVI shift 
could result in an erosion of self-management by professionals -a shift from 
autonomous to heteronomous forms of organisation. In autonomous organisations, 
administrative officials delegate to the professional employees well-specified 
responsibilities for the definition and implementation of the organisation's goals, for 
the setting of performance standards and for their supervision. In heteronomous 
organisations, the autonomy granted professional employees is relatively small and 
they are clearly subordinated to the administrative officials (Scott, 1965: 66-7). 
Following Mintzberg (1983), not only do professionals enjoy a high degree of 
autonomy in their work, which they carry out relatively independently of their 
colleagues and in close relation with their clients, but they also normally aim to 
control the administrative 'middle line' of their organisation, whose decisions can 
affect their autonomy. This orientation is backed up by making the main co- 
ordinating mechanism in professional bureaucracies the standardisation of skills 
and knowledge, which largely originated outside the organisation structure by a 
broader occupation community organised in self-governing collegial associations. 
However, professional staffs' autonomy within large employing organisations can 
be subverted by the drive to introduce a managerial logic of authority with its 
emphasis on economy and efficiency. 
The major change in the health care sector initiated by NPM reforms in a 
number of OECD countries is a shift from integrated public provision models to 
competitive contracting and managed markets of divisionalised professional 
bureaucracies (Abel-Smith, 1995: 23-4). However, both the specificities of the 
health sector (its market failures), and its central role in the welfare state (in the 
trade off between equity and efficiency) condition the development of these 
reforms. Originally, the need to counteract private health market failures led to the 
design of the public health governance structures. Nonetheless, these post-war 
governance structures gradually developed failures themselves which became the 
argument for introducing NPM as a way to further counteract them. 
The health sector is characterised by a number of market failures such as 
informational asymmetry; complexity and uncertainty of demand; professional 
power (supply-led demand, knowledge monopoly); indivisibilities and externalities; 
difficulty in measuring performance; and equity concerns. Similarly, in health care 
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insurance, aspects such as the coverage of high-risk groups, the existence of 
interdependent risks, adverse selection, moral hazard and increasing returns make 
the health sector market heavily imperfect (Arrow, 1963; Barr, 1993). In this 
context, the implicit or explicit contractual response (agency relationship) becomes 
a crucial defining feature structuring the health care market4. However, even if all 
participants in the health market were 'price takers, neither allocative efficiency nor 
equity would be achievable because the specification of preferences and, 
consequently, demand are no longer clearly in the domain of choice over which the 
consumer has fundamental control. Moreover, property rights may not be clearly 
defined or legally enforced; individuals may not have full information about the 
nature of those property rights which are defined and legally enforced; and there 
may not exist a unique, market clearing price for each commodity over which such 
property rights are defined and legally enforced (McGuire, Fenn, Mayhew, 1991). 
A variety of complex governance structures evolved as responses to private 
health market failures, ranging from the allocation of government subsidies to the 
appearance of mutual aid societies of private insurance (in Switzerland, and the 
Netherlands), to the creation of a National Health Insurance (in France), and to the 
further creation of a National Health Service in some countries (for example, in the 
United Kingdom, in New Zealand and in Spain). Public provision of insurance 
(National Health Insurance or NHI) is intended to counteract the adverse selection 
inherent in an unregulated insurance market. In this model, moral hazard stemming 
from third-party payment tends to be counteracted through cost-sharing schemes 
(deductibles, co-payment, and co-insurance). The risk of cream-skimming is 
diminished in a system of monopsonistic compulsory health insurance, where the 
4 In the 'agency' literature asymmetry of information among self-interested contracting 
parties is considered the main cause of shirking, namely an inherent problem with 
hierarchies -which are defined as nexus of contracts themselves. 'The principal-agent model 
is an analytic expression of the agency relationship, in which one party, the principal, 
considers entering into a contractual agreement with another, the agent, in the expectation 
that the agent will subsequently choose actions that produce outcomes desired by the 
principal' (Moe, 1984: 756). Adverse selection and moral hazard are key problems dealt with 
in principal-agent contractual relations. Adverse selection is an ex-ante problem to the 
contract, stemming from the unobservability of the information, benefits and values on 
which the decisions of the agent are based. Moral hazard is an ex-post problem to the 
contract, derived from the unobservability of the actual behaviour of an agent, who, once 
hired, may change his behaviour to the detriment of the principal. Thus, the essence of the 
principal's problem is to design a contractual incentive structure that makes it advantageous 
for the agent to serve the principal's interests. However, the agency theory claim that 
organisations are not different from nexus of contracts contradicts the claim by other 
incentive theories that organisational arrangements do matter (Stevens, 1993: 281-183). 
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single purchaser can exert greater leverage over providers' behaviour. The further 
integration of both public insurance and publicly-owned provision (in a National 
Health Service or NHS) is an attempt to directly monitor the economic 
consequences of medical behaviour. This solution provides greater potential for 
planning and control over costs by bringing together economic and medical 
information - while self-regulation by the medical profession had overwhelmingly 
focused on medical behaviour (Immergut, 1992). 
Thus, state provision, regulation and taxes/subsidies can be seen as 
responses to failures of the private health market. Provision is a means of dealing 
with the problem of monopoly; regulation, with the problem of imperfect consumer 
information; and subsidies with the problems derived from uncertainty of demand 
and externalities. Nevertheless, each of these solutions generates its own 
problems. Provision can create inefficiency as a result of the absence of 
competition; the regulated can capture the regulator and ensure measures that 
service their interests; and subsidies can lead to overuse and an unequitable 
distribution of public resources (Le Grand, Propper, Robinson, 1992). The 
aggregate measures used in an integrated NHS-type system to constrain 
behaviour and associated resource allocation do not ensure that such allocation is 
efficient because basic incentives are absent - for example, those insured have no 
possibility to exit. If public financing is dependent on macro-economic concerns 
and there is a lack of detailed information about the demands placed on the sector, 
resource allocation can hardly be efficient. Moreover, at the micro-level, the 
medical profession retains a monopoly over information and continues to respond 
to the uncertainties which dominates the production process through a highly 
individualistic agency relationship and through the pursuit of medical objectives. 
Thus, in spite of the move away from fee-for-service to salaried remuneration 
characterising NHS integration efforts, monitoring problems still remained (Le 
Grand, Propper, Robinson, 1992). 
In either the NHI or in the NHS-type of health systems, the main functions for 
third-parties (that is, government or other actors) regardless of their organisational 
and institutional nature are: a) the insurance function, taking over consumers, 
financial risk of service utilisation; b) the agency function, reducing moral hazard, 
providing information about the quality of care and being a prudent buyer of care 
on behalf of the consumer; and c) the access function, guaranteeing universal 
access to basic health services. Present third-party arrangements adequately fulfil 
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the first and third functions. However, a common problem is to satisfactorily 
execute the agency function, that is, to find the adequate incentives for the third 
party to perform it in an efficient and equitable way on behalf of the consumer 
(Ven, Schut, Rutten, 1994). 
Both NPM and quasi-markets (as a common development of the NPM 
approach) attempt to introduce incentive structures which seek to counteract some 
of the failures of either private market provision or government intervention. In 
quasi-markets the NPIVI components of incentivisation, disaggregation and 
competition are comprehensively applied within different policy domains. The shift 
from integrated models to quasi-markets tries to deal with the tension between 
more demanding consumers and limited resources. The explicit assumption is that 
competitive pressures provides incentives for efficiency, the benefits from which 
outweigh the transaction costs involved in designing and enforcing contracts 
(Saltman, Otter, 1995). This claim led to two different objectives: delegating more 
responsibility down the line of management, which requires reducing the burden of 
control imposed by hierarchies and emphasising local choices; and exerting more 
control to ensure efficient performance, which emphasises performance 
assessment and enhanced control over providers' commitment to users' welfare in 
order to counteract the present producer bias (Harrison, 1993). 
Thus, quasi-markets consist of an agency system where relations among 
purchasers (for example, health authorities, general practise fundholders) and 
providers (for example, managerially autonomous hospitals, primary care practices) 
are made explicit and binding through a complex incentive structure founded on 
contracts. A contract-based model of institutional arrangement is created, where 
financial risk is moved either to the provider, or to the consumer in the case of 
voucher systems. It is asserted that separating decision rationality from action 
rationality would enhance efficiency (Brommels, 1995). Thus, the emphasis is put 
on entrepreneurial business units, performance related pay, team-based 
production, decentralised budget management, and clients increasing their 
satisfaction by exercising a free choice of practitioner and/or hospital. 
According to Saltman and Otter (1989,1992), the health care reforms 
implemented in the early nineties differed both in the scope for market and 
competition, and in the lever of change promoted, between supply or demand. The 
theoretical extremes of the spectrum would be the public competition and the 
mixed markets models - the former prevailing in Sweden and the latter in Britain. 
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The public competition model is based on three principles: (1) public ownership and 
management of providers of health care, and a public insurance system, so there 
are public purchasers of services; (2) patients are free to periodically choose their 
general practitioner and health centre; (3) budgetary resource allocations (for 
capital investment and remuneration incentives) to primary care centres and 
hospitals are based on their market share (number of patents) and productivity 
(internal efficiency). In sum, this is a market internal to the public sector. 
By contrast, in the mixed market model a budget is allocated to a purchaser 
authority within a geographical area - with a population between 100,000 and 
800,000 people. The margin of manoeuvre for this purchaser includes: (1) 
negotiating and contracting public or private provision of health services, 
considering prices and quality; (2) selling and transferring assets; (3) raising 
financial resources in the capital market. Basically, the difference between the two 
models is that within public competition the lever of change is the patient, whereas 
in the mixed market the lever of change is the manager responsible for the health 
service in the area. In other words, public competition is a demand-led reform, 
while mixed markets is a supply-led reform. 
There has been an awareness, though, that for quasi-markets to succeed 
certain conditions should be fulfilled. Following Le Grand and Bartlett (1993), key 
conditions are: 
a) Market structure: the structure on both sides of the market should be 
competitive. Nevertheless, when a monopoly exists on one side, a monopoly 
on the other side may be needed as a countervailing power. 
b) Information: both providers and purchasers need to have access to 
accurate, independent information, the former primarily about costs, the latter 
about quality. 
c) Transaction costs associated with uncertainty should be kept to a 
minimum. 
d) Motivation: providers should be motivated to some extent by financial 
considerations, and purchasers by the welfare of users. 
e) Cream-skimming: no incentives should exist for purchasers or providers to 
discriminate between users in favour of the least expensive ones5. 
5 The difficulty to meet such conditions for quasi-markets to succeed is the reason for 
different kinds of implementation 'shortfalls' in the new health care model. Evidence of the 
British experience, where this reform process has been taken furthest, is available for the 
early nineties. There was a lack of relevant and accurate information on costs, outputs and 
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Moreover, contracts are incomplete by definition. They cannot cover the 
contingencies involved in the sequential nature of the production process of health 
care. The formalisation of the agency relationship between purchasers, providers 
and patients does not overcome the fundamental problem of uncertainty and the 
complexity of diagnostic and prognostic processes. For example, cash-limited 
budgets might increase rather than reduce allocation problems, because budget- 
holders should attempt to reconcile unpredicted resource commitments with their 
budget constraints. Also, the change in the financial incentives towards prospective 
payments or relating fees to service provision seems likely to foster costs 
escalation, as providers attempt to minimise financial losses. Therefore, crucial 
questions about quasi-markets are their potential impact on the structure of 
organisational power and accountability in health institutions (managers, clinicians, 
patients), shaping the best task-focused units from hierarchically integrated local 
centres and hospitals, developing forms of internal and external competition, 
designing contracts suitable to achieve health policy objectives, consequences for 
health personnel (flexibility in labour regulation), and equity considerations 
(Saltman; Otter, 1995). 
Such rediscovered prospective quasi-market failures led to a shift from 
'quasi-market'to 'managed market' (Ranade, 1994: 156-8). The purchasing function 
outcomes for monitoring and evaluating health services on both sides of the market . In fact, in a competitive market there are advantages to be gained from retaining rather than 
sharing information (Maynard, 1994). At a district level, the market structure seemed to 
stabilise with a single purchaser and a few large providers, and mergers are being 
encouraged (Robinson, Le Grand, 1993). There was also evidence of greater transactions 
costs -namely, administrative and management costs derived from contracting-, in the form 
of new accounting and information systems and staff. District Health Authorities had, in 
principle, an advantage over GP fundholders as purchasers in terms of ex-ante costs, as 
health authorities tended to use block or cost-and-volume contracts. General Practise (GP) 
fundholders negotiated contracts on a case-per-case basis, which, given their increasing 
number, was likely to prove expensive in terms of ex-ante transactions costs also for 
providers. Nonetheless, fundholders had an advantage in terms of ex-post costs, since they 
were in closer touch with the patient and, consequently, in better place to monitor contract 
compliance as well (Appleby et al. 1993: 24-53). Interestingly enough, some GP fundholders 
set up private companies so as to contract with themselves and profit thereby -a practice 
which was stopped by the government in 1993 for contradicting the purchaser/provider split . 
On the purchaser side, strong motivation to keep within budget, that is, remaining financially 
viable, was documented. Admittedly GPspreferences counted for more as a determinant of 
health authorities' decisions to purchase than other factors such as competitive prices or 
quality assurance (Le Grand, 1993: 258-9). According to some researchers, fundholding GPs 
were, in principle, able to distort priorities by requesting preferential admission for their 
patients, fostering accusations of a two-tier system and demands for more regulation 
(Mohan, 1995: 226). However, some evidence showed no clear cream-skimming trends, 
partly as a result of the historical cost base applied to the calculation of GPs' funds 
(Glennerster et al. 1994). 
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has evolved from an initial preoccupation with contracts and information systems 
design, to a determination to make providers adapt to purchasers' demands and 
criteria. This attitude asserted a disengagement with providers' financial difficulties 
and consequent crises. Later on purchasing was understood as 'commissioningf, 
that is, working closely with providers in order to jointly plan contracts and future 
service developments, although incentives for efficient management continued to 
be crucial. However, in the United Kingdom such collusive tendencies were not 
approved of by the Major government. Region Health Authorities (with a regulatory 
role) were abolished in 1993 and replaced by eight regional offices of the NHS 
Management Executive (Mohan, 1995: 213). Some reasons for such a decision 
pointed to Region Health Authorities having excessive sympathy towards 'their 
trusts and undertaking too much. interference with providers' affairs: separation of 
purchasers and providers was a principle to be safeguarded. 
Despite the varying emphasis on different NPM components across the 
countries leading these reforms, their respective policies have a common objective: 
to redesign the governance structure of both public administration and several 
substantive policy domains. In order to identify explanatory variables of public 
sector institutional reforms and their outputs, I now turn to explore relevant existing 
theories and elaborate the framework guiding this research. 
1.2. Governance structures in the public sector. 
According to Moe, public administration is the natural domain for a theory of 
political organisation to have developed, but this has not happened. Organisation 
theory has remained the domain of economists, sociologists and psychologists. 
Political scientists still have to build a theory of political organisation which 
integrates the defining features of the political process in order to understand the 
politics of structural choice, that is, the process by which public officials and interest 
groups make decisions about the structure of government (Moe, 1990a; 1990b; 
1991). Nonetheless, the structure of government does not only involve the 
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institutional form of public authority, but also the policy tools with which it is 
endowed for governing the relationships between the relevant actors of a policy 
domain. Therefore, the theoretical framework proposed for this research (about 
why Catalan legislators chose a particular governance structure) not only has to 
account for the design of a particular institutional form, but also for the 
accommodation between this institutional design and the policy tools which actors 
in the governance structure are entitled to use. 
a) Choosing institutional forms. 
Deciding on the structure of government, that is, on the structure of political 
organisations, means setting the rules governing the relationship between different 
actors and allocating them decision rights of a public authority nature as well as 
costs and benefits. In this respect, political organisations serve two objectives. First 
they help mitigate the problem of collective action (particularly the commitment and 
enforcement problems which hinder political exchange), by allowing actors to 
cooperatein the political arena and benefit from political exchange. Second, they 
are tools of coercion and distribution because they are the means by which political 
winners pursue their interests often to the detriment of losers (Moe, 1990a: 213). 
Therefore, a theory of political/public organisation (that is, of political institutions 
and public administration) has to build on essential features of politics, such as 
public authority, political uncertainty, political compromise, fear of the state and 
problems in effective organisation (Moe, 1990a; 1990b). 
Politics is about the exercise of public authority and about the struggle to gain 
control over it. In a principal-agent relationship where the exercise of public 
authority is involved, the agent (public officials) controls the principal (interest 
groups and citizens) in a relationship which, moreover, is not based on voluntary 
exchange but on coercion. In addition, politics is characterised by uncertainty, 
because 'property rights' are not guaranteed. The right to exercise public authority 
does not belong to specific individuals but to offices whose conduct and effects 
depend on who gains the office according to the selection rules established. This 
uncertainty makes it difficult to ensure legislators reach a political compromise 
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(their commitment problem) assumed in relation to specific policy options, on which 
their constituents supposedly base their support for legislators. 
Both public officials and interest groups are aware that the structure of 
government influence policy outputs and outcomes. Thus, when making decisions 
on the structure of government, interest groups and legislators are both driven by 
fear of the state. Interest groups seek protection through structural design features 
(such as, participation rights, appealing rights, oversight) so that other rival groups 
cannot capture public agencies and thereby influence policy. In turn, public officials 
seek to ensure through their decisions on structures that reversing or modifying 
their policy commitments is difficult for a new legislative majority or a new 
incumbent in government to accomplish. Thus, both of them are ultimately 
concerned with designing an effective organi. sation to ensure the implementation of 
their policies, while opponents are interested in jeopardising the structural design 
which may lead to effectiveness in those policies which they do not support. 
None of the theoretical frameworks developed in organisational theory in the 
seventies and eighties endogenises these characteristics of political/public 
organisations into an explanation of the process of institutional choice. In those 
decades new institutionalism 'rediscovered' institutions as a central subject of 
political research and shifted away from the study of behaviour as the main unit of 
analysis. Despite the high fragmentation of schools within new institutionalism, a 
distinction may be drawn between a sociological and an economic approach. The 
(sociological' version of new institutionalism rejects two prevailing approaches to 
the explanation of organisational phenomena - the contextual (systems 
perspective) and the individual actor (rational choice) frameworks. According to 
new institutionalism, these two perspectives take politics and political phenomena 
(like public institutions) as a by-product of non-political factors such as social 
structure or individual self-interest (March, Olsen, 1989: 8-19). Instead, this new 
approach argues that institutional change processes are of an inherently political 
nature, by which they mean that the ideas of purposeful organisational design is 
not defensible. 'Organisations can never be restructured according to formulas by 
means of policy fiat' and 'the notion of effective organisational adaptability to 
environmental needs is an illusion'. Instead, 'organisational change is a contested 
process involving accidental outcomes and random activity ... results cannot 
be 
predicted and change cannot be controlled by fiat' (Lane, 1993: 172-3). 
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According to March and Olsen (1984,1989), the main exponents of this 
strand of thought, interests cannot be separated from institutions. Rather 
institutions are normative, cognitive and symbolic orders that pre-exist and shape, 
or even determine, the definition of interests and preferences. In fact, in their 
garbage can theory (Cohen, March, Olsen, 1972) there is no causal link between 
individual choices and organisational features, because the former are left 
endogenous to the choice process, which is itself determined by organisational 
features. There is no room for the pursuit of strategies, because outputs are largely 
random. Similarly, in the institutional school of organisation theory organisational 
structure is not the result of either individual or group strategies, but of symbolic 
processes of social and cultural adaptation for survival (Meyer, Rowan, 1977; 
DiMaggio, Powell, 1983). The central argument of. these schools down-plays the 
action components of institutional change, thus sharing the risk of its predecessor 
(the old institutionalism) of over-emphasising the formal aspects of organised 
collective action. This argument is particularly relevant for the decision-making 
model prevailing in the present 'segmented negotiation state, because formal 
institutions will determine the outcome of the interactions between organised 
interests. However, as Lane (1993: 175) points out, this premise does not imply the 
conclusion that institutions and interests cannot be logically separated. Rather, 
such a premise shows the importance of purposeful institutional design as a vital 
political concern and the need to distinguish conceptually between individual or 
group preferences and institutions. 
In other words, this approach's argument that institutions are to be treated as 
political actors for the sake of institutional coherence and autonomy (March, Olsen 
1989: 17) does not follow on to incorporate the decisive role of interests - be they of 
an individual or of a group nature. As Dowding (1994) points out, there is a flaw in 
the new institutionalists causality argument which defines institutions as 
autonomous decision-makers themselves - holding a deterministic view of policy 
outcomes affected by structural and procedural features. Instead, 'institutional 
rational choice' (part of the 'economic' version of new institutionalism) takes 
individual and collective actions as the cause of social change. It conceives of 
organisational structures and rules as a framework which both induces and 
constrains the strategies and behaviour pursued by such actors. In this respect, the 
'economic' version of new institutionalism conceives of political institutions as being 
not just a policy outcome, but a policy option in the first place. That is, political 
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institutions may be the result of a purposeful deliberation by which patterns of 
interaction in society are defined. Underlying this statement is the conception of 
decision-making as a rational (though boundedly rational) process through which 
appropriate means (organisational designs) are chosen in the pursuit of ends. In 
sum, 'instead of treating institutions as given, the institutionalist approach in 
economics attempts to endogenise what has traditionally been regarded as 
exogenous' (Lane, 1993: 176). 
However, as Moe (1990a, 1990b) argues, within this 'economic' version of 
new institutionalism, neither the positive theory of institutions nor the new 
economics of organisation (transactions costs economics, agency theory, repeated 
games theory) have integrated the political and organisational dimensions into their 
theories. Instead, they have mostly applied to the public sector theories which have 
been developed in another discipline - namely, economics. On the one side, the 
positive theory of institutions focuses on the paradoxes explored by social choice 
theory (Arrow, 1971), mainly concerning theoretical instabilities inherent to voting 
processes. This school interprets political institutions as sources of induced stability 
and concentrates its application on the role of committee structures, agenda-setting 
processes and majority rule in the United States Congress (Shepsle, 1979; 
Shepsle, Weingast, 1981; Weingast, Marshall, 1988; Weingast, Moran, 1983). The 
connection of these political institutions with organisation theory has been limited to 
issues of political control over bureaucracy. 
On the other side, the new economics of organisation (Williamson, 1975, 
1985) represented a shift from theoretical classical market equilibrium models to a 
9 greater respect for organizational (as opposed to technological) features and for 
efficiency (as opposed to monopoly) purposes' in explaining the development of 
modern economic organisations (Williamson, 1985: 17). Its central claim is that the 
organisations which support contracts matter, and so does their evolution. Positive 
theorists of institutions drew on the conceptual apparatus of new organisational 
economics for the study of legislatures - not bureaucracy. The underlying 
assumptions of this school referred to voluntary exchange in the pursuit of 
efficiency, which does not belong to the political but to the economic sphere. 
Therefore, the theoretical problem remains that neither the sociological nor 
the economic perspective integrate politics and organisation. An attempt to 
overcome this dissociation in order to build a 'political' theory of organisation is 
Horn's (1995) theory of the main variables affecting legislators' decisions on the 
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structure of government and the public sector. According to Horn, an enacting 
coalition (the political party in power) faces the commitment problem of how to 
ensure that its policy objectives are difficult to influence by the next incumbent 
coalition. This author argues that this commitment problem drives the institutional 
choice which the enacting coalition has to make concerning the design of the 
public sector, and that this choice is made on transactions costs criteria. That is, 
legislators choose those administrative arrangements that best address the 
following transactions costs: 
1. Decision costs involve a choice between vagueness and a detailed 
refinement of legislation, and in turn impact on participation costs: Conflict between 
private interests and uncertainty about the contingencies that may derive from 
legislation increase the decision costs of refining a law and encourage the enacting 
coalition to leave it vague. This, in turn, has an impact on the need for constituents 
to participate in the implementation process. Beneficiaries (with a concentrated 
benefit or intense preferences) face lesser collective action problems and less 
participation costs than taxpayers. However, those bearing the costs of 
participating may have differing preferences on the balance between legislative 
vagueness and participation costs, because it implies different degrees of influence 
and different kinds of influence channels. 
2. In a parliamentary regime the commitment problem facing the enacting 
coalition is particularly acute, even more when situations in which the party 
controlling the executive has an overall majority in parliament are frequent. The 
incumbent coalition has the power not to meet the previous enacting coalitions' 
commitments. This model assumes that forward-looking constituents (both 
supporters and opponents) capitalise the long-term impact of legislation (costs and 
benefits) into its present 'value. Therefore, the amount of net electoral support 
legislators receive depends on the flow of benefits and costs that private interests 
expect it to generate over time. The shorter the time which the legislation is likely to 
endure the less present value it has. 
3. The enacting coalition faces the agency costs of ensuring a successful 
implementation of legislation. These costs derive from the principal-agent 
relationships between legislators and the implementing agent, characterised by 
moral hazard, adverse selection and information asymmetry. 
4. Uncertainty about the private benefits and costs associated with legislation 
implies costs for the enacting coalition. It makes it difficult for them to derive 
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support from strategically assigning risks to the social groups and interests that are 
best able to control or insure against these risks. 
Horn argues that these four transactions costs facing the enacting coalition 
are the independent variables in a theoretical model which tries to explain the 
apparent regularity between organisational forms in the public sector and the 
function they perform. Resorting to different institutional forms (bureaux, state- 
owned enterprises, regulatory agencies, private providers) implies the design of 
distinctive governance, financing and employment characteriStiCS6. In this respect, 
the choice variables are: the degree of legislative vagueness (extent to which 
decisions are delegated to the administrative level rather than taken by the 
legislature); the rules for administrative decision-making (including the rights that 
constituents have to participate directly in them); the nature and extent of 
legislative monitoring of administrative decision-making (such as the ability to use 
ex-post rewards and sanctions); and the rules governing the allocation and use of 
capital and labour (such as, the extent to which agencies are financed by sales 
revenues or by taxes, and administrative employment conditions). 
Different functions assigned to the public sector involve different mixes of 
objectives, such as commercial or non-commercial objectives. In the latter case, for 
example, legislators would prefer implementation to be undertaken by less 
independent agents (such as a government bureau) which is more responsive to 
beneficiaries' interests. In this respect, 'form follows function. And form also follows 
transactions costs, because particular functions are characterised by particular 
transactions costs. However, the choice of a particular institutional form in the 
public sector is influenced, according to Horn's model, by exogenous variables 
such as: the historical and institutional framework; the distribution of the costs and 
benefits of legislation among supportive and non-supportive private or civil society 
interests; the difficulty in defining goals and the way to achieve them; and the 
6 An example of the regularities in choosing between different forms in modern 
bureaucracies is that bureaux are tax-financed and tend to have non-commercial objectives, 
pose high monitoring costs, and participation by beneficiaries in administrative decision- 
making makes bureaus less independent implementing agents. By contrast state-owned 
enterprises (SOE) sell public sector output and are funded by sales, are governed by a 
board which enjoys some independence from the legislature and are less contrained by civil 
service rules. Moreover, SOE's self-financing Gontraint helps legislators address the 
commitment problems linked to commercial objectives and reduce political uncertainty for 
tax-payers and bondholders, as well as beneficiaries. Lastly, production for sale enables 
better monitoring of management and so helps reduce agency costs without the need of civil 
service contraints (Hom, 1995). 
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ability to rely on output and factor markets to decrease transactions problems. 
These variables constrain the range of institutional arrangements among which 
legislators may choose, as well as the perception they have of the relative 
importance of the transactions costs they face. In principle, these constraints affect 
all legislators alike (the enacting coalition and prospective incumbent coalitions). 
Nonetheless, if rational legislators in the opposition are capable of foreseeing 
that they may be in government in the future, which may often happen in a 
democratic system, then they should not assess transactions costs in a very 
different way from the enacting coalition. However, the policy preferences of 
legislators or political parties may have a great impact on the kinds of transaction 
costs that legislators care about. Therefore, Horn's model could be complemented 
as shown in Figure 1.1. Different policy preferences lead politicians to care about 
different functions to be performed by the public sector, and in turn, to care about 
different transactions costs. As a result, they will support different institutional 
choices. In this respect, the model endogenises the formation of policy preferences 
in the process of institutional choice - because once an institution has been 
created, legislators, beneficiaries and other interest groups have a stake either in 
its maintenance unchanged or in its reform or even abolition. Preferences are also 
influenced by both the ideology of actors and the resources on which these actors 
count - such as reputation, information, legitimate authority, and conditional and/or 
unconditional incentives to alter other actors' incentive structures. Preferences may 
also be influenced by the way that actors use (or do not) use their resources 
(Dowding, 1995,1996). These resources enable the development of specific 
choice situations and patterns of interaction among both institutional and non- 
institutional actors, which also become key variables explaining policy outputs (in 
this case, an institutional form). 
In political decision contexts, both access to decision-makers and 
argumentation by those affected (that is, non-institutional actors) influence 
outcomes. These 'outside' actors also count on a wide range of resources and 
have their own preferences concerning the design of public institutions. In this 
respect, the 'power of ideas' within policy-making is associated with the diffusion 
processes of belief systems. Along with the standardising effects of political control 
across the public sector, these diffusion processes help account for mostly the 
same policy option being adopted across domains or environments which are very 
different in terms of institutions, resources and interests groups. In this respect, 
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advocacy coalition theory defines an 'advocacy coalition' as a policy community 
which 'brings together actors from a variety of governmental and private 
organisations at different levels of government who share a set of policy beliefs 
and seeks to realise them by influencing the behaviour of multiple governmental 
institutions overtime' (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier, Jenkins-Smith, 1993: 212). 
Figure 1.1. The politics of institutional choice. 
institutional actors 
ideology -4 0 
z 
policy preferences 
i 
public sector 
functions priorities 
IF 
focus on certain 
transactions costs 
0 
resources 
institutional form 
choice 
Source: Horn (1995) and own elaboration. 
impact on costs and benefits 
for private interests 
non-institutional 
+ actors 
The belief system these actors share consists of a set of value priorities, 
causal assumptions about how to realise them and problem perceptions. The 
structure of belief systems in an advocacy coalition normally consists of a deep 
non-institutional institutional 
action action 
I1 
-1 
22 
(normative) core of axioms, a near (policy) core concerning basic strategies for 
achieving the normative axioms, and secondary aspects concerning instrumental 
decisions and information searches necessary to implement the policy core. It is 
asserted that, actors within one advocacy coalition will show substantial consensus 
on issues pertaining to the policy core, although less so on the secondary aspects. 
This is why an actor (or a coalition) will give up secondary aspects of her belief 
system before acknowledging weaknesses in the policy core. 
Such considerations imply that new policy options stem from a process of 
policy-oriented learning. This process involves relatively enduring alterations of 
thought or behavioural intentions which result from experience and which are 
concerned with the attainment or revision of the precepts of one's belief system. 
This learning process can result from factors external or internal to the policy 
community/subsystem. Among the exogenous factors affecting the constraints and 
opportunities of subsystem actors, a distinction is made between: 
a) relatively stable parameters: the basic structures of the problem area (or 
'good'), the basic distribution of natural resources, fundamental cultural values and 
social structure, and the basic legal framework, and 
b) dynamic (system) events: changes in socio-economic conditions and 
technology, changes in systemic governing coalitions, policy decisions and impacts 
from other subsystems. 
Among the factors endogenous to the policy sub-system, the following are 
stressed: the delimitation of sub-system boundaries (the range of actual and 
potential actors involved); the origins of the subsystem; the number of subsystem 
actors (advocacy coalitions and policy brokers); guidance instruments and 
resources used to translate beliefs into policies; policy-oriented belief systems; 
policy change within subsystems and policy-oriented learning across belief 
systems. 
The model summarised in Figure 1.1 bdngs together Horn's (1995) theory on 
the transactions costs driving legislators' decisions on the organisation of the public 
sector, and Sabatier's and Jenkin's (1993) theory on the role of non-institutional 
advocacy coalitions. Both models are complemented with Dowding's (1995,1996) 
argument on the need to look into the use all these actors make of the resources 
on which they count. This theoretical framework is then applied to the questions set 
out above about the shift to a NPM solution in Catalonia's health care system, and 
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the appearance of implementation gaps or deficits despite favourable conditions 
for the reform. 
In Chapter 2, the stable and dynamic environmental parameters affecting 
policy elites' resources and belief systems are analysed, looking at the policy 
options that led Catalonia to follow a diverging path from the rest of Spain in the 
design of a governance structure for the health system dudng the 1980s. In 
Chapter 3, the gradual consolidation of the non-institutional policy elites and the 
role they played in the policy options made in Catalonia is examined, taking into 
account both their resources and their belief systems. This consolidation process is 
taken as an antecedent variable in understanding the 1990 legislative debates 
about Catalan health care reform, analysed in Chapter 4. The aim is to examine 
the extent to which legislators cared about Hom's main types of transactions costs, 
and whether their ideology and resources influenced their commitment problems 
and the transactions costs about which they cared most. 
b) Choosing policy tools. 
The actual 1990 formulation of the institutional form of the Catalan health authority 
was apparently ambiguous, partly because of the negotiation process between the 
enacting coalition and the political parties in the opposition. However, the law 
passed by parliament was shortly afterwards reinterpreted in new public 
management terms With a wide consensus among all the policy elite, who took a 
NPM view as the defining formulation of the Catalan health reforms. The main NPM 
tenet for the design of a governance structure is to reconfigure the public authority 
into a separate purchasing/contracting agent and providers organised as delivery 
agencies. Therefore, in order to answer the question of 'to what extent was the 
actual or the discursive formulation of the reform implemented? ', it is necessary to 
define indicators of such function-based roles. In Chapter 5 this question is 
answered by applying the bureau-shaping model's function-based typology of 
agencies (Dunleavy 1991: 181-190). 
Dunleavy argues that by analysing the different components of the budget 
structure of public agencies it is possible to infer the functions they carry out, and 
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their role in their relationships with other agencies. He identifies four different 
budget elements: core, bureau, programme and super-programme budgets (see 
figure 1.2). The relative weight of each of these elements within an agency's global 
budget reflects its budget structure, which, in turn, indicates the function-based role 
it performs. 
Figure 1.2. Components of core, bureau, program and 
super-program budgets. 
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Building on these concepts, Dunleavy defines the following types of agencies 
which are particularly relevant for NPM reformS7: 
a) Delivery agency. It directly produces outputs or delivers services using its 
own personnel to implement policy, so that they are labour-intensive. This role is 
reflected in its core budget absorbing a large part of the bureau and programme 
budgets, with a high proportion spent on staff costs. As it tends not to have 
important relations with subordinate public agencies, the super-programme budget 
is very small or non-existent. 
b) Regulatory agency. It limits or controls the behaviour of private and public 
agents through, for example, accreditation or licensing systems, or performance 
standards controls. Its budget structure resembles that of a delivery agency, but 
because it actually externalises the costs of compliance, the size of its budget is 
typically very much smaller. 
b) Contracts agency. It develops services, outputs or capital projects 
specifications, as the basis for letting contracts with providers, which may be either 
private firms or commercially-run public agencies, for the implementation of policy. 
Consequently, its bureau budget absorbs most of its global budget, and its core 
budget (running and administration costs) appears to be only medium-sized. 
c) Control agency. It channels funding to other public agencies or levels of 
government and is responsible for supervising the management of that funding and 
the implementation of policy. Its budget structure shows a small core budget, with 
low running and administration costs and a relatively small bureau budget. As it 
transfers money to sub-national levels of government or to other public agencies its 
programme budget represents the largest part of its global budget. And its super- 
programme budget's size depends on the amount of self-raised money spent by 
those agencies and levels of government which the control agency supervises. 
d) Transfer agency. It shifts government payments to private firms or 
individuals. Even if it has a large staff, the running and administration costs, 
included in the core budget, represent a small share of the global budget of the 
agency, in relation to the share represented by the transfers it handles ('monies 
going to client groups'). Thus, the bureau budget absorbs most of the agency's 
global budget. 
7 Dunleavy (1991: 186-190) also defines other types of agency which are not so relevant as 
indicators of NPM function-based roles. For example: taxing agencies, trading agencies and 
servicing agencies. 
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In Chapter 5 of this study, the analysis of the budget structure of the different 
public health bodies comprised in the Catalan health authority is taken as an 
indicator of the type of agencies they actually were. Thus changes in budget 
structures can show the extent to which either the 1990 reform formulation or its 
NPM reinterpretation concerning their institutional design were finally implemented. 
Apart from the institutional design of the new health authority, the other main 
component of a governance structure is the policy tools which public agencies 
exercising authority are entitled to use for the fulfilment of its policy objectives. In a 
NPM model such as the Catalan health system contracts are defined as the main 
policy tool to govern the relationship between the health authority and a network of 
arms' length providers. The actual operation of these tools by the health authority is 
the object of Chapter 6. The incentive-based contract system characterising NPM 
governance structures theoretically involves an increase in transactions costs, that 
is, in the costs derived from 'writing and monitoring long-term contracts that are 
complex because of all the contingencies introduced by uncertainty and by the 
disposition, in what [Williamson) calls "human nature as we know it", to lie, cheat 
and steal' (Perrow, 1986: 239). In this sense, transactions costs economics 
examines 'the comparative costs of planning, adapting, and monitoring task 
completion under alternative governance structures [that is, hierarchies and 
markets]' (Williamson, 1985: 2)8. And it argues that the choice between them will be 
based on efficiency criteria -a common and very explicit argument among 
supporters of NPM reforms. 
Williamson (1975: 9) argues that the circumstances under which complex 
contingent contracts will pose overwhelming transaction costs for the parties arise 
from the combination of two sets of factors. On the one hand, environmental 
factors may lead to prospective market failures - especially, uncertainty, information 
impactedness, and small-numbers exchange relations. On the other hand, there 
8 By contrast to other incentive approaches, such as agency theory, transactions costs 
economics appears to be more comprehensive. It concentrates both on ex-ante and on ex- 
post sides of contracts, as, it argues, support organisations of contracts matter and thus 
their evolution. Its explanation of the forces driving this process -namely, economising on 
transaction costs- is more insightful than other institutional economics approaches. As 
Perrow (1986: 239) points out, Williamson's major departure from agency theory is his 
admission of authority relations, as they replace contractual disputes with fiat. Agency 
theorists, by contrast, not only deny authority relations and insist there are only contracts 
even within organisations, but also concentrates on the accountability conspiracy sustained 
by the agent, thus, under-emphasising the principal's resources to constraint such 
conspiracy, through the overall control of incentive systems. 
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are human factors such as bounded rationality (the limited human capability to 
acquire, process and communicate information) and opportunism ('rent-seeking 
with guile' or the pursuit of self-interest at the expense of others). In such cases, 
the decision may be to resort to hierarchical or vertical modes of organisation 
(forward or backward integration) to economise on these costs, by assigning them 
to an internal governance structure. 
Hierarchy or unified governance (see Table 1.2) permits interdependent 
organisations or units to adapt to unforeseen contingencies in a co-ordinated way, 
and to absorb uncertainty. The information gap between agents is narrowed by 
extending central units' powers to Perform an audit. Small-numbers bargaining 
indeterminacies are resolved by fiat. Unified governance also extends the bounds 
on rationality by permitting the specialisation of decision-making and economising 
on communication expenses. Additional incentive and control techniques would 
serve to curb opportunism. Finally, a less calculative exchange atmosphere than in 
a market context is provided9. Thus, forbearance - as bilateral adaptation effected 
through fiat - has its origins in the employment contract and is the implicit contract 
law supporting internal organisation (Williamson, 1975: 257-8). 
Most importantly, hierarchy or unified governance would institutionalise the 
'disequilibrium' (in terms of the neo-classical market model) derived from an 'asset 
specificity' relationship - namely, small-numbers exchange relations. This situation 
develops when parties engaged in a trade that is supported by non-trivial 
investments in transaction-specific (idiosyncratic) assets are effectively operating in 
a bilateral trading relation with one another. Internalising this relationship allows for 
harmonising the contractual interface, thereby affecting adaptability and promoting 
continuity, turning it into a source of real economic value. Thus, both the frequency 
of such transactions and the uncertainty inherent to the environment will provide an 
efficiency criterion to organise contractual relationships. It becomes possible to 
economise on bounded rationality, while at the same time safeguarding the parties 
against the hazards of opportunism. Yet, markets will continue to exist when spot 
9 However, although integration may have been fostered by asset specificity, the latter is in 
fact intensified after integration. In this respect, Perrow (1981: 373-375,1986: 241-247) 
argues that vertical integration may increase costs of coordination, of surveillance and 
accounting systems, without necessarily eradicating opportunism -internal pricing systems 
are unreliable and expensive, while the market provides comparatively cheap information. 
Eventually, bureaucratic proclivities inherent to hierarchy may hinder flexibility to adapt to 
changes and to recover from shocks because of increased transaction costs. 
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(that is, occasional) transactions are needed; when investments are non-specific 
but oriented to the production of standard goods which are not subject to 
uncertainty in price, volume, production costs, or labour relations; and when the 
costs of entry to the market are low. 
Table 1.2. Types of transactions and governance structures. 
Investment characteristics 
Frequency Non-specific Mixed I Idiosyncratic 
Trilateral governance 
Occasional Market (neo-classical contracting) 
governance 
(classical 
contracting) Bilateral Unified 
Recurrent governance governance 
(relational 
contracting) 
Source: Williamson (1985: 79). 
According to Williamson (1991: 271-77) each generic form of governance - 
market, hybrid, and hierarchy - needs to be supported by a different contract law. 
The efficiency of each governance structure will vary according to the joint effect 
of the investment characteristics (non-specific, mixed, idiosyncratic), and with the 
frequency of transactions (recurrent or occasional). Classical contract law applies 
to the ideal autonomous market structure, where non-specific investments and 
occasional transactions dominate. However, between markets and hierarchies 
theoretical possibilities e)dst of hybrid forms of governance: trilateral and bilateral 
governance (see Table 1.2). Trilateral governance is needed where investment is 
mixed (with some degree of asset specificity) or idiosyncratic (highly asset-specific) 
but when transactions are only occasional. Neo-classical contract law supports 
hybrid modes of contracting, where the parties to the transaction are bilaterally 
dependent to a relevant extent and are therefore interested in promoting continuity 
for an efficient adaptation by resorting to the involvement of a third party in the 
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governance of a contractual relation, instead of going to litigation. When 
transactions are recurrent but investment is asset-specific only to some degree, 
bilateral governance will be preferred. Here adaptation through the contractual 
relation itself prevails over resorting to a third party. 
Markets, hybrids and hierarchies also differ in the mechanisms on which they 
rely for adapting to disturbances (autonomous adaptation, co-ordination), and in 
the trade off between the intensity of incentives and the strength of administrative 
controls which they enforce. For example, by preserving ownership autonomy, the 
hybrid mode of governance fosters strong incenbves and encourages autonomous 
adaptation to disturbances - without having to consult the other parties. At the 
same time, though, administrative controls are provided for by the long-term 
contract supporting the bilateral dependency, which elicits adaptation through co- 
ordination (see Table 1.3). 
Table 1.3. Distinguishing attributes of market, hybrid and hierarchy 
governance structures. 
Governance structure 
Attfibutes Market Hybrid Hierarchy 
Instruments 
incentive intensity +++0 
Administrative controls 0+++ 
Performance attributes 
Autonomous adaptation +++0 
Co-ordination 0+++ 
Contract law +++0 
strong; += semi-strong; 0= weak 
Source: Williamson (1991: 281). 
In this sense, Stinchcombe's (1985) definition of 'hierarchical' contracts could 
apparently be taken as the contractual form supported by Williamson's (1991) 
'hybrid' governance structure. Stinchcombe argues that solving hierarchical 
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problems by contractual means requires building hierarchical elements into 
contracts. First, a command structure and authority system are needed whereby 
communication flows are certified as legitimate or authoritative. Second, incentive 
systems are designed supporting the authority system and establishing 
performance measures, according to which differential rewards can be allocated 
without recourse to the market. Third, standard operating procedures are included 
which describe routines to be followed by both clients and contractors in their 
actions. Fourth, dispute resolution procedures are provided which are isolated to a 
certain extent from the court system and the market. Finally, non-market pricing 
(usually based on contractor costs) is the basis for valuing variations in 
performance. Their aim is to serve as substitute for the regulations a formal 
organisation would have written in its constituent documents, by incorporating 
elements of the client and the contractor organisations into a new unity under 
circumstances where theory would predict vertical integration. When uncertainty 
involves too many contingencies to be predicted in advance, 'hierarchical contracts' 
provide that contractual stipulations may be changed by specific methods. This 
provision is intended to better deal with uncertainties derived from: (1) 
performances not being easily or separately measured and observed; (2) costs not 
being accurately predictable because of contractor technical uncertainty or cost 
uncertainty, or client ignorance, or of commercial or legal uncertainty in the client- 
contractor relation; or (3) client or contractors wanting to change specifications. 
Ultimately, 'what usually has to be binding under such circumstances is the overall 
control of the incentive system by one of the parties' (Stinchcombe, 1985: 169). 
The overall shift from soft to hard contracting that NPM entails - that is, from 
command-and-control supervision to incentive-based contractual systems - has 
deep consequences at an organisation level as much as at a systemic level: 
'While soft contracting presumes much closer identity of interests 
between the parties, and formal contracts are much less complete, 
under hard contracting, the parties remain relatively autonomous; each 
is expected to press for his or her interests vigorously, and contracting 
is relatively complete' (Williamson, Ouchi, 1981: 361). 
In this respect, shifts in bridging strategies affecting organisational structures are 
being developed. Organisations depend on continuous exchanges of personnel, 
resources, and information with the environment for their survival - hence 
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contingency theory's claim that successful organisational forms are designed 
according to the nature of the environment in which they are embedded. According 
to resource dependence theory, a system of external control of semi-autonomous 
organisations is based on a bound ary-setti ng strategy. An organisation's boundary 
is determined by its relative influence and control over activities critical for its 
survival compared to the influence and control of other social actors over the same 
activities (Pfeffer, Salancik's, 1978: 23-32). 
Within this framework, the two major components of inter-organisational 
power relations are an organisation's dependence on crucial resource exchanges 
and the control other organisations exert over such exchanges. Thus, resource 
importance, discretion over resource allocation and use, concentration of resource 
control, and asymmetric dependence appear as features essential to effectively 
designing a system of external control of organisations. From a resource 
dependence perspective, bridging strategies involve designing mechanisms for co- 
ordinating mutual interdependence and are aimed at stabilising the resulting 
transactions in order to reduce uncertainty. By establishing linkages - of varying 
formalisation, flexibility and scope - with interdependent others, and by negotiating 
and standardising power/dependence relationships, organisations develop 
channels of communication, of persuasion and of negotiation. 
In Chapter 6 the effective use of contracts as the main tools of the new 
Catalan health authority for governing its relationship with providers is analysed. 
The aim is to assess, first, the extent to which the frequency and kinds of 
transactions occurring fit with the typology of contracts discussed above; and 
second, the extent to which contracts are in fact being used for the development of 
bridging strategies based on resource-dependence relations. As Ferlie et a/. (1996) 
conclude, public sector quasi-markets are socially, relationally and institutionally 
embedded, and their distinctiveness derives from the fact that it is the government 
that sets their boundaries through its financing and regulation powers. As a result, 
hybrid forms of organisations (public and private, tax-financed and sales-financed), 
and relational markets based on trust and long-term dependence relations, tend to 
prevail over NPM discourse. 
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1.3. The Catalan case. 
Although Horn points to the historical and institutional frameworks as 
exogenous variables influencing legislators' decisions on the institutional design of 
the public sector, he does not develop their role much in his model, and so leaves 
little room for institutions and 'path dependence' to play a role in institutional 
choices'O. The commitment problem of an incumbent coalition as defined by Horn 
is most suitable for a parliamentary regime of a Westminster system, in which the 
executive supported by parliament has the power to overhaul previous policies. 
However, in a parliamentary regime dominated by proportional representation, 
such as the case of Catalonia, direct confrontation between government and 
opposition is more blurred than in a Westminster system. In turn this difference 
affects the way in which an incumbent coalition seeks to manage its decision costs 
and tries to overcome its commitment problem. In a proportional representation 
system the executive may often not have an absolute majority in parliament on 
which to rely. Even if it does have such a majority, its commitment problem will 
much less commonly centre on fears of a complete policy overhaul by the next 
incumbent party. The opposition may be fragmented into several forces which may 
or may not coalesce against the government, and any new government may well 
find itself in a minority position. So the commitment problem is more about 
maximising present support for the government's legislation so as to prevent any 
later coalition effecting radical changes or operating discretionary elements of the 
legislation in ways inimical to the enacting government's or enacting coalition's 
interests. 
In addition, the structure of the state also affects the way in which an 
incumbent coalition may deal with its commitment problem. While in a unitary state 
there is one main formal decision-making venue at the central level of government 
(apart from the informal venues existing in all political systems) in a decentralised 
10 According to North (1990: 3-7), organisations are created or restructured both to take 
advantage of institutions and to alter them, because institutions are the rules of the game: 
they create an incentive structure for organisational strategies by affecting the costs of 
exchange and production. 
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state such as quasi-federal Spain", i nter-govern mental relations between 
municipalities, Autonomous Communities and the central government appear as 
parallel decision-making venues. Each may affect the policy commitments of the 
enacting coalition operating at any of the component levels of government. 
Moreover, if these inter-govern mental relations are affected by citizens splitting 
their support across parties differently at local, autonomous and general elections, 
issues about possible 'divided government' come to the fore. The commitment 
problem may not be perceived as a mere question of insuring against policy shifts 
by the next incumbent coalition, but as a question of consensus-building at 
different government levelS12. 
This complex system of political power-sharing forces both incumbent parties 
and the opposition to repeatedly interact with each other and amongst themselves, 
even when they may be holding different power positions at different government 
levels. As a result, co-operation emerges as a rational strategy13. However, co- 
operation may not only come under several forms of formal and informal coalition 
building. It may also develop into a de facto different strategy, such as co-optation 
of part of the opposition. As Moe (1990) suggests, a way to promote durable deals 
when negotiating about the structure of government (namely, the design of the 
public sector) is to co-opt part of the opposition and of interest groups and give 
them offices in the structure of public authority being defined. In this way, their'fear 
11 For a discussion and analysis of empirical data on the actual federal model being 
developed in Spain, see Grau (1998). For a comprehensive analysis of the modem Spanish 
political system and its immediate origines in the democratic transition of the late seventies, 
see Heywood (1995). For a description of the institutional framework of the Spanish state 
organisation see Newton and Donaghy (1997). 
12 According to Ostrom (1991), the configurational interaction of rules in the decision- 
making process provides opportunities and constraints for those actors to shape their 
respective 'action situation' and the interrelation between different 'action arenas. Thus, a 
distinction should be made between the impact of formal institutions and the impact of the 
actual decision-making process, in which the location and nature of veto points are crucial to 
condition policy outcomes and their relation to active interests (Immergut, 1992). This 
entails the need to take into account not only the policy stances of participants -including 
interest groups, but also the use they make of the resources they count on to shape others' 
preferences. 
13 Liphart (1984) identifies several dimensions along which majoritarian (Westminster) and 
consensus models of democracy differ. In contrast to the majoritarian model, the consensus 
model aims at counteracting the effects of majoritadan rule by establishing power-sharing 
mechanisms (coalition governments), the dispersal of power (among more than one 
legislative chamber, among the executive and the legislature and among different levels of 
government), 'fair' distribution of power (proportional representation), and formal limitation 
of power (minority veto). 
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of the state' is reduced, and the commitment problem solved, because these actors 
no longer have an interest in overhauling a government structure in which they 
have a stake. 
This is the context in which the NPM policy options in health care 
administration have been adopted by the Autonomous Community of Catalonia 
between 1985 and 1995. The Catalan political system is a parliamentary regime of 
proportional representation. Although the enacting coalition (Converg6ncia i Uni6 
or CiU) had an absolute majodty in parliament from 1984 to 1995, it has tended to 
adopt co-operation and co-optation strategies to overcome its commitment problem 
concerning its preferred model of governance structure for the health sector. 
However, the strategies of co-operation and co-optation have been influenced by 
the split voting affecting the main parties in Catalonia. The nationalist centre-right 
coalition CiLl performs more strongly in the Autonomous elections and the Party of 
the Catalan Socialists (PSC) is favoured in the general and local elections. 
Moreover, the dynamics of inter-govern mental relations require simultaneous 
coal ition-bu ilding processes at different levels of government. Thus, apart from the 
role of ideology itself, these different power positions influenced CiUs commitment 
problems and, therefore, the governance structures they advocated. 
The strategies of co-operation, co-optation and consensus building have led 
to the emergence of a wide consensus among the Catalan health policy elites 
which refers both to policy instruments and political discourse, and which involves 
not only legislators but also the main social actors which are the object of the 
reforms. Nonetheless, this dynamics has been facilitated and induced by the initial 
distribution of resources among the most relevant policy elites. While the 
autonomous government had the normative and economic resources (legislative 
competencies and budget) the provision of hospital services was to a large extent 
in the hands of non-Social Security providers - namely profit and non-profit 
providers, 'many of the latter under the patronage of local governments. 
And the 
main policy elites involved agreed on preserving this distribution of resources as 
the basis for gradually consolidating the health system. 
In sum, the existing distribution of power and resources among relatively 
stable policy elites is at the origin of the wide consensus achieved on NPIVI ideas in 
Catalonia. In Spain, by contrast, such considerations were ignored at the central 
government level when a 1991 report suggested the reform of the National Health 
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System on NPM lineS14. However, despite the apparently favourable scenario for 
the introduction of NPM in the Catalan health sector, a paradox arises. There is not 
only a gap between the initial and ambiguous formulation of the Catalan reforms in 
1990 and its clear NPM interpretation shortly afterwards. There is also a gap 
between this clear NPM formulation and the actual implementation of the new 
governance structure between 1990 and 1995. In this respect, the object of this 
research is to find out why the Catalan policy elite designed this particular NPM 
govemance structure for the health sector, and why its implementation 
encountered short-falls. 
Conclusions 
This research uses a transactions costs approach to examine recent developments 
in the public sector organisational arrangements. It explores the extent to which 
transactions costs or other factors drive the institutional choices that legislators 
make about the organisation of the public sector, including both the institutional 
design of public authority and the policy tools it is entitled to use for the governance 
of particular policy domains. This approach is applied to the analysis of the 'new 
public management' (NPM) reforms introduced in Catalonia between the mid-1980s 
and the mid-1990s for the governance of health care. The questions explored in 
this case are 'why did the Catalan legislators choose a NPM governance structure 
for the health sector? 'And 'why was there a divergence between policy formulation 
and its implementation, despite the favourable conditions for realising a NPIVI 
solution in Catalonia's health sectorT 
Horn's (1995) theory of the political transactions costs that legislators have to 
address when designing public sector organisations is taken as a core focal theory. 
I assume that the organisational design of the public sector influences both policy 
14 The proposals of this report were never the object of a public debate. Instead it was put 
aside as a result of the opposition to some of its proposals by the main political parties both 
to the right and to the left of the PSOE government, and by class-based, health professions- 
based and civil service unions, as well as by consumers and retired people associations 
(Rico, 1997; WHO, 1996). 
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outputs and outcomes, and that both legislators and interest groups are aware of 
their political stake on such design. Legislators have to overcome their commitment 
problem concerning the persistence of their policy options and the conditional 
support of their constituents by designing public sector organisations that best help 
them minimise their political transactions costs. These political transactions costs 
include decision or legislative costs and participation costs, implementation costs, 
as well as costs associated with the uncertainty about assigning risk to those 
agents best able to control or insure against it. 
This theory tries to overcome the critique made of the two main approaches 
of new institutionalism: first, that the 'sociological' approach does not allow either 
theoretical or empirical differentiation between interests (individual's and 
collective's) and organisational structures, because the latter are not conceived of 
as the result of purposeful strategies but are taken as given exogenous 
determinants of action; and second, that the 'economic' approach does not 
integrate the power components inherent in political processes of formulation and 
implementation of new governance structures. Moreover neither the 'sociological' 
nor the 'economic' approaches have elaborated a theory in which both the 
organisational and political dimensions of the public sector as a political 
organisation are integrated as independent variables. 
In the theoretical framework presented here interests are clearly 
differentiated from organisational structures. However, Horn's (1995) theory is 
modified by not conceiving of the elites' preferences and interests as exogenously 
fixed, but as endogenous to the decision-making process, though not determined 
by it. Rather, the preferences and interests of the policy elites (public officials and 
interest groups) concerning the design of the public sector are conditioned both by 
their ideology (their belief systems) and the resources on which they count. The 
distribution of these resources and the way actors use them to facilitate certain 
patterns of interaction will in turn influence the formulation and implementation of 
new governance structures. 
This study analyses both the policy formulation process leading up to a NPM 
governance structure in the Catalan health sector in 1990 and the nature of the 
further implementation process between 1990 and 1995. In order to understand the 
output of this formulation Chapter 2 explores the policy changes made at the 
Spanish central government level over the 1980s in relation to the governance of 
health care. The contrast with the policy options taken over the same period in 
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Catalonia is made apparent. Innovation and incrementalism in the introduction of 
policy tools characterised the gradual configuration of the Catalan health system 
and paved the way for the NPM reforms of the early 1990s. Chapter 3 focuses on 
the resources, interests and patterns of interaction among the Catalan health policy 
elites and on their gradual consolidation throughout the eighties. This process is 
analysed in the light of central concepts of Sabafier's and Jenkin's (1993) 
advocacy coalition theory. 
Chapter 4 analyses how political transactions costs considerations shaped 
the stances taken by legislators and influenced the final institutional design of the 
new health authority in the 1990 reform. Regarding the implementation process, 
Chapter 5 uses Dunleavy's (1991) function-based typology of agencies and budget 
structures to assess the extent to which the implementation of the new institutional 
design of the Catalan health authority fitted either the legislative formulation of the 
reforms or its further NPM interpretation. Finally, Williamson's (1985) typology of 
governance structures is applied to assess the extent to which the policy tools and 
contract law on which this new health authority relied fitted the governance 
structure designed. In both Chapter 5 and Chapter 6a number of divergences 
between the NPM discourse (that was taken as the interpretation of the 1990 
reform) and the actual implementation are traced to some efforts at minimising 
transactions costs which turned out to be incompatible with NPM postulates. The 
analysis shows that the impact of politics, that is, the repeated interactions among 
policy elites controlling complementary resources, shaped the way in which 
transactions costs and other considerations were approached in both policy 
formulation and implementation processes. 
The concluding Chapter 7 draws, first, some conclusions concerning the 
characterisation of NPM in the Catalan case, the extent of change that the reforms 
brought about, and both the institutional design and the policy tools which 
configured the new health governance structure. Second, it focuses on some 
recent developments of NPM in health care and in the public sector in general. 
Finally, two central theoretical lessons are drawn from this research: that although 
transactions costs are difficult to measure, they are useful heuristic tools for 
analysing the rationale driving decision-making processes on institutional design, 
and that both the theoretical definition of transactions costs and their actual impact 
on decision-making are mediated by power relations, that is, by politics. 
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Chapter 2 
The governance of health care in Spain 
and Catalonia. 
The role of political transactions costs as defined by Horn (1995) was explicitly 
circumscribed both to the decision-making stage of the policy process and to the 
specific institutional design which is the object of legislation. However, the way 
political transactions costs are perceived and dealt with at a particular point in time 
reflects also the impact of decisions made about other institutions and within other 
policy domains. In order to complement Horn's model, it is necessary to examine 
how other external policy processes have a cross-influence on the decisions made 
on the policy subsystem which is the focus of this research. In this sense, 
advocacy coalition theory identifies two sets of factors -exogenous and 
endogenous to the policy subsystem - which create both constraints and 
opportunities for the policy elite to elaborate and redefine their preferences and 
arguments (Sabatier; Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Thus, the introduction of 'new public 
public management' policy tools in the Catalan health sector was gradual and 
conditioned by two main exogenous variables: the creation of a National Health 
System and the democratisation and decentralisation processes affecting the 
Spanish state. The focus of this chapter is on the way these variables influenced 
and conditioned the early development of a differentiated health system in 
Catalonia. This is the context in which the factors endogenous to the Catalan 
health policy subsystem developed, which is the object of the following chapter. 
Until recently the Spanish health system was based on a Beveridgean direct 
public provision of services, and a Bismarkian system of financing, that is 
compulsory Social Security contributions. The National Health System (NHS) 
created by the 1986 General Health Law (GHL) was intended to gradually shift 
from professionalist Social Security foundations to a model similar in concept and 
objectives to the British National Health Service (Bohigas, 1992: 9). Ideals of 
achieving equity, solidarity and universal coverage fostered not only the extension 
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of Social Security coverage, but also general tax finance - the latter introduced in 
1989. Central to the GHL were also the priorities set by the World Health 
Organisation (1978) - reinforcing the role of primary care, health promotion and 
illness prevention. Moreover, citizens' participation and control were introduced as 
additional legitimising elements. 
This 'substantive dimension' of health policy was gradually consolidated 
under the mandate of the Spanish Workers' Socialist Party (PSOE) throughout the 
1980s without relevant controversies. It was a constitutional mandate formulating a 
collective aspiration. In addition, the gradual increase of health coverage had 
achieved a rate of 82 per cent of the population by 1978, when the Spanish 
Constitution was approved, and, thus, the effective universalisation of coverage 
had to be more of a qualitative than a quantitative nature. By contrast, the 
'operational dimension' - namely, the governance structure of the N HS - was at the 
forefront of the political debate surrounding the GHL and has continued to be a 
matter of disagreement and critique until the present day (mid 1998). The 
controversy during the 1980s arose mainly from the impact of the GHL (and of the 
specific regulations derived from it) on the actual practice of the medical 
profession, that is, on both the structure of the health care market and the 
governance structure at a micro-management level of individual health centres. In 
turn, the beginning of the 1990s saw the debate shift to focusing on the macro- 
and meso-management levels of the whole health care system. 
Both the gradual decentralisation of the management of health services to 
the Autonomous Communities since the early 1980s, and the international reform 
trend towards introducing 'new public management' (NPM) in the health sector, 
contributed to the re-opening of the debate about the NHS's governance structure 
at the beginning of the 1990s. However, those who took the lead in questioning the 
integrated public provision model characterising the NHS were some Autonomous 
Communities with full competencies over health. In this respect, in the early 
nineties innovation was sought through new institutional forms for the health 
authority which allowed the use of new management forms - in line with NPM 
reforms - to reorganise the health services within their territory under new 
governance structures, 
While at the time of writing (mid 1998) these reforms are at a very initial stage 
both in those Communities and in the Spanish non-decentralised health authority, 
in Catalonia a contract-based governance structure for the health sector was 
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designed over the first half of the eighties and consolidated through the decade. 
The policy tools characterising this governance structure happen to fit the NPM 
discourse of the nineties, and are being taken as a reference point by reformers in 
the rest of Spain. In this chapter, the governance structure of the Spanish health 
care system is first described, focusing on the evolution of the provision and 
financing models during the eighties and early nineties. Within this framework the 
different governance structure developed in Catalonia over the eighties is then 
analysed, and interpreted as the policy precedents leading up to the NPM reform 
which this Community launched in 1990. 
2.1. Creating the Spanish National Health System, 1978-95. 
The creation of a National Health System (NHS) in Spain in the mid-1980s 
basically involved a compromise to achieve universal coverage, to gradually 
finance the health system through taxes - that is, through the budget instead of 
through Social Security contributions. It also aimed to consolidate and improve the 
existing public provision model of Social Security-owned and directly managed 
providers where other public providers were integrated to conform a single NHS 
network, and where private providers might only have a complementary role. The 
governance structure of this system was characterised by the integration of 
providers in the health administration and their lack of managerial autonomy or 
differentiated legal personality. These aspects were the target of reforms in the 
early nineties as a result of the direct pressure from international forums. 
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a) The provision model. 
The present governance structure of health care in Spain is closely idenfified with 
the Social Security administration, as designed during the democratic transition in 
the second half of the 1970s. The Ministry of Health was created in 1977 assuming 
together for the first time the responsibilities for both Social Security health care 
and public health15. In 1978 the National Health Institute (INSALUD) was created 
as an autonomous organism of an 'administrative nature' for the management of 
Social Security health services16. Social Security health providers were integrated 
into it as budgetary and expenditure units without autonomous legal personality. 
The INSALUD's direction and supervision was assigned to the Ministry of Health in 
1981, which formulated health policy and managed the budget. However, the 
INSALUD finance and expenditure control remained with the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Security until 1988: this section formulated the budget project, approved its 
modifications, and controlled expenditure process. 
In administrative law terms the INSALUD is an 'institutional' or 'autonomous, 
organism of an 'administrative' nature, that is, a body created by law and subjected 
to public/administrative law both in its internal and external operationS17 (Parada, 
1997: 251-4). Within this framework, Social Security providers of health services are 
15 During the francoist regime public health was a competency of the Home Ministry, under 
whose authority were the psychiatric and charity hospitals of the provincial administrations 
(Diputaciones). In turn, the Social Security administration and its health care services were 
managed by the National Institute of Prevision, an autonomous body which was first under 
the tutelage of the Home Ministry and then of the Ministry of Labour. Over the years, this 
duality resulted in networks differing in their staff regime, in the services offered, and in their 
organisation and territorial distribution. The state owned a heterogeneous network related to 
infectious diseases, to charity, and to medical staff training, the latter carried out in 
university hospitals dependent on the Ministry of Education (Lobo, 1993). 
16 Three other institutes were created in 1978: the Social Security General Treasury, for the 
financing and economic management of social security benefits; the Social Security 
National Institute, for the management of pensions; and the National Institute of Social 
Services, for the management of social services. These three institutes, together with the 
INSALUD, form the 'institutional' administration of the Social Security (Guilldn, Cabiedes, 
1998: 177). 
17 Autonomous organisms are defined by the present legal framework as those which 
operate within administrative law regulations and which perform functions of promotion, 
provision or management of public services which have been functionally decentralised to 
them by the parent Ministry for the implementation of specific programmes (Parada, 
1997: 251). 
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budgetary and expenditure units of the INSALUD but have no autonomous legal 
personality. The structure and subjection to administrative law characterising the 
INSALUD have been repeatedly crificised for some aspects which were considered 
as dysfunctional for an efficient management. First, the political level, instead of 
providers, was held responsible for service management. Second, health services 
were organised following public administration principles - centralisation, hierarchy, 
uniformity and an emphasis on procedural controls. Third, effective supervision of 
health services was biased because of public administration's responsibility for 
their provision management. Fourth, managers were trapped into bureaucracy. 
Fifth, it became extremely difficult to 'incentivise' managers to achieve the system 
objectives, so that meeting citizens' demands became extremely difficult (Elola, 
1993: 150-1). 
Within this hierarchical and integrated public provision model, the civil 
service-like status of the personnel working for the Social Security health services 
is a most controversial point of criticism. Within the Social Security 'statutory 
personnel', different groups have their own statute (regulatory framework) - the 
medical profession, non-medical health professionals, and non-health personnel 
(L6pez, 1993). The main argument against the maintenance of this personnel 
regime is that the rigidities derived from selection, promotion and personnel 
management tools not only hinder an efficient personnel policy definition and 
management, but also reinforce the corporatist tendencies of the medical 
profession, as opposed to a more managerial approach to health care. The 
regulation of this personnel regime was given a basic character by the 1986 GHL, 
that is, this area of competency is exclusive to the Spanish government. The GHL 
established that a framework statute for this personnel had to be elaborated by the 
central government. The fact that it has not been done by mid 1998 is a 
consequence of the disagreement between the Autonomous Communities 
themselves, and between them and the Spanish central government, on the labour 
relations model to be defined. There has also been resistance from the unions to 
accepting the different proposals. 
The need to reform the governance structure of the health care system has 
been stressed as the decentralisation of the INSALUD's health management 
competencies to the Autonomous Communities has developed. This process 
started in 1981 with the transfer of Social Security health services and related 
budgetary resources to Catalonia. Later on, decentralisation affected those 
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Autonomous Communities which the 1978 Spanish Consfitution defined as having 
a higher level of competencies (Catalonia, Andalusia, Basque Country, Galicia), 
and those assimilated (Valencian Community, Navarra and Canary Islands)18. 
These Communities have gradually created their respective 'Health Institutes' for 
the assumption of responsibilities over the services transferred to them from the 
INSALUD19. While they have the 'INSALUD decentralised', the remaining 
Communities have their health services managed by the 'INSALUD-direct 
management#. 
This decentralised management model was reinforced by the 1986 GHL. As 
Vicens (1991: 16-7) stresses, this Law did not provide the NHS with a legal 
personality, but defined it as composed of the health services of all the 
Autonomous Communities (article 44.2). Within the distribution of competencies 
jointly established by the Constitution and the Statutes of Autonomy2O, the GHL 
provided the obligation for every Autonomous Community to create a Health 
Service, by reorganising and managing under their authority all the public health 
providers within their territory, regardless of whether they were attached to 
provincial, local or other sub-autonomous levels of administration (article 51). 
Autonomous Communities were made responsible for health services 
18 So far, the decentralisation of the INSALUD has affected Catalonia (1981), Andalusia 
(1984), Basque Country (1987), Valencian Community (1987), Galicia (1990), Navarra 
(1990), and Canary Islands (1997). These Communities represent 61 per cent of the 
population covered by the NHS (Guill6n, Cabiedes, 1998: 180; Rico, 1997: 232-236). 
19 As a rule, departmental structures of the Autonomous Communities' governments 
reproduce the bureaucratic model of the Spanish central government. However, there is a 
generalised trend to build the Communities' own public sector on what in an Administrative 
Law system is named 'institutional' or'autonomous' organisms. They have been created for 
the gradual assumption of responsibility over the services transferred to the Communities, 
and embody the trend of 'escaping Administrative Law' (Aja, 1985: 300-1; Martin-Retortillo, 
1988: 14; Ariflo, 1994). 
20 The 1986 GHL completed the basic legal framework for the creation of a NHS, but it did 
not establish either the timing of the decentralisation process or a detailed specification of 
the distribution of competencies between the State and the Autonomous Communities. The 
reason is that for each an every policy area, such a basic legal framework is jointly laid by 
the 1978 Constitution and the Statutes of Autonomy of each of the 17 Communities. This 
legal framework establishes the distribution of competencies over policy areas between 
central and autonomous governments, and to be effective it needs to be followed by the 
corresponding transfer agreements and decrees concerning the actual services and 
resources involved in each area. 
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management, public health and health planning. The health plans of all the 
21 Autonomous Communities had to conform to the National Integrated Health Plan 
. 
According to some scholars, a completely decentralised scenario could result 
in the emergence of 'seventeen health systems22. First, the process of transferring 
the services previously managed by the INSALUD to each Community has not 
been completed yet. Second, Communities differ in their administrative traditions 
and thus, in their readiness and potential to assume the responsibilities mentioned 
above. Third, factors such as the structure of the services inherited, socio- 
economic conditions, morbidity and coverage, posed a major challenge for a 
financing system to be equitable across Autonomous Communities, a question 
which has not yet been solved (Gallo, 1994: 863). In any case, at the time of writing 
(mid 1998) the central government still keeps full powers over economic and 
budgetary matters concerning the INSALUD - which is financed through the Social 
Security budget and the state general budget. 
The decentralisation of the NHS as defined by the 1986 GHL was crucially 
shaped by the main Catalan nationalist force (Convergence and Union or CiU) and 
the main Basque nationalist party (PNV) in the Spanish central Parliament. 
According to Rico's (1997: 134-6) findings, they achieved, first, their objective that 
most of the articles concerning the territorial organisation and organisational 
structure of primary care were not classified as 'basic' for those Autonomous 
Communities which had already regulated those matters. Second, any mention of 
21 This plan has to establish basic evaluation criteria for needs and services, include an 
inventory of physical and human resources, and set common basic objectives about illness 
prevention, health care, health promotion and protection. The first state health plan as part 
of the Integrated Plan was issued in 1995 (WHO, 1996: 44). However, 12 years after the 
1986 GHL was passed there are still two Communities (Extremadura and Balearic Islands) 
which have not elaborated their respective Health Plans. This means that the Ministry of 
Health and Consumption cannot as yet elaborate the Integrated Health Plan required by the 
GHL (Diario Wdico, 25 April 97). Taking into account that for health plans to have any 
usefulness - as guidelines for the organisation of provision of health care according to 
needs-assessment - they have to be revised every two or three years, the viability of an 
Integrated Health Plan in this bottom-up process has so far been questioned. 
22 An integration mechanism designed by the 1986 GHL was the NHS Inter-territorial 
Council, which was composed of one representative of each Community and an equal 
number (17) of members of the Spanish central administration. However, according to a 
non-published report elaborated in 1997 by consultants external to the Ministry of Health 
and Consumption, this Council had not played the expected role of central venue of co- 
ordination, direction and planning of the system - particularly in controversial areas common 
to all Communities where tough decisions had to be made. Instead, it had turned out to be a 
consultative and consensus-building forum where no binding decisions were made (Koldo et 
al., 1997). 
45 
the General Health Co-ordination as an exclusive competence of the (central) State 
was eliminated, together with its capacity to modify the Communities' Health Plans. 
Similarly, the High Inspection was no longer defined as ordinary inspection, and 
mention of the capacity of the State to evaluate the quality and results of the health 
services in the Communities was suppressed. Third, numerous functions were re- 
defined from being the exclusive competence of the State to being a shared 
competence with the Communities - among which the accreditation of non-public 
hospitals, the design of contracts with the private sector and the legal nature of the 
autonomous Health Services were particularly relevant for the Catalan case. 
Fourth, the principle of subsidiarity which in the 1978 Constitution favoured the 
State, was defined in the opposite direction by the GHL, favouring the Autonomous 
Communities. Moreover, the Catalan minority got both a legal recognition that non- 
profit providers may be part of the NHS, and that the intervention of the Spanish 
central government should not be a requirement. Finally, it achieved its demand 
that the Communities with health transfers had a proportional share in the annual 
budgetary deviations of the INSALUD. 
However, the reforms of the 1980s fostered by the GHL had a 'basic' legal 
character and therefore affected the whole NHS, although those Autonomous 
Communities with a higher level of competencies could legislate without 
contradicting the GHL. The formulation of these health care reforms in the 1986 
GHL was the result of a long process23 which was characterised not only by the 
23 In December 1983 the socialist Minister of Health publicly presented the final draft bill of 
the General Health Law elaborated by a parfiamentary commission - one year after the first 
draft bill had been elaborated by the Ministry. Even before the bill was sent to parliament for 
debate, amendments and voting (a process which lasted for eight months until the law was 
passed in April 1986) a controversial public debate took place in which several professional 
groups asserted their opposition (Rodriguez, de Miguel, 1990: 238-43). However, health 
reform had also been the object of two previous failed attempts to legislate under the Union 
of Democratic Centre (UCD) government (in 1978 and in 1981). Both the definition of 
different models of health systems and the initiation of the decentralisation process 
(affecting not only health but also the rest of competencies concerned) were at the origin of 
a long and deep controversy among political forces and between the Spanish central 
government and autonomous governments. In 1981 the UCD government approved a 
decree, with the support of an agreement with the PSOE (the Autonomic Pacts) by which 
the authority of the Spanish central government over health was reinforced to the detriment 
of the Autonomous Communities. This measure led the Catalan and the Basque 
autonomous governments to present several appeals before the Constitutional Court on the 
grounds that the decree was unconstitutional. The resolution by the Constitutional Court was 
not approved until May 1983. Meanwhile, in 1983 the Catalan and the Basque autonomous 
governments passed their respective health laws after receiving their competencies 
transfers and unconstrained by a basic health legislation of the Spanish central Padiament 
(Rico, 1997: 117-20). 
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negotiation with Communities of a high ceiling of competencies, but also by the 
political confrontation between the medical profession and the PSOE's 
government. The limits and structure of the health care market on the one hand, 
and the structure and organisation of the health care centres on the other hand, 
were both at stake. The socialising stance of the government openly questioned 
the power and authority which the medical profession had enjoyed over the 
francoist regime and until the early eighties over these two areaS24 (Rodriguez, 
1996: 152). 
The main thrust of the reforms of the GHL focused on the development and 
restructuring of the primary care sector as the gatekeeper of the system, and as a 
means to ensure equity of access to health care. Thus, reinforcing the 1984 decree 
of primary care reform passed by the Socialist government, this 1986 law 
organised health provision in Health Areas defined on demographic and socio- 
economic criteria where primary care is the main reference point. There, Primary 
Care Teams of saladed medical professionals (primary and non-hospital 
specialists) and non-medical professionals were responsible for health care, health 
promotion and illness prevention. The reform required these professionals to co- 
ordinate their activities within Primary Care Centres, and to raise their working 
timetable from the previous two hours a day to a full-time schedule. 
This reinforcement of the primary care role within the health system was 
relevant in Spain, where the weight of the hospital sector has developed to the 
detriment of new conceptions of health based on illness prevention and health 
promotion through an equitable and accessible primary network. As Figure 2.1 
shows, expenditure on the hospital sector represented nearly 63 per cent of total 
health expenditure in 1990 - eight points above the percentage it represented in 
198225 -, while the percentage of total health expenditure corresponding to primary 
care decreased six points over the same period. From the late 1940s to the early 
1990s, some developments can be traced within specialised care. Despite the 
creation of a hospital network, the ratio of beds remained unchanged (4.4 per 
24 Three main strikes by health care professionals made opposition to these reforms 
apparent: in 1985 - against the implementation of the Work Incompatibility Law -, in 1987 - 
against the internal reorganisation of hospitals and labour conditions and remuneration of 
the professional work all derived from the GHL -, and in 1990 - against the remuneration 
system of hospital doctors (Rodriguez, 1996). 
25 For a detailed disaggregation of these data see Table A. 1 in Appendix 1. 
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1,000 inhabitants) as well as the weight of the public sector (70 per cent of beds). 
There was a concentration in a lesser number of hospitals and a centralisation of 
the public sector while many small private hospitals disappeared. Still, by OECD 
standards, even by the mid 1990s there were not enough hospital beds in Spain, 
too many physicians, scarce and inadequate resources, utilisation rates were low, 
and the territorial distribution of resources was unbalanced (CaYs, Castilla, 
1995: 246). Therefore, despite the pre-eminence of the public sector, the 
INSALUD's own specialised resources were insufficient to cover the demand of a 
growing coverage (see Table 2.1). 
Figure 2.1. Structure of public health expenditure in Spain, 
1982-90 (in percentages). 
Source: CAESNS, 1991: 18. 
For this reason, the Social Security resorted since its creation to the 
establishment of agreements with other public and private centres. However, as 
Espadas and Largo (1933: 186-7) point out, these agreements were not specifically 
regulated until 1981, when providers were classified into seven groups and twenty- 
one levels according to which tariffs were calculated, but priority was given to 
public and charitable centres. Moreover, such 'agreements' were defined as an ad 
hoc complement to the Social Security's own specialised resources, mainly used 
for diagnostic and treatment services, while being almost irrelevant in the primary 
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care sector. In this respect, the 1986 GHL provided two formulae for establishing 
service 'agreements' between the Social Security, that is, INSALUD, and private 
providers. On the one hand, convenios (articles 66-67) implied the full integration of 
the private provider into the public hospital network, being subject to the same legal 
regime. On the other hand, conciertos (article 90) defined a specific service to be 
provided which cannot be offered by the public sector - the duration of the 
agreement is not explicit, though. As for agreements between the INSALUD and 
other public providers, conciertos were also established for the provision of health 
care. 
Table 2.1. Hospitals and available beds in Spain classified 
by private or public ownership, 1995. 
Ownership nO of hospitals % nO of beds % 
Public 332 42 115,700 69 
Social Security 132 17 56,400 34 
other* 200 25 59,300 35 
Private 455 58 52,400 31 
non-charitable 290 37 28,100 17 
charitable** 165 21 24,300 14 
Total 787 100 168,100 100 
* Owned by municipal, provincial, autonomous, or central administrations, including 
consortia of several administrations and of administrations and non-profits. 
** Owned by Red Cross, Church, and others. 
Source: Based on MSC (1995). 
The payment method for such services was designed on a per them basis, 
adjusting rate levels to the foresaid functional classification of the centres. As 
Espadas and Largo (1993: 188-9) stress, the situation resulting from both the 
implicit incentives to lengthen stays and the pervasive revision of rates below the 
inflation level, led to designing different payment formulae. Thus, since 1988 
'administrative' hospitals have been defined on an experimental basis, affecting 
seven specialised care centres in Spain, where rates are calculated according to 
functional costs. In these cases, the INSALUD signed 'special concerts' (conciertos 
singulares) with public providers (owned by provincial or municipal administrations) 
(B 
LON 
UNIV) 
or charitable private centres for the co-ordination and programmeming of their 
activities within the corresponding sectoral plan of the public sector. In contrast to 
the foresaid conciertos (article 90), private providers were thus made subject to the 
legal regime of the public sector by these conciertos singulares (Martin, 1996: 201). 
In sum, the weight of the Social Security health care sector in terms of 
budget, personnel, structure and functioning did not change in a relevant way 
during the seventies and eighties. The meso- and micro-management levels were 
still conditioned by the hierarchical organisation of medical specialities and by the 
lack of management autonomy of such hospitals, which were expenditure and 
budgetary units of the INSALUD. These issues were central to the reform affecting 
hospitals in the 1980s, and were also the focus of the contestation of the GHL by 
the medical profession and the unions. It was these two management levels in the 
hospital sector, and the macro-management level of the whole NHS, that were still 
the focus of discourse and reforms of the 1990s. 
b) The financing model. 
The compromise made to reach universal coverage as a defining feature of the 
NHS was virtually achieved by the end of the nineties, being no longer linked to the 
Social Security contributions. Thus the direct public provision model established by 
the GHL covered 99.8 per cent of the population by 1991. However, the coverage 
26 rate had already reached 82 per cent in 1978 and 96 per cent in 1986 . 
Therefore, 
the universalisation of coverage was more related to small groups than to the core 
of the system. The relevance of public coverage is apparent from Table 2.2, as the 
overlapping between the population covered by the public system and the 
population covered by private systems in 1993 implies that only seven per cent of 
the population had double coverage27. The total health expenditure rose from 5.7 
per cent of the GDP in 1980 to 6.9 per cent in 1990 and 7.7 in 1994. In 1980,80 
26 For a detailed disaggregation of these data see Table A. 2 in Appendix 1. 
27 For a detailed disaggregation of these data see Table A. 3 in Appendix 1. 
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per cent of this total health expenditure was public (4.5 per cent of GDP), in 1990 
public expenditure reached 79 of the total health expenditure (5.5 per cent of 
GDP), and 1994 it amounted to 77 per cent of the total health expenditure (5.9 per 
cent of GDP) (Bengoechea, del Llano, 1995: 188). 
Table 2.2. Public and private health coverage in Spain, 1993. 
Public coverage 
Social Security Health care 
coverage 91.7% 
(Charity and others 
without resources) 0.4-1,0% 
Civil servants' mutualities 7.5% 
Public total 99.6% 
Private coverage 
Individual private insurance 4.4% 
Individual employers insur. 2.0% 
Private fee for service 0.4% 
Iguala 0.8% 
Pdvate total 7.6% 
Source: Freire (1993: 89) . 
Figure 2.2. Financing sources of the INSALUD's budget: State contributions, 
and Social Security contributions, 1986-97. 
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In 1988 the Ministry of Health and Consumption reinforced its budgetary 
autonomy by having the INSALUD's budget share of the state general budget 
directly transferred to its own budget instead of to the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Security's. From Figure 2.2 it appears that the evolution of the financing sources of 
the INSALUD's budget had a clear turning point in 1989, when the share of State 
contributions (general tax financing) rose from 25 to 70 per cent. After remaining 
stable for five years, the State contributions to the INSALUD's budget were raised 
again and reached 92 per cent in 1997, following the NHS financing model defined 
by the GHL28. 
The transfer from the State general budget was formally integrated into the 
INSALUD's budget and had to be spent on the NHS health services. These were 
either directly managed by the INSALUD (INSALUD-direct management covering 
those Autonomous Communities without these services transferred) or by those 
Communities with health competencies which had already had the services to be 
managed transferred. In principle, the Social Security general financing was 
clarified: general taxes for health care as a provision of a redistributive nature, and 
Social Security contributions for the financing of pensions as transfers within the 
life cycle (Lobo, 1993: 122). However, the INSALUD-direct management and the 
decentralised INSALUD under the authority of Autonomous governments continued 
to be regulated as 'autonomous organisms' for the management of Social Security 
health services. 
In turn, the decentralisation process of health care management to the 
Autonomous Communities initiated in 1981 was bringing crucial structural problems 
of the financing model to the fore of the political debate. The decentralisation of the 
INSALUD's management competencies to seven Autonomous Communities by the 
mid 1990s resulted in 60 per cent of the resources of the system being managed 
by the latter (as these Communities represented 60 per cent of the population 
covered by the NHS). However, the fact that the INSALUD-direct management 
(non-transferred) managed only 40 per cent of resources did not influence the 
budgetary process. As Sanfrutos (1993: 105-7) explains, the economic resources 
transferred to the Autonomous Communities with health competencies depended 
on the initial budget allocated to the INSALUD, on how that budget was managed, 
on the executed budget, and on the measures taken to cover the difference 
28 For a detailed disaggregation of these data see Table A. 4 in Appendix 1. 
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between the executed budget and the initial budget appropriation. Such measures 
affected the delay in receiving the corresponding transfer which, for example, took 
one year in the case of credits covering the INSALUD's direct management - and 
these credits covered 85 per cent of budgetary deviations. 
The relevance of this process stemmed from the increasing deviation of the 
INSALUD's budget over the years - the difference between the initial appropriation 
and the budget executed -, which reached 14.4 per cent of the initially appropriated 
budget in 1992. Referring to these dynamics, Argent6 (1993: 114) stresses that the 
fact that the initial INSALUD's budget was insufficient as a rule not only hindered 
management itself, but also cast doubts on the credibility of the budgetary system 
as a tool to incentivise more efficient management. The financial crisis of the health 
system derived from the difficulty with adjusting the level of services covered and 
results of health management to the budget, and from the delays in the adoption of 
structural measures to contain expenditure. This situation led to increasing debt 
being incurred by the INSALUD with providers and with the Communities which had 
health competencies transferred for insufficient budget estimates. In order to pay 
for these debts, four major additional budget allocations for compensation were 
approved between 1982 and 1997. The last three of them approved between 1989 
and 1993 amounted to over one billion pesetas (CGest, 1997: 27-9). 
The distdbution of the INSALUD's budget among the Autonomous 
Communities - whether having health services and resources transferred or still 
being under the INSALUD-direct management - remained a controversial matter for 
some other reasons. As Rico (1997: 342-3) explains, the transfers were calculated 
on three different criteria: the cost of services in the year before the transfers; the 
population covered according to the census - which is updated every ten years -; 
and the bilateral agreements reached between the Spanish central government 
and each Community which were made at different points in time, as the 
decentralisation process developed. Only Catalonia and Galicia followed the first 
criteria, while Andalusia and the Valencian Community followed the criteria of 
service cost in the previous year, and the Basque Country and Navarra followed a 
different system related to their special financial status within the constitutional 
framework29. Rico highlights that the gradual adjustment to the population criteria 
29 The Communities of the Basque Country and Navarra have a financing system different 
from the rest of Communities which concerns not only health care but all policy areas. 
Basically, instead of relying on the budgetary allocation to be transferred by the Spanish 
central government, these Communities transfer to it a share of their own budget. In the 
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favoured Galicia, whose historical service costs are well below what would 
correspond to them for the population covered. Andalusia would also be better off 
if it received its budgetary share on the basis of the population criteria instead of 
service cost. By contrast, the population criteria has made Catalonia worse off as 
the cost of services in this Community are well above its population share. This 
would have also been the case of the Basque Country and Navarra if they had 
been part of the main financing system, and of Madrid if it had accepted the 
transfer of the health competencies - which in fact this Community rejected in 1992. 
However, these aspects of the financing model not only concerned territorial 
equity, but also the margin of manoeuvre available to those Autonomous 
Communities which, by virtue of their competencies, strove to develop a 
differentiated health policy. The uncertainty about the budget which would finally 
be transferred to them after the initial under-estimated budget project had been 
exceeded affected policy definition and implementation. In this respect, the 
September 1994 Council of Fiscal and Financing Policy addressed these problems 
and proposed measures for a new financing model for the period 1994-97 
concerning aspects such as: (1) replacing the mixed capitation/historical costs 
calculation base by the criterion of the protected population registered in the 1991 
census; (2) designing compensation mechanisms for patients' displacements 
among Autonomous Communities; and (3) designing a more realistic health budget 
in keeping with GDP growth in order to reduce deviations between appropriated 
and executed budgets (Montero, 1994: 128-9). 
However, some dysfunctions of that new financing model were apparent. 
First, as in the previous model, the criterion of protected population as registered in 
the 1991 census did not incorporate socio-economic factors (for example, 
urbanisation level, age pyramid), or provision network characteristics specific to 
each Community (for example high-technology hospitals treating patients from 
other Communities). Second, a mechanism of compensation for patients' 
displacements was not approved. Third, although since 1994 the annual health 
budget increment was adjusted to the GDP growth rate, no structural measures 
were taken to ensure that those budgets were reliable (CGest, 1997: 32). Moreover, 
case of health these two Communities managed to negotiate participation shares in the 
INSALUD's budget larger than it would correspond to them on the population criteria. 
Moreover, they receive the compensations for the INSALUD's annual budgetary deviations 
the year after (Rico, 1997: 345). 
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in July 1995 the Ministry of Economy and Treasury of the central government 
revised the agreed level of resources to be transferred and reduced their amount 
according to new measures of expenditure rational isation, thereby affecbng the 
above agreements, whose budgetary valuation was again insufficient for the whole 
NHS (DSSS, 1995a: 17). 
c) From the Abril Report to the Convergence Plan. 
The Abril Report was elaborated in 1991 by a Parliamentary Commission following 
a mandate from the Spanish central Parliament. Citizens' dissatisfaction with health 
services quality and the need to control expenditure and reduce deficits were the 
main arguments for analysing NHS structures, as well as management and 
financing techniques, so as to formulate adequate reform proposals. Two principles 
were central to the Report: devolving decision-making authority and fostering 
entrepreneurial management. Some of the proposals formulated in the Report 
included: clarifying and separating purchaser/financing and provider 
responsibilities, redefining district purchasers' coverage, converting hospitals into 
autonomous bodies subject to private law, enhancing managerial freedom at health 
centre level (particularly for staff policy), increasing contracting out with private 
providers, introducing invoicing and revising pricing techniques, defining budgetary 
allocations at the centre's disposal, defining basic and complementary services 
coverage as a basis for charging, weighed per capita and territorial financing 
criteria; and maintaining social security contributions to health services (CAESNS, 
1991: 49-66). This Report raised such a controversial debate between political and 
social actors that it was finally side-lined in the public arena. The most controversial 
proposals of the Report were not implemented - the co-payment of 
pharmaceuticals by pensioners, the managerial autonomy of hospitals, the 
definition of basic and complementary health care services, and a clear separation 
between purchasing a provision functions. 
After the 1991 Abril Report, the need to reform the health sector came 
directly from international forums. In this context, the 1992 Spanish Convergence 
Plan for meeting the Maastricht criteria established several measures. As Montero 
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(1993: 33-4) points out, the most relevant ones undertaken include organisational, 
budgetary and management measures. Concerning organisational measures, a 
1992 decree assigned to the INSALUD-direct management (non-transferred) the 
functions of insurance coverage and health promotion, differentiating them from 
the provision role. For the first time, contract-like agreements with public or private 
centres could have a substitute rather than a complementary nature. By the late 
1990s five hospitals had their'special agreements' accordingly transformed. As for 
budgetary measures, steps were taken to gradually cancel the INSALUD's debt. 
Finally, management measures included a catalogue of services to be provided by 
the NHS (1995); the creation in 1992 of a National Commission for the Rational 
Use of Pharmaceuticals; the project to create a National Agency for the Evaluation 
of Technology3q; the co-ordination of health and social services for the care of the 
elderly; and the reduction of personnel costs through not offering new public 
employment posts and freezing civil servants' wages in 1993. 
The most relevant management measure established in the 1992 decree was 
the introduction in 1994 of the 'programme-contract'. This tool was projected to be 
extended to the 88 hospitals managed by the non-transferred INSALUD, and 
primary care centres, on an experimental basis. Following an explicit drive for 
efficiency, several measures were designed to link management objectives to 
budget allocation mechanisms. First, prospective budgets were negotiated on a per 
centre basis according to health care objectives. Second, activity measures were 
defined for primary and specialised care (Activity Weighted UnitS)31 (Sevilla et aL, 
1993: 144-6). Third, information systems on activity and costs were developed 
across the 88 hospitals directly managed by the INSALUD (Elola et al., 1993: 150- 
4). The main objectives pursued by these measures included: a more accurate 
payment system (as by process), the possibility of introducing economic incentives 
to efficiency at the centre level, a more transparent definition of objectives and 
30 According to Abel-Smith et aL (1995: 62-3), only Catalonia (1991) and the Basque Country 
(1994) had set up health technology assessment agencies dependent on their respective 
autonomous governments by 1995. At the Spanish central government level the Drugs 
Directorate exerts regulatory powers particularly towards industry. 
31 These measures developed by the INSALUID-direct management were very similar to 
those introduced by the Basque, Andalusian, Valencian and Galician Health Services during 
that same period. In Catalonia activity measure units have been used for prospective 
contracting with providers since 1986 (see Section 2.2). 
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responsibilities on each part, a more decentralised and autonomous management, 
and to make managed internal competition possible (Gonzdlez et al., 1995: 10-6). 
However, the programme-contract remained a legal fiction, as it was 
constrained by the unchanged public administration organisational and contractual 
framework, where ex-ante controls and centralised decision-making is the rule. The 
budgetary process was in practice subject to the legal framework of the annual 
public administration budgetary process. In this process, prospective budgeting 
was confined to an exercise without direct economic consequences, as risks were 
not born by managers. Personnel and payment policies remained centralised and 
ruled by statutory and civil service legislation. However, the very instrument of 
program me-contract was criticised for the following shortcomings: first, these 
contracts agreed on. a per centre basis hindered an effective planning and co- 
ordination between primary and secondary health care levels; second, the planning 
agent interfered with management by setting objectives which were in fact 
management indicators (for example length of stay per service); third, health 
objectives concerning the population were not included in these agreements 
(Gonzcilez etaL, 1995: 10). 
Moreover, the regulation of prices and activity measures as the base of 
prospective budgeting was not being implemented as it had been defined. Instead, 
the incrementalist dynamics in the definifion of budgetary objectives persisted. In 
turn, subsidies covered the difference between budgetary and activity objectives 
agreed and the actual performance, as a rule. The decentralisation of decision and 
control rights to health care managers referred to the objectives established in the 
programme-contract with that particular centre. But the effectiveness of the process 
was impeded because risks were not simultaneously transferred. In addition, health 
centre managers did not have decision-making power over personnel - who were 
centrally managed under statutory and civil service regulations. They also had a 
budgetary ceiling for contracting out goods and services, and were not allowed to 
decide on investments once projects affecting the centre have been centrally 
approved. They did not even have market-price valuations of their capital assets. 
And finally, the General Social Security Treasury centralised payment fluxes 
derived from payrolls, contracts and purchases (Martin, 1996: 198-200). 
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2.2. The origins of the'Catalan model', 1981-89. 
The relevance of the 'governance issue' in health care was explicitly claimed by the 
party coalition in the Catalan government (Convergence and Union or CiU) during 
the negotiation process of the GHL, which was eventually passed by the Spanish 
Parliament in 1986 after a long and controversial negotiation process. The fact that 
this law had a 'basic' character meant that it established the principles concerning 
health care which were applicable to the whole country. However, while those 
Communities with a higher level of competencies had the health and social 
services actually transferred -to them in terms of resources and regulatory powers 
between 1984 and 1997, Catalonia had received the transfers in 198132. By the 
time the GHL started to be debated in 1983 as a forthcoming major health care 
reorganisation at the state level, the Catalan government had already formulated 
and implemented policy options which departed from the model that law projected. 
They c6ticised the GHL as 'statist' because of its overwhelming focus on direct 
provision and bureaucratic management. 
a) Allocating health competencies and resources. 
The Catalan government elected in 1980 - the first after the democratic transition - 
was aware of the political importance of health policy not only in terms of resources 
(the health budget amounted to a third of the Catalan government's total budget) 
but also in terms of its impact on other sectoral policies which could be affected by 
the development of a health care network. The corresponding negotiations and 
actual decentralisation of health competencies from the Spanish central 
government to the Catalan government took place between 1980 and 1982 within 
32 In 1977 the provisional Catalan government was re-established, in 1979 the Catalan 
Statute of Autonomy was approved by referendum, and in 1980 the first Catalan democratic 
government was elected within the new constitutional framework of 1978. For a political and 
historical analysis of the origins and evolution of Catalan nationalism see Balcells (1996). 
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the legal framework jointly established by the 1978 Spanish Constitution and the 
1979 Catalan Statute of Autonomy. In this respect, the bulk of the resources 
transferred included the health services owned and directly managed by the Social 
Security administration as well as their corresponding budget. These health 
services basically comprised the network of large, high technology and research 
hospitals built up by the Social Security mostly since the sixties and concentrated in 
the largest cities, and a weaker primary care network. 
According to a former top official of the Department of Health and Social 
Security (DHSS) of the Catalan government, in the very initial stages of political 
autonomy within the new democratic state, the Catalan government's priority was 
to assume the competencies established in the Statute of Autonomy as soon as 
possible in order to assert their political power. Thus, having exclusive 
competencies over health care, the negotiations to reach the transfers agreements 
with the Spanish central government for the management of the health services 
became a matter of political opportunity. However, what they did not expect, was to 
face an 'inexplicably receptive INSALUD' towards the transfer of competencies. 
Convergence and Union (CiU), the coalition in office in the Catalan government33 
wanted the transfers and accepted them at any price - and as a result, the price 
was too low. In this interviwee's view, this is still considered as one of the key 
reasons for the historical under-funding of health care in Catalonia: 
'These transfers were not well calculated in terms of financing. I think 
that it was not because of anybody's bad faith, but ... because the 
transfer was done on a cdterion of political opportunity. In a relatively 
inexplicable way, the central govemment said: "if you want the 
INSALUD I pass it to you". And the political directive was that 
everything which could be brought here and which strengthened 
autonomy was essential, and thus, let the INSALUD come here'. 
The main policy options made over this initial period were formulated within 
the Direction General of Health Care. This DG was created within the Department 
of Health and Health Care of the provisional Catalan government (1977-80) and 
undertook the task of 'receiving' the health resources which were going to be 
transferred to the Catalan government. Although the small staff of experts of this 
DG had diverse political allegiances, they were not replaced by the new democratic 
33 CiU obtained 27.6 per cent of votes and 43 of the 135 seats of the Catalan Parliament. 
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autonomous government elected in 1980. As a former prominent political figure in 
the DHSS explained: 
'It has been a joint effort. The [provisional] Department of Health, 
before CiU won the elections, was under the area of influence of Dr. 
Espasa of the PSUC34. When the Consellef, -15 changed [for one of CiU, 
after the elections], half the people in the DHSS could have been 
replaced. But we did not do it - instead we chose to collaborate ... We have had many advantages. We started this policy in 1981, the year of 
the transfers, and we have remained in government. And I would say 
that the same team has remained in the DHSS over sixteen 
consecutive years, and this has given a great coherence to what we 
have been doing. Dr. Espasa began [as Conselled, but I was already 
working with him, and the present one had been working with me, that 
is, we have been a team. We have had a very good collaboration at the 
level of local administrations, a very'close collaboration, and also with 
the private, charitable foundations, which were usually presided over by 
the mayor. 
During the first year of the first legislature the new Department of Health and 
Social Security (DHSS) of the Catalan government was structured into three 
Direction Generals (DG of Health Promotion, DG of Social Services, and the 
foresaid DG of Health Care), and three staff organs (the Cabinet of the Conseller, 
the Technical General Office, and the Institute for Health Studies) directly attached 
to the Consel/er Within the DHSS, the weight of this DG of Health Care in 
formulating policy was related, in part, to the competencies it held among its four 
Services: first, health care analysis and programmeming (accreditation, regulation 
and control of providers, care reorganisation, private insurance sector); second, 
non-hospital services and equipment; third, the hospital care sector (hospitals and 
contract-like agreements with private and public providers); and fourth, organisation 
of the pharmaceutical sector. In part, too, the think-tank role of this politically 
heterogeneous staff was reinforced by their strong collaborative links with relevant 
figures in the academic and managerial communities in Catalonia - particularly, with 
the Catalan Union of Hospitals, an association of managers which until the early 
34 The communist Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia 
35 The Conseller is the political head of the Department and a member of the Catalan core 
executive, and is the counterpart of a Minister of the Spanish central government. 
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nineties had the role of the main employers' association in the hospital sector (see 
Chapter 3). According to a former top political appointee of this DG: 
'The 'Catalan model' was promoted from within the DG from the very beginning. What we promoted was further transformed into a political 
tool named 'Catalan model'. What we promoted from that moment was, first, the creation of the Hospital Network of Public Utilisation. This 
concept, and this name, I wrote it down on a working document for the 
first time the day after the 23-F36 - as we all were dependent on 
whether they would get us out or not, we had time to think. Second, the 
accreditation order of 1981 - the first in Europe - together with contracts 
orders .... to make possible that the network of hospitals which were 
contracted - which until that moment had had to go to Madrid, half- begging, 
... because for the INSALUD contracts were totally subsidiary. We said "with the transfers it is made clear that all centres which are 
used to give a public service have to be considered equal to those 
which are public, with reasonable tariffs, etc". We gave the contracted 
sector the strength and the extension we thought it needed. And third, I 
... made the decision - of course further supported by the Conseller and the President -, of appointing a professional manager at the top of each 
public [Social Security] hospital. ' 
Thus, the DG's staff continued under the new CiU government doing their 
'fieldwork' in order to gather the information which was not only necessary for 
managing this policy area, but also for calculating, first of all, the budget required 
for its financing. Civil servants working until then for the INSALLID had suddenly to 
cope with a different political and administrative authority - the DHSS of the 
Catalan government. Therefore, in these first stages, collaboration and exchange 
of necessary information was very dependent on personal relations and 
networking. As this former top official of this DG recalled, they almost started from 
scratch. To begin with, a task of 'inventory' had to be carried out to find out the 
resources which the DFISS could count on, and what the budgetary and economic 
situation was for both the Social Security providers and other providers (public and 
private) in Catalonia. The INSALUD had a very poor knowledge of its own 
administration and the real situation of health services in Catalonia - for example, it 
did not have reliable data on human resources (either in its own administration or in 
health centres), and expenditure was not updated because many documents had 
36 February 23,1981, when a coup dWat was aftempted and failed. 
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not been inspected or fiscalised over the previous years, and therefore, that 
expenditure was not registered as having been incurred. 
Moreover, the Social Security administration preceding the INSALUD had 
been contracting with non-Social Security providers - which in Catalonia 
represented over 75 per cent of available hospital beds - at a price well under the 
real production cost, because they were considered as 'complementary' providers 
to the Social Security-owned and managed services. This situation was maintained 
even though those providers were in fact 'substituting' for the lack of Social 
Security-owned services in Catalonia: the Social Security-owned services in 
Catalonia had a per capita bed ratio well under the average in the rest of Spain 
(Vallribera, 1994). Within these constraints, the calculation of the health budget to 
be transferred on a annual basis by the INSALUD to the 
, 
Catalan government was 
under-estimated. This was not only because it did not include a population 
criterion, but also because it took as a point of reference the expenditure at the 
time of the transfers, which was not reliable. As a result of these factors, the 
transfer agreements became the origin of a cumulative public debt. When other 
Communities received their transfers from 1984 onwards, the calculation base was 
changed to introduce the criteria of population covered, although the under-funding 
and the accumulation of historical debts continued to grow. 
During the second year of the first legislature, a new DG of Social Security 
was added to the organisational structure of the DHSS. This new DG held the 
competencies over the health care Social Security budget, the Social Security legal 
regime, the Social Security personnel, and the provision of health services and 
Social Security benefits (pensions, related mutualities, own health care providers). 
In turn, the pre-existing DG of Health Care saw its role as a regulatory agency 
reinforced. Its structure was enlarged and made more complex with the creation of 
four territorial delegations, an Under-DG including the techno-structure Services, 
and a new Service of Planning and Organisation. Moreover two new Services were 
created to assume the Social Security Health Services and Social Security Social 
Services respectively - as they were eventually transferred from the Spanish 
central government. In 1983 the latter of this Services became the Catalan Institute 
of Social Care and Services, and the former became the Catalan Health Institute 
(see Figure 2.3). 
By 1983, when the stage of receiving the transfers of health competencies 
over budgetary, human and physical resources was finally accomplished, the DG 
62 
of Health Care was dismantled, and a new DG of Health Organisation and 
Planning was created within the DHSS- Its competencies covered regulation 
(accreditation, inspection and evaluation of services), resource organisation and 
planning, health programmes, organisation of the pharmaceutical sector, relations 
with private insurance entities and mutualities, and health promotion. In other 
words, all the former DG of Health Care's competencies plus health promotion and 
a stronger role for planning, organisation and health programmes now organised 
under an Under-IDG (Vallribera, 1994). 
Figure 2.3. Organisational chart of the Department of Health 
and Social Security, 1985. 
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In 1983 the Catalan Health Institute (CHI)37 was created by law as the Social 
Security management entity in Catalonia - that is, the decentralised Catalan branch 
of INSALUD38. The weight of the CHI was apparent as it managed 88 per cent of 
37 Law 12/1983,14 July, passed by the Catalan Parliament. 
W The parliamentary debate leading to the passage of this law reflected disagreement 
between political parties on the legal nature of this new entity - whether the CHI should be 
defined as a management entity of the Social Security (as the Spanish central government 
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the DHSS's total budget, for the financing of the services it owned and directly 
managed - that is, over 90 per cent of primary care and a seventh of hospital beds 
available in the early 1980s - and for contracting any complementary providers 
needed. The CHI was created mirroring the INSALUD's governance structure, as 
an autonomous organism of an administrative nature. That is, the CHI was (and by 
mid 1998 still is) defined as an organism with a single legal personality, within 
which hospitals and primary care services were cost centres without management 
autonomy or any independent legal personality of their own. The corporate centre 
of the CHI centralised the budgetary processes and the personnel policy - which 
was conditioned by the quasi-civil service status of health professionals. In 
addition, contracting and procurement policies were subjected to the Law of Public 
Administrations' Contracts - that is, previous inspection of most administrative acts 
involving expenditure. The lack of flexibility and therefore the difficulties in 
introducing managerial practices in this structure were later on to be the target of 
reforms. The main competenciesof the CHI were assigned to its three under-DGs 
(General Administration, Health Services, and Personnel). Moreover, the CHI 
managed the budget for and negotiated the contractual agreements with those 
non-Social Security public and private health providers whose services were 
necessary for ensuring Catalans' health. In 1984 this contractual agreements with 
non-Social Security providers represented 34 per cent of the CHI's budget and 30 
per cent of the DHSS's budget. 
Within the INSALUD and, therefore, within the CHI there had been no 
managerial tradition beyond the 'administration' of the budgetary allocation. In the 
early 1980s, at the head of each hospital there was an administrator, while the 
medical director and the 'board of doctors' embodied the formal and informal power 
within each hospital, and in any external relations with the CHI or with the DHSS. In 
the primary care centres, the figure of the medical co-ordinator was the visible 
head but with no decision power. In this respect, before being dismantled, the DG 
of Health Care had taken two initiatives to change this lack of managerial culture. 
First, a system of correspondence between the budgetary public accounting and 
had done since the Social Security creation) or as an autonomous organism. This was 
relevant because in the latter case, the CHI resources could not be prevented from being 
used for financing non-Social Security expenditures. Keeping the Social Security budget 
separate from the general budget was a guarantee that when the state incurred debt it could 
not resort to the Social Security resources, but only to the Public Treasure (DSPC-P, 
139: 4327-8,4332,4343-4,4346,4353). 
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management accounting was set up. Second, in 1982, this DG formulated the 
definite will of the DHSS to 'managerialise' Social Security hospitals by appointing 
a manager to each of them. These managers were further health area managers 
when the CHI was terdtorially organised into nine management areas (initially ten) 
in 1983, within which they had to co-ordinate a pattern of integrated health care 
provision and to administer and control the budget allocated to it. As a former 
official of the DG and former hospital manager put it: 
'We started from scratch. The [hospital] administrators purchased, paid, 
transferred the payroll to the personnel and controlled them, carried out 
the required investments decided on somewhere else, contracted-out, 
were responsible for the up-keeping, and for accountancy. In contrast 
to managers, administrators did not have responsibility over health care 
tasks. The medical director, the nurses' head, and the administrator, it 
was like a triumvirate: different spheres of power. One or another could 
have more power in practice. ... There was something basic: in hospitals nobody was in charge. And we launched this programme for 
training managers, together with these ... business schools in Barcelona and the Catalan Union of Hospitals. This policy affected 
mainly the Social Security hospitals because the others usually had 
managers'. 
The first generation of health area and hospital managers was hired following 
the advice of 'head-hunters' from sectors other than health care. Of the ten initial 
managers, five were industrial engineers, three were economists, one was a navy 
engineer, and one was a merchant navy captain (Roma, 1994a). The introduction 
of managers at the head of the Social Security hospitals raised opposition partly 
because at that time their wages were considered too high within the health sector 
standards. Most importantly, as the same former hospital manager argued: 
'Appointing a manager meant that the medical director and the general 
administrator had to be under his/her authority. Managers gradually 
created close support staff for the management of resources, legal 
matters ... In this way the managerial and command structure was 
consolidated in this first period with the creation of three directors below 
the managerial structure (medical, nurse and administrative directors). 
... 
The manager figure was gradually accepted partly because in a 
period of expansive investments the power of he [sic] who allocates 
resources is consolidated, and partly because of the generalisation of 
this figure in the rest of economic and organisational environments. ... In the second generation of managers the number of doctors re-trained 
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as managers was very important ... 
When it comes to relationships and 
credibility there is more understanding ... and management is very well paid'. 
The first director general of the CHI in 1983 (who had previously been 
manager of infrastructures of the INSALUD) developed an administrative and civil 
service-like style. He had sought the advice of a close staff who had previously 
been members of the INSALUD and whose 'bureaucratising' drive led some of 
those first managers to resign in 1984. That same year Mr. Xavier Trias, member of 
the Catalan DHSS and clearly committed to the'managerial drive' of the initial DG 
of Health Care, was appointed as the new director general of the CHI. It was not 
until 1986, though, that the figure of manager for the whole CHI was created, with 
the function of co-ordinating the territorial structure of management areas and the 
central services (Roma, 1994a: 95,101,110). At the same time, Xavier Trias, the 
director general of the CHI, was also appointed director general of the DG of 
Health Organisation and Planning created in 1983, thus holding both offices. In 
1988 Xavier Trias (until then Director of the CHI and of the DG of Health 
Organisation and Planning) was appointed Conseller of the DHSS. He held this 
office for the two legislative periods over which the 1990 Law for the Organisation 
of Health in Catalonia was debated and passed (1989-90) and further reinterpreted 
and modified (1991-95)39. The debate concerning this law was at the centre of a 
consensus-building process whose results sharply contrasted with the controversy 
which the 1991 Abril Report faced at the Spanish central government level. 
39 In November 1995 CiU won the autonomous elections for the fifth consecutive legislative 
period since 1980, but this time without the absolute majority in parliament it had had since 
1984. The CiU President of the Catalan government appointed Xavier Trias as Head of the 
Presidency Department of the Catalan government. In May 1996, he announced a four-year 
programme to reorganise the Catalan government's administrative apparatus along private 
sector management criteria. This was to be achieved through the introduction of incentives 
to foster competitiveness, the definition of citizens as clients who have to be served 
effectively, and the pursuit of flexible and quick responsiveness through the creation of 
autonomous agencies, public or mixed companies, and consortia which could by-pass 
administrative law (La Vanguardia, 13/5/96, my emphasis). 
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Figure 2.4. Reorganisations of the Department of Health 
and Social Security, 1980-89. 
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Two changes in the macro-institutional framework appear to be a prelude to 
the reforms further introduced by 1990 Law for the Organisation of Health in 
Catalonia and its 'new public management' (NPM) interpretation: the split between 
financing and provision. The first of these two changes was the creation of the 
Direction General of Economic Resources of the Health System in 1989 by decree 
within the DHSS. It assumed the functions of allocation and evaluation of economic 
resources within the health sector, organisation and projects of physical resources, 
and economic and financing control of the CHI and of the rest of public and private 
providers holding contracts with the CHI. With the benefit of hindsight, this new DG 
of Economic Resources of the Health System is now defined as the precursor of 
the Catalan Health Service created by the 1990 LOHC (see Chapter 4). The 
regulatory role (definition and evaluation of the accreditation system) still remained 
with the DG of Health Organisation and Planning created in 1983, but this DG was 
dismantled with the creation of the Catalan Health Service in 1991, and this 
regulatory role was assigned to the DG of Economic Resources of the Health 
System, which changed its name into DG of Health Resources (see Figure 2.4 and 
Figure 2.5). 
Figure 2.5. Organisational chart of the Department of Health 
and Social Security, 1989. 
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Figure 2.6. Organisational chart of the Catalan Health Institute, 1987-88. 
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The second main institutional change in 1989 affected the CHI. By virtue of 
the same decree, the CHI had an internal restructuring mandated by which the 
units holding managerial tasks were directly attached to the CHI's manager -a 
figure created in 1986 which broke some hierarchical features of its organisation. 
As Figure 2.6 shows, the figure of manager introduced in 1986 did not have clear 
areas of responsibility under its line of hierarchy. By contrast, the 1989 
reorganisation of the CHI gave the manager an explicit area of competence - 
namely the management of the CHI hospitals and primary care providers (see 
Figure 2.7). In this reorganisation the Under-IDG of Administration of the CHI 
disappeared and the role of health area managers was reasserted - beyond their 
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turnover, which was said to be concomitant to changes in organisational culture 
(Roma, 1994a: 127). Most importantly, within the Under-DG of Health Services of 
the CHI, the Sections responsible for the contracted services with non-CHI 
providers disappeared, so that the Services of Hospital, Primary Care and 
Pharmacy, kept only the Section of 'activity' and 'control' concerning CHI providers 
only. This institutional redefinition of the CHI is also considered to be a prelude to 
the split between financing and provision which the LOHC developed one year 
later. 
Figure 2.7. Organisational chart of the Catalan Health Institute, 1989-93. 
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b) Regulating health care provision. 
The diversity of providers in Catalonia has traditionally contrasted with the 
homogeneity of public provision in the rest of Spain. Taking into account all 
hospital beds available, that is, those accredited as part of the acute Hospital 
Network of Public Utilisation (HNPU) created in 1985 and those which were not 
accredited and were therefore non-HNPU members, their distribution by ownership 
in Catalonia differs substantially from that in the rest of Spain (see Table 2.3). The 
weight of public providers is higher in the rest of Spain both for Social Security- 
owned hospitals (39 as against 12 per cent) and for hospitals owned by local and 
provincial administrations (37 as against 29 per cent). Also, the weight of private 
providers in Catalonia is twice as much as in the rest of Spain in the case of the 
non-charitable, and nearly three times in the case of the charitable. 
Table 2.3. Hospitals and available beds in Catalonia and the rest of Spain, 
classified by private or public ownership, 1995. 
Ownership nO of % over total nO of beds % over total 
hospitals 
Catalonia rest of Catalonia rest of Catalonia rest of Catalonia rest of 
Spain Spain Spain Spain 
Public total 48 284 27.1 46,5 12,1900 102,800 41.0 75.3 
Soc. Security 8+ 124 4.5 20.3 3,800 52,600 12.2 38.5 
Other* 40 160 22.6 26.2 9,100 50,200 28.8 36.8 
Private total 129 326 72,9 53.5 18,600 33,800 59.0 24.7 
non-charit. 68 222 38.4 36.4 9,400 18,700 29.7 13.7 
charitable++ 61 104 34.5 17.1 9,200 15,100 29.3 11.0 
TOTAL '177 610 100 100 31,500 136,600 100 100 
+ Counting the three hospitals of Vall dHebr6 as one. 
++ Owned by the Red Cross, the Church, and others. 
* Provincial and municipal hospitals, in the case of Catalonia including the newly created consortia 
(4,752 beds) in most of which the Catalan government takes part. 
** Of which only 69 hospitals (17,878 beds) are part of the Catalan Hospital Network of Public 
Utilisation. 
Source: Own elaboration based on MSC (1995). 
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This scenario has given the Catalan government a wider margin of 
manoeuvre in the field of health management concerning the 'contracted sector' 
than in the rest of Spain. The Catalan government had a choice to make: either 
expanding the organisational and direct management model of the CHI (Social 
Security-owned health services), or revitalising the existing non-CHI contracted 
providers and transforming them into a network for the coverage of public health 
care, that is, 'substituting' instead of 'complementing' the Social Security/INSALUD 
direct provision. The Catalan government chose the latter option. In fact, the driving 
idea throughout the eighties was the need to integrate the existing resources in a 
single health care network, the Hospital Network of Public Utilisation (HNPU), 
which was internally diverse in terms of both management and ownership. 
The Department of Health and Health Care of the pre-autonomous, 
provisional Catalan government elaborated a Health Map of Catalonia under the 
co-ordination of its Conseller, Mr. Ramon Espasa, who was a leading member of 
the communist Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSUC). This Health Map was a 
consequential contribution to further developments in the Catalan health policy. It 
was presented in 1980 before the first autonomous elections gave the largest 
minority to CiU and confined the PSUC to the opposition. The leftist forces 
represented in parliament were not able to reach any post electoral agreement and 
CiU governed as a minority. The Health Map was conceived of by its authors as an 
expression of the main strategies to follow for the implementation of the model of 
National Health Service defended by the Catalan socialists and communists during 
the transition. In the second half of the seventies, they were the first to directly 
tackle the issue of defining a model of health policy and system as a centrepiece of 
a democracy4O, and explicitely focused on the 'Catalan Countries'41 even before 
40 The theoretical health system models and proposals elaborated by the leftist opposition 
during the Spanish democratic transition in the second half of the seventies (for example, by 
Espasa, Arcarin, Revent6s, Artigas, Brunet and Soler, among others) and the contributions 
of the 1976 Congress of Catalan-speaking Physicians and Biologists, were all discussed and 
brought together in the Congress of Catalan Culture in May 1977. The main conclusions of 
this congress pointed to the need to create a public health system financed through the 
general budget and aimed at universal coverage. Universal coverage was not defined as 
equity of access but equity in the actual opportunities to achieve the same minimum level of 
health across the territory (regionalisation of the network) and across social classes 
(selective interventions) (Gol, 1978: 93-6). The proposals in this congress were also the first 
among the opposition's models in which the creation of a fund for regional redistribution for 
counteracting territorial inequities was suggested not only for the Catalan Countries but also 
for the rest of the Spanish state (Gol, 1978: 91; de Miguel, 1979: 214-222). 
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the political system and territorial organisation of the state was defined. The core of 
their proposals were universal coverage, equity in the access to resources through 
the regionalisation of the health network, planning, and an integral concept of both 
health (prevention, public health and education) and of health provision (co- 
ordinating different levels and areas of services). These ideas became the core of 
the Health Map. 
The central idea of regionalisation of a health care network based on the 
existing resources - though without integrating them in the health administration - 
and the principle of equity of access were central contributions of the Health Map 
which characterised the policy developments throughout eighties. To this end, 
Catalonia introduced an accreditation system for the hospital sector in 1981, 
immediately after the Spanish government transferred the management of its 
health services to the Catalan government. It was the first accreditation programme 
in Europe42. In contrast to other countries' accreditation systems, the Catalan 
accreditation body was not a professional agency or commission but the health 
administration itself - which was also responsible for setting the prices system 
which applied to contract-like agreements (Bohigas, 1991a: 139). According to 
L6pez et a/. (1988: 15-6), the need for the Catalan government to design an 
accreditation programme, after the assumption of competencies over health, came 
about because of three main factors: first, the lack of data about the centres for 
which it had become responsible; second, the fact that the hospital network of 
public coverage consisted (via economic contract-like agreements held by the 
INSALUD in Catalonia) of hospitals belonging to private and public proprietors 
other than the INSALUD; and third, the urgent need to contain health care costs 
without decreasing quality. 
The process of accrediting a health care provider was based on the analysis 
of ! its physical, organisational and operating structures and its comparison with 
41 The term 'Catalan Countries' defines a geographical area with common socio-cultural 
features - at present with a clear reference to where the Catalan language is spoken. This 
area includes Catalonia, the Valencian Community (called Valencian Country in this 
terminology), the Balearic Islands, a narrow strip of the east of the Autonomous Community 
of Aragon (called the 'west strip' in this terminology), a southern strip of the Rosse116 in 
France (called the northern Catalonia in this terminology), and I'Alguer (in Sardinia). 
42 And in Spain, where the 1991 Abril Report still recommended the creation of an 
accreditation programme for the INSALUD's own providers and for those with which it has 
contractual agreements. For an analysis of different health sector accreditation systems in 
the different countries see Scrivens (1995). 
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standard indicators. In the case of Catalonia, this regulatory role was played by the 
DG of Health Care from 1981 to 1983 and from 1983 to 1990 by the DG of Health 
Organisation and Planning. The aim of this process was to guarantee adequate 
structure levels and detect problems which can affect the quality of care, as a first 
step to project improvements. Furthermore, being accredited (that is, meeting the 
standards), was a necessary condition for holding a contractual agreement with the 
DHSS for the provision of health services. The first accreditation order (November 
1981, and revised in 1986 and 1992), together with the contractual agreements 
orders (1981, and revised in 1983 and 1991) modified the existing Social Security 
contractual system by reducing the hospital levels established by the INSALUD 
from twenty-one to three. Those centres which were not given accreditation did not 
renew their contractual agreement and either disappeared or, as in the second 
accreditation order, were redefined as hospitals for chronic illnesses and mental 
care. In turn, the Development of the Health Map of Catalonia was presented in 
1983. This Development was a strategic document which formulated the criteria 
and proposals to guide the planning of hospital resources for the following ten 
years. The basic idea was the need to rationalise the health care supply and to 
ensure its quality. To this end, the projected public hospital network had to include 
the non-Social Security hospitals holding contractual agreements as stable and 
regular providers of Social Security-financed services (Vallribera, 1994: 28). 
c) Policy tools in health care. 
The accreditation process as a selection mechanism had a major impact on the 
hospital sector as it informed the creation of the Hospital Network of Public 
Utilisation (HNPU) in 1985. This network included only accredited centres, 
regardless of their ownership and legal nature, which provided health care for the 
Social Security beneficiades - and since 1986 for all the population covered by the 
NHS. The Spanish Social Security had started building some hospitals of its own at 
the end of the forties and intensified investments from the sixties. However, in 
Catalonia such investment was lower on a per capita basis than in the rest of 
Spain, because Social Security relied on contractual agreements with long-existing 
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public and private hospitals, the latter being mostly charitable and often involving 
the church, local governments, and mutuality members in their directive boards. By 
the beginning of the 1980s the number of Social Security beds in Catalonia was 
0.74 per 1,000 inhabitants, compared to a ratio of 1.56 beds in the rest of Spain, 
where, for this reason, the role of contractual agreements was much less important 
(Pomds, Ahicart, 1988: 55),. 
The existing diversity of providers in Catalonia originated from a 
differentiated Catalan health policy. This policy was intended to reverse the 
prevailing preference for Social Security providers and, consequently, the 
consideration of public and private non-Social Security providers as 
'complementary' resources. Instead, the latter became a priority for the Catalan 
government in an attempt to redress their under-funding, while all public hospitals 
were considered to be most in need of better management (Bohigas, 1991b: 6). 
The creation of the HNPU as a central measure in the development of the Catalan 
'model'was the consolidation of a policy option formulated back in 1981 within the 
DG of Health Care. As a representative of the managers association Catalan Union 
of Hospitals expressed: 
'The 'Catalan model' [was not 'formulated' but] already existed. What 
we have done is to organise, up-date, and modernise it. The Catalan 
model is based on the historical fact that a number of hospitals existed 
which were the initiative of the civil society's - not of the 
administration's. It did not make sense to invest in new hospitals 
because then those would have closed down. And we did not have the 
money [to built new hospitals]. ' 
However, whether these developments were the re-assertion of an existing 
model or a deliberate policy option among other possible options is a matter of 
debate. In this respect, a top official of the Catalan Health Service (the new health 
authority created in 1991) argued that: 
'The 'Catalan model' was the freest by the time the transfers of the 
Social Security health services were agreed. The case of Catalonia had 
the most open options. If the whole territory is covered by the health 
services of the Social Security it is more difficult to change than if you 
have a structure which, to begin with, is more diverse ... 
There were 
options: everything which has been done from anew could have been 
done according to the INSALUD's model. With the transfer agreements 
two unfinished hospitals of the Social Security were also transferred 
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(Vic and Terrassa), which [once finished] could have been managed by 
the Social Security [that is, the CHI], having statutory personnel ... 
The 
decision of the Catalan government not to do it was political. They 
negotiated with close entities (foundations, the church, local councils... 
and the first consortia were created'. 
In any case, this proliferation of private hospitals as civil society initiatives 
included both non-charitable (including mutualities)43 and charitable (of a larger 
size) centres. The private hospital sector in the rest of Spain is characterised by 
open institutions, such as private clinics, which do not have structural costs 
comparable to closed institutions. For these open institutions the client is not the 
patient but the doctor, who treats her/his own patients in those clinics and receives 
fee-for-service payment. In this system, doctors remain liberal professionals. By 
contrast, a crucial feature of the management tradition of charitable private 
hospitals in Catalonia was that they were not open but closed institutions. That is, 
they had an integrated, permanent medical staff, paid for by the hospital (fee-for- 
service was not permitted), and patients were treated there as clients of the 
institution rather than of a particular doctor - in a similar way as in a public hospital. 
Some of the largest of these hospitals belonged to the Church and had the highest 
reputation as centres of excellence for treatment, research and medical training. In 
some cases their reputations dated back to the middle ages (for example the Sant 
Pau's Hospital in Barcelona). Their reputation attracted prestigious professionals to 
work as staff members - who also worked as liberal professionals in private 
practices - and students, in spite of the poor remuneration involved (Revent6s et 
a/., 1991: 69-82). 
Many of these private hospitals had reached a critical economic and financial 
situation of bankruptcy and de-capitalisation, due to a lack of investment as well as 
to an improvement of Social Security health services. They depended on 
contributions from the Church, from their municipal councils, from private donations 
given by mutualities' clients, and from the contractual agreements they had been 
signing with the Social Security. These contracts were based on the negotiation of 
a block grant, which was similar to a budgetary allocation as it did not specify the 
43 In contrast to the rest of Spain, where double public and private health coverage reached 
seven per cent of the population in 1993 (see Table 2.2), in Catalonia 21 per cent of the 
population has double coverage - Social Security contributions and private insurance. 
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units or the kinds of services to be provided. However, it was not until the late 
1970s that this situation began to be considered as non-sustainable. The local 
authorities had often been represented as honorary members in those hospital's 
directive boards. Following the first muncipal elections of 1979, the democratic 
local authorities undertook financial and political commitment towards these 
hospitals -a policy area of greatest importance to the local people. When a new 
health authority with exclusive competencies was created (the DHSS of the 
Catalan government), these local governments and hospitals demanded that this 
new authority undertook the responsibility for the survival of these centres. 
The creation of the HNPU in 1985 had two main objectives. On the one hand, 
to give those hospitals stability in the provision of services and, consequently, 
ensure their economic viability. On the other hand, to require from such hospitals 
the adoption of efficiency, quality and cost-control measureS44. Thus, the HNPU 
integrated all the accredited acute hospital resources regardless of their ownership 
and legal nature. Some hospitals outside of this network would be financed 
(contracted) to undertake care of patients with chronic illnesses -a service not 
covered by the Social Security (Vallribera, 1994: 30-5). Thus, from 1985, being a 
HNPU-member required hospitals to be a more closed institution and to redefine 
the role of the hospital as a publicly financed provider. Something which was not 
required but which has been a dominant development is that mostly all HNPU- 
members ended up having a single main client: the DHSS, which contracted with 
them for the health coverage of nearly the whole population. 
However, the criterion for being included in the HNPU was not only because 
of having a contract-like agreement with the CHI - since contracts can be used with 
non-accredited providers in time-limited, exceptional situations. Rather, the criterion 
for including a hospital in the HNPU was the health care role that particular provider 
was supposed to play in a particular geographical area. The consolidation of the 
HNPU as a territorially balanced network required an expansive trend of investment 
aimed at rebuilding, enlarging or modernising existing old private and public non- 
44 In addition to being accredited as a necessary condition to hold a contract with the CHI, 
the HNPU-member hospitals were required to: adapt their accounting systems to a standard 
plan designed by the DHSS; supply management indicators and adapt their management to 
the DHSS guidelines; facilitate discharges reports following standardised models; ensure 
quality control mechanisms; to facilitate annual audits undertaken by the Department of 
Economy and Finance of the Catalan government; and submit a three-year plan for 
resources and investment (Pom6s, Ahicart, 1988: 57). 
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CHI public centres, or even buildings which had not been completed or equipped, 
in order to transform them into A-level facilities, namely basic hospitals with a view 
to cover the territory equitably (DSSS, 1995b: 10). This investment programme was 
halted by a deep economic crisis in 1984-85 affecting the hospital sector, which 
created difficulties for the accreditation process. As a result the prices used in 
contractual agreements were frozen following the budget control policy decided by 
the Spanish central government. Social Security hospitals also had wages and 
investments almost frozen. This crisis situation led to an agreement between the 
DHSS and the Spanish central government (the Cullell-Guerra Agreement), which 
provided a temporary solution through an additional budget allocation. 
Two main causes were argued to be the origin of this situation of near- 
bankruptcy amongst hospitals. On the one hand, there was the argument that the 
accreditation programme had been too strict in its requirements, inducing hospitals 
to live up to them by increasing their expenditures. On the other hand, as a top 
representative of a HNPU member hospital consortium (created in 1986 by several 
private and non-CHI public hospitals) put it: 
'The Social Security had been paying contract-agreements much below 
the real costs of services ... This led to an endemic under-financing of the [contracted] sector over time ... 
The tariff paid for contracts had 
been frozen, while the inflation of health costs is higher than in other 
economic sectors ... This generated a 
deficit in the operating costs of 
these hospitals, and the only way to solve the tension created was to 
stop paying the Social Security contributions, thus generating a huge 
debt ... Many 
hospitals still resort to this solution when they have 
financial problems'. 
It was in this context of financial and economic crisis that the 1986 Plan for 
the Reorganisation of the Hospital Sector (PRH) was formulated. Its main drive was 
to reorganise the hospital sector by consolidating an accessible hospital network 
based on basic level hospitals evenly distributed across Catalonia. This required 
expanding resources in some places and reducing them in others. The former was 
achieved, but the second was not. As Pom6s and Ahicart (1988: 58) point out, the 
ratio of beds per 1,000 inhabitants ranged from 3.66 in the then CHI's management 
area of Barcelona to 1.9 in those of Lleida and Girona, and 1.46 in that of 
Maresme. In order to achieve a more even distribution of beds, the PRH was 
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presented as a planning exercise of the public supply of hospital health care 
services to be implemented between 1987 and 1991, and was intended to develop 
the Development of the Health Map. The expansive measures continued while the 
projected rationalisations (that is, reductions) of hospital resources mostly in the 
metropolitan area of Barcelona were not carried out. 
The problems the PRH was supposed to address were: the rising costs of 
hospital services, the excessive weight of the hospital sector in the health care 
network, the territorial and technological imbalance in the hospital network, and the 
low productivity of the health sector in general (Bohigas, Oriol, 1987: 7). Therefore, 
the PRH provided several supply-side measures to influence both the HNPU- 
member hospitals (for acute patients) and those non-HNPU hospitals (for chronic 
patients), the latter being a first step for the elaboration in 1986 of the socio-health 
programme for the elderly 'Life to Years'. A first group of measures was intended to 
help the economic survival of providers by postponing the payments of the Social 
Security contributions to the Treasury for a period of 20-30 years, giving credits in 
special conditions, as well as non-recovery subsidies. In addition, financial 
measures were taken to increase the global health budget in real terms, regardless 
of the transfers from the central INSALUD - which had decreased as a percentage 
of the GDP in the previous two years. Given that by 1987 the debts of hospitals 
contracted by the CHI amounted to 75 per cent of their annual income, and many 
of them were bankrupt, these measures were justified as vital. 
A second group of measures was intended to modify the contractual system 
by defining levels of hospitals and calculating the price of units of activity measures 
for each level. In this respect, planning measures intended to give more weight to 
the basic of the three levels of hospital (A) to the detriment of the reference45 
general level (B) and the high technology level (C). Thus, the bed distribution 
projected was 25 per cent for level C- one hospital per 1,5 million people-, and 35 
per cent for level B- one hospital per 400,000 people. A-level hospitals were 
projected to be equitably distributed within Catalonia - one hospital per comarca (a 
supra-municipal territorial demarcation). As for the chronic network, the objective 
was to achieve a ratio of 0.5 beds per 1,000 inhabitants. Within this classification, 
prices paid for Basic Care Units (BCU) of activity measure were adjusted to costs 
4,5 A reference hospital is that to which patients are referred by other hospitals of lower 
technological level, so that they Gan be provided with more complex treatment. 
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according to the different level of treatment complexity dealt with by these levels of 
hospitals, and the financing system was left to be negotiated with providers. 
These measures were formalised in four contractual orders in April 1986 
regulating the bases of the corresponding administrative process, including levels 
of hospitals defined, the procedures for the integrafion into and exclusion from the 
HNPU, health care services regulations, and BCUs of activity and payment. Thus, 
the contract model included clauses on the services to be provided, the length and 
method of renewal or non-renewal, patients' access regime, the statistical 
documents required, the incompatibility regulations applying to their personnel, and 
the maximum percentage of primary care emergencies to be billed (Artal et al., 
1987: 36). In 1992 and in 1997 these contractual orders were again revised. 
Among the central supply-side measures of the PRH, the reduction of beds in 
the metropolitan area confronted a strong opposition from the collectives affected 
and was actually not implemented46. By contrast, the objectives of expansion and 
consolidation of a territorially balanced hospital network of basic-level hospitals was 
achieved to a large extent. This process relied on the proliferation of new 
management forms such as the creation of consortia with the participation of the 
DHSS, and the contracting out of the management of public providers. In this 
context, the DHSS took an active role in fostering the creation of consortia in order 
to reorganise the provision structure of health care. This process involved the 
integration of individual hospitals of specific areas into public-private consortia in 
order to rationalise the existing resources and their utilisation. Also, the DHSS 
invested in infrastructure and equipment of non-CHI hospitals and became in 
several cases a member of the directive board of some of the consortia it had 
encouraged to form. These negotiations were aimed at finding locally based 
solutions by involving local councils, mutualities and other private owners. In this 
period four consortia were created - two hospital consortia (in Vic and in Sabadell), 
and two health consortia which included both hospital and primary care (in 
Terrassa and in Barcelona)47. The aim was to reorganise services, raise the quality 
46 Several key informants stressed this point: a leader figure of the HNPU member Health 
Consortium of Barcelona, a manager of the HNPU member Hospital Consortium of Parc 
Tauli in Sabadell and a top figure of the Foundation of this Consortium, and aa leader of 
the hospital association UCH. 
47 Several cases of negotiation processes leading up to the creation of consortia are 
explained in (SCS, 1995c). 
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standards of care, optimise resources and engage institutions in a co-responsible 
health care management. In this respect the indirect management form of consortia 
was preferred (as opposed to direct management by the CHI) because there was 
no general regulation of it as a legal figure: it was therefore a flexible mechanism of 
governance. This change was intended to facilitate the further introduction of 
private sector management practices and the avoidance of bureaucratic models of 
organisation, together with public sector features such as personnel regime and 
budgetary processes (Lafarga, 1994: 142-3). 
These tactics of local-based negotiations in the development of the Catalan 
'model' of hospital network are interpreted differently by other informants. They find 
a parallelism between these tactics and those being applied in the implementation 
of the contractual system characterising the relationship between the health 
authority and non-CHI providers - even after the introduction in 1986 of the 
calculation system of BCU per tariffs. In the view of a former senior official of the 
DHSS and top directive of the Hospital Consortium of Catalonia, an association 
which mostly represents non-CHI public hospitals in which local governments are 
involved: 
'The tactics of the DHSS has been to segment, forcing very 
individualised negotiations - and this finished with blocks. For example, 
the DHSS negotiates hospital contracts on a per centre basis, it has 
never accepted to negotiate them with associations. With them the 
DHSS only discusses big issues (tariff increments ... ), but the translation 
into concrete stay length, activity... is made in the clauses of each 
contract and is discussed with each hospital. This is a transaction in 
which many contingent factors are at play - if there are municipal 
elections or of another kind that year, the relationship between the 
mayor of that locality with I do not know whom, that a leader of the 
[Official] Medical College works there... ' 
The primary care sector, virtually all of it owned and managed by the CHI, 
was also the object of reform from 1985. From 1982 to 1985, the DHSS of the 
Catalan government built 26 primary care centres in Catalonia (IDSSS, 1995b: 38- 
9). A 1985 decree48 initiated the reform following the pattern of the 1984 primary 
care decree of the Spanish central government. Thus, Basic Health Areas were 
defined, in each of which a Primary Care Team comprising medical and non- 
48 Decree 84/1985,21 March, of the Catalan govemment. 
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medical staff developed activities of health care, health promotion and illness 
prevention. The implementation of this reform further reinforced by the 1986 GHL 
at the state level, and again by the 1990 Law for the Organisation of Health in 
Catalonia (LOHC), confronted apparent difficulties (see Chapter 6). From the early 
nineties to date (mid 1998), this model of primary care provision has been openly 
questioned and contrasted with new management forms. These new forms 
involved the integration of primary care into health consortia comprising also 
specialised/hospital care, the creation of new providers acting within private law 
management mechanisms and the diversification of providers in terms of 
organisation, ownership and management form. These processes were formalised 
into 'management by contract' forms and were also introduced in the early nineties 
in the primary care providers which were owned and managed by the Social 
Security administration - the CHI. 
Conclusions 
According to a former senior official of the former DG of Health Care in the DHSS: 
'The [1990] Law for the Organisation of Health in Catalonia (LOHC) is 
what really creates the Catalan health model, but the LOHC creates the 
model when it was ripe. That is, the LOHC is born because all the 
pieces are already there and in one way or another you cover them with 
an umbrella and bind them up. ' 
As this observer implied, the policy options taken in Catalonia about a 
differentiated health provision model stretched throughout a decade and were 
adopted on an incremental bases without an explicit and binding legal framework 
which might have shaped them from a top-down perspective. With the benefit of 
hindsight, the decade of the eighties in Catalonia was characterised by a 
permanent state of health care reform in which both maintaining continuity and 
making innovations played a relevant role. However, both the sequence and 
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content of these political decisions were conditioned not only by stimuli 
endogenous to the Catalan political and health systems, but also by factors 
exogenous to them. For example, the almost full financial dependence of the 
DHSS of the Catalan government on the central INSALUD's transfers and the 
negotiation and formulation process of the 1986 GHL both conditioned the 
strategies of the Catalan government. Thus, although the Catalan government and 
its DHSS did follow a purposeful and differentiated line of reform which was based 
on their exclusive competencies to organise health care, their autonomy was not 
clear-cut. Nor did they have a health provision model which was clear enough for 
them to pass an explicit legislation right after the basic GHL provided this mandate. 
Initially, the innovative drive of the Catalan reforms emerged from the 1981 
accreditation system and subsequent contracting orders, which implied the will to 
regulate non-Social Security providers with a view to giving them a role in the 
provision of public health services. This accreditation system was at the origin of 
the most consequential of the policy options taken in Catalonia - the creation of the 
HNPU in 1985, which became the basic piece of the 'Catalan model'. The HNPU 
expressed the definite political commitment to follow a divergent path from the 
main Spanish health system by promoting the diversification of health care 
management and provision forms away from the model inherited by the health 
authority. From then on, the management model of the Social Security services 
transferred was not to be expanded but confined to those providers integrated in 
the Catalan Health Institute (CHI) - the decentralised INSALUD. In turn, the existing 
public and private non-Social Security providers were to be regulated and 
consolidated into a network which would remain at an arms-length relationship with 
the health authority (the CHI) on the basis of a contractual system. The several 
updatings of the accreditation system and contracting orders, together with the 
definition of the BCU as an activity measure for setting contractual prices, 
configured the main elements of that contractual system. In the early nineties the 
HNPU and the development of contracting processes were viewed as the origin of 
the NPIVI governance structure which became the focus of the reforms from 1990. 
While innovation was remarkable concerning the policy tools used in the 
hospital sector, the organisation and management of primary care closely followed 
the NHS model defined for the rest of Spain in the mid-eighties. In contrast to the 
hospital sector where the CHI owned and managed less than a fourth of resources, 
in pdmary care the CHI owned and managed virtually all services. This situation left 
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little margin for divergence from the model being implemented in the rest of Spain, 
based on the creation of Health Basic Areas and the full-time, multidisciplinary 
team configuration of Primary Care Centres. 
The institutional design of the health authority was also characterised by 
continuity and inertia. The CHI mimicked the INSALUD's structure and 
management form. Hospitals and primary care services were cost units of a CHI 
which had a single legal personality and which allowed little managerial freedom to 
its provider units. The introduction of Health Area and hospital managers in the 
early eighties and of the CHI manager in 1986 did not involve consequential 
changes in the basic features of the model. However, the fact that the CHI was 
both a provider of health services and the contracting health authority did not seem 
to hinder the gradual consolidation of the HNPU and the contracting system as the 
main features of the Catalan hospital sector. 
This differentiated governance structure of the health sector developed within 
a wider state health system which was also undergoing reforms but leading to a 
different provision model. While the Catalan government was committed to 
preserve and expand a privately managed hospital network, the PSOE in the 
Spanish central government was committed to a direct, public provision model of 
health care. Aware as the Catalan government was of these diverging paths, it 
tumed out to be particularly active in influencing the formulation of the GHL. This 
law was passed in 1986 after a long and controversial process of negotiations and 
was endowed with a basic legal character - that is, it affected all Autonomous 
Communities. As a result of the negotiations, though, the provisions concerning the 
organisation and management of the health services were classified as non-basic 
for those Communities with full competencies over health. 
In the Spanish case, the creation of a NHS was a continuity option which built 
on the existing model of Social Security services, and above all, on the hospital 
network which the Social Security had built from the sixties. The reinforcement of 
primary care as the main gatekeeper of the system did involve innovation in 
relation to the weak network of services available until the mid-eighties. By the 
early nineties, when the NHS created by the 1986 GHL had almost achieved 
universal coverage and almost full tax-based financing - to the gradual detriment of 
Social Security contributions -a 1991 report recommended NPM-like reforms for 
the NHS but was rejected by relevant political and social actors. Shortly afterwards 
the pressures for reform came from international events, such as the Maastricht 
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Treaty (1991) and the subsequent 1992 Convergence Plan, focusing on the need 
to reorganise the direct public provision system. As a result, the main aspects of 
reform involved the management autonomy of Social Security providers. They were 
supposed to eventually opt out of the health administration structure and contract 
with the health authority, thereby separating purchaser and provider. There was 
also to be a gradual shift from the 'statutory J, civil-service like regime of health 
professionals to a labour market-like contractual system. Thus, it is not until the 
early nineties that both the Spanish central government and some Autonomous 
Communities considered undertaking reforms on the lines that Catalonia has 
followed since 1981. 
However, although the creation of the HNPU is an innovative policy option in 
the Spanish context, it is arguably a feature of, structural influences and 
incrementalism in the Catalan context, since the HNPU involves reinforcing and 
consolidating a network of providers which already existed. Even so, in order to 
explain why the Catalan government managed to develop a governance structure 
for the health sector which was different from the rest of Spain is it not enough to 
just point out the existence of a heterogeneous hospital network - because in the 
early 1980s most of these hospitals were in an non-sustainable economic situation 
and did not even meet the standards of the Social Security providers. Clear 
decisions had to be made about policy options which affected different policy 
coalitions. For this reason, an analysis of the role played by non-institutional actors 
involved in the health policy arena is necessary to understand the developments 
which occurred in the Catalan health policy over the eighties. The policy 
preferences of these actors, their resources and the patterns of interaction among 
them are strong explanatory variables for the policy outcomes which followed. 
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Chapter 3 
Policy elites and the consolidation of the 
Catalan model, 1980-90. 
Two important factors that influence the decisions legislators make about the 
design of public sector institutions are policy precedents and the interaction 
between public officials (legislators and bureaucrats) and non-institutional actors 
(interests groups). In this sense, political transactions costs derive, to a large 
extent, from the way in which risk is assigned to different groups who have varying 
capabilities to insure against it (Horn, 1995; Moe, 1990). The formulation in 1990 of 
a new governance structure for the Catalan health system was dependent, to a 
relevant degree, on a decade-long policy incubation period in which both the 
development of key policy tools and the participation of interest groups in their 
formulation and implementation played a strong role. As advocacy coalition states, 
two kinds of exogenous elements influenced the Catalan health policy subsystem 
throughout this period. First, those stemming from the Spanish political system 
(democratisation, decentralisation and creation of a National Health System), and 
second, those derived from the Catalan political system (institution-bu il ding and 
territorial distribution of power within Catalonia). This chapter analyses the latter 
exogenous elements, as well as those elements endogenous to the Catalan health 
policy subsystem -namely, the role that interest groups and governmental actors of 
different administration levels played in the incremental development of a health 
system differentiated from the rest of Spain. 
One of the characteristic features of the reform process of the Catalan health 
sector since the late 1980s has been the high degree of consensus achieved on a 
wide policy core of ideas among a relatively stable policy elite. There are four 
reasons why this consensus should be seen as remarkable and made a matter of 
inquiry. First, in the Catalan case this agreement concerns the introduction of policy 
tools and of a political discourse clearly in line with 'new public management 
(NPM) reforms which in other countries and even in the rest of Spain have been a 
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matter of strong disagreement. Second, in Catalonia this consensus encompasses 
not only political parties whose ideological counterparts in other countries have 
strongly criticised NPM reforms, but also the actors who were most fundamentally 
affected by the reforms. Third, the distribution of political power in Catalonia among 
different levels of government (the Autonomous Community and local 
governments) reflects both a particular distribution of resources and the 
persistence of split voting between the two largest parties, each facing different 
commitment problems and having different reasons for co-operating. And finally, 
despite this wide consensus there has been a gap between actual formulation and 
discourse, and between discourse and implementation, which, according to an 
even wider policy elite (including the minority opposing the reform), amounts to a 
fundamental distortion of the model and of the spirit of the reforms. 
In order to explain - at least to a relevant extent - this unusual consensus it is 
necessary, firstly, to analyse the role of the non-institutional elite in the policy- 
making process - namely, the consequences of their interactions with public 
officials. In this sense, advocacy coalitions are defined as comprising actors 'from a 
variety of governmental and private organisations at different levels of government 
who share a set of policy beliefs and seeks to realise them by influencing the 
behaviour of multiple governmental institutions over time' (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier, 
Jenkins-Smith, 1993: 212). On the one hand, the analysis of the role of advocacy 
coalitions requires identifying the resources the different actors rely on, the way 
they use (or do not use) them, the choice situations they face and the pattern of 
interactions among them. These factors help explain the gradual consolidation of 
the policy elite, their interests and their expressed preference orderings concerning 
the policy in question. On the other hand, the analysis of the role of this elite in the 
consensus achieved requires defining the areas on which their belief systems offer 
a common bases for agreement. The belief system they share consists of a set of 
value priorities, causal assumptions about how to realise them and problem 
perceptions. In this respect, their explicit arguments and preferences on specific 
policy choices expressed in publications and in-depth interviews provide evidence 
about the extent to which their belief systems overlapped - which in turn reveals the 
potential bases for agreement or disagreement in the case of the Catalan 
institutional reform process. 
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Table 3.1. Changes in factors exogenous and endogenous to the Catalan 
health policy elite over the 1980S. 
Exogenous factors 
Relatively stable 
parameters: 
Dynamic system 
events: 
l. assumption of 
health competencies 
by the autonomous 
government, 
2. regulation of the 
health sector 
(provision side) 
Iconsolidation of 
asset ownership 
on the provision side 
4. revival of cultural 
values enhancing the 
role of civil society. 
1. stability in the systemic 
governing coalition 
(territorial distribution of 
power), 
2. impact from another 
subsystem (financing from 
the Spanish central 
government, negotiation of 
the General Health Law), 
Ichange in socio-economic 
conditions and technology 
(demand, resources 
management techniques). 
Endogenous factors 
1. shared and stable leadership 
of central actors (policy brokers 
and advocacy coalition leaders), 
2. clear definition of subsystem 
boundaries (actual and potential 
actors), 
3. policy oriented learning across 
belief systems in the late eighties 
and nineties. 
Source: Own elaboration based on Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993). 
The learning process by which actors redefine their convictions and 
arguments can result from changes in factors which may be exogenous or 
endogenous to the policy elite or subsystem. Advocacy coalition theory identifies 
two sets of factors which affect the constraints and opportunities of subsystem 
actors (or policy elite) - exogenous and endogenous factors to the subsystem - 
and which have a two-directional impact between one another. This theory 
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distinguishes between two kinds of exogenous factors: stable and dynamic 
parameters. Concerning the exogenous-stable factors, the most relevant in the 
Catalan case appear to be the following (see Table 3.1). First, there have been 
gradually induced changes in the basic structures of the problem area through both 
the assumption of health competencies at the autonomous government level and 
the purposeful consolidation of a heterogeneous health care provision network. 
Second, these structural changes have been supported by modifications of the 
basic legal framework through the regulation of the sector. Finally, an induced 
revival of fundamental cultural values, namely the countervailing roles of the civil 
society and of government, has been fostered by the policy elite. 
At the same time, the dynamic factors exogenous to the policy subsystem 
appear to be relevant for the consensus achieved in the late eighties and early 
nineties reform in Catalonia. First, there has been relative stability in the Catalan 
political system. The two largest forces, the coalition Convergence and Union (CiU) 
and the Party of the Catalan Socialists (PSC), have to a great extent 
accommodated to a tenitorial distribution of their respective power. The impacts 
from other policy subsystems have mainly concerned the financing of the whole 
reform process - because this financing has been subjected to negotiations with 
the Spanish central government - and the negotiation of the 1986 General Health 
Law at the Spanish central government level. Finally, there have been remarkable 
changes in socio-economic conditions and technology such as the introduction of 
pdvate management techniques in the health sector, investments in infrastructure 
and technology and an overall increase in the resources of the system. 
Among the factors endogenous to the policy subsystem identified by 
advocacy coalition theory, the most relevant in the Catalan case is the shared and 
stable leadership of central policy elite actors (policy brokers) over the eighties and 
early nineties, combined with a clear delimitation of subsystem boundaries (actual 
and potential actors). In addition, policy-oriented learning across belief systems 
was purposely intensified throughout that same period by the different advocacy 
coalitions. 
However, although advocacy coalition theory explores the role of values of 
coalition members and of exogenous factors in fostering policy change, it does not 
stretch its analysis to find out how ideas are actually used by decision-makers. This 
theory could be even more insightful if it attempted to link properties of the 
structure under which decision-making takes place with the properties (resources) 
89 
of individuals - such as information, legitimate authority, conditional and/or 
unconditional incentives to alter others' incentive structure and reputation 
(Dowding, 1995,1996). Both resources and ideology have an influence on how 
actors' perceive their interests and form their preferences. These preferences and 
the use actors make of their resources enable the development of specific patterns 
of interaction which become explanatory variables of policy outputs. In turn, these 
patterns of interaction influence both actors' ideology and the distribution of 
resources among them (see Figure 3.1). 
Figure 3.1. Policy preferences formation. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Following this framework, this chapter focuses on the pattern of interactions 
(bilateral and multilateral) between the main actors of the most relevant actors, that 
is, among the non-institutional policy elite and between each set of actors and the 
health administration as a central actor. These interactions help explain not only 
the result of the policy formulation process, but also the result of the 
implementation process. The analysis of these relationships will be based on the 
use these actors make of the resources on which they depend. At the same time, 
the gradual consolidation of the belief systems of this policy elite will be analysed 
on the bases of the arguments they have developed. This analysis identifies a 
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common ground for agreement and for the consensus which further characterised 
the 1990 reform process that is analysed in Chapter 4. 
The non-institutional policy elite which has played a relevant role in the 
decision-making process of the Catalan health care reforms throughout the eighties 
and nineties conforms to a policy subsystem in which four different interest 
groupings may be identified. Each grouping - or rather, their leader and most 
prominent figures - depend on different resources, develops a different pattern of 
relations with the health administration and focuses their broker activities on 
different aspects of the policy area. Two organised groupings have maintained the 
closest relations with the health administration - the DHSS of the Catalan 
government - and played a central role in the definition and implementation of the 
reforms: the Catalan Union of Hospitals (UCH), formed by hospital managers, and 
the Hospital Consortium of Catalonia (CHC), initially formed by 'public/political' 
owners. A third interest grouping is formed by a particularly relevant professional 
association of compulsory membership for the medical profession, the Official 
Medical College of Barcelona (COMB). The COMB represents the interests of the 
medical profession in the province of Barcelona49but its informal, issue-led pattern 
of interaction with the health administration (DHSS) and the large membership it 
represents has led it to become the most relevant of its kind in Catalonia5o. The 
fourth grouping shows a more heterogeneous composition, formed by class-based 
and profession-based unions. The class-based unions are nation-wide and the 
49 Catalonia is divided in four provinces (Barcelona, Girona, Lleida and Tarragona) which 
are supra- municipal, local administrations. In 1987 the Catalan Parliament passed four laws 
for the territorial organisation of Catalonia. Two of them were relevant for provinces. One 
established the provisional nature of the competencies of the provincial administration 
organ (DiputacO) with a clear aim to gradually reduce their functions and eventually abolish 
this administrative level. The other law created a different supra-municipal, local 
demarcation (comarca) which further led to the organisation of the Catalan territory in 41 
supra-municipal units. Similarly to the Diputacions, the comarca's administration organ 
(Consefl comarcao is formed out of a mixed system of direct and indirect representation out 
of the municipal electoral results. The competencies assigned to the Consells comarcals 
overlapped those of local governments (municipalities) and those of Diputacions. However, 
as at 1998, provinces have not been abolished yet. These laws were driven by the anti- 
provincialist stance which has traditionally characterised the political Catalanism from the 
second half of the XIX century. After the francoist dictatorship and into the new democratic 
regime the provincial administration was still viewed as an imposed structure which bore no 
relation with the economic, social and idiosyncratic configuration of the Catalan territory 
(Bag6,1991: 17- 45). 
50 The territorial organisation of the Official Medical Colleges have a provincial basis - that 
is, there is one Official Association in each province. 
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most representative of them are the communist-leaning Workers' Commissions 
(CC. 00), and the socialist-leaning General Union of Workers (UGT). Among the 
profession-based unions CESM-SATSE is the most representative one, being a 
coalition formed by the Catalan branch of the Spanish Confederation of Medical 
Unions (CESM) and the main union of nurses (SATSE). Several other profession- 
based unions have been emerging in the late eighties through a bottom-up process 
originated in different health providers across the Catalan Health Institute, the rest 
of the Hospital Network of Public Utilisation and the private providers, making the 
interests representation more complex. The influence of trade unions has been 
more relevant in specific issues such as labour relations, than in the definition of 
the'Catalan health model'. 
3.1. Hospital interest groups. 
The non-institutional policy elite groups which most closely collaborated with the 
DHSS of the Catalan Government in the decision-making processes leading to the 
'Catalan model' of health care were the UCH and the CHC. To some extent, these 
two organisations had a common origin which was soon followed by a diversion in 
their interests and arguments. But they converged again in the mid-nineties both 
organically and in argumentation terms. Their roles are further analysed. 
a) Managerial interests. 
The UCH is an association of hospital managers initially created in 1974-75. In this 
period the objectives of the hospital managers involved were to co-ordinate actions 
and efforts to confront an administration - namely, the Spanish central 
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administration until the early 1980s. They argued that it treated non-Social Security 
hospitals arbitrarily both in the allocation and remuneration of contracts. At first, the 
UCH assumed the functions of an employers' organisation looking after 
negotiations with trade unions, plus the health administration and with other 
associations. Later on, the UCH widened its objectives to cover the preservation of 
the health provision heritage and of their experience, with an aim to improve the 
organisation and operation of hospitals. Thus, the UCH gradually developed into a 
forum of debate, training and research, and into an instrument of opinion building 
and pressure (UCH, 1995a). 
The relevance of the UCH's role as a collective actor in the policy formulation 
process concerning health policy in Catalonia stems to a great extent from the 
contribution of a small number of its leaders. These people were highly qualified 
and well reputed health managers with an economic education and, in some cases, 
they were also members of the academic staff of private specialised undergraduate 
and postgraduate programmes of well reputed institutions. Key members of the 
directive board of the UCH were in fact in-house staff of the DHSS of the Catalan 
government, actively participating in expert committees during the early and mid- 
eighties. They played a central role in the formulation of key policy options 
throughout the eighties, such as the organisation of the health services and 
resources transferred by the central government, the accreditation and contracting 
orders, the creation of the Hospital Network of Public Utilisation (HNPU), the 
formulation of the Plan for Hospital Reorganisation (PRH), and the definition of the 
Basic Care Unit (BCU, a contracting method for measuring activity and calculating 
the tariffs to be paid for the services contracted by the administration on the bases 
of a fix part and a variable part) (Martinez, 1995; Trullý, 1995). As a highly involved 
actor in the UCH put it: 
'The relations between the Department of Health, the Direction General 
of Health Care and the UCH were fruitful for the country and for the 
hospitals ... The existing mutual acquaintance and 
friendship links with 
some members of the board of the UCH, were key elements for 
achieving the climate of trust which was established between the 
Catalan Health Administration and the UCH. Thanks, on the one hand, 
to the knowledge and experience accumulated by the members of the 
board and, on the other hand, to the technical quality of the studies it 
had been elaborating, the UCH was, in those years, the pfivileged 
intefiocutor of the Department of Health and the Direction General of 
Health Care. ' (Marti, 1995: 11, emphasis in the original). 
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In addition to this central role of influential UCH members as in-house experts 
in the DHSS throughout the eighties, the UCH configured itself as a polyvalent 
think-tank. This role involved, first, undertaking the responsibility for co-ordinating 
mutual collaboration between its members; second, providing services for helping 
smaller members and reaching agreements with enterprises for improving the 
operating of those members; and third the development of research, consulting 
and professional training activities. The UCH was not only personally and 
ideologically close to the party in government, but it was also persistently 
committed to the managerialisation of the health sector amongst both public and 
private health providers. In this respect, the UCH has carried out numerous studies 
on the improvement of hospital management and on the regulation, organisation 
and management of the whole system according to its explicit normative 
convictions and its policy strategies. These studies covered areas such as the 
sectoral adaptation of the General Plan of Accountability in 1978 and 1990, the 
management and training of human resources in health services, and handbooks 
of recommendations for the design and operationalisation of the health information 
system. These studies have been disseminated in courses, conferences and 
seminars for professionals of the sector, as well as in documents for the health 
administration which have represented a direct influence on policy formulation 
(UCH, 1995b). 
The UCH considers as one of its main achievements the creation and 
spreading of a common language across the administration and the health sector 
and among most of present managers. In fact, many of the UCH's arguments - that 
is, their policy strategies or near core arguments - have impregnated the 
vocabulary and thinking of the professionals within the health sector and outside it. 
In this respect, Marti (1991 a) and Salazar (1995) point out the following arguments 
originally brought to the fore by the UCH, and now widely accepted: the defence of 
the hospital heritage built up by the civil society; the separation between planning, 
financing and provision; an equitable distribution of resources, autonomy of 
management for providers; the need to foster organisational changes for the 
improvement of efficiency and quality; and the emphasis on personnel training and 
a homogeneous information system. In a working session of conferences on the 
HNPU held in 1991, Marti (1991b) insisted on the success of this process. He 
argued that two sub-networks (public and private) of non-Social Security contracted 
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providers became acquainted in order to harmonise their objectives and language, 
and ended up becoming more similar and homogeneous as a result of the 
exchange of expedences and knowledge. 
However, from the passing of the 1990 Law for the Organisation of Health in 
Catalonia and the creation of the Catalan Health Service, the UCH's leaders stood 
to be amongst the most critical towards the distortion of the model they had so 
closely collaborated to create for over a decade. Thus, from the beginning of the 
nineties: 
the relations with some members of the super-structure which has 
been created in the CHS [the Catalan Health Service] and its regions 
have not always been totally cordial and fluent. Over the past years, the 
UCH has observed with concern the temptation to create oligopolies of 
providers and strategies of vertical control over population areas. For 
this reason [the UCH] reinforces the position it has always defended, in 
favour of organising hospitals as enterprises of services. At the same 
time [the UCH] highlights the negative 'politicisation' of many hospital 
directive councils and the inconsistency embodied in having separated 
the functions of financing (purchase of services) and provision (sale of 
services), and still having representatives of the purchaser in the 
councils of providers. (The UCH] also reports against the excessive 
bureaucratisation of the CHS and the lack of homogeneity of criteria 
and actions in the different regions. The UCH thinks that the 
intermediation which is taking place in the Catalan public health system 
contributes little to efficiency and does not add value to the care 
process, and that, on the contrary, it makes it more expensive and 
deteriorates its functioning. Finally, [the UCH] sees with disappointment 
how some 'actors' are helped to position themselves strategically in 
order to 'live on the system' instead of 'working for the system'. ' (Marti, 
1995: 13, original quotes and emphasis). 
The creation and evolution of consortia, which has been a central feature of 
the health reforms throughout the eighties, has been viewed by the UCH's leaders 
as a way of making providers which were the expression of a dynamic civil society 
become de facto public5l. The financial and organic dependency of these providers 
51 A leader of the UCH regretted the increasing dependency of civil society on the 
administration. She asserted that the latter hindered the dynamism the former had shown in 
the case of the Catalan health sector, with the creation of hospitals and prestigious schools 
of medicine which are documented even for the middle age (Marti, 1995). On this latter 
point see also Gol et aL (1978). This same argument was also stressed by a top official of 
the Institute of Health Studies of the DHSS of the Catalan government interviewed for this 
study. Trullb (1995) gives evidence on the 'associative spirit' of the Catalan civil society by 
citing the guide of entities in Catalonia, which is edited by the Department of Justice of the 
Catalan government. In this guide, the legal associations are classified into ten categories. 
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on the administration and the interventionism derived from this situation was 
defined as the antithesis of the management autonomy which the UCH had 
defended. This autonomy of management and its identification with private 
business management techniques were the policy core of the reforms throughout 
the eighties and were even intensified from the early 1990 as one of the main 
arguments of the NPM discourse and reform. The UCH and CHC shared views on 
this policy core of ideas, (leaving aside the theme of the 'public/municipal 
ownership' of providers), and as a result their respective positions got closer by the 
mid-nineties. 
Among both the institutional and the non-institutional policy elite there is a 
widespread consensus on the need to preserve the active role of the civil society. 
The argument is that in Catalonia there is a culturally different approach to the 
private/public debate partly because the presence of the private (profit and non- 
profit) initiative has always been very relevant and also very dynamic - particularly 
in those sectors where the administration has not had a strong presence or has not 
covered the eyisting demand. In the case of the health sector, the evolution of 
highly reputable and prestigious institutions which are rooted in consolidated social 
networks has helped develop this differentiated mind-set. 
However, a former top political head of the DHSS of the Catalan government 
insisted that despite this dynamism - which he recognises as a valuable heritage - 
4 civil society' as a concept has been used to support policy choices which 
purposely 'resuscitated' the private sector to the detriment of the public sector 
expansion. This is also the view of the leftist coalition Initiative for Catalonia (IC), 
created in 1988, and of its largest member - the communist leaning Unified 
Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSUC)52. As a minority, IC has strongly opposed the 
actual development of the Catalan model of health care: 
'In the hospital sector, the Catalan government has financed the re- 
conversion of non-Social Security providers which were bankrupt, has 
promoted the creation of private providers for the management of 
Health Basic Areas in primary care always avoiding any direct 
In 1995 there were over 25,000 such associations in Catalonia, from which 500 belonged to 
the health sector. The latter were distributed among three categories of the existing ten - 
health associations, economic and professional interests and co-operatives. 
52 From 1987-88 the PSUC was a member of the coalition Initiative for Catalonia (IC), which 
in 1994 was enlarged and became IC-V, including The Greens. 
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management involvement ... The critique ad absurdum would be: 'If they are so liberal, why is the government directly promoting and 
financing the appearance of new economic agents? Let them appear 
by themselves. It has been the govemment, with the help of the Official 
Medical College of Barcelona, which has revived mutualities and helped 
private providers of intermediate products to emerge in order to contract 
with them. The supposedly spontaneous creation of the civil society has 
instead been actively promoted by the DHSS. ' 
Table 3.2. Overlapping membership between hospital associations in 1994. 
HNPU members Non-HNPU members Total 
beds hospitals beds hospitals beds hospitals 
n. % n. % n. % n. % 
only UCH 
membership 4,540 25 22 32 3,979 30 19 16 8,519 41 
only CHC 
membership 3,562 20 17 24 1,438 11 985,000 26 
LICH and CHC 
double 
membership 2,448 14 15 22 530 4442,978 26 
non- 
associated 7,348 41 15 22 7,253 55 84 72 14,601 92 
Total 17,898 100 69 100 13,200 100 116 100 31,098 185 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from UCH, 1995a; CHC, 1996; and DSSS, 1994a. 
In 1994,25 per cent of the HNPU beds belonged to hospitals which were 
only members of the UCH, while 20 per cent belonged to hospitals which were only 
members of the CHC. In addition, 14 per cent of the HNPU beds belonged to 
hospitals with simultaneous double membership to both the UCH and the CHC 
(see Table 3.2). Bearing in mind that 26 per cent of HNPU beds belong to the CHI 
(Social Security administration) and, therefore, are not members of any of these 
organisations, this means that around 60 per cent of bed hospitals - namely almost 
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all non-CHI beds - were represented by either one or the two of these very relevant 
organisations. This double membership affected 37 per cent of the CHC's total bed 
number and 26 per cent of the UCH's total. That is, the CHC had a higher ratio of 
double membership of its associates and, moreover, 74 per cent of the CHC beds 
belonged to the HNPU, which involves a much greater dependency of this 
organisation on the HNPU regulations and financing (UCH, 1995a; CHC, 1996; 
DHSS, 1994a). The CHC had no private clinics members but had 15 Basic Health 
Areas associated - primary care teams -, and socio-health centres. 
By contrast, the UCH had a smaller ratio of double membership of its 
associates, was less dependent on the HNPU, but also had a more heterogeneous 
composition, with a higher potential for internal interest conflicts. On the one hand 
the UCH is interested in defending the HNPU, but on the other hand, above half 
the UCH bed total, that is nearly 5,000 beds, belonged to non-HNPU member 
hospitals including private clinics, psychiatric hospitals, and medium and long stay 
centres, apart from private diagnostic and intermediate product providers. 
Moreover, 1,000 beds (ten providers) of the UCH are also members of an 
association of private, profit-making health centres which was created in 1977 - the 
Catalan Association of Health Centres -, and which was ideologically close to the 
UCH. 
The centres associated to this Catalan Association of Health Centres are all 
external to the HNPU. This association includes acute clinics - one of which 
contracts with the Catalan Health Service (CHS) -, socio-health centres - 12 of 
which have contracts with the CHS -, psychiatric centres - two of which have 
contracts with the CHS -, and several providers of intermediate products. In income 
terms, the relevance of this private sector stems from the fact that its total income 
amounts to seven percent of the Catalan Health Service's budget (see Table 3.3). 
This association has not have, though, any relevant role in the formulation of the 
Catalan health policy nor in the policy developments of the eighties and nineties. 
For example, they did not organise their first public cycle of conferences until 
November 1997, twenty years after their creation. The title of the conference spoke 
for itself: 'Private health: new horizons, new perspectives'. According to a top 
manager of this association, their main role so far has been that of an employers' 
association for the collective bargaining with unions. In the late nineties, though, 
they are developing several lines of action: institutional relations with the DHSS 
and with the CHS, with the Official Medical College of Barcelona, with mutualities, 
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insurance companies and individual professionals (which represent almost 90 per 
cent of their businesses), and with other providers. In this top managers view, the 
basic difference between non-Social Security providers inside and outside the 
HNPU is that in the former owners do not risk their own capital, while in the latter 
they do. And the UCH tries to represent both these incompatible interests. 
Table 3.3. Activity and resources of the hospital members of the Catalan 
Association of Health Centres*, 1996. 
Acute care Chronic 
care 
Psychiatric Mixed Total 
Beds 2,351 1,070 1,511 355 5,287 
Personnel 6,357 832 738 362 8,289 
Average stay 4.25 163.65 157.39 20.38 11.47 
Occupancyindex 60.18 96.75 90.01 67.49 76.61 
Rotation/bed 51.65 2.16 2.09 12.08 24.81 
Income** 28,039,186 3,546,701 3,541,454 1,132,488 36,259,829 
*Agrupaci6 Catalana dEstabliments Sanitaris (ACES). 
Source: ACES (1997) ACES informatiu, n02: 6. 
The UCH, the CHC and the Catalan Association of Health Centres act as 
employers' associations and conduct the collective bargaining affecting their 
members with the most representative unions of the sector (the UCH and the 
Catalan Association of Health Centres from their creation and the CHC since 1993- 
94). Nevertheless, the signing of regular contracts between the Catalan health 
authority and providers is bilaterally agreed between the authority (the Catalan 
Health Institute until 1990 and the Catalan Health Service from 1991) and each 
individual hospital. The DHSS has not accepted suggestions to do it otherwise, and 
the CHC and the UCH only participate in the definition of the model of contract and 
the financing model, leaving the negotiation of the individual contracts to the health 
authority and the individual providers themselves. 
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The explanation of this overlapping membership of hospitals between two 
organisations, the LICH and the CHC, which followed divergent policy orientations 
over the eighties requires analysing the origin and role of the latter, an equally 
relevant group, as well as the different set of costs and benefits facing it when 
defining a health system model. 
b) Local governments and i nter-govern mental relations. 
Whereas the UCH was and is an association of managers, the CHC is an 
association of political representatives of public providers (and semi-public 
providers) attached to local governments which, in the mid-nineties, started to 
include managers too. During the second half the 1970s, and after the first 
municipal democratic elections in 1979, some local governments assumed political 
commitments to improve local health services. This issue was a major demand by 
active and numerous neighbourhood associations and municipal movements 
during the Spanish democratic transition and the municipal electoral campaigns. 
Citizens' expectations about local democracy were high, and they viewed it as a 
key channel for facilitating the badly needed investments in infrastructure and 
management. Mayors, as political representatives, often presided in the governing 
boards of non-profit and charitable health trusts53 and foundations which had a 
municipal or even supra-municipal area of influence for their services (see Table 
3.4). By contrast, the large and high-technology Social Security-owned hospitals 
were concentrated in the provincial capitals and their area of influence. 
In this context, the Department of Health and Health Care54 of the pre- 
autonomous, provisional Catalan government (1977-80) actively promoted 
53 A trust is 'money or property vested with an individual to administer in the interest of 
others. Trusts of this kind are usually set up to continue interests in accordance with the 
general instructions of the initiator and to protect them from outside interference and for tax 
reasons. Thus, people set up trusts or appoint trustees to administer their states after their 
death. ' (Bannok et aL 1992: 429). In the case of Catalonia a number rich people left their 
heritage to the Church or to local authorities for the provision of hospital health care, from 
the middle age. 
54 The political head (Conseller) of the Department of Health and Health Care of the 
provisional Catalan government was a member of the communist PSUC, which, since the 
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meetings of managers and presidents (mayors) of these non-profit charitable 
hospitals to exchange information and to approach the situation of these hospitals. 
The political and institutional movement led by the concerned municipal 
governments elected in the 1979 municipal elections aimed to decentralise the 
health network model developed by the Social Security, and to achieve an 
equitable access to health resources by better distribution across the territory. This 
policy option involved the transformation of the existing local non-Social Security 
network into a publicly financed acute network, instead of enlarging the centralised 
Social Security model of health provision. 
Table 3.4. Ownership distribution of hospital beds and centres 
in Catalonia, 1975. 
Hospitals Hospital beds Average hospital 
size 
Ownership nO % nO % n" of beds 
Public total 52 22.2 13,679 40.6 373 
Social Security 10 4.3 4,705 14.0 470 
Municipal admin. 27 11.5 2,187 6.5 81 
Provincial admin. 9 3.8 3,447 10.2 383 
Other 6 2.6 3,340 9.9 557 
Private total 183 77.8 19,995 59.4 120 
Charitable found. 32 13.6 3,282 9.7 103 
Red Cross 4 1.7 594 1.8 145 
Other 147 62.5 16,119 47.9 110 
Total 235 100 33,674 100 247 
Source: DSAS (1980: 118). 
One of the first steps taken by local governments was to appoint managers 
and widen the representation of the different sectors of civil society in those 
hospitals' governing boards. These measures reflected the political will to 
modernise the management of health services by appointing professionals from 
first democratic autonomous elections in 1980, has been part of the opposition in the 
Catalan Parliament. 
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the private business sector (such as banking and industry) who could develop, for 
example, accounting systems, human resource management or information 
systems. In contrast to the case of the CHI, though, the introduction of private 
management techniques was facilitated by the fact that these providers had no 
organic or hierarchical dependence on the public administration and therefore had 
full autonomy of operations. This autonomy was purposefully reinforced as an 
alternative model to that of the CHI. 
Between 1982 and 1984 these local government representatives had an 
acknowledged PSC-leaning according to all expert interviewees and to the 
municipal electoral map of the early eighties in terms of votes. But in this same 
period they decided to create the CHC, together with the hospitals involved, as 
presidents and hospital owners representatives of citizens. A top representative of 
the CHC recalled that: 
'When we were about to create the CHC we analysed the possibility of 
being born inside the Federation of Municipalities of Catalonia and we 
decided not to do so, but to get organised autonomously and 
separately because by that time the municipal movement was 
undergoing a division between two associations: the socialists [PSC] 
and communists [PSUC] consolidated the Federation of Municipalities 
of Catalonia, while those of CiU created the Catalan Association of 
Municipalities, promoted by this party in the autonomous government. 
Therefore, in order to avoid this division we created the CHC 
autonomously because one of the features of our entity has been the 
unity of different political parties, or rather different mayors of different 
political parties for the defence of a decentralised, high quality hospital 
network. ' 
However, another top representative of the CHC and of the local council of 
Barcelona emphasised that the CHC was partly a tool for co-ordinating and giving 
technical and professional support to health care-member providers, but that it was 
also an interest group facing a new and closer administrative and political power - 
the Catalan government. Moreover, not only was the CHC an initiative of the local 
council of Barcelona (led by the PSC, in opposition in the Catalan Parliament), but 
also most of the initial local councils who became members of the CHC were PSC- 
governed, and in some cases PSUC-governed: 
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'The local council of Barcelona and the Municipal Institute of Health 
Care55 created the CHC, which others then joined. The objective of the 
Consortium was to provide a networking field between local councils 
and the hospitals linked to them, through an organ which at that time 
was basically a mechanism of co-ordination and representation before 
the health authority. Moreover, it was done in a moment in which the 
health map of Barcelona had just been elaborated, in which there was 
the former health map of Catalonia, but in which also the Plan for the 
Reorganisation of the Hospital Sector was being discussed. That is, we 
wanted to have a voice, which was not the voice of the hospitals' 
employers' association - the UCH. ' 
Until that moment, the UCH had led the representation of the interests of 
both profit and non-profit non-Social Security hospitals in Catalonia, even from 
within the DHSS as internal staff. However, the prospective members of the CHC 
felt that the UCH could no longer adequately represent their interests as public 
owner and politicians, because the UCH were managers - and some of them from 
the municipalities' own hospitals: 
'One of the conceptual differences between the UCH and the CHC is 
that we are owners that are moreover public, institutional owners and 
who are in these institutions as a result of municipal elections and are 
therefore endorsed by political parties. The UCH is an association of 
hospital managers, not owners, and thus, throughout their history, they 
have defended biased interpretations about the role of ownership and 
the role of the politician-owner and the role of the manager ... 
These 
were the differences which made us create a separate organisation. 
Because from 1979 to 1982-83 we see that the discourse, the role, and 
the concepts [which the UCH] defends do not represent our interests as 
owners of municipal public [health] resources in Catalonia ... At that time, the model of the UCH was an open clinic and ours was a closed, 
hierarchical hospital'. 
Although the mayors in the CHC were the 'patrons' or 'bosses, the CHC did 
not undertake the role of an employers' association and let the UCH do the 
collective bargaining with professionals and unions until the early nineties, when 
the CHC decided that this role should be part of their responsibility. The reason for 
55 This autonomous organism of the local Council of Barcelona was created in 1983 for the 
management of the municipal health services run by this local council. In its organisation 
and management it tried to avoid the CHI model, particularly the statutory, civil service- like 
regime of its personnel. 
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delaying the adoption of this responsibility was the political consequences and 
difficult situations which might derive from the exercise of this function. 
The gradual implementation of the Autonomous Communities involved the 
assignment of exclusive competencies over the organisation of health to the 
Catalan autonomous government, which received the transfers of the Social 
Security health services in the early eighties (Mantd, 1993). However, local 
governments continued to experience direct pressure from the population's 
demand to improve public health services. But the budgetary constraints of these 
municipal administrations and the unsustainable economic situation of those 
providers brought the improvement process into a cul-de-sac. Mayors did not want 
to lose control over those hospitals but they also wanted the Catalan government 
to assume financial responsibilities for remedying their economic, infrastructural 
and technological deficiencies. 
Therefore, the actual distribution of resources among the relevant policy elite 
led to a de facto situation in which a co-operative strategy was a rational choice to 
make. That is, the autonomous government had the legitimate authority over health 
in terms of legislative and executive competencies, and the associated budget, 
which could be used either as conditional or unconditional incentives to shape 
municipal governments' policies. However, municipal governments had information 
concerning the existing health network derived from their direct involvement in 
those hospitals, and a reputation derived from their explicit commitment to the 
health issue and from the close - though very recent - relation with their 
municipality. And most importantly, the first democratic electoral map in Catalonia 
showed a split pattern of voting which gave the autonomous government level to 
the CiU and municipal governments and provincial administrations to the PSC. As 
a former top official of the DHSS put it: 
'The distribution of political power in Catalonia between local 
government and autonomous government, the fact that the health 
resources, their ownership and management, were distributed between 
these spheres of political power, and the savoir faire of key leaders on 
each part (who in some cases have followed parallel political careers 
from lower to higher posts), are all factors which partly explain the 
development of a consensus and the culture of negotiation. They have 
similar problems - both have responsibilifies over the health sector, [so] 
co-operation was the best strategy. The diversification of management 
forms and the introduction of private law has also been carded out by 
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the PSC in the municipal government of Barcelona ... Therefore, in actual fact, they are not that different. ' 
Between 1982 and 1984 the constraints on health expenditure by the central 
government had a corresponding impact on the investments and hospital contract 
tariffs in the health sector in Catalonia, leading to a crisis situation. The CHC 
suggested the possibility that the Catalan government should assume the 
management responsibilities that local governments had been exercising without 
having either the legal competencies to do so or sufficient financing. The conflict of 
interests derived ended up in a debate in the Catalan Parliament which 
represented a turning point. The Catalan govemment asked local governments to 
continue exercising such managerial responsibilities under a commitment not only 
to finance the reform of the network but also to get directly involved in the creation 
of consortia with local governments for the governance of the system. With the 
improvement of the economic situation in 1985-86, the Catalan government 
committed itself to the creation and consolidation of these network of supra- 
municipal medium and small size hospitals. Key steps were the creation of the 
HNPU, the Plan for Hospital Reorganisation, the creation of consortia, and new 
investments and contracting and payment systems. All these steps attracted the 
active collaboration of both the UCH and the CHC- 
Therefore, throughout the eighties there was the definite will - both on the 
part of the municipal and autonomous governments - not to enlarge the centralised 
public sector structure characterising the Catalan Health Institute (CHI), nor its form 
of (direct) management and organisation. Instead, the option was to reinforce the 
existing network of non-Social Security (non-CHI) providers, particularly those 
which were non-profit organisations, and which had private forms of management. 
Thus, in the mid-eighties an expansive process of investments was initiated in 
order to rehabilitate those hospitals and create a network of acute care. Until that 
moment, those hospitals had held contracts with the Social Security for covering 
the provision of health services where the Social Security administration had not 
built providers of its own. These contracts were not meant to substitute but to 
complement Social Security provision. But in fact, these providers were substituting 
the Social Security provision as in most areas of Catalonia such services were 
scarce or non-existent. This led to an insufficient financing and led many of those 
non-Social Security providers either to disappear or to become centres for chronic 
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patients or for elderly people. Both this insufficient financing of contracts and also 
the gradual improvement of the Social Security health services had led those 
providers into de-capitalisation. The investment programmes subsequently 
developed were accompanied by a gradual movement of health professionals from 
the large and complex Social Security hospitals concentrated in Barcelona, and 
province capitals, to those smaller local hospitals which were being rehabilitated 
and transformed into basic reference centres of a territorially expanded network. 
These professionals brought with them expertise, qualifications and the will to 
develop professional practices learnt in the Social Security centres. 
The re-conversion and consolidation of this network of basic or general 
medium and small size hospitals, as opposed to a capital city-based, large complex 
organisations of the Social Security administration, was based on an intense 
process of reorganisation of resources through collaboration mechanisms. Different 
forms of collaboration between the DHSS and these existing providers involved, in 
some cases, the contribution by the DHSS of the infrastructure and the assignment 
of its autonomous management and organisation to the existing provider/s in the 
area. This strategy was a way to co-ordinate and unite tangible and intangible 
resources (infrastructure, budget, managerial know-how, knowledge of local 
conditions), and to create a sense of identification of the population with a hospital 
- which was not built from new but from the re-organisation and re- enforcement of 
the existing centres. 
In this context, consortia were conceived of as a tool for achieving 
consensus. In the mid-eighties the Catalan government and some local hospitals 
together with their respective local governments launched several initiatives for 
rationalising, co-ordinating and integrating health care resources which were in 
deep economic difficulties, or in bad need of investments. They had originally 
developed at the margin of any health sector planning, leading in some cases to 
destructive competition in overcrowded areas. The fact that there is a lack of a 
general regulation of consortia as a legal form has facilitated the introduction of 
private management instruments in the public health services and the consolidation 
of a model of management alternative to that of the Social Security health services, 
which characterises the CHI and most of the Spanish health sector. The flexibility 
of this legal form stems from the present legal framework defining it as a formal 
coverage for a wide variety of activities, allowing in each case the most suitable 
organisation and legal operating regime (Lafarga, 1994). Significant innovations 
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derived from this flexibility were the introduction of administration boards with 
representation of the plurality of owners rather than relying on a single manager 
head of a hierarchy, and a more participative definition of operational programmes 
by professionals. As for personnel policy, the contractual relation developed was 
that of a general labour market regulation instead of the civil service employment 
regime. Finally the creation of consortia facilitated the economic and financial 
recovery of those providers (SCS, 1995a). 
Following the objective of promoting the diversification of management and 
organisational forms in the provision of health care, in the late eighties and the 
early nineties there was a proliferation of forms other than consortia which do not 
require the consensus of different administrative levels and institutions. Instead 
these new forms - namely anonymous societies and autonomous institutes - 
involve either the creation of new organisations or the subdivision of parts of an 
existing organisation into prod uct-oriented smaller units, whose operations are then 
subjected to private law and private management techniques. These forms were 
developed in both the CHI and non-CHI providers. 
From the early nineties the CHC also consolidated itself as an association 
providing technical services to its members, as a think-tank for the diffusion and 
training in new management techniques, and as an interlocutor of the autonomous 
administration. The CHC also diversified its structure creating a group of service 
enterprises (consulting, supply of health intermediate products) in order to 
professionalise the services offered to its members and to improve the quality of 
final (care) services to patients. This new role was also accompanied by a closer 
collaboration with the Catalan autonomous administration, which was at the base 
of the consensus achieved in the whole reform process of the late eighties and 
nineties. Nevertheless, according to this same informant (who has himself been a 
leading interlocutor of the DHSS from the late seventies), collaboration was 
facilitated by a relatively unusual political stability: 
'As for this eyisting consensus in Catalonia, there is an important fact 
which is the people who have been at the front of the organisations. 
There has been leadership, there has been continuity, there has been 
intelligence for accepting negotiation instead of confrontation. First we 
have something unusual and it is not me who defends it, but we have 
continuity in the autonomous government since 1980 - the same party, 
same president, and basically the same people in health. Mr. Xavier 
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Trias56 was already there [in the DHSS] during Mr. LaporteS57 period, 
though in lower posts, and then he was Conseller until 1995. But even 
now [two years later], in the background, there is this same person. 
Thus, knowing who your interlocutor is year after year ... is very important because eventually there is friendship and you get to know 
one another. I do not know if this is good for the democratic system that 
there is so much continuity, but this is a fact which moreover has 
created leadership. Second, we have promoted consensus by creating 
the CHC separately from both the Federation of Municipalities of 
Catalonia and the Catalan Association of Municipalities, thus avoiding 
the division between political parties over health issues5B. Here [in the 
CHC] the presidency is renewed every four years, thus changing 
political colour so that everybody feels comfortable. ' 
In this respect, the composition of the directive board of the CHC reflected 
both the continuity of leadership figures and changes in the municipal political map 
represented through its mayors, as did the CHC permanent commission which was 
formed by hospital managers. Thus, by the late 1990s the CHC no longer only 
represented owners. Moreover, the owners and managers representatives in the 
CHC did not usually belong to the same hospitals and some managers were UCH 
members. All this reflected not only the constant undergoing negotiation processes, 
but also, the increasing links with the LICH, from which they had distanced 
themselves throughout the eighties. These renewed links with the UCH involved, 
first, that the owner and the manager of a hospital might belong to the CHC and to 
the UCH respectively and even the manager might belong to both of them. 
Second, this link pattern was reproduced at the top of the directive board of both 
organisations from 1995. Third, top members of the new directive board of the 
UCH had been trained within the CHC and shared their core views on the hospital 
model and on the role of the public owner and the managers and their 
relationships. As a leader of the CHC put it: 
56 Mr. Xavier Trias was Conseller of the Department of Health and Social Security of the 
Catalan Government from 1988 to 1995, and from 1995 is Conseller of the Department of 
the Presidency of the Catalan Government. 
57 Mr. Josep Laporte was Conseller of the Department of Health and Social Security of the 
Catalan Government from 1980 to 1988. 
58 The Federation of Municipalities of Catalonia is considered to be socialist-leaning, while 
the Catalan Association of Municipalities is considered to be CiU-leaning. 
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'Until the mid-nineties the discourse on the public ownership versus the 
civil society reflected our discrepancies. When the historical leadership 
of the UCH gave way to this new directive board the discourse on 
ownership is left aside and the discourse on management becomes the 
main core of the reforms. And it is here that we all agree. Even more 
when in the consortia directive boards there are representatives of that 
civil society [that is, private actors]. ' 
According to a former high official of the DHSS, the development of a 
common frame of mind was a key feature of both the institutional and the non- 
institutional policy elite. Thus, the consensus which has characterised the Catalan 
health policy throughout the eighties and in the definition of the Catalan 'model' of 
health care after the passage of the 1990 LOHC, may be partly explained by the 
disposition, frame of mind, political ability, and the long leadership incumbency of 
the core of the policy elite. This elite included the Catalan government, the DHSS, 
politically relevant local governments of large and medium size municipalities, and 
the leaders of the UCH, and of the CHC. A former official of the DHSS expressed 
that: 
'The political ability of the Conseller has led him to give relevant offices 
to sympathisers or even members of the socialists, as hospital 
managers, or within the Department. Or, if he did not give them posts, 
he, the Department, has been wise to give the local council of 
Barcelona and its political representatives enough leading role and 
enough weight for them to feel that they were also collaborating or 
participating in the design of a model ... 
[Mr. Xavier Trias] is a very 
clever politician and he has been wise to get health out of the everyday 
political battleground. And he has been wise to give a role to the 
different groups, not only political, but also corporatist -I am thinking of 
the Official Medical College of Barcelona - and within CiU itself [the 
Catalan nationalists] to people of CDC and of UDC59 of different 
branches. He has known how to keep everybody a bit happy, and how 
to give everybody a share of leadership role and participation. ' 
However, a different view was taken by a representative of the minority 
communist-leaning PSUC (member of the coalition Initiative for Catalonia or IC) 
which has not shared the consensus: 
59 CiU is a coalition formed by two political parties: CDC (Democratic Covergence of 
Catalonia) is the largest member in terms of parliamentary members and votes of the CiU 
coalition. The other member is UDC (Democratic Union of Catalonia). 
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'This model of creation of consortia and of appearance of new health 
provision agents generates the emergence of a managerial elite which 
can be shared by two large political organisations. And depending on 
where one is, and in order to preserve one another, they end up 
frustrating the progressive thinking of one's or the others. I think this is 
what has happened ... Also, the managers of the contracted hospitals 
of the HNPU which are in progressive administrations - socialists, 
communists before and IC now, or of leftist alliances - to the extent that 
the contracts with the CHS through the HNPU are absolutely vital for 
their survival, they cannot even think about critique ... They depend on 
one another ... As everybody depends on the contract nobody dares 
criticise the system this is the benevolent explanation. The malevolent 
explanation would be: they have created a managerial elite who, 
regardless of the political colour each one has, is interested in ensuring 
that everything remains the same, and the more new agents there are 
the more managerial posts there will be ... And it is much more pleasant to have a managerial post and get paid a lot of money than to have a 
clinical post and get paid what a doctor gets paid - which is relatively 
little in the public sector. 0 
c) Distribution of resources and activity. 
The public investment effort made in the Catalan health sector over the 
eighties is reflected in its indexed representation in Figure 3.2. Setting the public 
investment made in the health sector at 100 in 1982 (the base year), it appears 
that by 1990 the budget share spent on this sector had more than doubled. The 
first half of the eighties showed a declining investment trend in the sector reflecting 
the general economic crisis which affected Spain and which by extension had also 
a negative impact on the financing of health. The increasing investment effort of 
the second half of the decade was only halted and reversed in 1986, when the 
level fell even below the lowest rate, registered in 1984. 
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Figure 3.2. Evolution of total investment in health care in Catalonia by the 
corresponding health authority*, 1982-90 (indexed 100 in 1982). 
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*Between 1982 and 1983 the financing health authority was the Direction General of Social Security 
Health Services, from 1984 to 1990 the Catalan Health Institute, and from 1991 to date the Catalan 
Health Service. 
Source: Own elaboration based on DEF (1982,1983,1984,1985,1986,1987,1988,1989,1990). 
As Figure 3.3 shows, the largest part of these public investments were made 
in the hospital sector, including both CHI and non-CHI providers6O. Reform of 
primary care started in the mid-1980s, following the same model of the rest of the 
Spanish NHS and allegedly required important investments in infrastructure. 
Primary care did receive increasing investments in the early 1980s, but its share 
stabilised in the second half of the decade. This distribution of resources, which 
allocated an average of 63 per cent of investments between 1983 and 1990 to the 
hospital sector, not only indicates the higher costs involved in hospital 
infrastructure and technology in comparison to that of primary care, but also the 
clear commitment of the relevant health policy elites to revitalise the existing 
hospital resources and to create a hospital network which was territorially balanced 
and close to citizens6l. 
60 The data published by the DEF do not reflect the disaggregation of recipients of 
investments into CHI and non-CHI providers. 
61 For a more detailed disaggregation of these data see Table A. 5 in Appendix 1. 
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Figure 3.3. Distribution of investments* in the Catalan health sector, 
1982-90 (in percentages over total investment by the 
corresponding health authority). 
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*Investments include real investments in and capital transfers to both CHI and non-CHI providers. 
NB: From 1982 to 1984 there is no item classified as 'investment in general administration', but as 
I other', and it included urgent investment programmes for infrastructure and equipment, prices review 
and other (the first of them being very important in 1982). 
Source: Own elaboration based on DEF (1982,1983,1984,1985,1986,1987,1988,1989,1990). 
The evolution of the total health budget share spent on contracts with non- 
CHI hospitals and primary care centres for the provision of public health services 
remained relatively stable throughout the 1980s - representing an average of 33.4 
per cent of the budget of the corresponding health authority'52. Only in 1989 did a 
clear increase start. This change of trend, though, reflected the increase in the 
budget share spent on contracting with non-CHI hospitals: the budget share spent 
on contracting with non-CHI primary care providers sharply diminished in 1989 (see 
Figure 3.4). While this change in the late eighties represented an increase of nearly 
ten points in the budget share spent on contracts with non-CHI hospitals, in the 
62 If this calculations are made over the total budget of the DHSS of the Catalan 
government the share spent on contracting with non-CHI providers is higher and shows a 
more steep increased. For a more detailed disaggregation of these data see Table A. 6 in 
Appendix 1- 
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case of primary care it represented a decrease of nearly eight points from 1988 to 
1989 followed by an increase of nearly six points by 1990. 
Figure 3.4. Budget share spent on contracts with non-CHI providers in 
Catalonia, 1982-90 (in percentages over the total budget of 
the corresponding health authority*). 
0 Primary care Hospital care Other" Current transfers*** W Total 
*Between 1982 and 1983 the financing health authority was the Direction General of Social Security 
Health Services, from 1984 to 1990 the Catalan Health Institute, and from 1991 to date the Catalan 
Health Service. 
"Specialists services and other, in 1989 it also included haernodialysis. 
*'**To families and non-profit organisations (one-off regulatory payments, prostheses, vehicles for 
handicapped patients and other). 
Source: Own elaboration based on DEF (1982,1983,1984,1985,1986,1987,1988,1989,1990). 
Although the evolution of the budget share spent on contracts with non-CHI 
providers shows a clear increase in 1989 and 1990 for the hospital sector, the 
relative weight of the physical and human resources and activity of CHI and of 
contracted non-CHI hospitals within the health system of public coverage remained 
remarkably stable between 1987 and 1990, when the increasing trend in the 
budget share spent on contracts was reinforced. As Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show, the 
indicators of the general resources and activity of CHI and of contracted non-CHI 
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hospitals and the indicators concerning acute and psychiatric care reflect little 
variation throughout the period. For example, activity indicators such as discharges 
and stays remained around 27 per cent for the CHI and 63 per cent for contracted 
non-CHI hospitals throughout all the period. Only in the cases of emergencies, 
discharges paid by the Social Security and outpatients visits did the variation 
involve more than one percentage point (2.9,2.8 and 2.5 points respectively). By 
contrast, in the case of long stay care a clear general decrease was apparent in 
the relative weight of the CHI physical and human resources and activity within the 
public coverage health system. These data also show some features which reflect 
structural differences between CHI and non-CHI hospitals. While CHI hospitals had 
a higher general ratio of health personnel per bed and a higher occupation ratio 
both in general and in acute care (though not in long stay care),. contracted non- 
CHI hospital showed a higher rotation ratio in acute care. As for psychiatric care, it 
was all provided by contracted non-CHI hospitals. 
Therefore, the relative weight of the activity and the physical and human 
resources of CHI and non-CHI hospitals in the public coverage health system 
remained remarkably stable throughout a period in which the budget share spent 
on contracts rose. So it may be argued that, during that period, contracted non-CHI 
hospitals received an increasing share of public money for providing the same 
share of the total health services provided under public coverage. This 
interpretation may support key informants' argument that the policy option to create 
a heterogeneous hospital network based on the eAsting resources required not 
only large investments, but above all that the contractual system redressed the 
historical underfunding of the contracts which the Social Security administration 
signed with non-Social Security (non-CHI) providers. Considering non-CHI 
hospitals as substitute rather than complementary providers of publicly financed 
services necessarily involved reducing the comparative disadvantage of non-CHI 
providers in the financing of the public services which they provided. 
114 
Table 3.5. CHI hospital resources and activity, in percentages over 
total CHI and contracted non-CHI hospital resources and 
activity for acute care in Catalonia, 1987-90. 
1987 1988 1989 1990 
General 
Hospitals 18.9 17.6 16.7 15.2 
Beds* 27.2 27.1 26.4 26.4 
Total personnel 36.1 36.9 36.4 35.9 
Health personnel 35.0 35.5 35.0 34.4 
40 h. health personnel" 37.0 38.0 37.0 36.3 
Discharges 27.5 28.9 27.3 26.8 
Stays 26.9 27.0 27.9 27.1 
Outpatient visits 19.1 22.9 22.1 21.5 
Emergencies 26.0 24.9 24.5 23.8 
Discharges paid by Soc. Sec. 29.0 30.3 28.6 28.7 
Running costs 36.9 37.3 36.9 36.5 
Income 38.5 38.6 38.6 38.0 
Health personnellbed 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.3 
Occupation ratio 79.0 81.7 86.2 82.5 
Soc. Sec. dischar. lTotal disch. 93.9 94.0 93.2 93.2 
Acute care 
Beds 28.5 28.2 27.9 27.7 
Discharges 27.5 28.8 27.5 26.9 
Stays 28.4 28.6 29.7 28.6 
Occupation ratio (Yo) 79.1 81.6 86.2 82.6 
Rotation ratio 26.7 31.6 30.8 31.1 
Average stay 10.1 9.4 10.2 9.7 
% over total stays 97.4 96.9 99.3 99.2 
Long stay care 
Beds 11.2 12.5 3.3 5.0 
Discharges 33.1 52.8 9.0 10.1 
Stays 9.4 11.4 3.2 4.1 
Occupation ratio 75.7 84.6 89.6 73.4 
Psychiatric care 
Beds 0 0 0 0 
Discharges 0 0 0 0 
Stays 0 0 0 0 
Includes incubators. 
"Personnel weighted at a timetable of 40 hours a week. 
Source'. DSSS (1994c): 112,113. 
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Table 3.6. Hospital resources and activity of contracted non-CHI hospitals 
for acute care services, in percentages over total CHI and 
contracted non-CHI acute hospital resources and activity in 
Catalonia, 1987-90. 
1987 1988 1989 1990 
General 
Hospitals 81.1 82.4 83.3 84.8 
Beds* 72.8 72.9 73.6 73.6 
Total personnel 63.9 63.1 63.6 64.1 
Health personnel 65.0 64.5 65.0 65.6 
40 h. health personnel" 63.0 62.0 63.0 63.7 
Discharges 72.5 71.1 72.7 73.2 
Stays 73.1 73.0 72.1 72.9 
Outpatient visits 80.9 77.1 77.9 78.5 
Emergencies 74.0 75.1 75.5 76.2 
Discharges paid by Soc. Sec. 71.0 69.7 71.4 71.3 
Running costs 63.1 62.7 63.1 63.5 
Income 61.5 61.4 61.4 62.0 
Health personnetlbed 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 
Occupation ratio 80.4 81.3 79.9 79.8 
Soc. Sec. dischar. lTotal disch. 87.1 87.9 87.9 84.9 
Acute care 
Beds 71.5 71.8 72.1 72.3 
Discharges 72.5 71.2 72.5 73.1 
Stays 71.6 71.4 70.3 71.4 
Occupation ratio (11o) 79.3 80.1 78.9 79.0 
Rotation ratio 30.1 30.7 31.5 32.3 
Average stay 9.6 9.5 9.2 8.9 
% over total stays 90.2 90.2 90.7 92.1 
Long stay care 
Beds 88.8 87.5 96.7 95.0 
Discharges 66.9 47.2 91.0 89.9 
Stays 90.6 88.6 96.8 95.9 
Occupation ratio 92.1 94.4 93.3 92.0 
Psychiatric care 
Beds 100 100 100 100 
Discharges 100 100 100 100 
Stays 100 100 100 100 
Occupation ratio 82.0 86.7 76.0 84.4 
Includes incubators. 
"Personnel weighted at a timetable of 40 hours a week. 
Source: DSSS (1 994c): 112,114. 
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3.2. The power of the medical profession. 
The Official Medical College of Barcelona (COMB) is the main medical professional 
body in Catalonia. Its leading figures stressed that its relationship with the health 
administration in the late 1990s followed two different channels - formal and 
informal. The COMB formally participated together with other organisations in the 
directive and participation organs of the new health authority - the Catalan Health 
Service -, as provided by the 1990 Law for the Organisation of Health in Catalonia 
(LOHC). In these meetings, the administration presented projects and listened to 
the view of the rest of members. The COMBs view was that the administration did 
not have the will to make a forum of debate and discussion out of these formal 
meetings, but instead used them as a place to cover formalities and avoid conflict. 
However, the COMB did not try to change this dynamics of relationship at this level 
even though they thought it was not very constructive. The reason was that 
another channel of bilateral and informal interrelation with the administration was 
available and had proved more effective and flexible. The COMB resorted to direct 
contacts with top officials of the health administration for dealing with specific 
problems affecting the different sectors of the medical profession whom they 
represented. The COMB found in the administration a satisfactory predisposition to 
discussion and a will to find agreed solutions, so they did not consider it necessary 
to try and change the rules of the game. 
The COMB leadership feel that their organisation has not been an actor 
consulted on a regular and relevant basis concerning the policy options taken 
throughout the eighties in the Catalan health policy. Only after professional 
organisations built up their legitimacy long after the democratic transition did they 
gain a role as interlocutors of the different administrations with health 
competencies - though not on a regular basis. The professional organisations' 
difficulties in re-gaining legitimacy after the democratic transition of the late 
seventies in Spain may by illustrated by the case of the Spanish body of official 
medical associations - the Collegial Medical Organisation. The creation of this 
organisation during the Franco regime was conceived as a mechanism for the 
political control of the profession. By imposing compulsory affiliation and endowing 
it with a high degree of control over the design and operation of the Social Security 
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health system which was being created, the Collegial Medical Organisation became 
a tool for suppressing potentially divergent ideologies within the profession or any 
conflict with the state, for which the Collegial Medical Organisabon actually worked 
(Rodriguez, 1994,1995: 153). Thus, after the democratic transition the public 
corporative status of this organisation was openly questioned, as much by the 
government as by the profession. As Rodriguez (1995: 154-5) explains, while the 
Collegial Medical Organisation struggled to re-define its role as the representation 
of medical interests, other organisations emerged as alternative articulation 
mechanisms. Thus, on the conservative side, the Spanish Confederation of 
Medical Unions was founded as a profession-based union, for the defence of work- 
related interests. With a leaning towards the Collegial Medical Organisation, it 
defended the reinforcement of the liberal profile of the profession and the 
extension of the private market. On the leftist side there emerged the Federation of 
Associations for the Defence of Public Health. Sharing arguments with the class- 
based unions CC. 00 and UGT (communist and socialist leaning respectively), it 
defended a socialised, public health system. 
While this political fragmentation of the representation channels of the 
medical profession at the Spanish central government level aggravated the 
problems of interest articulation and the profession's relationship with the 
government, parallel and different legitimisation processes developed in Catalonia. 
Contrary to the assertion that the COMB has not been a relevant actor in the health 
policy in Catalonia, a former senior official of the DHSS contended that: 
'There might be the impression that the Conselleria has never 
consulted them for any relevant decision and that therefore they have 
not been a relevant actor. But what I can say, having been inside, is 
that what the COMB might or might not say was very much taken into 
account. Second, many of the appointments within the Conselleria over 
the past years have been people of their liking or well linked to them [to 
the COMB]. In a way, when somebody is appointed to a directive post 
in the Conselleria they do not only look for somebody who can do a 
good job, but someone who also has good relations with the COMB, or 
with the personnel of the local council of Barcelona if the job so 
requires ... 
The COMB has always had within the Conselleria someone 
with whom they had a good relation or whom they had in good 
consideration, or who had been a member of the COMB's directive 
board ... And there 
has been some exchange of people going from the 
Conselleria to the COMB and from the COMB to the Consellefia. 63' 
63 All the Consellers of the DHSS of the Catalan government so far have been doctors, as 
well as the President of the Catalan government, who has been the same person since its 
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A long-standing issue in contention between the COMB and the General 
Council of Medical Colleges (representing all province-based official medical 
colleges in Spain) stemmed from the transfers of health competencies to Catalonia 
and was not settled until 1994 (COMB, 1994a). The COMB claimed that the new 
distribution of health competencies required a more relevant role for the province- 
based official medical colleges of Catalonia and for the corresponding Medical 
Council of Catalonia. This more relevant role implied keeping a higher proportion of 
the membership fees from those collected by the General Council of Medical 
Colleges. The settlement of this dispute involved an agreement between the 
COMB and the General Council to jointly decide on the share to be kept by the 
official associations in Catalonia. 
Formally, the COMB has no political affiliation. Its main objectives concern 
the defence of professional ethics, of the quality of the health services provided by 
its members, and of the rights of profession aI s64. In the celebration of its centenary 
in 1994, the COMB president insisted on its role as an example of the dynamic civil 
society of Catalonia and its commitment to the defence of the Catalan identitY65 
(COMB, 1994a; La Vanguardia, 1/10/94; Avui, 2/10/94). However, this claim is 
ubiquitous among almost all the Catalan political forces, so, in principle, it shows no 
explicit party-leaning. However, according to a survey conducted in 1997 a third of 
the member doctors of the COMB declared not to have any political ideology or 
affiliation. Among the rest, the majority felt closer to CiU66. In the view of a COMB 
leader: 
first incumbency in 1980. 
64 The foundational objective of the COMB was to clearly define the boundaries of the 
profession and to fight intrusiveness from other sectors. In the third decade of this century 
the COMB impulsed the creation of a medical union in Catalonia for the defence of the 
labour rights of the medical profession. In the late francoism and the democratic transition 
the COMB took part in charitable activities. Presently, the defence of the rights of the 
medical profession focus on the development of a professional ethics, the definition of the 
civil responsibilities of professionals before the judicial system , and the negotiation with 
mutualities about the remuneration of professionals (COMB, 1994a). 
65 An indicator of the perception of this defence role is that the Catalan government 
awarded the Saint George's Cross to the COMB in 1994 (COMB, 1994a). 
66 This information was given by a top representative of the COMB. The results of this 
survey were published but the questions concerning the political ideology of the COMB 
members were not published (EIPO, 1997). 
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'This leads to the directive board [of the COMB] being a bit of a 
reflection of this. The board comes out of an election and it is logical 
that the doctors who do have a specific polifical leaning vote for people 
who are, let's say, closer to this same political position - even though this is never used in the electoral campaign for gaining access to the 
directive board. For example, I am affiliated to CDC from 1977 - this is 
public and everybody knows it. Therefore, if they vote for me it is 
because this does not bother them and there is not any critical 
opposition. I do not think they vote for me because of this - they may 
vote for me for other things, but as a matter of fact, this gives the 
directive board of the COMB a leaning towards the orbit of CDC - though unintentionally. But I do not exercise as an affiliated member 
here and therefore I would say this does not introduce any distortion. 
There is good personal understanding with the [Catalan] government 
and the Conseller of health of CDC, which facilitates rather than hinder 
things. ' 
The COMB has also established collaborabon links with other professional 
organisations in the health sector, with mutualities, unions, public and private 
health providers, and with insurance companies. These links involve the 
organisation of conference cycles, seminars and training courses, as well as 
financing and other purpose-led collaboration. Thus, it is not only the official 
medical college of compulsory membership for the profession but also a forum of 
debate, a think-tank, and a provider of services for the health sector. 
In contrast to other interest organisations which undertake the representation 
of relatively homogeneous collectives - such as class-based unions or sectoral 
organisations - the COMB has the formal monopoly of interest representation of the 
whole medical profession in Barcelona, which is heterogeneous in terms of labour 
market prospects, working conditions, and which, accordingly, shows mixed 
preferences over health system and organisation. However, the COMB's directive 
board showed a clear preference for introducing management reforms on the line 
of facilitating the involvement of professionals in management, and bringing in 
forms of organisation and service provision closer to that of a liberal profession. 
The interests of the medical profession condition their support for the COMB 
and are to a great extent dependent on their labour situation. The data available on 
this variable come from two surveys conducted in 1994 and 1997, which showed a 
divergence which appears too remarkable to have developed within a three-year 
period - which is why they should be taken as indicative. According to the 1994 
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survey67,30 per cent of the medical profession had more than one professional 
activity, while according to the survey conducted in 199768 nearly half the medical 
profession (48 per cent) has more than one professional activity. Both surveys 
found that those who tended to have only one activity as a salaried employee were 
predominantly women, non-specialists and the youngest sections of the profession. 
Those who tended to combine more than one activity were predominantly men, 
specialists and over 40 years old - who are the elite of the profession. Finally, the 
1994 survey found that nearly three quarters of professionals were employees and 
the rest practised as liberal professionals, whereas the 1997 survey found that only 
half the professionals exercised their profession as employees, while the rest were 
either liberal professionals in private practice (19 per cent) or combined both 
situations (31 per cent). 
The analysis of the 1997 survey focused more on trends. It showed that the 
youngest members of the profession tended to gradually depend more on 
organisations for the exercise of their profession - and to be characterised by 
greater job insecurity or relative precariousness in comparison with previous 
decades, whereas the private practice sphere tended to diminish. Those who were 
only employees are so in the public sector. However, this gradual dependence of 
professionals on organisations involved mainly dependence on non-Social Security 
providers. These doctors consequently hold labour-market contracts instead of 
working in statutory, civil service-like regimes (EIPO, 1997). These trends were 
interpreted by the authors of the survey as a reflection of the mechanisms used by 
the profession to adjust to the historical process of building an organised public 
health system based on an employer-employee contractual relation, while trying to 
preserve the organisational forms of the liberal exercise of the profession. 
In the survey responses the medical professionals said that they received 
most satisfaction from the service they provided (helping the others) and from the 
exercise of the whole content of the profession itself. By contrast, dissatisfaction 
67This survey was carded out by EMB-Yankelovich and by the COMB, which also sponsored 
it. It was published in COMB (1994b). The sample surveyed had 600 individuals of a 
population of 21,000 individuals. The sample was stratified and randomised. 
68 This survey was conducted by the Research Team on Professions and Organisations of 
the Department of Sociology of the University of Barcelona, directed by J. Rodriguez, and 
sponsored the COMB. The sample surveyed had 500 individuals, who were selected 
through a stratified and random process. This sample was representative of a population of 
21,549 individuals (doctors members of the COMB). 
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derived from factors over which they had no control: the saturation of the medical 
labour market (leading to high unemployment and job insecurity), low wages, 
unsatisfactory career development, lack of incentives, bureaucratisation and 
impersonal profession a I-patie nt relations. Thus gradual 'proletarianisation' was 
seen as the source of their discontents as the progressive loss of autonomy in 
decision-making. Lack of control over organisational, technical and ideological 
aspects of their job situation were the main problems, rather than the mere fact of 
being employees. 
Nevertheless, despite the high percentage of the profession dependent on 
the public sector, only 30 per cent thought that the solution to this problem should 
come from the public authorities. Instead they should come from the profession 
itself, with possible solutions involving recovering the organisational, value system 
and technical control over their organisations - 81 per cent thought that hospitals 
should be managed by doctors who are adequately qualified to do so. Moreover, 
78 per cent would prefer to work in smaller and more simple organisations (small 
professional teams) - instead of large complex ones or individual practice. Public 
institutions were the preferred context for exercising their profession for 51 per cent 
of respondents, institutions of professional ownership for 27 per cent, and private 
institutions for 22 per cent. Accordingly the preferred model for organising the 
health system was universal public coverage with complementary private health for 
50 per cent of the profession, followed by a mixed model for 40 per cent. Only 
seven per cent defended an exclusively public provision and under four per cent 
defended an all-private health system. The high technical and clinical quality and 
the social and the re-distribute goals of the public sector were the base for this 
preference, because they enabled professionals to meet patients' needs better. 
The demand for a new organisation and management setting expressed by 
the medical profession was part and parcel of a legislative initiative fostered in the 
mid-nineties by the COMB. Leaders of the organisation asserted that while the role 
of this professional organisation was not at all relevant in the formulation process 
of the 1990 LOHC, it was decisive in its modification in 1995 (see Chapters 5 and 
6). The reason was that while the LOHC was mainly concerned with separating the 
functions of financing and provision as a basic organisation pdnciple for the whole 
system, the 1995 modification directly focused on management forms which could 
give a more relevant managerial role to doctors within their own organisations. It 
established the possibility for professionals to create enterpdses and anonymous 
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societies and contract with the new health authority created in 1991 - the Catalan 
Health Service or CHS - for the provision of primary care. The COMB was so 
committed to this project that it even created a foundation for financially 
collaborating with these private associative teams69 (El Pais, 15/2/95,21/9/95, 
Barcelona edition). 
Thus, the initiative in 1995 to modify the LOHC and introduce the possibility 
of self-managed primary care teams opting out of the CHI was first put forward by 
the COMB. In fact, a top representative of the COMB declared to El Pai's (14/2/95; 
15/2/95, Barcelona edition) that they had been working on the project for the 
previous three years. According to this report, the project was conceived of as a 
by-pass to the primary care reform launched in 1985, which in Barcelona had only 
reached 25 per cent of the population. The main reason was that this reform was 
made dependent on doctors being willing to be integrated in Primary Care Teams, 
where, among other aspects, their working hours would rise from two to six a day. 
In Barcelona, where the combination of public and private practice of the 
profession is most relevant, the reform had come to a standstill. Thus, it seemed an 
attractive possibility to create enterprises or anonymous societies where doctors 
have managerial responsibility and freedom - within the economic allocation set in 
the contract signed with the CHS - as well as the potential to keep any surplus. 
However, while one such pilot experience was started in 1996, no other of its 
kind has been tried (see Chapter 6). The COMB believes that the fact that this line 
of reform seems to have been halted stems from the administration not being 
willing to expand it. A leader of the COMB asserted, though, that the COMB has 
not received any explanation from the administration which could show they have 
any conceptual or ideological disagreement at all with the basic principles of this 
form of management apart from 'it is too complicate, it costs a lot'. In the COMB's 
view the administration has not facilitated the expansion of this model because it 
involves losing control over management decisions and over professionals, who 
thus escape the administration's authority by getting closer to the private practice 
model of the liberal profession. Some people in the COMB argued that the 
69 The president of the UCH strongly criticised the initiative of the COMB to give financial 
support to these new providers that might emerge, as well as the privileged treatment the 
DHSS provided for them in the 1995 bill - reservation of the statutory place for three years. 
According to the UCH this was unfair competition for those providers which did undertake 
risks (EI Pais, 1/2/95, Barcelona edition). 
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involvement of health professionals in the management of health centres should 
not only apply to primary care in the form of self-management, but also within 
hospitals, by giving professionals more autonomy to manage resources and a 
consequent direct responsibility for the use they make of them. A suitable 
organisation for the development of integrated services processes could be the 
support for such distribution of responsibilities - which should involve some sort of 
financial incentivisation. 
3.3. The role of trade unions. 
Several of the most representative trade unions had formed clandestinely under 
the francoist regime and had gathered strength towards the end of the dictatorship 
as part of the opposition movement against the regime. In 1977 a law passed by 
the Spanish Parliament established associative freedom. It was then that the 
e)dsting unions - and many other organisations - were legalised, and that other 
most representative health professionals unions were also created. However, while 
the employers' associations UCH and CHC had consolidated their central role in 
the gradual definition of the 'Catalan health model' during the early eighties, the 
unions did not start to assert their relevance among the health policy elite until the 
late eighties and early nineties. Although their organisations did operate and had 
informal contacts with the employers' organisations, they were not central actors in 
70 the formulation of policies leading up to the 'Catalan model' . 
Therefore, their 
interests and preferences - and those of the people they represented - did not have 
an impact comparable to that of the UCH and the CHC on the policy precedents of 
the 1990 Catalan reform (see Chapter 4). A top representative of the class-based 
union MOO recalled that: 
70 The information presented in this section comes basically from two sorts of sources: from 
the non-published intemal reports cited, which were provided by the corresponding unions, 
and from four interviews held with one representative of CC. 00, one representative from 
CESM, one representative from CATAC and one representative from CTS. 
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'When the HNPU was defined, we gave an important answer against it 
from the union. In that moment we thought that the option to be made 
was to expand a publicly owned network. This was not done this way, 
and the HNPU was developed, and the stance of the union from that 
moment was to accept this situation and try that those resources were 
managed through consortia with the direct participation of the DHSS ... We were in favour of this management form given that almost 100 per 
cent (between 80 and 96 per cent) of the HNPU resources come from 
purchases made by the Catalan Health Service7l. It is obvious that the 
Catalan Health Service has to be represented in the governing boards 
of these providers. ' 
The relevance of unions as collective actors in the health policy arena in 
Catalonia was linked to the celebration of unions elections. The first elections were 
held in 1987 and only in the CHI providers, and from 1990 they affected the rest of 
the HNPU. These elections are held every four years and the electoral district is the 
'working centre' (each provider) - an enterprise or a provider may have more than 
one working centre. The elections follow a regulated process covering, for 
example, the duration and timetable of the whole process, the updating of census, 
the number of representatives eligible in each centre, and the formal presentation 
of candidatures. Closed and blocked lists of unions apply in the case of working 
centres with more than 50 workers, and open lists of candidates in the case of 
working centres of less than 50 workers (CC. 00,1998a). The results of the 
elections were the legitimising basis for the collective bargaining process. This was 
not a single global process for the whole sector, but was separately organised: one 
for the whole CHI, another for a number of HNPU members which negotiate and 
sign a common collective agreement, and a series of different bargaining 
processes for each HNPU provider which decided to have their own individual 
enterprise collective agreement72. For each of these bargaining processes a 
permanent negotiation table was set up which was composed of representatives of 
the employers' associations-73 and of different unions according to the results of the 
elections. The importance of being among the most representative unions in each 
71 The Catalan Health Service was created in 1991 and took the role of the health authority 
which the Catalan Health Institute had performed until then. 
72 This latter option is predominant among private non-HNPU providers. 
73 In the HNPU the main employers' associations are the UCH and the CHC, and in the 
private sector the Catalan Association of Health Centres. 
125 
of these sectors - namely, those with more than ten per cent of representatives - 
depends chiefly on the number of workers affected by the collective negotiation. In 
1990 there were 30,000 workers in the CH174,7,000 in the members of the HNPU 
with the same collective agreement, and 11,000 in the members of the HNPU 
which had individual enterprise collective agreements'5 (CC-00,1991). 
Table 3.7. Unions electoral results in the health sector, 1987-90. 
1987 1990 1990 1990 
CHI Catalan Health HNPU HNPU 
Institute (CHI) non-CHI providers non-CHI providers 
(common collective (individual 
agreement) enterprise 
agreemen s) 
Unions % representatives % representatives % representatives % 
elected elected elected 
CESM-SATSE 38 84 37.7 17 6.6 28 14.0 
CC. 00 34 70 31.4 138 53.7 100 50.0 
UGT 8 26 11.7 24 9.3 31 15.5 
USTECATAC 22 9.9 0 0.0 16 8.0 
uso 2 7 3.1 46 17.9 19 9.5 
Other" 1 14 6.9 3 1.2 6 3.0 
Non-affiliated 15 29 11.3 0 
Total 100 223 100 257 100 200 100 
"The unions included in this category are not specified in this internal report, which does point out 
that none of them reached the level of ten per cent of the elected representatives and, therefore, 
cannot be considered as being among the most representative unions in the health sector - namely, 
those obtaining at least ten per cent of representatives. 
Source: CC. 00. (1991) based on the certificates of elections of the Department of Labour of the 
Catalan government. 
74 At that time, in the CHI only those having a statutory, civil service-like contract -namely 
93 per cent of its workers- were entitled to vote. 
_151n the private sector there are 5,900 workers, in the psychiatric sector 500, and 540 in the 
providers for elderly people care. In the HNPU and 
in the private sector the electoral results 
are the aggregation of the results of two 
different electoral colleges: on the one hand, 
medical staff, nurses and administrative personnel, and on the other 
hand, nurse assistants 
and non-health personnel. The number of representatives each electoral college may elect 
is proportional to the number of workers in each college (CC. 
00,1998b). 
126 
As Table 3.7 shows, the electoral results of the 1987 elections in the CHI 
made apparent, first, the strong position of a coalition formed that same year by 
two sectoral, profession-based unions - CESM (Spanish Convergence of Medical 
Unions)76 and SATSE (Union of Technical and Health AuAliaries) - representing 
the interests of doctors and nurses respectively, which obtained 38 per cent of the 
delegates elected. Second, the classed-based, communist-leaning union CC. 00 
(Workers' Commissions) obtained a very relevant 34 per cent of the delegates 
elected. However, the non-affiliated reached 15 per cent of delegates, which put 
them among the most representative forces - namely, those obtaining over ten per 
cent of delegates. They obtained twice as many representatives in the HNPU - 
providers with a common collective bargaining process in 1990 but lost their 
representativeness in the CH177. 
The HNPU was not created until 1985 and its gradual consolidation took 
place during the second half of the eighties. Thus, it was not until 1990 that the 
unions election were held not only in the CHI, but also, and for the first time, across 
the HNPU and the private providers outside this network. In the elections of 1990 
CESM-SATSE maintained its share of delegates in the CHI, while CC. 00 lost three 
percentage points in its share of delegates. Also, the class-based, socialist-leaning 
UGT (General Union of Workers) joined the most representative unions gaining 
almost three percentage points in representation. Moreover, a new coalition of 
public sector unions - USTEC from education and CATAC from the administration - 
almost joined the group of the most representative by obtaining ten per cent of 
delegates. By contrast, in the rest of the HNPU CC. 00 was by far the majoritarian 
union, obtaining over half of the elected representatives. Among the private 
providers UGT obtained an important representation share - 35 per cent. 
76 The Catalan branch of CESM is also referred to as Medical Union of Catalonia. 
77 For a detailed disaggregation of electoral results among private providers, psychiatric 
hospitals and elderly residences see Table A. 8 and Table A. 9 in Appendix 1. 
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Table 3.8. Unions electoral results in the health sector, 1994-97*. 
1994-1997 1994-1997 1994-1998 
Catalan Health HNPU HNPU*** 
Institute(CHI) non-CHI providers non-CHI providers 
(common collective (individual enterprise 
agreement) agreements) 
Unions representatives % representatives % representatives % 
elected elected elected 
CESM-SATSE 134 42.8 
CEMSAT 3 0.7 
SATSE 55 12.1 
AMIC 8 1.7 
APF 8 1.7 
CC. 00 75 24 171 37.5 87 46.8 
UGT 37 11.8 79 17.3 39 21.0 
USTECATAC 31 9.9 
CTSC 48 10.5 
SAE 9 2.9 3 0.7 
CGT 8 2.6 4 0.9 
CSIF 8 2.6 
uso 4 1.3 44 9.6 
CTC 3 1.0 
SAC 2 0.6 
APAIL 2 0.6 
SPAS 0 0.0 
INDEP 12 2.6 
SIVIC 12 2.6 
API 9 2.0 
Non-Affiliated 7 3.7 
Other" ***53 28.5 
Total 313 100 456 100 186 100 
*The union elections follow a dynamic time pattern as they are not held at the same point in time in 
all providers. The data shown in this table represent the results obtained by the different unions in the 
health sector as accumulated between 1994 and 1997. 
"The unions included in this category are not specified in this internal report. 
***Those included in this result involve some associations standing for election within AMIC and 
others, though they have not been classified as such in this report78. 
NB: The membership of the HNPU varies over the years as new providers sign contracts with the 
Catalan Health Service on a regular basis and are included in the HNPU by decree. 
Source: CC-00. (1998b) based on the certificates of elections of the Department of Labour of the 
Catalan government. 
78 1 want to thank Javier S5nchez, head of the electoral office of CC. 00., for providing me 
with these unpublished data directly from CC-00's database, which was updated to May 
1998. 
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The accumulated results of the unions elections between 1994 and 1997 - as 
they were gradually held in the different providers -, showed a reinforcement of 
CESM-SATSE and a decrease in CC. 00's representation in the CHI. On the other 
hand, a complex process of coalition building and alliances pushed by CESM- 
SATSE among profession-based unions had an impact on the electoral results 
across the HNPU. First, CC. 00's proportion of delegates declined by 16 points in 
the HNPU with a common collective bargaining process and also that of USO 
declined eight points. By contrast, the representation share of UGT in these 
providers increased seven points, and CTS appeared as a new union obtaining 
over ten per cent of delegates. CESM-SATSE's strategy also led to a sensible 
increase in its representation in the HNPU (see Table 3.8). In the HNPU sector 
where collective bargaining is carried out on a centre-per-centre basis MOO lost 
three points in its percentage of representatives while UGT increased by more than 
four points. Among these providers, recent coalition-building initiatives promoted by 
CESM-SATSE in 1997, such as AMIC, were still classified within the group 'other', 
thereby making it difficult to assess the extent to which the increase in their 
representatives stems for this strategy. Finally, in the private sector, MOO 
continued to be the strongest union, followed by a slightly weakened UGT and 
slightly reinforced smaller unions. 
The objective of the unions has been that there should eventually be a single 
collective bargaining process for the whole HNPU - namely CHI and the rest of the 
HNPU (both those with a common collective agreement and those with individual 
enterprise agreeements) - as a first step to homogenise the labour conditions of all 
health professionals and workers. Thus, while the class-based CC. 00 and UGT 
were already represented in all three sectors, the strongest union in the CHI - the 
profess ion-ba sed CESM-SATSE - was gradually spreading across the rest of the 
HNPU in the mid-nineties. However, the articulation of interests among unions was 
far from fluent, but rather characterised by conflict of interests, as class-based and 
professional-based unions wanted to assert their respective sphere of influence, 
which, in fact, overlapped. Moreover, class-based unions' approach was that 
professions were not a differentiating feature when defining a union's strategy for 
the defence of workers, while corporatist approaches focused on the 
representation of specific professions such as doctors, nurses. However, they did 
have some common arguments. The interests defended by the unions CESM- 
SATSE, CC. 00 and UGT in the second half of the eighties were mostly identified 
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with those of health professionals on the statutory, civil service-like contracts 
working in Social Security health providers, the CHI. Their actions focused on 
labour relations, working conditions and the professional careers of these health 
professionals. In this respect, one of the clearest points of consensus among the 
central policy elites - the CHC, the UCH and the COMB -, as well as among the 
autonomous and local administrations and the directive personnel of the CHI itself, 
was that the statutory personnel regime together with the lack of managerial 
autonomy to develop a personnel policy (including retributive incentivisation) were 
the most important factors leading to inefficiency in the Social Security health 
services. They argued, that this situation was further aggravated by other factors, 
such as the administrative constraints on procurement expenditure and procedures 
and the consequent transactions costs involved. 
By contrast, the most representative unions in the CHI were against the 
gradual transformation of the statutory regime for the CHI's employees into a 
contractual labour market-like employment relation. First of all they acknowledged 
that, as unions, they were stronger in large organisations whose employees had 
the kind of civil service-like contractual arrangement which gave them employment 
security and independence to defend their rights through collective action. By 
contrast, a CC. 00's leader acknowledged that they had encountered great 
difficulties in gaining support among employees of the contracted sub-sector of the 
HNPU, where providers had a contractual relation with their employees based on 
the labour market regulations. These labour contracts covered a wide range of 
different working conditions and different degrees of labour insecurity which made 
it difficult for employees to develop solidaristic common goals for collective claims. 
Thus, there were very low levels of awareness of the unions as a tool for collective 
bargain or for the defence of their rights. Instead, these employees believed that 
any improvement in their condition would be better dealt with directly and 
individually with their employer. 
However, these unions also pointed out principle-based arguments as the 
main reasons for defending this contractual arrangement. The leadership of both 
CC. 00 and CESM-SATSE argued, first, that there was no evidence (comparing 
providers with similar levels of complexity and cost structures) that the civil service 
regime imposed an inefficient burden on the management of public health 
providers. Second, they claimed that being a civil servant involved an ethical 
commitment not only of a professional kind but also to the public service. This 
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commitment was safeguarded by the civil service status, which enabled employees 
to develop their profession free of political and managerial influences and 
uncertainties - which they viewed as often related. Finally, the unions viewed the 
civil service system as a guarantee of quality of service and economy in 
management. Both aspects they saw as difficult to guarantee in the ongoing 
process of diversification of management arrangements in the Catalan health 
system. 
Table 3.9. Personnel ratio in HNPU acute hospitals classified 
by ownership in Catalonia, 1993. 
Ownership Beds Doctors Nurses Auxiliaries 
/bed /bed /bed 
Social Security 
(CHI) 4,495 0.7 1.1 0.7 
Other public 2,839 0.5 0,8 0.6 
Municipal 1,074 0.4 0.7 0.6 
Foundations 3,287 0.4 0.7 0.6 
Diputaci6* 468 0.4 0.7 1.1 
Red Cross 547 0.4 o. 7 0.4 
Mutualities 2,361 0.3 0.5 0.5 
Church 1,598 0.3 0.5 0.8 
Other private 2,900 0.3 1.6 0.7 
Total 19,569 0.5 0.9 0.7 
Social 4,495 0.7 1.1 0.7 
Security (CHI) 
Non-CHI 11,765 0.4 0.6 0.5 
The rest 3,309 0.4 1.6 1.1 
*Provincial administration's governing organ (high number of psychiatric hospitals outside 
the HNPU). 
Source: Ramis et aL (1997: 103) based on the Estadistiques dEstabliments Sanitaris en 
R6gim Ontemat of the DHSS of the Catalan government. 
The unions argued that the Catalan reforms of the eighties took the statutory 
employment regime of the health professionals of the Social Security health 
services (hospitals and primary care) as the scapegoat on which to pin the blame 
for the inefficient management of the system. One of the reasons why the 
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organisational and management forms of the CHI had not been taken as a pattern 
for the rest of the HNPU was the aim of reducing personnel expenditure and 
staffing levels. As table 3.9 and table 3.10 show, the CHI hospitals have a higher 
ratio of personnel per bed and spend a higher percentage of their income on 
personnel. On this line, a former official of the DHSS and member of IC (the only 
political force opposing the reforms) argued that: 
'Limiting or reducing the personnel who directly depends on the public 
administration [the CHI] is a way to reduce the risks of negotiation, of 
strikes impacting on politicians ... 
And who may be the progressive 
agents most likely to support a public model of health [system]? ... The 
workers of the public sector themselves, and not only for corporatist 
interests, but also for scientific interest - health as a collective problem, 
planning, selective interventions. ' 
Table 3.10. Personnel expenditure as a percentage of total income 
and expenditure of hospitals in Catalonia, classified by 
ownership, 1993. 
Personnel expenditure 
Ownership % over total expenditure % over total income 
of the hospital of the hospital 
HNPU 65 69 
Non-HNPU 54 54 
CHI 67 71 
Non-CHI 64 67 
The rest 52 52 
Other public 66 71 
Municipal 63 69 
Priv. foundation 65 68 
Diputaci6 64 64 
Mutualities 56 58 
Church 58 59 
Other private 53 54 
Total 63 66 
Source: Ramis et al. (1997: 93) based on the EstadIstiques dEstabliments 
Sanitaris en Rdgim Ontemat of the DHSS of the Catalan government. 
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From the perspective of the private sector, a top manager of the Catalan 
Association of Health Centres pointed out that the wage level agreed through 
collective bargaining in the CHI was higher than that of the HNPU (which he 
considered to be para-public), and the latter was higher than that of the private 
sector, having a corresponding impact reflected on the personnel expenditure of 
their respective providers. From the private sector perspective the reason was that 
in the private sector personnel relations were between labour and capital, and 
therefore followed an economic (and more balanced) rationale, while labour 
relations in the public sector were based on political struggle mediated through the 
vested interests of civil servants. 
In the late 1980s, while CESM-SATSE, CC. 00 and UGT were the most 
important unions and the CHI was the only sector where elections of unions had 
been held, other associations started to emerge both in some CHI's centres and 
across the rest of the HNPU. The new groupings did not see their interests 
represented by these e)dsting and largely consolidated unions. On the one hand, 
their members did not identified with the organisation and decision-making 
procedures of the class-based unions, and on the other hand they regretted what 
they saw as the corporatist view taken by the main profess ion-ba sed union, 
representing doctors and nurses. Instead, they first aimed at representing all 
workers in the publicly financed health sector (the CHI and rest of the HNPU), and 
later on widened their aspirations to the whole public sector. Conceming the health 
sector, their main objective was the homogenisation of labour conditions for all 
workers of the HNPU at the same standards as the CHI's workers. 
These associations originated from a bottom-up process in which committees 
elected from assemblies followed relatively ad hoc networking patterns. In 1987 
some of these assemblies created, through their committees, the Autonomous 
Collective of Health Workers of Catalonia (CATSC). In 1990, CATSC agreed to be 
integrated into the public sector union Autonomous Candidature of Workers of the 
Catalan Administration (CATAC), which had been created in 1987, and to stand 
together for elections with the Union of Education Workers of Catalonia (USTEC), 
which had been created in the late seventies. In a parallel process other 
assemblies created the Co-ordinating Committee of the HNPU. This Co-ordinating 
Committee of the HNPU negotiated the first agreement in which the gradual 
homogenisation of labour conditions across the HNPU was defined, and which was 
the basis for the first collective negotiation with the employers' association - that is, 
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the UCH because the CHC did not assume this particular function until 1993. 
However, although the first agreement was signed by the Co-ordinating Committee, 
the collective negotiation was formally signed by the best represented unions of the 
sectors, as the Co-ordinating Committee had not stood for elections and therefore 
did not have any formal legitimacy from the ballot box. In order to obtain such a 
legitimacy for future negotiations, they created in 1994 the Co-ordinating 
Committee of Health Workers of Catalonia (CTSC) out of the existing committees. 
The CATAC-USTEC coalition did not welcome the parallel process that CESM- 
SATSE was pushing to spread its influence across the HNPU, creating the 
Association of Doctors and Nurses of Catalonia (AMIC) in 1997 together with other 
smaller unions (see Table 3.7). This coalition saw CESM-SATSE as too corporatist, 
focusing on doctors and nurses, while the coalition aimed at different sectors within 
the public sector from a more global approach. At the end of 1997 CATAC-USTEC 
formed a coalition with CTSC in order to increase their representativeness in the 
following elections. And shortly afterwards they created the Alternative Inter-Union 
of Catalonia (IAC), by associating with other unions from health and other public 
sectors. 
CATAC-USTEC-CTS not only demanded the homogenisation of labour 
conditions across the HNPU at the same level as the CHI, but also supported the 
predominance of the public sector ownership and direct management responsibility 
over what they view as an increasing predominance of the private sector. In their 
view those HNPU's providers which had received public money for their survival - 
namely investments and subsidies - should have been transferred into the 
ownership of the autonomous administration, an argument in line with that of the 
leftist coalition Initiative for Catalonia (IC) in the Catalan Parliament. In the 'Catalan 
model', the radicals argued, the opposite has been done: public investments in 
those providers have in fact been a transfer of public resources to private interests 
which have seen their capital increased and their initial debt frozen. 
The issue of reforming the statutory regime applying to CHI personnel, or 
even changing the legal nature of the CHI, has not been at the centre of the 
debate so far. Since the Social Security health services represent only a fourth of 
acute hospital beds in Catalonia, the unions see the Catalan government as trying 
to avoid the political risk of being the first in Spain to have a direct confrontation 
with those sectors. Some senior figures in the DHSS and the CHI assumed that a 
consensus is emerging in the late nineties on the need to reform the non- 
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transferred INSALUD, the Social Security health services still managed by the 
central government in ten Autonomous Communities. Their view was based on 
extrapolating from Catalonia's experience, so that any reform needed in the CHI 
(the INSALUD transferred to Catalonia) must also be needed to a greater extent 
where the full public sector is the largest part of the health system. 
The difficulties this reform is bound to encounter are not only confined to the 
reaction of the statutory personnel, but also that of the Autonomous Communities, 
because any reform process is integrally bound up with decentralisation of the 
INSALUD to the Autonomous Communities, and with disagreements over the 
distribution of financing resources among the latter (see Chapter 2). Conflict of 
interests which may derive from this process partly explain why some Communities 
have made less progress in acquiring these competencies. For example, the 
Autonomous Community of Madrid refused in 1992 to have the INSALUD and the 
health competencies transferred (although it would have given this autonomous 
government enhanced influence since the capital's health budget is huge). One of 
the reasons for this was that the concentration of Social Security high technology 
centres in Madrid have high costs, and hence the city would not be able to run 
them if funding was allocated to this Community on a per capita basis. 
Conclusions 
The Catalan health care reforms of the eighties were influenced by both 
exogenous and endogenous factors. The most relevant of these endogenous 
factors included, first, the shared and stable leadership of both the main coalitions 
as collective actors and their leaders (policy brokers). Second, there is a clear 
definition of the subsystem boundaries between actual and potential actors; and 
third, a process of policy-oriented learning resulting from the interaction and 
collaboration between interest groups and advocacy coalitions which controlled key 
complementary resources in the health policy domain. 
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While the new autonomous health authority had the legal competencies and 
the financial resources for the governance of health care, non-institutional policy 
elites had been emerging and consolidating in the late seventies and early eighties. 
The resources these elites controlled were essential for the development of the 
Catalan government)s policy preferences. Thus, while the autonomous health 
administration owned and had management responsibility over the transferred 
Social Security health services, most hospital resources were in private and semi- 
public local hands. Among private providers, a relatively small managerial elite had 
accumulated the knowledge and experience which were most needed for the 
organisation and rationalisation of a hospital network which had developed without 
planning and hospitals which in many cases were in dire financial straits. Among 
semi-public providers dependent on the local administrations, the role of municipal 
representatives involved both managerial and political commitment to a 
decentralised hospital network model, in which the resources under their influence 
could play a central role. 
The policy preferences of these elites were, in principle, compatible with 
those of the health administration - namely, the consolidation of a mixed health 
provision model. Therefore, the existing distribution of key resources concerning 
this policy area involved an internally heterogeneous policy elite who found 
themselves forced to develop a collaborative pattern of relations in order to co- 
ordinate the use of those resources in the pursuit of common policy preferences 
and objectives. In this context, the incremental and consensus-building strategy 
pursued by the DHSS of the Catalan government was facilitated by the 
compatibility of the policy elites' preferences and belief systems, which were 
themselves conditioned to a large extent by that distribution of resources. As 
shown in Chapter 2, the DHSS of the autonomous government had a clear policy 
preference for not enlarging the Social Security provision and management model, 
but rather for regulating the provision of health care in such a way that the existing 
heterogeneous network of non-Social Security providers was reinforced and 
consolidated as a stable contracted network. This option involved first, the 
detachment of the health authority from public direct management and ownership 
in relation to those providers, and second, the expansion of private management 
techniques in the health sector. 
On this same line, the main policy preferences of the managers' association 
UCH focused, on the one hand, on the managerialisation of the health care 
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network, including the Social Security providers (CHI) as well, by introducing private 
management techniques. The UCH was also determined to avoid public sector 
features such as the civil service-like personnel status of the CHI's workers or the 
lack of managerial freedom, which they considered to be the most important 
obstacle to the improvement of efficiency. On the other hand, they demanded from 
the Catalan government the political and economic commitment to the existing 
heterogeneous provision network as an example of a dynamic civil society. 
Similarly, the main policy preference of the local governments associated in the 
CHC was to ensure the Catalan government's financial commitment to the 
consolidation of the existing non-Social Security network - in which the CHC had a 
large stake - while maintaining the managerial and political relevance of the 
municipal providers. 
Thus, the distribution of resources and dependencies among different 
groupings of actors explains to a great extent their interest and patterns of 
interaction. The contribution of the UCH to the development of the Catalan 'model' 
was channelled by some of its leading members being appointed as internal 
collaborators of the DHSS, from which they had a most relevant role in the design 
of regulatory and contractual policy tools. The collaboration between the DHSS and 
the CHC as representative of providers dependent on local administrations was 
also crucial for the rationalisation and consolidation of the HNPU. Both the UCH 
and the CHC played mixed roles as pressure groups, think-tanks and, more 
recently, consulting and services enterprises of the hospital sector. 
The policy learning process involved in their constant and developing 
collaboration was to a large extent the origin of the consensus achieved by the 
main groups of actors. However, another crucial strategy which helped the 
development of this consensus was the purposeful focus the Catalan reforms on 
aspects of the elites' belief systems dealing with applied policy issues. Other 
aspects touching on different groupings' deeper values (their normative core 
beliefs) were consistently left to be dealt with in the formulation processes at the 
Spanish central government level. For example throughout the formulation of the 
1986 General Health Law the coalition in the Catalan government actively 
participated to help its preferences prevail. And these preferences were not only 
shared by the UCH and the CHC to a large extent, but also by the Party of the 
Catalan Socialists (PSC). Although the PSC-PSOE was in office in the Spanish 
central government, it was the largest party in the opposition in the Catalan 
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Parliament and the most important party in terms of local councillors in the Catalan 
municipal governments - which led the PSC to identify with their corresponding 
mayors' interests. 
The applied beliefs on which this heterogeneous and stable elite agreed 
included the policy tools they developed throughout the eighties - namely, the 
managerial isation of the health care network. However, a deep (normative) core 
argument that set the UCH and the CHC apart was the role that public authorities - 
and in this case including local governments - should have in relation to the 
ownership and management of the non-Social Security providers. While the UCH 
argued for managerial autonomy and depoliticisation, the mayors represented in 
the CHC re-asserted their involvement as elected politicians representing public 
ownership, and argued that management efficiency was not necessarily at odds 
with public authorities' responsibility. By gradually leaving this argument aside, 
consensus was relatively achievable. Building on both the policy precedents of the 
eighties and the consolidation of a highly interdependent policy elite of clearly 
defined collective actors, the formulation process of the 1990 Law for the 
Organisation of Health in Catalonia was widely interpreted as giving consistency 
and legal status to the existing model, which made consensus appear achievable. 
Nevertheless, the early nineties were characterised by a challenge to those 
clearly defined boundaries of the policy subsystem as other advocacy coalitions 
demanded a more relevant role in the decision-making processes within the health 
policy domain, in the face of the increasing heterogeneity of labour situations and 
conditions. These collective actors who had been at the outskirts of the core- 
decision making until the late eighties were both class-based and profession-based 
unions. The importance of these unions was originally linked to the gradual 
introduction of elections for unions in the health sector. Thus, in the late eighties 
the profession-based CESM-SATSE and the class-based CC. 00 shared the 
highest representation levels in the CHI providers, focusing on the labour relations 
concerning the statutory civil service-like personnel. But in the early nineties, new 
unions, emerging from a centre-based, bottom-up process gained some relevant 
representation both in centres of the CHI and across the rest of the HNPU, where, 
previously, CC. 00 had been the most important negotiator with the employers. 
But interest representation in the health sector was not straightforward. The 
fragmentation of the unions' forces reflected conflicts of interests between 
corporatist approaches (focusing on the representation of specific professions such 
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as doctors, nurses, etc. ), class-based approaches (where professions were not a 
differentiating feature when defining a union's strategy for the defence of workers), 
and public sector-wide approaches (pursuing the homogenisation of labour rights 
across the public sector). Moreover, some of the key workers in the health sector, 
the medical profession, were also represented Via their most influential official 
professional association, the COMB. Through this channel the medical profession's 
influence was not only reflected in the exchange of relevant figures between the 
DHSS and the COMB but also in an explicit common political leaning. In the early 
nineties, the COMB took a more relevant role in supporting a line of reform of the 
Catalan model which most unions opposed: the possibility that primary care 
doctors could assume financial risks by running team-based primary care centres 
as a private business contracting with the new health authority created in 1991 - 
the Catalan Health Service. 
In 1990, after the passage of the Law for the Organisation of Health in 
Catalonia gave legal status to the previous reforms and provided their further 
development, the policy elites realised that the 'new public management' (NPM) 
discourse which was spreading across many OECD countries actually fitted the 
main features of the Catalan reform. Thus, they imported it and gave the ongoing 
policies a discursive consistency with what the international academic and political 
elite defined as a new paradigm to be pursued for the management of the public 
sector. However, during the first half of the nineties this elite complained that there 
were divergences between this discourse and the implementation of the reforms 
furthered from 1990, divergences which involved the need to further clarify the 
'Catalan model'. 
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Chapter 4 
Institutional design issues in the 1990 reform 
of health administration. 
Institutional choice is about specifying and allocating decision rights to different 
actors and determining the rules that govern the way that these actors are selected 
and the way they use their discretion. The formulation process of the 1990 Law for 
the Organisation of Health in Catalonia (LOHC) was a case of institutional choice 
concerning the design of the governance structure for the health sector - that is, 
the rules governing the relations between the different actors who may play a role 
in a particular policy domain. More specifically, this institutional choice concerned 
the design of the administrative agent which, within the Department of Health and 
Social Security of the Catalan government, embodied the public health authority, 
and which would be responsible for organising and co-ordinating the health system 
and for implementing health policy. 
According to Horn, an enacting coalition (or the political party in power if it 
enjoys an overall majority) faces the commitment problem of how to ensure that its 
policy objectives will remain untouched or unchanged by the next incumbent 
coalition. In Horn's account this commitment problem drives the institutional choice 
the enacting coalition has to make concerning the design of the public sector, and 
this choice is made mainly on transactions costs criteria. That is, legislators choose 
those administrative arrangements that best address the following transactions 
costs: 
1. Decision costs (vagueness versus refinement of legislation) and its impact 
on participation costs. It will be shown that the LOHC was extremely vague 
concerning the institutional form of the new health authority and its relations with 
administration-owned providers and with the rest of providers. In turn, the 
participation issue concerning social actors became the main point involved in open 
negotiation. 
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2. The commitment problem to ensure the flows of costs and benefits derived 
from the new governance structure. In the Catalan case, the solution to the 
commitment problem was not influenced by the majoritarian dynamics of the 
Westminster-type of democracy - even though the enacting coalition had an 
absolute majority in the Catalan Parliament. Instead, co-operation, negotiation and 
co-optation of different interests into the very structures of the health administration 
were the preferred strategies to solve the "prospective side' of the enacting 
coalition's commitment problem. 
3. The enacting coalition faces the costs of ensuring a successful 
implementation of legislation - namely, the costs derived from an agency 
relationship. As it will be shown, CiU designed an implementing agent which was 
highly dependent on the executive (the incumbent coalition), and which at the 
same time had a high degree of discretion in terms of management. By contrast, 
opposing projects by the Party of the Catalan Socialists (PSC) and by the leftist 
coalition Inititative for Catalonia (IC) advocated a more politically independent 
agent but with a lower degree of management autonomy. Moreover, CiU and the 
PSC advocated an arms-length relationship with non-administration providers, 
while IC supported the integration of the latter into the structures of the health 
administration. 
4. The enacting coalition faced the costs derived from uncertainty about the 
private benefits and costs associated with the legislation, which made it difficult for 
them to derive support from strategically assigning risks to the group that was best 
able to control or insure against it. In the formulation of the LOHC these groups 
were not only citizens, but mainly numerous public and private providers which 
were not part of the public administration structure with which they had contractual 
relationships. These non-institutional actors had consolidated a strong role for 
themselves throughout the eighties in the health policy domain, and had developed 
implicit and explicit identification links with the different political parties in 
parliament. 
The enacting coalition Convergence and Union (CiU, the main Catalan 
nationalist party) claimed that the passage of the LOHC confirmed the Catalan 
government's capability to set and maintain their own distinctive policy priorities for 
the organisation and administration of health. Having been in power since 1980, 
the enacting coalition argued that their policy priorities were reflected in the policy 
options they had developed throughout the eighties, which had consolidated into 
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their own 'model of health system'. The 1990 LOHC gave legal status to those 
policy precedents and clarified the governance structure of their 'model' by 
designing a more adequate institutional form for the health authority. In Mintzberg's 
(1987) terms, decision-makers recognised an emerging strategy as a result of a 
repeated feedback between formulation and implementation by which a strategy 
(option) is re-defined, reinterpreted and legitimised79. 
In Horn's terms, QU had a commitment problem (Horn, 1995) in safeguarding 
the persistence of the 'Catalan model of health system'. However, it could be 
argued that this commitment problem had two time dimensions: one retrospective 
and another prospective. In retrospective terms this commitment problem had 
arguably been solved: CiU in the Catalan government had been capable of setting 
and maintaining its priorities for a health care governance 'model' without formally 
changing the institutional features of the health authority (CHI). This point is 
relevant because such institutional features of the Catalan health administration 
had been inherited from the Social Security administration transferred from the 
Spanish central government in the early eighties and these features were claimed 
to be an obstacle by both central and autonomous governments to developing a 
different governance structure for health care. However, although the Social 
Security management entity (CHI) had represented the health authority from 1983, 
some policy options considered central to the 'Catalan model' had been developed, 
such as the introduction of an accreditation system for health providers in 1981, the 
creation of the HNPU in 1985, and in 1986 the reform of the contracting system 
with non-CHI providers. 
In order to achieve a balanced mixed provision system CiUs policies had 
required priority investments in the non-Social Security sector which, despite its 
relevance in Catalonia, had persistently been under-funded through its contracts 
with the Social Security administration. As explained in Chapter 3, these policy 
options had been intertwined with intense consensus building and policy leaming 
processes amongst the main policy elite in the health sector. The consolidation of 
this consensus by the late 1980s ensured that the enacting coalition's (CiU's) 
commitment problem had actually been solved. That is, the main policy elite and 
79 For a case study which shows a similar process of 'recognition of an emergent strategy, 
by the Catalan government see Gallego-Calder6n and Grau (1996). This case study 
analyses the territorial policy developed by the Catalan government concerning the location 
of protected green areas and the development of urbanisation. 
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the largest party in the opposition (the PSC) fully supported the defining features of 
the 'Catalan model'. 
A variable that intervened in this piecemeal reform process that stretched 
throughout the eighties was the negotiation of the General Health Law (GHL) 
passed by the Spanish Parliament in 1986, and the policy preferences and power 
position of the Ministry of Health of the Spanish central government. The General 
Health Law created a National Health System (NHS) and defined it as comprising 
and integrating the Health Service of each of the seventeen Autonomous 
Communities. In turn, the implementation of this NHS was made dependent on the 
gradual passage of corresponding laws by the autonomous Parliaments organising 
their respective health services. This mandate, though, had to follow a defining 
feature common for the whole NHS: the health service of each Community had to 
integrate and co-ordinate all public providers (owned by the autonomous, local, and 
any other public administrations) in their territory, as well as establishing the 
required complementary relationships with private providers necessary for ensuring 
universal public coverage of health care. 
CiUs capability can be analysed resorting to Weaver's and Rockman's 
(1993) theoretical framework. These authors argue that the set of institutional rules 
characterising the political system in general and the decision-making process in 
particular determine a series of government policy-making capabilities8o. Three of 
them have a clear relevance for the this case study: setting and maintaining 
priorities, ensuring policy stability, and innovafing. Although the relevance of the 
first capability was most emphasised by CiU when referring to the policy 
precedents of the 1990 LOHC, the second capability - to ensure policy stability - 
has also been pointed out by this enacting coalifion in relation to a particular aspect 
of their 'model', the consolidation of the public-private network of health providers 
in Catalonia. The capability of 'innovating' has been directly linked to the 1990 
80 Weaver and Rockman (1993: 6) identify ten capabilities which, according to them, all 
governments need to master: lo set and maintain priorities among the many conflicting 
demands made upon them so that they are not overwhelmed and bankrupted; to target 
resources where they are most effective; to innovate when old policies have failed; to co- 
ordinate conflicting objectives into a coherent whole; to impose losses on powerful groups; to 
represent diffuse, unorganised interests in addition to concentrated, well organised ones; to 
ensure effective implementation of government policies once they have been decided upon; 
to ensure policy stability so that they have time to work; to make and maintain international 
commitments in the realms of trade and national defence; and, above all, to manage 
political cleavages to ensure that the society does not degenerate into civil war. ' 
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LOHC, giving it a sense of turning point in the policy approach taken to the 
management of health care by changing the governance structure of the system. 
The capability of innovating was cited by the enacfing coalition as a result of the 
diffusion of their policies from the beginning of the nineties into other Autonomous 
Communities and into the health administration of the Spanish central government. 
If the 1990 LOHC represents a turning point in the approach to the 
governance of health care, this requires the consideration of the prospective 
dimension of CiUs commitment problem. The bill presented by the governing CiU 
had to be vague enough to meet two contradictory objectives: it had to fulfil the 
GHL's mandate, which gave a clear priority to the public sector, and, at the same 
time, it had to consolidate the policies developed throughout the eighties in 
Catalonia, which gave a clear priority to a mixed provision sector. Initially, from 
1990 onwards the capability to innovate in the existing public administration 
structures through the creation of the Catalan Health Service (CHS) focused on 
three themes which emerged as central issues during the negotiation and 
formulation processes of the law. These themes were first, the legal nature of the 
CHS as the health public authority and administration; second, the nature of the 
relationships between the CHS and the public and private providers; and third, the 
participation rights of administrative, political and social actors in the decision- 
making and management structures of the CHS. These issues emerged as three 
graduated dimensions along which the political parties represented in parliament 
negotiated: 
- the margin of discretion of the CHS; 
- the degree of integration of providers into the CHS; and 
- the extent of social participation in the structures of the CHS81. 
The analysis of the documents issued throughout the process of formulabon 
and passage of the 1990 LOHC allows the empirical testing of Horn's theoretical 
model in order to explain 'why the enacting coalition chose a particular institutional 
form instead of another for designing the public sector? '. As the analysis of these 
81 At a further stage, following what key informants acknowledged as a 're-interpretation' of 
the LOHC, this capability to innovate was easily linked to the intemational trend of 'new 
public management' (NPM). Although some of NPM's defining features could be found 
within the very ambiguous provisions of the LOHC, it was not until after the law was passed 
in 1990 and the CHS was actually created in 1991, that the NPM terminology used in 
intemational forums like the OECD was readily adopted by the enacting coalition (see 
Chapter 5). 
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documents shows in this chapter, the LOHC and its modification were a case of 
institutional choice concerning the public sector. In particular, the three main 
dimensions of the negotiation leading to the passage of the LOHC - the margin of 
discretion of the CHS, the degree of integration of providers into the CHS, and the 
extent of social participation in the structures of the CHS - paralleled the 
transactions costs defined within Horn's theoretical model. 
In addition to examining Horn's hypotheses about legislators' concern with 
these transactions costs, this chapter also maintains the focus set out in Chapter 1 
on understanding why different political parties cared most about different 
transactions costs. Following Dowding's (1995,1996) argument that resources play 
an important role in shaping both preferences and patterns of interactions among 
actors, this analysis traces legislators' preferences for a particular institutional 
solution to their commitment problem (in the case of the governing coalition) or to 
their policy priorities (in the case of the parties in opposition). Their preferences for 
a particular institutional form are in turn explained by looking both at parties' explicit 
ideologies (in this case views on what functions the health authority should 
perform) and their resources (for example, electoral support in different levels of 
government). 
Although some of the exogenous variables pointed out by Horn as 
influencing the institutional choice formulated by legislators are common to both 
incumbent and opposition parties, some are or affect them in different ways. In 
particular, at any given time governing parties may face different commitment 
problems and transactions costs because of the effect of power distribution among 
the different administration levels (and political spheres) in an overall system of 
government. If they have different authority positions in other levels of government 
and administration they may care about different constituents and interests groups. 
This is particularly relevant in political systems such as the Spanish and the 
Catalan ones, where inter-governmental relations are of the utmost importance - 
not only owing to the territorial (and power distribution) structure of the state, but 
also because of the relevance of split voting affecting such relations. This split 
voting partly stems from the two-dimension ideological space characterising 
political competition in Catalonia (see Figure 4.1). 
145 
Figure 4.1. How Catalan voters in Catalonia positioned themselves in 
ideological space, by the party to which they felt closer in 1988. 
Spanish 
Nationalism 
Left 
Catalan 
Nationalism 
Right 
Source. Montero and Torcal (1990) based on a survey by the Centro de Investigaciones 
Sociol6gicas (1988). 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show that CiU has been a clear predominant party at the 
autonomous level of government, with an absolute majority in the Catalan 
Parliament for over 11 years, which it eventually lost in 1995. The PSC has 
consolidated its second place at this legislative level. By contrast, the parties 
positioned to the left of the political spectrum have enjoyed a majority of votes in 
municipal elections, with the PSC as the first party but facing an increasing 
percentage of CiUs vote share (Pallar6s, Font, 1995). However, those leftist 
parties get their support from the largest, most populated municipalities, as can be 
inferred from the lower percentages of mayors they achieve - which usually 
indicates the percentages of municipalities where they have been the most popular 
party. This definition of spheres of political influence across different government 
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levels is not only confined to the internal politics of Catalonia, but also conditions 
the i nter-govern mental relations between local and autonomous governmentS82. 
This chapter focuses on institutional actors and in particular, on the political 
parties with largest parliamentary representation. The first section analyses the 
different projects they presented in 1989 for the design of an institutional form for a 
new health authority (the Catalan Health Service). These proposals are used as a 
basis for identifying either their commitment problems (in the case of the enacting 
coalition) or their interests and their policy preferences (in the case of the parties in 
opposition) in relation to the functions to be performed by that health authority. 
Both issues are originally concerned with certain transactions costs and with the 
institutional form they advocated during the formulation process of the new health 
authority, and this is examined in the second section. Here the focus is on the 
degree of the CHS's discretion (concerning agency costs); the degree of 
participation by social actors in the structure of the CHS (concerning legislative and 
participation costs); and the degree of providers' integration into the health 
administration, (which affects both agency costs, and uncertainty and risk 
assignment costs). Finally, section three assesses the extent to which CiU used the 
veto power derived from its absolute majority in parliament during the formulation 
process leading up to the passage of the LOHC in 1990. 
82 As Montero and Font (1991) point out there is still a stronger division of spheres of 
political influence between the central and the autonomous government, this time based on 
a persistent split voting which favoured the PSG-PSOE at the general elections (for the 
central government) and CiU at the autonomous elections. This phenomenon was relevant 
for the modification of the LOHC in 1995, when the opposition of the PSC in the Catalan 
Parliament was conditioned by the support the PSOE needed form CiU in the Spanish 
central Parliament, after it had lost its absolute majority in the 1993 general elections. 
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Table 4.1. Autonomous elections in Catalonia, 1980-95: vote percentages 
and number of seats in the Catalan Parliament. 
1980 1984 1988 1992 1995 
Parties votes seats votes seats votes seats votes seats votes seats 
ciu 27.7 43 46.6 72 45.7 69 46.2 70 41.0 60 
PSC 22.3 33 30.0 41 29.8 42 27.6 40 24.9 34 
PSUC 18.7 25 5.6 6 
Ic 7.8 9 6.5 7 9.7 1183 
ERC 8.9 14 4.4 5 4.1 6 8 11 9.5 13 
AP/PP 7.7 11 5.3 6 6 7 13.1 17 
PSA 2.6 2 
PCC 2.4 
UCD 10.6 18 
CDS 3.8 3 
Other 9.3 2.6 3.5 4.7 1.9 
NB: The Catalan Parliament has 135 seats. 
Source: Parlament de Catalunya (1985: 30), (1989: 30), (1993: 34-35), (1996: 40-41); Generalitat de 
Catalunya (1996: 65). 
Table 4.2. Municipal elections in Catalonia, 1979-95: parties' shares of the vote 
and of mayoral positions. 
Parties 
1979 
votes mayors 
1983 
votes mayors 
1987 
votes mayors 
1991 
votes mayors 
1995 
votes mayors 
ciu 18.6 23.2 24.9 46.9 32.5 63.9 33.1 63.0 30.0 63.3 
PSC 26.6 9.1 39.4 16.1 37.1 15.2 36.8 16.0 32.8 15.3 
PSUC 20.2 3.2 11.2 1.5 
Ic 10.2 1.4 9.6 1.5 11.8 1.3 
ERC 3.8 2.6 2.8 1.5 2.4 1.2 3.3 1.5 6.2 3.4 
AP/PP 1.3 0.1 9.2 2.5 5.7 1.0 6.7 0.6 12.2 1.1 
PCC 
UCD 13.3 13.6 
CDS 0.6 0.2 3.1 0.3 
Other 14.6 48.2 9.6 31.3 8.6 17.2 5.1 12.7 
Source: Subirats and Vall6s (1990), and ESE (1998) (forthcoming)84 
83 The fact that IC gets more votes but less seats than ERC derives from the impact of 
where they get their votes. Catalonia is divided into four electoral districts, which are the 
same as the four provinces (Barcelona, Tarragona, Lleida and Girona). The assignment and 
distribution of the 135 parliamentary seats among them is not based on a strict 
proportionality criterion. This means that in the most populated areas, from where IC obtains 
most of its votes, more votes are necessary to obtain a seat than in less populated areas. 
84 1 want to thank Jaume Magre from the Universitat de Barcelona for allowing me to use 
the electoral data corresponding to the 1991 and 1995 municipal elections, which have been 
elaborated by F. Pallar&s, J. Font, R. Canals and J. Magre, and which will soon be published 
(ESE, 1998). 
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4.1. The government's bill and alternative proposals. 
There is an argument that the governing coalition in Catalonia, Convergence and 
Union (CiU), pursued a clear governance structure for the health system from the 
early eighties, and that its legal formulation into the LOHC was not possible until 
1990 because the economic and ideological conditions both at the state85 and 
autonomous level were not favourable until then. But this position is difficult to 
sustain. First of all, a distinction should be made between two interrelated 
components of a governance structure: on the one hand, the institutional form of 
the (health) authority and, on the other hand, the policy tools it is entitled to use. In 
this respect, the Catalan government's priorities proved to be much clearer 
concerning policy tools than the institutional form of the public health authority. 
The Catalan government had full competencies to legislate over health, 
affecting both components, and a clear basis on which to do so as soon as the 
1986 GHL was passed by the Spanish Parliament at the central government level. 
As Cernadas (1994: 54-57) points out, three different draft bills internal to the DHSS 
were elaborated and dropped during the 1984-88 legislative period, before the bill 
that finally lead to the LOHC was drafted and sent to parliament. The first of those 
draft bills was rejected for being too close to the GHL - that is, too pro-public 
sector. The second draft was rejected for being too privatising. The third bill was 
sent to parliament but had to be dropped because the legislative period came to an 
end and the Parliament had to be dissolved. 
Apparently, the main priority to which the Catalan government clearly did 
commit itself was the creation of the HNPU - directly related to the use of contracts 
as policy tools - in the mid-1980s, one year before the passage of the 1986 GHL. 
The formulation process of this Law lasted for three years and the model it defined 
was that of a National Health Service - publicly financed through taxes and 
stressing overwhelming public or Social Security provision, giving a minimal 
85 In principle, though, the PSOE's commitment to the NHS model defined by the 1986 GHL 
might have been a basis for the Spanish central government to oppose CiUs health 
provision model if it had been made explicit through a law from the Catalan Parliament 
earlier than 1990. In fact, internal reports from the Ministry of Health and Consumption in 
relation to the 1989 CiUs bill reveal reluctance to accept the emerging definition of the CHS 
and the legalisation of the mixed provision network (MSC, 1989a, 1989b). 
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complementary role to the private sector. In order to ensure the persistence of the 
Catalan mixed provision, CiU and the main Basque nationalist party, PNV, in the 
Madrid Parliament negotiated with the PSOE - which controlled the Spanish core 
executive and had an overall majority in the Spanish Parliament. Their concern was 
that this Laws provisions referring to the organisation of health services were 
classified as non-basic, that is, not requiring mandatory implementation by the 
Autonomous Communities with health transfers (Vaqu6,1987; Rico, 1997). 
In April 1989, the parliamentary group of the Party of the Catalan Socialists 
(PSC) presented a law proposal in the Catalan Parliament for organising health 
care in Catalonia, but it was rejected by the majority. Finally, in May 1989, CiU 
(from the Catalan executive) sent a bill to the Catalan Parliament on the 
organisation of the health system in the Autonomous Community. The negotiation 
process lasted until June 1990 when the LOHC was passed. In this process, two 
alternative texts to the CiUs bill were presented, by the parliamentary groups of the 
PSC and of the communist-leaning Initiative for Catalonia (IC). The remaining 
groups in the Parliament presented their respective amendments but with no 
alternative project formalised into a text. Crucial stages in the Catalan legislative 
process are, first, the legislative initiative86; followed by the presentation of 
amendments and the debate in the corresponding sectoral Commission87 (the 
Social Policy Commission); and third, the debate in parliament on the text 
negotiated and agreed in the commission and on the amendments each 
parliamentary group reserved for this final debate. This final debate and vofing is 
conducted on an article by article basis. 
In this legislafive process, the main modifications introduced to the CiUs bill 
text were agreed during the Commission debate, while the debate in parliament 
resulted in minor changes to the Commission's text. However, the executive itself 
86 The legislative process may be initiated by the executive sending a bill to parliament, by 
members of parliament presenting a law proposal - five members of parliament or a 
parliamentary group-, by the representative organs of supra-municipal territodal 
demarcations presenting a law proposal, or by citizens (Internal regulations of the Catalan 
Parliament, 1987, article 92) (DOGC, n. 916,18/11/87; DOGC, n. 918,23/11/87). 
87 In the Catalan padiament there are 14 Sectoral Commissions, of which eight are 
permanent Legislative Commissions (such as the one concerned in the LOHC case - 
Commission of Social Policy), three are permanent non-legislative Commissions, one is 
regulatory, and two are specific for the Accounting Magistracy (Sindicatura de Comptes) and 
for the Ombudsman (Sindic de Greuges) (internal regulations of the Catalan Parliament, 
1987, several articles) (DOGC, n. 916,18/11/87; DOGC, n. 918,23/11/87). 
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supported by an overall majority in parliament could exercise a veto on those 
aspects to which CiU was strongly committed - for example, the legal nature of the 
CHS, and a system of mixed public and private provision. These key points had 
remained the same throughout the eighties as CiU had controlled the Catalan 
executive from 198088 and this coincided with the third consecutive legislative 
period (1988-1992) in which they had an overall majority in parliament. In a 
parliamentary regime such a situation guarantees dominance of the executive to 
the majority party and leaves negotiation with other parties subject to its political 
will. 
The three texts presented by CiU, the PSC and IC represented three different 
reform projects concerning the choice of a new governance structure for organising 
the health system in Catalonia, stemming from their commitment problem (in the 
case of the enacting coalition CiU) or policy priorities (in the case of the PSC and 
IC in the opposition) in relation to their constituents and political stances89. 
However, not only did the governance structure each project defined differ 
substantially, but also few and ambiguous explicit links were made between these 
different 'solutions' ('insfitutional forms') and the 'problems' (Iransactions costs') 
they were supposed to address. 
The bill presented by the governing CiU came closest to an explicit statement 
of a problem concerning the e)dsting distribution of competencies over health 
across different organs of the DHSS. This problem was defined as the need 'to 
overcome some particular deficiencies in the organisation of health, such as the 
detachment of the functions of organisation, planning and management of the 
health services, which were so far allocated to different organs' (BOPC, 5/6/89, 
n078: 4964). According to CiU, the solution to this problem required the creation of a 
single organism, the Catalan Health Service (CHS), which assumed the 
responsibility for all these functions under its authority, in order to achieve an 
adequate co-ordination between those matters. This institutional reform bringing 
together those functions was considered 'fully advisable, ..., 
bearing in mind the 
close interrelation between them'. The legal nature and organisation of the CHS ('a 
88 Although they did not have an overall majority in parliament in the 1980-1984 legislative 
period they did not share government with any other party and governed as the largest 
minority. 
89 See BOPC, n078,5/6/89 for CiUs bill and BOPC, nOl 15,4/12/89 for the PSC's and IC's 
alternative texts. 
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public entity of an institutional nature') as well as the policy tools available to it 
(private management techniques) were, in fact, the object of the whole project and 
the solution to that problem. Hence, QU emphasised that its proposal was not a 
health law, but a law for organising the governance of health care. Another aspect 
identified as a problem in CiUs project was the dichotomy dissociating public 
health and health care, which had been the result of the overlapping distribution of 
competencies between different administrative jurisdictions. The Basic Health Area, 
as the lowest territorial unit of the CHS, was given the responsibility for integrating 
both functions. Both these options and the creation of the CHS with the 
corresponding organisation of the health sector was a mandate of the 1986 
General Health Law. 
In the introductory text presenting CiUs project there are no other explicit 
links between identified problems and supported solutions, not even other explicit 
problems to be addressed. However, three statements concerning CiUs objectives 
pursued by the reform appeared to be particularly relevant, as the parliamentary 
debate showed afterwards. First, there was the intention to favour: 
'... the introduction of private management mechanisms in accordance 
with the service nature of the health administration, its public nature 
notwithstanding. ' (BOPC, 5/6/89, n078: 4965). 
Second, the reform was meant to: 
consolidate ... a mixed 
health system based on making use of all 
resources, either public or private, with the aim of achieving an optimum 
hospital reorganisation which allows an adequate homogenisation of 
services and a correct use of physical and human resources, in line 
with the general trend in developed countries' (BOPC, 5/6/89, 
n078: 4965). 
Third, there was the intention to: 
I... make progress in the adequate distribution of health resources, the 
optimisation of the economic resources allocated, the co-ordination of 
the whole system of public coverage, the participation of users in 
decision-making, and the improvement of the quality of health services, 
with the ultimate and essential aim of ... effectively enforcing 
the right to 
the protection of health'(BOPC, 5/6/89, n078: 4965). 
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CiU made its 'prospective' commitment problem explicit by means of these 
three objectives, which bore directly on its policy preferences. Those objectives 
concerned the consolidation of the mixed health system developed throughout the 
eighties, which implied the recognition of and support to a role of private providers 
in the health system of public coverage which was substitute rather than 
complementary to public provision. Moreover, it involved the expansion of private 
management techniques in the health sector. However, these objectives involved a 
specific option regarding uncertainty and risk assignment costs as far as private 
providers were concerned, because for many of them their economic situation 
made public funds indispensable for their survival. Additionally, a main concern 
with agency costs was also implied in the reallocation of competencies to a single 
authority, the CHS, and its endowment with powers to co-ordinate the whole health 
system. Finally, a brief reference to participation costs was also made. 
Confirming its policy priorities during the parliamentary debate - the final 
stage in the legislative process -, CiU referred to the policy precedents developed 
by the Catalan government over the eighties and pointed out that the CHI, the 
management entity of the Social Security in Catalonia, had proved a 'good 
management instrument' throughout that process. The CHI, as a bureau form in 
Horn's (1995) terminology, had implemented a policy of contracting with non-Social 
Security hospitals, and had initiated changes in its own hospitals. At the same time, 
the CHI had initiated a reform process in primary care in 1985, a sector in which, in 
contrast to the hospital sector, the CHI owned and managed over 90 per cent of 
resources. In spite of acknowledging the CHI's task as the health administration in 
Catalonia from 1983, CiU considered that: 
'This CHI, maybe enlarged, could have been transformed into the 
would-be-Catalan Health Service, as has happened in other 
Autonomous Communities of the state with their own respective [Social 
Security] management entity. If it had not been for this hospital 
scenario, with a scarce number of Social Security providers, it would 
have been very easy to create the Catalan Health Service, building on 
the enlargement of the Catalan Health Institute [CHI]. This [option] has 
not been possible owing to the hospital sector reality in Catalonia. ' 
(DSPC-P, 13/6/90, n068: 3251). 
Additionally, CiU supported this arguments by highlighting three dysfunctions 
which had persisted despite the reforms of the eighties and which were basically a 
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matter of agency costs. First, there was the considerable lack of permeability 
between primary and hospital care. Second, the professionals of the Network of 
Hospitals of Public Utilisation (HNPU) still did not have incentive and promotional 
elements in their career. Third, there were services which were not regulated yet, 
such as mental health, labour health and family counselling. For all these reasons, 
QU concluded, it was necessary to create a new legal entity which made it 
possible to encompass all these heterogeneous providers, different status 
professionals and services. In this respect, they emphasised that the debate on the 
private/public dichotomy had grown confusing. They claimed that the public 
character of a health system does not stem from the ownership of providers but 
from the universalisation of services and their being free at the point of provision. 
In contrast to the CiUs bill, in which the need to reallocate competencies to a 
single authority, a public body, appeared as the main problem to be solved and the 
consolidation of a mixed health system the main problem to address, the 
alternative text presented by the parliamentary group of the PSC put the emphasis 
on the need to integrate all public health providers (CHI and non-CHI) into a single 
network. Thus, although they agreed with CiU that the health sector should at last 
be organised by integrating public health and health care under that authority, the 
problem stressed by the PSC was basically linked to uncertainty and risk 
assignment costs affecting a range of charitable and semi-public providers 
dependent on local administrations - in which the PSC had the greatest political 
stakes. Their text started with the general problem statement that 'the existing 
functional, organisational and technical structure of the health system is 
inadequate for meeting the health needs of the population as they have evolved'. It 
then advocated as a solution: 'it is necessary to reform the health system, adapting 
it to the needs of modem society, integrating all resources and optimising all 
services'. In this respect, and in accordance with the main problem the PSC 
identified, they claimed that'the present administrative framework dating from 1983 
organises under the same entity all public health resources transferred by the 
Social Security. However, the rest of public health services in Catalonia, mainly 
attached to municipal governments and provincial administrations - with a strong 
health tradition - were not integrated in that main public structure'. For them this 
was the key problem that had to be solved (BOPC, 4/12/89, nOl 15: 7390-1; DSPC, - 
P, 13/6/90, nO68: 32-59). 
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The PSCs text stressed that the 1986 General Health Law provided the 
necessary legal base for the organisation and rabonalisation of the health sector 
and for the full exercise of competencies by the Catalan government in this matter. 
Thus at in the late 1980s there was a legal vacuum in this respect in Catalonia 
because the General 'Health Law mandate had not been fulfilled, creating a 
problem of uncertainty. This reform, the PSC's text said, should involve the creation 
of an entity for the provision of health services - the CHS - with effective health 
management capacity, which ensured the use of all public health resources, 
overcame duplications and allocated specific functions to each resource. The CHS 
was the basic instrument for integrating and co-ordinating the efforts concerning 
health from all administrations in Catalonia (therefore, including local 
administrations, where the PSC had a political stake), as well as for co-ordinating 
the private resources which might be necessary for meeting the public interest. The 
repeated stress on the integration of all public resources, that is, from all 
administrations in Catalonia, showed that one of the PSC's main policy priorities 
was concerned with the role of local administrations (where they have a strongest 
political position in the most populated areas). Accordingly, they conceded a 
secondary role to private providers. In fact, in the final parliamentary debate, the 
PSC regretted the ambiguity concerning the legal nature of the CHS and the 
blurring of the distinction between the public and private sectors in health care: 
g... we are not against the private sector, ... in the 
health sector, it is 
good that private institutions work for the public sector on a 
complementary basis, and through a contractual regime which is clear 
and transparent. This is good and necessary, and this need is even 
more obvious in Catalonia, where the private sector comprises 
institutions leading the medical research in many specialities, and which 
are internationally competitive ... and which need 
to be given support 
and funding ... 
However, this law ... provides a 
legal nature which is 
basically designed for regulating the CHS through private law ... and we 
do not agree with this [ ... 
because... ] it involves two kinds of risks ... 
On 
the one hand, the possibility of privatising those services which are 
profitable or may yield returns ... 
On the other, the possibility of a 
regime of subsidiarity of the public sector with respect to private 
initiatives which reach a crisis point. ' (DSPC-P, 13/6/90, n068: 3261). 
The PSC interpreted that CiUs 'general philosophy' was that the public sector 
was ungovernable by definition and that it was the private sector which 
had 
developed efficient management methods for the health sector. Thus, although the 
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DHSS had explicitly denied that they might go for either of the two possibilities 
pointed out by the PSC, this parliamentary group highlighted a sentence which was 
most frequently stated by the DHSS's Conseller and by QU in Parliament and 
which the PSC did not fully approve of: 'We intend to manage the public health as 
if it was private and we think that this is the only way to survive' (DSPC-P, 13/6/90, 
nO68: 3261-64). 
In a similar vein to the PSC, IC's alternative text stressed the need to 
integrate all public health providers into a single network - showing a policy priority 
similar to the PSCs for their stronger position at the local administration level, 
although their electoral support was far lower in both autonomous and local 
elections. Thus, they put a stronger emphasis than the previous two groups on 
giving funding priority to providers of public ownership (non-Social Security 
providers owned and managed by other administrations) as a preliminary step to 
the CHS assuming their ownership. Above all, IC was concerned with an agency 
costs problem: they argued for an integration of all HNPU-member centres into the 
CHS, by which these providers transferred the use and management of their 
assets to the health authority - namely to the public administration. They argued 
that as long as those providers were publicly funded, they should also be publicly 
managed. In any case, though, contracts with private providers should be limited to 
those cases in which it could be demonstrated that public providers are not enough 
for covering the needs of the public health system, and even then for a limited 
period of time (DSPC-P, 13/6/90, n'68: 3259). More resources were needed for the 
public system. In this respect, IC claimed that: 
'... the object of the law is to organise the Catalan health system giving 
particular priority to the public services and co-ordinating all the existing 
health services in Catalonia which will form the CHS ... 
The financing 
of the CHS has to give priority to those services which are owned by 
the Social Security (managed by the CHI), which conform to the 
majority of the existing health care services, but, given the existing 
heterogeneity of ownership, it also has to foresee the financing of those 
public services attached to local administrations or non-profit institutions 
of public interest, when there is a need to do so and which is objectively 
demonstrated. This financing is a step previous to the assumption of 
their ownership, if it is adequate and possible, into the public system. ' 
(BOPC, 4/12/89, nOl 15: 7378). 
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Finally, the need to fulfil the mandate of the 1986 GHL was also stressed by 
IC. They argued that there was a legislative vacuum in health care in Catalonia and 
that it was necessary to comply with the legal mandate of the GHL and give legal 
status to the right of Catalans to receive an integral public health care. However, 
the integral conception of health provided as an organising principle of the health 
system in the GHL was interpreted by IC in a slightly different way to CiUs 
approach. This integral conception did not require a reallocation of competencies to 
a single authority, as CiU stated, as much as to publicly cover a variety of 
dimensions of health (care, social, environmental, labour) which were not so far 
either covered by the public system or co-ordinated between them. IC insisted on 
an integrated social and health care in primary care, because, they claimed, both 
health and illness have a social dimension. 
* 
In this respect, they argued, the DHSS 
and the Department of Social Welfare should be integrated. 
So in contrast to CiU, which focused on an agency costs dimension of the 
problem, IC saw the problem as concerning uncertainty and risk assignment costs 
to citizens (and health professionals), rather than to providers as the PSC stressed. 
During the parliamentary debate on the law, IC emphasised the modifications of 
the CiUs bill which had been introduced during the Commission's debate as a 
result of IC's negotiations with CiU. Those modifications concerned: 
- the addition of users' rights; 
- the suppression of the possibility to charge taxes to citizens at the point of 
access to health providers (which CiUs text established); 
- the participation of local administrations, unions and business associations 
in the CHS's Directive Council (which CiUs text had not included); 
- the compromise to homogenise work and professional conditions across 
the HNPU, the assignment of planning and management functions to the 
lowest deconcentrated level established for the CHS (Health Sector); 
- the strengthening of the public administration over the 
HNPU by reinforcing 
the accreditation system; 
-a greater emphasis on primary care as the central structure of 
the health 
system (although IC still maintained a different model of primary care in which 
social and health care resources are integrated); 
the compromise to prepare the Health Plan in one year; and 
the relevance given to the Institute for Health Studies. 
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The rest of the groups which contributed to the parliamentary debate did so 
to a lesser extent both in terms of number of amendments presented, length of 
interventions and range of arguments defended, and without having presented 
alternative project texts. The Popular Party (PP) focused its criticisms of both the 
CiUs bill and the Commission's text on five main points which they insistent. ly 
mentioned almost in every single intervenfion they made during the debate. They 
addressed uncertainty and risk assignment concerning both citizens and health 
providers but based on different policy preferences from those of the PSC and IC. 
First, they regretted that the texts did not recognise the diversity of health care 
models (both in terms of insurance and provision, rather than just provision) which 
were so traditionally rooted in the Catalan society and economy. This recognition, 
the PP claimed, had to imply the definition of those health care models as 
alternative to the compulsory Social Security model. That is, citizens should be 
allowed to opt out from the Social Security model and privately provide for their 
own needs through private insurance and provision. (In this respect, CiU argued 
that the possibility to opt out from the Social Security was not allowed by the legal 
framework in force and that, in any case, freedom should be made compatible with 
the guarantee of rights of citizens). Second, the PP claimed that official 
associations of health professionals should be represented in the management 
structures of the system and of providers, which was eventually included during the 
negotiations. Third, they considered that the project did not make it possible for 
citizens to freely choose their doctor. Fourth, the PP stressed that the 'group 
collectivism' characterising primary health care teams and centres did not 
guarantee freedom and quality in the service, as this model ran counter to inherent 
features of the exercise of medicine as a liberal profession. The PP insisted that 
the GHL did not require that primary care teams should exist, and that this health 
care organisational form did not lead to an individualised, humanised, quality and 
effective health care (DSPC-P, 13/6/90, nO68: 3253-5). 
Lastly, the PP claimed that CHI hospitals should be given full autonomy to 
manage and govem themselves. This was the closest formulation to an explicit 
NPM component (disaggregation and implicit separation of management and the 
role of the health authority) which appeared in the whole formulation process. In all 
these aspects the PP saw a lack of political will on CiUs part to fully use the 
autonomous legislative competencies of the Catalan government. Instead, the PIP 
claimed, CiU had promoted a model too close to that enacted by the 1986 GHLI 
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which CiU itself had criticised for being too bureaucratic and statist. All this meant, 
according to the PP, that the value of freedom, which was a priority in the PP's 
ideology (and to CiUs, they asserted in amazement) had been surrendered9O. 
The Party of the Catalan Communists (PCC) from the Mixed parliamentary 
group9l, rejected CiUs project and criticised the Commission's text for what they 
considered to be a project for privatising the health system. Their policy 
preferences were different from the rest of the parties' as well as their respective 
views about how to address uncertainty and risk assignment costs. The PCC 
claimed that they supported an efficient and effective public management without 
having to resort to private management practices. For this group, the introduction 
of private business management techniques showed CiUs inability and lack of 
polifical will to reform the public administration so that it could become an 
instrument to solve the problems of the public health system. They claimed that 
under-funding was a problem and that more resources were needed. The PCC 
rejected the very definition of the HNPU because, according to them, it implied the 
intervention of private interests and businesses in the management of public 
resources, over which, according to the PCC, the public sector had to have full 
responsibility. As for private interest and business the PCC explicitly mentioned 
multinationals, medical and pharmaceutical professions, private mutualities and 
insurance companies, all of whom, they stressed, were increasing their benefits. 
Instead of consolidating the HNPU as it had been defined, the PCC advocated (in 
line with IC's arguments) that all HNPU-member providers should progressively be 
integrated into the CHS and become public in all respects. In this process, the 
representation of unions (Workers were de facto co-owners') and local 
administrations was of paramount importance. In any case, for the PCC the main 
problems of health care in Catalonia were scarce economic resources, and primary 
care, and none of them were the object of the law (DSPC-P, 13/6/90, n068: 3255-7; 
DCPS-C, 14/6/90, n069: 3397). 
90 These arguments are scattered in interventions which were relatively short in comparison 
to the interventions by the PSC and IC throughout the parliamentary debate (see for 
example, DSPC-P, 14/6/90, n"69: 3357-8,3362,3368,3372,3393,3395-6,3398). 
91 The member's of parliament whose political parties have got less than five seats are 
allocated to the Mixed group -there is no limit for the number of MPs who may be part of 
this Mixed group (Intemal regulations of the Catalan Parliament, article 18) (DOGC, n* 916, 
18/11/87; DOGC, n0918,23/11/87). 
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Finally, the Social and Democratic Centre (CDS) focused its interventions on 
values about which there was little controversy. These included the need to 
guarantee universal coverage of health care free at the point of access; giving 
priority to non-profit providers when contracting health services from non-CHI 
providers; widening the range of health services to be covered; improving quality in 
general in all services; and ensuring public participation in the management 
structures of the CHS (DSPC-P, 13/6/90, n068: 3257-8). 
In sum, the three main political parties with alternative projects, CiU, PSC and 
IC, sustained different views on what were the main problems to be addressed. 
While CiU cared most about the uncertainty and risk assignment costs affecting 
private providers and public non-CHI providers, both the PSC and IC were more 
pre-occupied about the uncertainty and risk assignment costs affecting first of all 
public CHI and non-CHI providers, and citizens. As for agency costs, they 
appeared to be most relevant in the discussion on the form the CHS should adopt. 
According to Horn (1995) 'form follows funcfion'. That is, the institutional form 
chosen for the fulfilment of particular functions in the public sector will depend on 
the nature of such functions and, therefore, on the kind of transactions costs such 
functions imply. From 1983 until 1990 the CHI (the Social Security management 
body) was the health authority and its institutional form was a 'bureau' in Horn's 
classification. In order to assess the extent to which 'form followed function' in the 
reform process of the Catalan health administration between 1989 and 1990, it is 
necessary to look at how the political parties' proposals assigned functions to the 
Catalan Health Service (CHS), the new health authority to replace the bureau form 
of the CHI. 
The text of the CiUs bill defined a complex and extensive jurisdiction for the 
CHS, because it was assigned functions of very different natures, without making a 
functional classification of them explicit. In fact, the list of competencies for which 
the CHS was responsible included policy formulation, regulation, enforcement and 
funding of health services (those which are public and of public coverage), but also 
management functions. Later, after the final passage of the law in its final version 
by parliament, these management functions were re-interpreted in NPIVI terms and 
claimed to be 'functionally separable' to 'assign them to different agents'. Thus, on 
the one hand, in the CiUs bill the CHS had functions concerning the formulation of 
health policy, such as the organisation, planning, programming and evaluation of 
health, socio-health and public health services. It also had regulatory functions 
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such as the establishment of the general guidelines and the performance criteria 
which were binding for those health providers functionally assigned to the CHS. In 
addition, the enforcement functions of the CHS included the establishment, 
management and review of all kinds of quasi-contractual agreements held with 
health providers, as well as organising the inspection of health, socio-health and 
public health services. The CHSs funding functions concerned the distribution of 
economic resources, appropriated through the annual budget, for the universal 
coverage provided by the NHS in Catalonia. The CHS had management (that is, 
provision) functions, such as the management and administration of those 
providers integrated in the CHS (those within the CHI - the Social Security 
management body that had until then been the health authority), the management 
and implementation of health programmes, and the management of services and 
entitlements covered by the public health service. 
In Horn's (1995) terms, the CHS had non-commercial objectives, and these 
were low-controversy core arguments. It was the concern with specifying in greater 
detail the health areas and specialities to be covered by the CHS that clearly 
differentiated the alternative texts of the PSC and IC from the CiUs bill. They 
regretted that the legislation was not a health law but essentially an organisational 
law. Their alternative texts not only provided a thorough and more detailed lists of 
the CHS's activities, but they also included specific articles stressing the CHS's 
responsibility for public health, health at school, health at the work place, mental 
health, primary care, hospital care, and health care specialities. However, in 
contrast to CiUs project, neither the PSCs nor IC's texts provided a very detailed 
definition of the management functions which the CHS was expected to perform in 
relation to these activities, whose coverage, it was stressed, was its responsibility 
as public authority. In this respect, the PSC's project assigned the CHS the 
functions of planning with rationalising criteria, developing specific training 
programmes, establishing agreements with non-Social Security health providers, 
functional co-ordination with public or private entities, the technical collaboration 
with municipal and provincial administrations, and the public health and health care 
so far covered by different administrations. Similarly, IC defined mainly 
management functions for the CHS: planning following an equitable distribution of 
resources according to needs assessment, the continuous training of 
administrative and health professionals, the management of contractual 
agreements with non-Social Security providers, co-ordination with private or public 
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entities in public interest matters, and the integration of health networks (social 
services, health care) emphasising different health areas to be covered. 
4.2. The 'institutional form' of the Catalan Health Service: 
Three dimensions of disagreement. 
The institutional 'form' of the CHS was bound to present a complex profile owing to 
the varied functions it was assigned by the different party proposals, a variety 
which was most remarkable in CiUs project. The main alternative projects, and the 
parliamentary debate around them, show that there were three main dimensions of 
disagreement between the political parties - about the discretion given to CHS, the 
integration of other providers with it, and the degree of participation by other social 
actors in its decision-making and management structures. 
a) Margin of discretion. 
The degree of discretion granted to a public organisation affects agency costs, and 
in the CHS's case two factors were crucial: first, the managerial autonomy it was 
assigned, and second the extent to which it is dependent from the Catalan core 
executive, that is, from the political level. The CHS's managerial autonomy was 
influenced by the definition of its legal nature, because it determined the policy 
tools it may use to fulfil its functions. Both its managerial autonomy and its degree 
of (in)dependence from the core executive were influenced by the definition of veto 
points in the process of administrative decision-making concerning the CHS, the 
Department of Health and Social Security and the Catalan core executive. It is 
possible to explore how the three projects by CiU, the PSC and IC differed in 
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relation to these aspects. While CiU advocated an CHS with a high degree of 
autonomy in the policy tools it was allow to use (private law tools), it gave it a low 
degree of independence from the executive. By contrast, the PSC and IC 
advocated a CHS which was more independent from the executive, but with less 
managerial autonomy in relation to the policy tools it could use (those explicitly 
allowed by public law to autonomous organisations). 
The legal nature of the Catalan Health Service 
In the CiUs bill the CHS was defined as a 'public entity' endowed with legal 
personality and full capacity for the fulfilment of its ends. As an instrumental body, 
the CHS was ascribed to the DHSS of the Catalan government, which was 
responsible for the direction, surveillance and guardianship of the CHS, as well as 
for the control, inspection and evaluation of its performance. Following the 
mandate of the 1986 GHL to organise and co-ordinate all providers offering public 
health coverage within each Autonomous Community, the CHS was at the same 
time defined as 'comprising' the providers of health and socio-health care owned 
by the Catalan government, the providers owned by the Social Security 
administration (those managed by the Catalan Health Institute (CHI) from 1983); 
the providers owned by provincial and municipal administrations, which were either 
integrated or functionally assigned to the CHS through the corresponding 
agreements; and other non-publicly owned providers which none the less provided 
health services of public coverage financed by the CHS. 
Both the alternative text presented by the PSC and that presented by IC 
supported a different institutional form for the CHS - that is, a different legal nature. 
They defined the CHS as an 'autonomous organism' of the Catalan govemment, 
with legal personality, whose object was the protection and promotion of health, 
health and socio-health care, as well as the management and provision of the 
corresponding services. The CHS was also ascdbed to the DHSS, which was 
responsible for the CHS tutelage. As a result of the negotiation at the Commission 
stage between the different representatives of the parliamentary groups, the text 
finally agreed and sent to padiament defined the CHS as a 'public entity of an 
institutional nature'. Afterwards, dudng the padiamentary debate, IC argued that 
although the CHSs legal nature had been modified from the extremely ambiguous 
163 
C public entity' in the CiUs bill to the still ambiguous 'public entity of an institutional 
nature' in the Commission's text, such a formulabon was not a legally defined 
figure in administrative law and, therefore, its regulation was not subject to clear 
legal terms - nor was the control of its performance. By contrast the definition of the 
CHS as an 'autonomous organism', as advocated by IC and the PSC, was an 
institutional figure explicitly regulated by administrative law and there was no 
vagueness about the policy tools available to it or the control mechanisms to be 
used (DSPC-P, 13/6/90, n068: 3265). 
In this same respect, the PSC pointed out that within the administrative law 
framework there were only three possibilities for designing an institutional form 
within the public sector: first, a public entity like a Social Security management 
body, such as the CHI from 1983 in Catalonia and the National Health Institute 
(INSALUD) at the central government level; second, a public entity regulated by 
private law, namely a state owned enterprise, which was regulated by the 1985 
Catalan Law of Public Enterprises, and which were conceived of for activities of 
commercial, financial or industrial nature; and third, a public body regulated by 
public law, that is, an autonomous entity or body of an administrative nature92. The 
PSC argued that this legal figure also had the capacity to develop diverse and agile 
management forms, such as anonymous societies and consortia, which did not 
require private law regulations. In this respect, the PSC argued that such an 
ambiguity involved in the CHS definition had to be criticised not only for legal 
reasons but also for political reasons, because it left its further more concrete 
development and implementation to the discretion of the Executive Council - 
particularly, the generalised use of private law for the CHS regulations and 
performance (DSPC-P, 13/6/90, n068: 3271). 
The PSC argued that the blurring of the distinction between private and 
public sectors was taken further by allowing both public and private interests a 
competing and common status within the structure of the CHS. This situation, the 
PSC stressed, weakened and biased the administration's capacity of intervention - 
92 The PSC referred to the autonomy of one of the existing autonomous organisms of an 
administrative nature (the Catalan Corporation of Television and Radio). In the law 
regulating this body there is no mention of the competencies of the Executive Council (the 
core executive) or of any department. Moreover, the law establishes that the administrative 
board has to approve the job structure of the Corporation and the staff remuneration, and 
also, that it has to give its opinion about the appointment proposal for the position of 
Director General. In the PSC's view these provisions made the Corporation more 
independent than the CHS in terms of decision-ma king. 
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in this case, the CHS93. In the PSC's view, CiUs definition of the CHS's legal 
nature and functions built on and strengthened what they considered: 
'... the politics of discretion, low transparency and difficulty to control the 
management of health performed by the Catalan Health Institute, and 
of the correct, effective, efficient and economic use of public financing 
sources carried out by the Executive Council from 1981' (DSPC-P, 
13/6/90: 3287). 
The PSC claimed that they did not see how the new CHS could achieve CiUs 
priority objective of a more agile public management and contribute to a greater 
efficiency, efficacy and problem-solving capacity in the Catalan health system. 
Crucially, they argued, the chain of decisions in the CHS did not contribute to the 
flexibility, efficacy, efficiency, which supposedly justified the definition of the GHS 
as a 'public entity', because many key decisions had to be ultimately made by the 
Catalan Executive. Hence their criticism of what they saw as an unnecessary 
ambiguity in the definition of the legal nature of the CHS. The only difference they 
acknowledged between CiUs, and the PSCs and IC's proposals, though, was that 
the establishment of these management forms by an autonomous body of an 
administrative nature had to be made by law, that is, approved and passed by 
Padiament, while in CiUs project, the establishment of these management forms 
was left to the discretion of the Executive Council. 
In this respect, CiUs argument was that they saw an obstacle for an 'agile 
and business-like public management' precisely in the fact that an autonomous 
organism of an administrative nature depended on parliamentary approval for the 
establishment of diverse management forms. This curtailed that organism's 
managerial autonomy. Finally, their answer to the PSC's and IC's interventions was 
that CiUs definition of the CHS's legal nature was the most adequate for the 
consolidation and management of a mixed health system and that it was their 
priority commitment. Moreover, they argued, 
93 In line with IC and PCC, the PSC argued that CiU lacked the political will to undertake a 
reform of the public health sector, the CHI, in order to ensure its continuity and 
modernisation, following the example of other public administrations (provincial and 
municipal) in Catalonia, such as the case of the Municipal Institute of Health Care in 
Barcelona. This Institute was dependent on the Local Council of Barcelona which, under the 
mandate of the PSC, had promoted the gradual transformation of the statutory civil service- 
like regime of its staff into a labour market-like contractual system, as well as a gradual 
adaptation of its productive capacities. 
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this CHS, we think, follows the present international trend in the 
most developed countries in the sense of using all health resources 
available, be they public or private, particularly in the case of Catalonia, 
with the tradition and characteristics which constitute the mixed heatlh 
system of our country. 94' (DSPC-P, 13/6/90, nO68: 3272). 
Note, however, that during this debate for the passage of the LOHC there is no 
mention of NPM concepts or terms, such as splitting the functions of purchaser and 
providers, but just 'using all resources available'. 
Managefial autonomy and independence from the Executive 
The analysis of the design each party's project gave to the administrative decision- 
making process within the health authodty shows the different degree of 
managedal autonomy and political independence assigned to the CHS. As Figure 
4.2 shows, this decision-making chain involves the CHS, the DHSS and the 
Catalan core executive (the Executive Council or Govemment). The nature of the 
functions for which each of these levels has the ultimate decision power is an 
indicator of the degree of the CHSs level of discretion. 
In the CiUs bill the central services of the CHS were structured into two kinds 
of organs. On the one hand were the directive and management organs, which 
included the Directive Council, the Director, and 'any other organ that might be 
created by executive regulations'. On the other hand, there was one participation 
organ, the Catalan Health Council. Among the directive and management organs, 
the Directive Council was the highest governing organ of the CHS (see Figure 4.3). 
Also in this bill, two groups of functions of the CHSs Directive Council may be 
distinguished: those for which the Directive Council had full autonomy, and those 
over which it had no final decision power but had to pass the matter on to a higher 
94 Within the Catalan political system, those political parties which position themselves 
closer to Catalan nationalism than to Spanish nationalism as two extremes of an ideological 
dimension (see Figure 4.1), use the term 'country' to refer to Catalonia, and the term 'state' 
to refer to Spain. In this terminology, one country implies one nation with no inherent 
reference to a political or an administrative institutional structure. By contrast, one state 
refers to a political institutional structure and a governmental apparatus controlling either 
several nations or part of one or more nations which may themselves spread across 
different state borders. 
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level of hierarchy for a binding decision to be made - to the DHSS or the Executive 
Council. 
Figure 4.2. Administrative decision-making processes involving the 
Executive Council, the DHSS and the CHS. 
Executive Council (the President and the Conseller 
A of each 
Department) 
DHSS 
CHS 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Those decisions for which the CHS's Directive Council had full autonomy 
concerned both policy formulation and regulatory functions. Policy formulation 
functions included establishing the criteria for the performance of the CHS within 
the health policy defined by the DHSS and the Catalan executive, approving the 
general proposals concerning health, socio-health and public health organisation 
and planning within the framework of the Health Plan, as well as the action 
programmes and general investment programmes of the CHS and its annual 
report. As for regulatoty functions, the CHS's Directive Council established the 
criteria for the co-ordination of all providers within the network of public coverage 
and the criteria for reaching contractual agreements with non-Social Security health 
providers. The Directive Council also had to establish and update these 
agreements, and approve the internal regulation of the Directive Councils of the 
Health Regions (an indicator of centralisation). Finally the CHS's Directive Council 
might also agree the delegation of specific functions concerning health 
organisation, planning, programming and evaluation to the Health Regions. 
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Figure 4.3. Organisational chart of the CHS in the CiLl's bill 
and IC's alternative project*. 
I Directive council I 
I Health council I 
I Director I 
Health Regions: Direc fHealth Ic 
n- il council cou 
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Instead, in the PSC's project the deconcentrated structure of the CHS comprised Health Areas 
and Basic Health Area, closely following the 1986 General Health LaWs provisions 
Source: DSSS (1992a). 
Despite CiUs explicit intention to create an organisation structure appropriate 
for flexible and autonomous management, the functions over which the CHS's 
Directive Council had no final decision power (but had to pass the matter on to a 
higher level of hierarchy for a binding decision to be made or authorisation to be 
given) were mainly concerned with management. On the one hand, the decisions 
requiring to be passed on to the DHSS - after reaching an agreement at the CHS 
level - concerned the internal management of the CHS. These functions were the 
definition of the jobs structure of the CHS, the appointment and removal of the 
Health Region managers, the formulation of the draft bill of the Health Plan, the 
draft budget bill proposal for the CHS, and the documents about the economic and 
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accounting management of the CHS. On the other hand, the decisions to be 
passed on to the DHSS also concerned the external management relations of the 
CHS. These included the establishment of integrated or joint-management forms 
with either public or private entities, the creation of organisms with legal 
personality, consortia, and the participation of the CHS in any other legal entity, the 
proposal to set the prices and tariffs for the CHS's contracting with non-Social 
Security providers, and proposals for regulating matters under the competencies of 
the CHS. 
However, only over some of these competencies did the DHSS represent the 
highest administrative decision-making point, that is, it was not required to pass 
them onto a the Executive Council for approval. These included the approval of 
prices and tariffs for the CHS's contracting with - and providing services through - 
non-Social Security providers, and the authorisation of any modification of the 
distribution and organisation of providers and services, as well as the updating of 
their required inventory and accreditation. The DHSS, and more specifically its 
Conseller, appointed and removed the members of the CHS's Catalan Health 
Council and Directive Council, the president and the members of the Health 
Council and the Directive Council of each Health Region, the manager of each 
Health Region, and the members of the Participation Council of each Health Sector 
- in all cases following the proposal of the groups to be represented. Finally, the 
DHSS authorised the intemal operating regulations of the CHS's Catalan Health 
Council and of the Participation Council of each Health Region. None the less, 
there were crucial matters over which the DHSS had no veto power and had to be 
dealt with by the Executive Council for a final decision to be made: the approval of 
the Health Plan, the CHSs organisational structure, the CHS's proposals for the 
creation of consortia or for its participation in any other legal entity, and the draft bill 
of the CHS's budget. 
In contrast to the CiUs bill, the PSC's alternative text designed a more 
independent CHS, as its Directive Council was the final decision-making point for 
all of its internal and external management functions. Internal management 
functions included: organising the central services of the CHS; approving the 
internal regulations of the CHS and of the Health Councils of the Areas; approving 
the health plans of the Areas; and appoinfing and removing their Directors (on the 
proposal of their respective Directive Councils) and members of their Health 
Councils (on the proposal of those organisations and institutions represented); 
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appointing and removing the directors of hospitals integrated in the CHS and the 
rest of their directive personnel (on proposal by the Directive Council of the 
corresponding Health Area and by the CHS Director General). In the CHS's 
extemal management its Directive Council had full autonomy to establish the 
necessary contracts for the achievement of its ends, to establish concerts for the 
provision of health services with non-public administration providers - but after 
having achieved an optimum utilisation of the public resources available- and to 
develop specific programmes for the training of human resources in the health 
sector. 
However, in the PSC's alternative text the hierarchical relationship between 
the DHSS and the CHS was clear as far as those functions concerning policy 
formulation. In this respect, the CHS's Directive Council defined the criteria for the 
CHS's performance and planned resources following the directives of the 
Executive Council. It also approved the annual budget of the CHS and raised it to 
the DHSS for its incorporation into the draft bill of the DHSS's budget. It also 
considered the CHS's annual report including the economic results and approved 
investments, and raised projects of plans and works to the DHSS. However, the 
DHSS had veto power over some matters, since it was responsible for terdtorially 
organising the health services, for authorising the creation of new services and 
centres, for developing the regulation on health personnel approved by the 
executive, and for integrating the different health plans with the DHSS's plan. 
However, it had also an enabling role concerned matters such as facilitating the 
activities of health services users' associations and health non-profit entities and 
co-operatives as well as their co-ordination with the public health system, and co- 
ordinating research programmes and public resources of any source. 
In line with this two-fold role of the DHSS, the PSC's alternative text defined 
the Executive Council as both a decision-making and an enabling organ. In the 
PSC's project the administrative decision-making of the Executive Council included 
establishing the required budget for covering the needs of all services which 
depended on public administrations, and approving the Health Plan and the 
statutory regime of civil servants. It was also responsible for establishing specific 
health plans with other administrations (such as the Spanish central government 
and local administrations), agreements between health centres and universities for 
training, agreements concerning the gathering and analysis of information on 
health, and the evaluation of investments according to economic and health 
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criteria. In turn, the enabling dimension of the Executive Council included the 
creation of technical commissions and committees and the establishment of 
agreements with other administrations for guaranteeing the efficacy and efficiency 
of health services; the guarantee of the democratic participation of those having an 
interest, including unions and business associations; and the promotion of the 
updating of health teaching, of interdisciplinary training and the financing of 
research. 
The distribution of competencies provided in IC's project was very close to 
that defined in the PSC's project. The Executive Council's 'veto power concerned 
the approval of the CHS's budget project and of the statutory regime of civil 
servants. As for the Health Plan, however, the Executive Council had to send it to 
parliament for approval. In turn, its enabling role concerned its competencies to 
establish specific health programmes, to promote co-ordination with other 
departments of the Catalan government, as well as health research, retraining and 
education, and to establish the political and administrative conditions for the 
democratic participation of social, political and local entities as well as citizens in 
the management and structure of the CHS. As far as the DHSS was concerned, IC 
demanded a clearer definition of the DHSSs political and administrative 
responsibilities over the CHS. IC assigned it the competencies to organise, 
regulate, co-ordinate and distribute public resources and all providers of publicly 
funded services across the territory - including the authorisation of the creabon of 
new ones - according to criteria of socio-health needs assessment and on social, 
economic and territorial equity. Moreover the DHSS had to facilitate the health 
activities of social entities and non-profit health co-operatives. 
In all three projects, the CHS's Director had a managerial profile. All three 
texts provided that the CHS's Director was responsible for ensuring that the CHS 
complied with all the regulations conceming the performance of its functions. The 
Director had to submit to the Directive Council all the proposals and documents 
over which the latter had to make a decision, either final or as a previous step to 
forward it to a superior level of hierarchy. The Director was also the head of 
personnel and was responsible for promoting, co-ordinating, inspecting and 
evaluating the organs of the CHS - following the directives of the Directive Council - 
and issuing the necessary internal orders concerning their functioning and 
organisation. Finally, the Director acted as a contracting organ of the CHS, 
authorising the CHS's expenditures and proposing the corresponding payments. In 
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all three projects, this figure was appointed and removed by the Executive Council 
on proposal by the Conseller of the DHSS. But the PSC's text stressed that the 
CHS's Directive Council had to be heard about the appointment proposal, and 
moreover, the Director put forward to the Directive Council the appointment and 
removal of the rest of directive personnel of the CHS. In the other two projects this 
power was not provided, but was left to the Conseller and the Executive Council. 
b) Participation rights for political and social actors. 
The ability of other political and social actors to participate in the CHS's structure 
was a major issue in the negotiation process. As a result of the negotiation, carried 
out at the Commission level, the participation issue had an impact on all collegial 
organs of the CHS and at the three management levels of its deconcentrated 
structure (central services, regions and sectors). In fact, it became the first case in 
Spain where, not only participation organs, but also the highest directive organ of 
an Autonomous Community's or central government's health authority included 
representatives of collective social actors like unions and business organisations. 
Participation experiences until then had only affected specialised participation 
organs, but not directive organs. 
As Table 4.3 shows, neither the CiUs bill nor the PSC's project provided any 
participation share for social actors. CiU designed a Directive Council composed of 
representatives of the executive branch of the Catalan govemment, all of them 
being political appointees. The PSC's altemative text included representatives 
selected from different administrations: 50 per cent from the Catalan govemment 
and 50 per cent from two levels of local administrations. By contrast, IC designed a 
more heterogeneous Directive Council including 50 per cent of members 
representing the Catalan govemment, 30 per cent representing different local 
administrations, and 20 per cent representing social actors95. In all three projects, 
95 In addition to this design, IC's project provided the formation of a Secretariat with 
executive powers which would meet monthly and which was composed of nine members: 
the Conseller, the under-secretary of the DHSS, three other members of the Catalan 
government, one of municipal governments, one of Consells Comarcals, one of the unions 
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all members were appointed by the Executive Council for four years and 
renewable, as suggested by the DHSS's Conseller, who had to listen to the 
proposals made by the collective interest which these members were to represent. 
Table 4.3. Composition of the Catalan Health Service's Directive Council. 
CiUs PSC's IC's Commission's LOHC 
bill text text text 
Catalan govt. 
admin. 5944 
DHSS 
(Conseller) 1 1 1 1 1 
(Secret. Gral. ) 1 1 1 
(other+) 7 
CHS 
(Director) 1 1 1 
(Health Region**) 7 4 4 
DEF* 2 1 1 
Municipal govt. 4 4 2 2 
Provincial admin. 296 
Comarca 2 2 2 
admin. ++ 
Unions 2 2 2 
Business assoc. 2 2 2 
TOTAL 19 12 20 20 20 
*Department of Economy and Finance of the Catalan Government. 
**CiU's bill suggested seven Health Regions although later regulations defined eight Health 
Regions. 
+CiU's bill required the same number of DHSSs representatives as the number of Regions' 
representatives. 
++Consells Comarcals (supramunicipal administrative demarcations indirectly elected and 
territorially smaller than provinces). 
Source: Own elaboration based on BOPC, 5/6/89, n078; BOPC, 4/12/89, nOl 15; BOPC, 8/6/90, 
n*177; BOPC, 617/90, n0187; and Cernadas (1994). 
and one of the business organisations. The functions of this Secretariat were not further 
specified. 
96 The PSC considered that, in order to simplify the health network under a single health 
authority, comarcal administrations and provincial administrations should not have health 
competencies. They argued that provincial administrations, despite having seen their 
competencies scratched since 1987, should be included in the law because they actually 
own important providers. In turn, municipal governments should gradually concentrate on 
public health and the Catalan government on health care. 
173 
in the three projects, the Catalan Health Council was conceived of as the 
central organ of community participation in the public health system. In the CiUs 
bill this Council's functions were defined as advisory and consultative concerning 
the draft bills of the Health Plan and the CHS budget, the CHS annual report, and 
the health care programmes and providers' performance, as well as their adequacy 
to the population needs. Its composition involved 30 members (see Table 4.4). The 
membership share was: one third representing the Catalan government, 20 per 
cent representing local administrations, 10 per cent representing the unions, 10 per 
cent representing business organisations in the health sector and health insurance 
companies, and 10 per cent for scientific and training entities. The remaining 
members corresponded to consumers' and users' associations, to health 
professionals associations, and to the Federation of Mutualities of Catalonia. 
Table 4.4. Composition of the Health Council of the Catalan Health Service. 
CiUs PSC's IC's Commission's LOHC 
bill text text text 
Catalan govt. 
admin. 9 3 9 9 9 
DHSS 
(Consefier) 1 1 1 1 1 
Municipal govt. 3 3 4 4 4 
Provincial admin. 2 
Comarca admin. 3 2 4 4 
Unions 3 4 2 4 4 
Health sector unions 3 3 
Health profess. assoc. 2 2 
Employers' assoc. 3 4 2 4 4 
Health empl. 'assoc. 3 3 
Consum. /users' assoc. 2 4 2 3 3 
Professional assoc. 2 3 4 3 3 
'Universities 2 2 3 2 2 
Scientific entities 1 3 1 1 1 
Federat. of Mutualities 1 
TOTAL 30 30 30 43 41 
Source: Own elaboration based on BOPC, 5/6/89, n078; BOPC, 4/12/89, nOl 15; BOPC, 8/6/90, 
n0177; BOPC, 6f7/90, nO187; and Cernadas (1994). 
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In the PSC's alternative text, this organ was named the Participation Council 
of the CHS. Apart from making citizens' participation effective and advising on the 
draft bill of the Health Plan, of the budget and of the annual report before the 
Directive Council approves them, the Participation Council was also given the 
functions to control and supervise the implementation of programmes and the CHS 
management, and to advise the rest of CHS's organs, as well as raising proposals 
and complaints to the DHSS. The allocation of its 30 members to different 
collective actors in the PSCs project gave far less weight to the representatives of 
the Catalan government and raised the weight of the rest of actors. Its composition 
was designed as follows: 10 per cent for the Catalan government; 17 per cent for 
local administrations; 17 per cent for scientific and training entities; 17 per cent for 
health professional associations; 13 per cent for users' and consumers' 
associations; 13 per cent for the unions; and 13 per cent for the business 
organisations. 
In IC's alternative project, the Catalan Health Council was defined in a 
different way. It was also conceived as a participation organ, but as the technical 
deliberation organ of the Directive Council - its functions were not decision-making 
but only of technical advice - and its members were appointed by the ConseHer 
This organ was composed of the members of the Directive Council as well as four 
representatives of the professional associations involved in the CHS, three 
representatives of the Catalan universities, one representative of the Catalan 
scientific entities, and two representatives of the associations of users of health 
services. 
The participation issue and this negotiation pattern for determining the 
composition of the Directive Council and the Health Council of the CHS's central 
services also affected the deconcentrated management structures of the CHS. 
These management structures were the Health Region and the Health Sector (the 
latter comprising Basic Health Areas where primary care is organised) in the case 
of the CiUs bill and IC's project, and the Health Area and the Basic Health Area in 
the PSC's project, the latter resembling its homonymous in the other two projectS97. 
97 In this point, the PSC closely followed the provisions of the 1986 General Health Law, 
which established this same territorial demarcation. Moreover, Health Regions as defined by 
CiU and IC were larger than Health Areas. In all three projects, though, the management 
structures of the CHS covered territorial demarcations defined on criteria of both health 
resources distribution and homogeneity of socio-economic, epidemiological and 
demographic aspects, as well as communication routes. A report of the Legal Cabinet of the 
Catalan government pointed out that 'The point of the draft bill [by CiU] which has to be 
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These deconcentrated management structures reproduced the directive, 
management and participation organs of the CHS's central services (Directive 
Council, Manager, and Participation Council), showing a similar initial proposal for 
their composition on the part of each parliamentary group, and reaching a final 
agreement which resembles that achieved for the central services' organs. This is 
consistent with the fact that the functions these organs have assigned parallel 
those at the central services level, though circumscribed to their territorial 
demarcation. These management structures were supposed to be the 
organisational channel for a bottom-up health planning and budgeting process 
which follows a gradual integration with upper mairiagement levels. 
However, the PSC drew on two reports presented as antecedent documents 
to the legislation process to support its argument that the CHS's deconcentrated 
structure fell short of the expectations raised about a fleyjble and decentralised 
management. According to a report by Tornos (1989: 7) there is a conceptual 
distinction to be made between decentralisation and deconcentration. 'in the first 
case, the areas would be entities with their own budget and with their own financial, 
personnel and physical resources; in the second case, just territorial demarcations 
with a deconcentrated organisation'. Health Regions were deconcentrated 
organisations and therefore less autonomous. Moreover, the Executive Council 
ultimately authorised the delegation of management to public and private entities 
and societies. Thus, the Health Region was not very autonomous, because it could 
not decide on the management of the centres within its territory. The competencies 
of its Directive Council also showed its low autonomy. 
c) Providers' autonomy. 
The third dimension of disagreement during the negotiation process of the 1990 
LOHC was the degree of integration of providers into the CHS. This issue involved, 
first, the extent to which private providers and those public providers which were 
taken in more careful consideration is that referring to the territorial organisation of the CHS, 
as it creates health regions and basic health areas, while the GHL refers to Health Areas 
and Health Basic Zones. ' (GJGC, 1989: 11-12). 
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not part of the CHI (the Social Security management entity) but which had a 
contractual agreement with the health authority (the CHI until then and the CHS 
onwards), had to remain autonomous organisations or had to transfer the 
ownership of their assets to the CHS and be integrated into its administration 
structure. Second, there was the need to clarify the CHS's responsibility over those 
providers and over their performance in relation to the contractual agreements they 
signed. The alternatives supported by different groups in parliament ranged from 
full integration (IC, and also the PCC and the CIDS) to full autonomy based on 
contracts implying no functional attachment (PP). In between laid CiUs and the 
PSC's preference for functional attachment without no transfer of ownership. 
This issue was relevant for at least three reasons. First, because the health 
authority's commitment to the survival of such providers was at stake. Either their 
functional attachment through stable contractual agreements or their integration 
and transformation into budget units of the health administration ensured their 
survival as necessary providers of National Health System, that is, as publicly 
financed health services. While in the former case they may incur deficits and run 
financial risks, in the latter case they are financed through the budget. The second 
reason directly derives from this point, as integration or functional attachment to the 
CIHS implied different policy tools available to the GHS for the fulfilment of its 
functions as health authority. The former reason involves hierarchical integration, 
while the latter involves contractual relations. Integration of providers into the CHS 
meant that they had to adopt the internal organisational and administration 
regulations of the Social Security providers. This option precluded the development 
of one of CiUs priority commitments: the widespread introduction of private 
management practices in the health sector by keeping the organisational and 
management autonomy of those heterogeneous providers. The third reason why 
this issue was relevant was that integration or functional attachment of providers 
involved different consequences for the role that local administrations could 
develop concerning providers which until then had been dependent on them and 
which had enhanced the importance of the municipalities' or provinces' 
competencies over health policy. The relevance of these reasons stems form the 
need to define a legal nature for the CHS ambiguous enough to encompass all 
these conflicting interests. 
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Functional attachment ver-sus integration 
As explained above, in the CiUs bill the CHS was defined as a 'public entity' 
endowed with legal personality and full capacity for the fulfilment of its ends. The 
LOHC, as finally passed by parliament reflected the agreement achieved at the 
Commission's stage, by which some ambiguity about its legal nature remained: the 
CHS was a 'public entity of an institutional nature'. This ambiguity was not clarified 
when, despite the CHS being an 'instrumental organism ascribed to the DHSS', all 
three projects and the final version passed established that the CHS 'comprised' 
the providers of health and socio-health care owned by the Catalan government, 
the providers owned by the Social Security administration and managed by the 
Catalan Health Institute (CHI) from 1983, the providers owned by provincial and 
municipal administrations (which were either integrated or functionally assigned to 
the CHS through the corresponding agreements), and other non-publicly owned 
providers financed by the CHS. This definition of the CHS raised questions such 
as whether the CHI was to be integrated into the CHS, and what the nature of the 
relationship was between the CHS and private and public non-CHI providers. 
In principle, the option to fully integrate private and public non-CHI providers 
in the new health authority (the CHS) implied that they surrendered not only the 
ownership of their assets, but also the management and organisational autonomy 
they had had until then96. By contrast, their functional attachment to the health 
administration took for granted their managerial and organisational autonomy, as 
well as the ownership of their assets. Both QU and the PSC favoured this latter 
option and agreed that within their autonomy, providers had to facilitate a 
participative management by objectives and performance control by results. 
Responsibility over management had to be clearly defined and the costs and 
quality factors had to be assessed. Moreover, these providers had to periodically 
provide the CHS with economic and health indicators, economic evaluation of their 
activities, and operational and economic auditing reports. Going a step forward, the 
same management approach was also required from all providers which were 
98 The internal organisation and management of those health providers which were part of 
the public administration, such as those included in the CHI, was regulated by executive 
regulations and replicated the much criticised model of the Social Security providers in the 
rest of Spain (rigid hierarchical structures, statutory personnel regulation, and budget 
management constraints). 
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HNPU-members, that is, all centres and establishments which were either 
integrated into or functionally attached to the CHS. 
However, the debate on integration versus functional attachment was only 
consequential for the non-CHI providers. This debate did not focus at all on the 
CHI, which is the largest single provider in Catalonia, and which comprises all 
public Social Security providers. As the CHI providers are owned and managed by 
the public administration, being integrated into the CHS did not mean their 
transferring assets or managerial freedom. Thus, during the debate of the LOHC, 
the future of the CHI was left ambiguous. According to temporary provisions of 
both the CiUs bill and the PSC's project, those organs and services of the DHSS 
and the CHI which until then had performed functions now assigned to the CHS by 
the new law had to be transferred to the CHS. The consolidation of the CHS 
depended on the completion of the process through which all services, providers, 
and programmes being managed by the CHI are finally integrated or functionally 
attached to the CHS. 
In any case, most parliamentary groups agreed on the providers that the CHS 
should 'comprise' - that is, those which will be publicly financed. The exception was 
the PP, which argued that health care models of an associative or co-operative 
nature which were so widespread in Catalonia should be explicitly included among 
the CHS resources. The rest of groups, including both the PSC and IC, agreed 
fundamentally with the CiUs bill. However, because of the mixed public/private 
character of these resources, the PSC demanded a clearer definition of the CHS's 
responsibility for providers beyond their contractual relationship. The PSC thought 
this clarification necessary even more when the distinction between private and 
public interests was blurred by providing the presence of both of them with the 
same status in decision-making in the managerial structure of the health authority. 
Moreover, in line with IC, the PSC claimed that the CHS had to assume 
responsibility for charitable health care foundations, either public or private 
attached to any public administration. Finally, the PSC stressed that the discretion 
of the CHS to resort to contracting with for-profit providers had to be limited, and 
priority should be given to non-profit institutions. 
However, the PSC asserted that they did not support a 'state-isation' or 
'publification' of health care provision in Catalonia. Rather all public provision from 
any administration should be integrated and modernised, while the private sector 
should have an important and necessary complementary role of in the provision of 
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publicly funded services. To achieve these two purposes, they claimed, it was 
necessary not to mix up both sectors because they had different legal 
management tools and interests (DSPC-P, 13/6/90, n068: 3287). By contrast, IC 
(together with the CIDS and the PCC) advocated the gradual integration of the 
HNPU members into the CHS. They stressed that there should not be confusion 
between public and private sectors. Ownership was important because it 
conditioned the possibility of democratic control by both public administration and 
parliament. They claimed that the private sector was free to function, but with 
private money. 
The role of /ocal administrations. 
The creation of the CHS by the autonomous administration involved a 
centralisation process. The reason was that the new governance structure of the 
health system required either integrating or functionally attaching all public health 
providers under the authority of the autonomous government. And this process was 
to take place within each Autonomous Community despite the fact that a 
considerable number of those providers were owned and managed by agents other 
than the Social Security administration (see Chapter 2). In Catalonia there are 
three levels of local administration - municipal, comarcal (supramunicipal 
demarcations) and provincial - of which the first and the latter often either own or 
manage health providers, and they were therefore affected by this process. 
However, the three projects presented by CiU, the PSC and IC took slightly 
different approaches to the matter of clarifying the distribution of competencies 
among them. 
The CiUs bill focused the competencies of two of these levels - comarques 
and municipal governments. Apart from the competencies derived from their 
participation in the management structure of the CHS, comarques were assigned 
competencies over co-ordination between municipal health services and between 
them and those of the Catalan government, over provision of supra-municipal 
services related to environmental and public health, over participation in health 
planning through their membership of the Directive and Health councils of the 
Health Region, and over provision of informabon and statistical support about their 
activities to the Catalan government. In turn, municipal governments were assigned 
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competencies basically related to the health control of the environment - for 
example, industries, services, means of transports and noise, distribution and over 
delivery of food, buildings, housings, and cemeteries. 
In contrast to the CiUs bill, the PSC's project gave a more thorough 
consideration to the health competencies of municipal governments and provincial 
administrations - though not to those of comarclues - and took a more active 
approach to their role in health policy. The PSC stressed the need to give a role in 
health competencies to the rest of the public administrations in Catalonia. They 
argued that this would deepen decentralisation and help to co-ordinate, clarify and 
simplify the competencies over health on a complementary basis as well as 
unifying all public health care networks into a single one, under a single health 
authority (the CHS). And it would help, they claimed, if the model of administrative 
decision-making was not so centralised, with so many decisions having to be sent 
to the Executive Council and the DHSS in CiUs text. 
Thus, the PSC demanded that the transfer of provincial and municipal 
administration providers to the CHS should be made according to specific transfer 
agreements; that the health personnel of the services attached to municipal 
governments would remain functionally dependent on local governments, though 
organically on the Basic Health Area; and that local administrations should not 
compulsorily help to finance the services they transfer. The PSC's project included 
a positive list of the compulsory services to be provided by municipal governments 
- as established by the legislation on municipal regime - and it highlighted that they 
might take any actions to promote the interest of their community including 
complementary activities to those performed by other administrations, emphasising 
the central government because of the possibility of obtaining earmarked funding99. 
In addition to participating in the management of the CHS and in the management 
of hospitals and care services, both municipal and provincial administrations had 
the competencies to create new providers within the framework of the Health Plan 
and on approval by the DHSS, and to establish agreements for the provision of 
services with non-public administration providers and agreements between 
universities and health entities, For the fulfilment of their competencies, local 
governments may resort to financing sources such as the Fund for Local Co- 
99 In the line with the PSC, the PCC also emphasised the need to establish specific action 
programmes and negotiated their funding with other administration, emphasising the central 
government. 
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operation. As far as provincial administrations were concerned, they were given the 
competencies of participating in the co-ordination between local administrations 
and the Catalan government, co-ordinating the municipal health services between 
them, providing municipal governments with legal, economic and technical co- 
operation, as well as health services of a supra-municipal character, and 
administering the health interests of its territory. 
In IC's project, local administrations were given a lower profile than in the 
PSC's project. In fact, they were assigned basic competencies derived from the 
centralisation of the new governance structure of the health system and the 
creation of the CHS. Thus, both municipal governments and Consells Comarcals 
(the administrative organ of comarques) were assigned the competencies to 
participate in the management of the CHS and in the management, '%Planning and 
implementation of the health plan of the Health Region to which they belonged. 
Moreover, municipal governments received and channelled citizens' voices, while 
Consells Comarcals co-ordinated municipal health services between them and 
provided the supra-municipal services for which they were responsible. 
Policy tools available to the CHS. 
All three projects presented by CiU, the PSC and IC agreed that the financing 
source of the CHS and the public health system must be a line item budget, 
following the traditional classification of expenditure, which forms part of the global 
and single budget of the Catalan government. Within the Department of Economy 
and Finance, the General Treasury of the Catalan government is in charge of the 
CHS treasury function, centralising the CHS resources, including those transferred 
by the Social Security and other entities. The CHS has to distribute these 
resources with the objective to cover the population's needs. The policy tools the 
CHS was allowed to use had therefore the financial constraints of the budget it was 
assigned. 
The CiUs bill emphasised in its introductory paragraphs that one of the 
aspects which differentiated their proposal from laws creating health services in 
other Autonomous Communities was the diversity of management forms which the 
CHS was allowed to use. For the fulfilment of its managerial responsibilities - the 
management of the 'services and providers integrated in the CHS', and the 
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'management and implementation of health programmes' - the CHS as a 'Public 
entity' could resort to different 'management forms' (BOPC, 5/6/89, n078: 4964-5, 
and article 7.2 of the CiUs bill and of the LOHC). The CHS might develop those 
functions directly or through organs with or without legal personality which might be 
created and ascribed to the CHS. Alternatively, the CHS might also exercise those 
managerial functons indirectly by establishing agreements, signing quasi- 
contractual relations, or using forms of joint or integrated management with either 
public or private entities. The CHS might also create consortia of a public nature 
with either public or private entifies, which may be endowed with legal personality, 
as well as creating or participating in any other legal entity. However, the CHS's 
freedom to develop its managerial responsibilifies through indirect forms was 
constrained by the requirement that the creafion of new entifies and the 
participation of the CHS in them had to be authorised by the Executive Council. 
The PSC's parliamentary group admitted that the Catalan administrations 
might establish contractual agreements with other providers for the provision of 
health services of public coverage. However, this possibility was subordinated to 
three conditions. First, public administrations had to take into account the optimum 
utilisation of the health resources they owned before making the decision to 
contract with other providers. Second, if such a decision was finally made, priority 
for contracting had to be given to non-profit providers when indicators of efficacy, 
quality and costs were analogous. Third, public administrations were not allowed to 
contract with other providers when the economic and social objectives established 
in the Health Plan were contradicted. 
Additionally, the PSC's text stressed the need for the Executive Council to 
regulate such contractual agreements as the standards of services contracted and 
the tariffs to be paid for them, their financing by the CHS and the prohibition that 
providers make any profit from the services contracted, the previous accreditation 
of those providers, the reciprocal rights and duties of both administration and 
provider, the time span of the contract, as well as the conditions for the physical, 
administrative and economic inspection of providers by the contracting 
administration'00. Specific reference was made concerning private providers and 
100 Without prejudice to the cost-free status of the public health services of universal 
coverage, CiUs bill established the possibility that both the CHI providers integrated in and 
providers functionally attached to the CHS might charge an amount authorised by the DFISS 
-on proposal by the CHS-, for services which are not strictly health care (Fourth Additional 
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their relationship with the CHS. In this respect, the PSC's alternative project 
recognised the free enterprise principle in the health sector, and provided that any 
private providers might apply for a status of functional attachment to the CHS, 
reaching an agreement which had to be reviewed every three years. However, this 
agreement had to be conditioned both by the provisions of the Health Plan and 
budget availability. In any case, though, the private providers functionally attached 
to the CHS had to keep their private ownership and management capacity over 
their internal labour relations. 
IC's alternative text also gave a clear priority to public providers, though with 
a stronger emphasis on the possibility of ownership transfer to the CHS from all 
private providers and non-CHI providers having a contractual agreement with it. As 
an exception, the CHS may establish contractual agreements with private centres 
when it is necessary to ensure coverage, following criteria of proximity to the citizen 
where there are no CHS providers. These agreements had to be public documents 
and might cover a period no longer than three years, clearly specifying the services 
contracted, including a compromise to transfer the use of their assets for that 
period, and tailoring the payment by the CHS to the accomplishment of the 
performance agreed. 
By contrast to the PSC's and IC's alternative texts, the CiUs bill approached 
the theme of the relationship between the CHS and the diversity of providers 
existing in Catalonia through the global reference to the Hospital Network of Public 
Utilisation (HNPU) created in 1985. In this respect CiUs project explicitly intended 
to consolidate: 
I ... a mixed 
health system based on making use of all resources, either 
public or private, with the aim of achieving an optimum hospital 
reorganisation which allows an adequate homogenisafion of services 
and a correct use of physical and human resources, in line with the 
general trend in developed countries' (BOPC, 5/6/89, n078: 4965, and 
article 39 of the LOHC). 
Provision of CiUs bill). This provision was strongly opposed by the PSC's and IC's projects, 
as well as by the CIDS and the PCC. 
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This network was to be composed of all health care providers which were 
either integrated into or functionally attached to the CHSIOI - namely, the HNPU. 
The former are owned by public administrations, the latter by any other private 
agent, but all of them regularly satisfy the needs of the public health system 
coverage, as the main instrument of the CHS for the implementation of the health 
policy. Those providers which are not integrated in the CHS but are functionally 
attached to it must have achieved the accreditation requirements. As HNPU 
members they were required to develop not only health care services but also 
health promotion and education, illness prevention activities, and medical teaching 
and research. They also had to submit to the CHS the statistical, management and 
economic information required as well as facilitating the controls and inspections 
carried out by the CHS. 
However, the PSC was sceptical about the HNPU member hospitals meefing 
the compromises listed in the law (articles 43 and 44 of the LOHC), because five 
years after its creation in 1985, when those same compromises were agreed, they 
had not yet been met either by the CHI or by the contracted-out hospitals. In 
addition, the mechanisms for integrating non-hospital specialist health 
professionals into the different providers of the HNPU in order to achieve an 
adequate co-ordination between health professionals of primary and hospital care 
were not clearly defined in the CiUs bill. In general, the PSC criticised the lack of 
definition of the hospital sector model, which, they considered, had evolved 
chaotically and was immersed in an ideological and planning crisis. For the PSC, 
the causes of this situation were firstly, the concentration of providers in Barcelona 
and the metropolitan area and particularly providers with high technology and high 
costs, which was against equity and efficiency principles. Secondly, the existence 
of a minority Social Security hospital sector, discriminated against in the allocation 
of resources, and the existence of a larger private sector, was leading to a conflict 
of interests in the distribution of resources. Finally, the PSC pointed to a 
conceptual crisis about for the role of the hospital in the health sector and in health 
care. For example, different rationalising initiatives, such as the 1986 Plan for the 
Reorganisation of the Hospital Sector in Catalonia, had not been implemented and 
hospital planning had not been made dependent on needs. 
101 The HNPU covered acute care. The creation of a network for chronic patients is left 
open as a possibility which would build on the existing health care centres which are not 
HNPU-members. 
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The closest formulation of a clear idea related to NPM policy tools was made 
by the PP. On the relation between the health authority (the CHS) and autonomous 
providers, the PP demanded that the performance criteria defined by the CHS to 
be followed by hospitals should not be binding for those which opted out and 
became self-govemed. The PP also came close to NPM formulations of purchasing 
roles but without mentioning it, by arguing that a two-year period should be set for 
giving the Health Regions functional, budgetary and management autonomy to 
have a decentralised and effective system. Additionally, the design of strictly 
contractual relations between autonomous entities, the PP claimed, required the 
clarification of how controversies between citizens and private providers holding a 
contract with the CHS should be dealt with, and the legal relationship between the 
CHS and those providers. 
CiUs answer to these interventions was to reassert that the fact that: 
the HNPU model has been maintained within a CHS defined as a 
public entity ... 
[it] has nothing to do with the privatisation of the Catalan 
health sector ... It is clear what the option of 
the Catalan government 
has been in this respect. The health sector which is public and of public 
ublisation is just that: public and of public utilisation; it is neither private 
nor for privatisation. The fact that we adopt this form stems, on the one 
hand, from the historical elements I mentioned, and [on the other hand] 
from the will to go ahead in pursuit of finding more flexible management 
forms, of applying the principles of private management to the public 
sector; in sum, following the internationally accepted and practised 
trend of using all existing resources in a context of economic 
constraints' (DSPC-P, 13/6/90, n069: 3364). 
Another major policy tool on which contractual agreements were supposed to 
find their raison d'dtre was the Health Plan for Catalonia. In comparison to the 
other issues discussed, the Health Plan as a policy tool central to the reform was a 
matter of considerable agreement between the three different projects presented. 
All of them agreed that the Health Plan consisted of the guidelines for the 
development of the activities, programmes and resources of the CHS in order to 
achieve the health policy objectives of the Catalan government. The Health Plan 
was meant to cover a three-year period and was approved by the 
Executive 
Council on proposal by the Conseller of the DHSS, making its objectives 
compatible with those of socio-economic and welfare policies. The 
Health Plan had 
to include an assessment of the starting situation in terms of economic and human 
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resources, programmes and services being provided, and the administrative 
organisation of the health system. The Plan also defined the objectives to be 
achieved concerning health promotion and protection, illness prevention, health 
care and rehabilitation, upkeeping of health centres, homogenisation and balance 
of resources between Regions, efficacy, quality, cost and users' satisfaction. In 
addition, it formulated the services, programmes and actions to be developed, 
together with the economic and financial resources available. Finally, it included 
mechanisms for evaluation of the implementation of the Plan had to be provided. 
All three party projects also agreed on the process for defining and 
elaborating the Health Plan. The DHSS formulated the general health policy 
framework and its own plan concerning its functions. Within these general 
guidelines, each Health Region (or Health Area in the case of the PSCs project) 
elaborated the draft bill of its own health plan and put it forward to the CHS's 
Directive Council. The latter integrated the Regions' health plans (which had in turn 
integrated the health plans elaborated by the Health Sectors) with its own plan of 
common and general services for the whole health system in Catalonia and 
forwarded the whole document to the DHSS. In turn, the DHSS integrated this 
document with its own plan. 
There were, however, some specific disagreements. The PSC wanted to 
explicitly link the content of the Health Plan to the financing sources and to 
stipulate that there should be a mechanism of parliamentary control of the 
implementation of the Plan. For the PSC, the content of the Health Plan should be 
given more detailed consideration and should include the timetable for the reforms 
to be carried out in health care. Contracting should be clearly subjected to the 
provisions of the Plan. Similarly, IC argued that the Health Plan should not be, as 
CiUs project established, an indicative tool and reference framework, but rather a 
necessary tool for all public interventions in health care - such as investments, 
health programmes and allocation of resources. It should also take into account a 
health map. The Health Plan should be the basis for the Health Regions' and 
Sectors' health plans, and clear objectives of the Health Plan should concern 
efficacy, efficiency and control by the administration. 
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4.3 Legislative negotiation and the government's power. 
In the negotiation process leading up to the passage of the 1990 Law for the 
Organisation of Health in Catalonia (LOHC) the CiU government relied on its 
absolute majority in parliament and on the institutional rules characterising a 
parliamentary regime - namely the dominance of the executive in the legislative 
process when it can count on a parliamentary majority which is, moreover, 
subjected to party discipline. In essence CiU had the power to reject any 
amendments, but to see how far it used that power it is necessary to identify the 
modifications introduced in the CiUs bill, first as a result of the Commission's 
negotiation'02, and second as a result of the parliamentary debate. The extent to 
which those changes are marginal or central to the three main dimensions of 
disagreement analysed above gives an indication of the extent to which CiU did 
use its power. 
On the CHS's managerial autonomy and degree of dependence on the 
Executive (which jointly defined the CHS's degree of discretion), CiU used its 
power so that its first preference remained unchanged throughout both the 
Commission's negotiation and the parliamentary debate and was finally passed as 
the LOHC (see Figure 4.4). However, and in contrast to the alternative texts, those 
functions for which the Directive Council of the CHS had full autonomy in the CiUs 
bill concerned both policy formulation and regulatory functions, while those over 
which the CHS had no veto power but had to pass the matter on to a higher level 
of hierarchy for a binding decision to be made - the DHSS or the Catalan core 
executive - concerned both internal and external management. 
1W Parliamentary groups present and discuss all their amendments - including whole 
afternative texts - at the Commission stage of the formulation process, but they may also 
leave the discussion of some of their amendments for the debate in parliament. In the case 
of the LOHC the amendments presented were published in BOPC, 8/6/90, n0177 and 
BOPC, 18/5/90, n0167. 
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Figure 4.4. Margin of discretion of the Catalan Health Service. 
Political independence High 
Low 
Low High 
Managerial autonomy 
Source: Own elaboration. 
The text law agreed at the Commission level defined the legal nature of the 
CHS as a 'public entity of an institutional nature', endowed with legal personality 
and full capacity for the fulfilment of its ends. Thus, it did not change CiUs initial 
definition ('a public entity') in any consequential respect in relation to the PSC and 
IC's arguments. However, some concessions to these two groups' worries about 
the CHS's discretion were made during the negotiations at the Commission level. In 
this respect, a clause was added to the CiUs bill so that in the formation of public 
consortia, promoted by the CHS with either public or private providers, must be of a 
non-profit nature. Similarly, the renewal of contracts for the provision of health 
services of public coverage by private providers had to be conditioned by the 
previous consideration of an opbmum use of the public health resources available. 
Accordingly, the CHS had to plan the criteria for the rationalisation of resources 
according to the directives of the executive, as well as the necessary measures for 
improving the services managed by the CHS. In this respect, it was specified that 
the assignment of levels of complexity to HNPU-member hospitals had to be done 
within the guidelines defined in the Health Plan. Thus, the criteria had to be 
established, by administrafive regulation, for guaranteeing the required level of 
care quality as well as of efficacy and efficiency of the management of the centres. 
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Finally, a controversial temporary provision of the CiUs bill was eliminated and, 
instead, it was made explicit that the centres and services integrated in or 
functionally attached to the CHS were not allowed to charge for the provision of 
cost-free services established with a general character by law. 
As a result of the negotiation process in the Commission, and in answer to 
the opposition groups' demands that the CHS's goals be stressed and detailed, the 
following points were added to the CiUs bill: 1. the distribution of health resources 
had to be conditioned by the socio-economic, health and population characteristics 
of the territory; 2. the modernisation of the health system had to affect both 
physical equipment and the retraining of personnel; 3. the CHS's organisation had 
to ensure the protection of the rights of users: the right to the protection of health 
had to be fulfilled respecting individual freedom and privacy, without any kind of 
discrimination; the CHS had to inform its users on their rights and duties as well as 
their freedom to choose a doctor within the existing availability in the public system, 
and the CHS had to ensure that users have every possibility to express their 
complaints on any service received for which the CHS is responsible at the level of 
Health Region. The Commission's text also included new functions for the DHSS, 
which had to guarantee that the CHS fulfilled its goals, functions and activities'03; 
for the CHS's Health Council, which apart from advice and consultation also had 
control functions'04; and for the Executive council, which might create research 
organisms for the management, co-ordination, financing and evaluation of research 
in health sciences'05. 
The participation issue was a clear theme of initial disagreement between the 
alternative projects, and here CiLl did negotiate and change its stated preferences. 
As Hom's model suggested, the vagueness of legislation implies more participation 
by beneficiaries - in this case, the non-institutional policy elite. In the Catalan case 
103 This point was eliminated after the debate in parliament. 
104 During the padiamentary debate this control function was eliminated and two other were 
added: supervision and oversight. 
105 The Commission's text added relevant articles which had been omitted in both CiUs and 
IC's text, and which concerned the organisational structure (directive and participation 
organs) of the Health Sectors. Moreover, some provisions were added establishing that the 
Basic Health Area was the backbone of the health system, and several section were added 
specifying the health personnel and non-health personnel necessary for their management, 
as well as the conditions of local civil servants, and the need to co-ordinate the health 
resources with the social resources of the local administration. 
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the participation issue was relevant because it focused not only on the participation 
organs of the CHS but crucially on parts of the health authodty with decision- 
making power. Three main groups of actors had a stake in such participation: 
representatives of the executive branch (that is, the administration of the Catalan 
govemment, including the CHS), representatives of local administrations (politically 
controlled in the most urbanised areas by parties in the opposition in the Catalan 
Parliament, mainly the PSC), and social actors (such as unions and employers 
association) to whom IC in the opposition was particulady committed. 
Table 4.5. Participation shares in the Catalan Health Service's 
Directive Council. 
Ciu PSC Ic Commission LOHC 
Autonomous 100% 50% 50% 60% 60% 
adminis. 
Local 50% 20% 20% 20% 
adminis. 
Social 30% 20% 20% 
actors 
TOTAL (n) 19 12 20 20 20 
Source: Own elaboration. 
The negotiation at the Commission level reached an agreement which 
remained unchanged after the parliamentary debate. As Table 4.5 shows in the 
participation issue QU did not use its power and made substantial concessions. 
This is no puzzle because the impact of participation provisions in pdnciple may be 
diminished by the high political dependence of the CHS on the core executive as 
an ultimate locus for key decisions. Following Horn's model, the different stances 
taken by the main political parties show that CiU mostly cared about agency costs, 
the PSC about the uncertainty and risk assignment to local governments, and IC 
about uncertainty and risk assignment both to citizens and to local governments. 
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Figure 4.5. Degree of integration of non-CHI providers into 
the Catalan Health Service. 
Degree of 
integration 
into the CHS 
Full integration 
Functional 
attachment 
Full autonomy 
Role of local administration 
Source: Own elaboration. 
According to Horn's concepts, the main political forces in the Catalan 
Parliament cared about different transactions costs because they had different 
policy preferences concerning the role of public administration in the CHS. CiU was 
clearly driven by the agency costs related to the discretion of the CHS. Aware of 
CiUs veto over this explicit commitment, the PSC and IC concentrated their efforts, 
first, on the participation issue in order to influence a CHS which was clearly 
dependent on the core executive. Second, these opposition parties struggled to 
clarify the ambiguous relation between the CHS and the non-CHI providers. In 
principle, the CHI was to be integrated in the CHS and the rest of providers were to 
be either integrated or functionally attached to the CHS. In this respect, the PSC 
and IC focused on the transactions costs associated with uncertainty and risk 
assignment affecting providers, but took different stances because they had 
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Irrelevant Relevant 
different policy preferences and different interests and policy priorities. IC 
advocated the full integration of all HNPU providers into the health administration, 
meaning an effective transfer of ownership. By contrast, as the largest political 
force in terms of votes at the local government level, the PSC not only advocated 
the functional attachment of HNPU providers via stable contractual relations with 
the CHS, but also the reinforcement of local governments' role in health policy, 
which appeared diminished in the face of an Autonomous government with 
exclusive competencies over this field (see Figure 4.5). 
CiU did actually take the same stance as the PSC concerning the attachment 
of HNPU providers. However, the text agreed in the Commission reflects the 
negotiation between these two parties in relation to the role of local administration. 
The PSCs commitment to the local administration's role in relation to those 
providers in which it had a stake (financial or representational in their administrative 
boards), was partly satisfied by some modifications in the CiUs bill. This 
modification specified that the integration or the functional attachment of non-CHI 
health providers owned or managed by provincial and municipal administrations 
would be subject to the corresponding transfer norms to be approved. The civil 
servants of those providers were not to be directly integrated to the CHS by virtue 
of the LOHC, as CiUs initial project ambiguously provided. Moreover, a provision 
was added that the core executive should gradually homogenise the work 
conditions of the personnel working in HNPU-member centres over a three-year 
period. Also, temporary provisions established the role of provincial administrations 
- as they actually owned important providers - and the contributions that local 
administrations had to transfer to the CHS for the health competencies it covered, 
all based on explicitly signed agreements. Finally, there was a more detailed 
specification of the competencies of the municipal governments, involving the re- 
assertion of the principle of 'general competencies' (Page, 1991). This principle 
states that the municipal governments may not only carry out activities 
complementary to those which are the competency of other administrations, but 
also within the framework of the sectoral legislation they may those services and 
activities that satisfy the needs and aspirations of their community - particularly the 
defence of consumers and users of health services, participation in the 
management of primary care, the protection of environmental health, and the 
protection of public health. 
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Comparing the final version further passed by parliament with the text agreed 
at the Commission level shows that the parliament majority did not exercise a 
relevant veto power. Some basic points introduced at the Commission level were 
reinforced. For example, for the public coverage of health needs the CHS could 
count on private providers as long as they are preferably non-profit and 
indispensable to satisfy needs of the public health system - as stated in the 
required agreements. In any case, the CHS's function concerning the management 
and administration of health services integrated in the CHS had to pursue the 
promotion of the management autonomy of health centres. Also, the Health Plan of 
Catalonia, once approved by the Executive had to be sent to parliament in thirty 
days so that the latter was fully informed. As for local governments, a more detailed 
specification of the competencies of the municipal governments was elaborated, 
including the provision of the minimum compulsory services required by the 
legislation on a municipal regime and detailed areas of municipal responsibility over 
health standards and plans. Furthermore, the text mentioned those competencies 
that the Catalan government might delegate according with the existing regulation 
of the local govemment. 
In more general terms, the comparison between the CiUs bill and the text 
agreed at the Commission level reveals the opposition's concern for specifying the 
principles which had to guide the performance of a new health authority whose 
discretion and ambiguous legal definition aroused in them a sense of distrust. 
Regretting that the LOHC was not a health law but an organisational law, the 
opposition and CiU agreed to reassert health principles as the basis for the CHS's 
performance. Thus, the object of the law was redefined as the organisation of the 
health system of Catalonia and the general regulation of all actions which made 
effective the right to the protection of health. In particular, the principles guiding the 
CHS's functions and activities were not only to be concerned with management but 
also with the right to health: universalisation of individual and collective health 
services, equity, overcoming the social and territorial inequalities in the provision of 
health services, promotion of the individual, family and social interest in health by 
means of an adequate health education, health control of the environment, and 
community participation in the formulation of health policy and the control of its 
implementation. 
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Conclusions 
The need to modernise the institutional design of the health authority in Catalonia 
was not explicitly taken up by the Catalan government until 1989. Some previous 
draft bills internal to the DHSS, and a law proposal by the PSC's parliamentary 
group, did not lead up to a public debate or an extended formulation process. 
Throughout the eighties, the introduction of innovative policy tools and the 
structurally incremental consolidation of a differentiated provision model had been 
carried out 'despite' the institutional design of the CHI, the health authority . And it 
was precisely this design which in 1989 was seen as a hindrance to further 
developing the Catalan 'model'. The LOHC initiative gradually evolved into an 
innovative institutional reform of health administration. In spite of the ambiguity of 
the actual legislation passed in 1990, two main points were made clear Contracts 
with providers were the main tool in the hands of the new health authority (the 
CHS) for governing the health sector, and the new body would operate within a 
private law framework in its external relations. Thus, the CHI had to redefine its role 
into a provider-only one, although its degree of structural and organisafional 
autonomy with respect to the CHS was not clearly established at this stage. 
The analysis of the three alternative proposals presented by CiU, the PSC 
and IC and the result of the further negotiation process for the institutional design 
of a new health authority shows that legislators did care about the transactions 
costs defined by Hom (1995): decision and participation costs, the commitment 
problem, agency costs and uncertainty and risk assignment costs. However, their 
respective concern with and perception of each of these transactions costs were 
different for each party, depending on what their interests and policy preferences 
were about the public sector functions. Because they had different perspectives, 
stemming from both their ideology and from the varied resources on which they 
counted, they tried to face different transactions costs, which led them to advocate 
different institutional forms for the new health authority. 
The enacting coalition's (CiU) 'prospective' commitment problem was to 
preserve and consolidate the mixed provision health system and the private 
management model it embodied, through the use of policy tools based on a 
contractual system, in which long-standing trust relationships and bilateral 
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agreements played a key part. However, no reference was made to possibly 
extending this system to the Social Security providers owned and managed by the 
previous health authority, the Catalan Health Institute (CHI). Instead it was 
assumed that the CHI would be integrated into the CHS. Both the CiUs bill and the 
final. version of the law passed by parliament in 1990 was ambiguous in this point, 
and about the complex blend of functions assigned to the CHS. Thus, CiU 
designed a CHS as a 'public entity' with a wide managerial autonomy to act within 
a private law framework, but which, at the same time, was very dependent on the 
political level - the Catalan core executive. 
By contrast, in their respective alternative projects the PSC and IC designed 
a CHS which was more independent from the political level but which had a lesser 
degree of managerial autonomy, because it was clearly subjected to the policy 
tools that public law explicitly provides for an 'autonomous organism'. However, 
the first policy priorities of these political parties were different. The PSC was 
mainly concerned with ensuring the CHS's economic responsibility over the public 
and semi-public providers in which local governments (where the PSC had a strong 
representation) had a stake as owners or managers. At the same time, though, the 
PSC wanted to preserve the ownership and managerial autonomy of those 
providers, in line with CiU, but giving a stronger role to local governments than the 
CiUs bill provided. 
Although IC agreed with the PSC on the institutional form of the CHS, they 
advocated the integration of all private and public non-CHI providers which were 
contracting with the health administration into the CHS, which would involve an 
eventual asset ownership transfer. In contrast to the PSC, IC's policy preference 
was not supported by a large political stake in any government level. This maybe a 
reason why it was the only party that took the participation issue as its strongest 
negotiation issue facing what it viewed as an extremely vague definition of a health 
authority which moreover enhanced the discretionary power of the core executive. 
While the CiUs bill did not establish any participation share in the CHS structure 
for any actor other than the executive branch, the PSC wanted to include a 
representation of local governments and provincial administrations, and IC wanted 
a prominent participation share for social actors (such as unions) among which it 
has its largest political stake. 
There were three main dimension of disagreement during the negotiation 
process which paralleled the transactions costs defined by Hom. First, the margin 
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of discretion of the CHS, including the legal nature of the CHS, and the 
administrative decision-making process (managerial autonomy and independence 
from the executive). These themes were connected to the costs derived from 
refining legislation - leaving the definition of the CHS's legal nature ambiguous - 
and to agency costs in the relation between the core executive, the DHSS and the 
CHS. Second, the issue of participation rights of political and social actors in the 
CHS's structures was related to the decision/negotiation costs, as supporters of 
these rights conceived them as a way to counteract the discretion of the health 
authority. Third, the theme of providers' autonomy from or integration into the CHS 
- including functional attachment versus integration, the role of local 
administrations, and the policy tools available to the CHS - was related to the 
uncertainty and risk assignment costs affecting non-CHI providers which had a 
stable contractual relation with the health authority. The result of the negotiation 
process showed that CiU only used its absolute majority power in the first 
dimension (the discretion of the CHS), by not accepting any relevant change to its 
first formulation. On the third issue dimension, CiU did negotiate and accepted 
clearer statements concerning the role of local administrations as demanded by the 
PSC. But CiLl reinforced its commitment (and that of the PSC) to consolidate the 
existing mixed provision network and its autonomy from the health administration. 
Only in the participation issue did CiU fully change its initial preference, by 
accepting not only the participation of local administrations but also that of social 
actors in the directive and participation organs of the CHS, at all levels of its 
deconcentrated structure. 
The vagueness of the final text passed by parliament in 1990 as the LOHC 
was criticised by all political parties. In Hom's terms, leaving legislation vague 
instead of refining it through negotiation was the result of the enacting coalition's 
effort to reduce decision-making costs. This legislative vagueness concerned the 
relations between principal and agents (health authority and providers respectively) 
and increased the discretionary power of the health authority (and of the 
executive). In turn, this ambiguity involved higher agency costs (monitoring 
implementation) and higher costs derived from assigning risk to private agents 
(providers). However, all the institutional and non-institutional policy elites admitted 
that the LOHC's vagueness also allowed its reinterpretation in 'new public 
management' (NPM) terms shortly after it was passed. This discourse diffusion 
process, which derived from the reforms being carTied out in several 
OECD 
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countries, involved the definition of the CHS as a purchasing body, and the 
decision not to integrate the CHI into the health authority, but instead to transform it 
into a separate provider body which may eventually contract with the CHS. 
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Chapter 5 
Introducing purchaser/provider separation, 1990-96. 
The fact that legislators' decisions about institutional design are influenced by 
political transactions costs involves a forward-looking attitude concerning the 
further implementation process. That is, the way in which decision and participation 
rights are defined and allocated and the way in which dsk is assigned to different 
actors at the policy formulation stage involve expectations that the enacting 
coalition's commitment problem will be solved through the implementation process. 
However, Horn's (1995) model does not provide a consistent conceptual framework 
encompassing also the analysis of the role of transactions costs arising throughout 
the implementation stage. Moreover, the formulation of an institutional design may 
not necessarily be clear and explicit, but rather ambiguous and prone to be 
reinterpreted as a result of either discourse and/or practice. Thus, in this research 
the analysis of the implementation process has been based in other theoretical 
models which complement Horn's decision analysis with concepts that are relevant 
for the specific kind of reform studied - namely, 'new public management' (NPM). 
The 1990 Law for the Organisation of Health in Catalonia (LOHC) was 
consensual for two main reasons, according to actors in the policy elite. One view 
is that the LOHC did not introduce a fundamental policy change, but rather gave a 
legal framework to a governance structure of health care which had gradually been 
developed throughout the 1980s in Catalonia. Moreover, this 'Catalan model' of 
health care had not been designed from scratch, but was the result of modemising 
and consolidating the health market structure which had traditionally characterised 
the sector. A second view is that the negotiation process between the different 
political parties in the opposition and the Catalan government led to a final 
formulation of the LOHC which was so ambiguous that all forces could see their 
interests reflected in the text of the law to a certain extent. 
However, this ambiguity in the actual formulation of the reform not only 
allowed for different discursive interpretations, but also for a considerable margin of 
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manoeuvre to enforce different implementation options. Shortly after the LOHC 
was passed a NPM discourse emerged as the basis for the prevailing interpretabon 
of the legislation. A discourse diffusion process was evident from several 
conferences in which the main advocacy coalitions in the health policy domain 
participated between the second half of 1990 and 1994. On those occasions 
representatives of the main collective actors openly assumed that a NPIVI 
reinterpretation was the most accurate reading of the LOHC. Moreover, a report 
issued in 1991 by the consulting firm McKinsey helped formalise and clarify such a 
reinterpretation. According to this NPM discourse, the redesign of the macro- 
institutional structure of the health administration had to basically focus on the 
separation of the financing/purchasing and provision functions. Thus, crucial reform 
processes were identified as both the creation of the Catalan Health Service (CHS) 
as a financing/contracting agency and the subsequent reorganisation of the 
existing Catalan Health Institute (CHI) as a provider only. 
Assessing the extent to which the definition and separation of those roles 
was actually implemented between 1991 and 1995 requires, first, analysing the 
reassignment of competencies among these bodies within the DHSS, as well as 
the internal reorganisations derived. However, for these reassignment of 
com, etencies to have an effective impact on the role which these bodies are ,P 
supposed to perform, a reallocation of budgetary resources is needed, which 
enables the restructuring of their respective budgets in accordance with their new 
roles. Thus, the analysis and comparison of the budget structure of the DHSS, the 
CHS and the CHI before and after the reform should give evidence on the roles 
these organisations were actually assigned. 
This approach is based on Dunleavy's (1991) typology of agencies, which 
infers function-based roles for public agencies from the analysis of their budget 
structure. In order to analyse the structure of an agency's budget Dunleavy 
distinguishes between four types of budgets into which all components or items of 
the total budget of an agency may be classified. These are the core budget, the 
bureau budget, the programme budget and the super-programme budget. By 
calculating the relative weight of each of these types of budgets within the total 
budget of an agency it is possible to identify the main functions the agency in 
question is expected to perform. To this end, the line-item budgets of the DHSS, 
the CHS and the CHI are analysed in this chapter, and budget ratios are taken as 
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an indicator of the role actually assigned to these organisations beyond the formal 
distribution of competencies. 
If the implementation had followed the NPIVI discourse which emerged as the 
prevailing interpretation of the LOHC, then the DHSS should appear to be a control 
agency, the CHS a contracts agency, and the CHI a delivery agency, each of them 
showing the corresponding budget structure defined in Dunleavy's model. 
However, if the implementation of the reforms between 1990 and 1995 had 
followed the actual formulation of the LOHC, which defined a much more complex 
function-based roles definition specially for the CHS, then a much more mixed 
picture should be expected to emerge concerning the actual assignment of roles 
between these three public bodies - which should be reflected in the structure of 
their corresponding budgets. 
Table 5.1. Expected agency types and budget structures in the reformed 
Catalan health administration as formulated in its NPM version. 
Agency Expected agency type Expected budget structure 
derived from NPM derived from NPM 
Department of control agency small core budget and bureau budget, 
Health and relatively large programme budget 
Social Security including transfers to other public 
(DHSS) bureaux 
Catalan contracts agency relatively small core budget absorbs 
Health Service 20-30 per cent of programme and Gore 
(CHS) budget together, 
. bureau budget absorbs most of 
programme budget 
Catalan Health delivery agency large Gore budget (mostly staffing 
Institute (CHI) costs) absorbs a high proportion of 
bureau and programme budget 
Source: Own elaboration based on Dunleavy (1991). 
As Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 show, the DHSS was expected to perform the 
same control role it had before the reform, either in the case the LOHC was 
actually implemented or in the case its NPM re-interpretation prevailed. By contrast, 
the CHS was expected to conform a different type of agency and have a different 
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budget structure depending on whether the LOHC provisions or the NPIVI discourse 
was implemented. In the former case the complex mixture of functions assigned to 
the CHS should be reflected in a mixed budget structure, while in the latter case 
the CHS should be a clear-cut contracts agency with a specific corresponding 
budget structure. Finally, the CHI was expected to play very much the same 
provider/delivery role whether the original LOHC formulation was implemented - 
integrating the CHI as a provider with no contracting competencies in the new 
health authority - or the NPIVI postulates took the lead. 
Table 5.2. Expected agency types and budget structures in the reformed 
Catalan health administration as formulated in the 1990 LOHC. 
Agency Expected agency Expected budget structure 
type derived from derived from the LOHC 
the LOHC 
Department of control agency small core budget and bureau budget, 
Health and Social relatively large programme budget 
Security (DHSS) including transfers to other public 
bureaux 
Catalan Health contracts agency relatively small core budget absorbs 
Service (CHS) 20-30 per Gent of programme and 
core budgets together, 
. bureau budget absorbs most of 
programme budget 
regulatory agency Gore budget absorbs a high proportion 
of bureau and programme budget, 
. small budgets as most costs are 
externalised onto the agents whose 
behaviour has to limit or control 
control agency small core budget and bureau budget, 
. relatively large programme budget including transfers to other public 
bureaux 
transfers agency. core budget absorbs a very low share 
of bureau budget 
. bureau budget absorbs most of 
programme budget, mostly on 
transfers to private agents 
Catalan Health delivery agency Jarge core budget (mostly staffing 
institute (CHI) costs) absorbs a high proportion of 
bureau and programme budget 
Source: Own elaboration based on Dunleavy (1991). 
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In any case, whether the formal or the discursive formulation prevailed in the 
implementation of the reform is an empirical matter. In this respect, both the 
distribution of competencies and the budget structure seem to indicate that at least 
the CHI was clearly affected by the role definition stemming as much from the 
LOHC as from its NPM interpretation. In both cases the CHI should cease to be the 
health authority and become only a provider, though the LOHC suggested it should 
remain inside the new health authority (the CHS) while the NPM interpretation 
required it to become an independent contracted provider. 
The analysis is divided into two sections. The first section focuses on the re- 
interpretation of the LOHC on a NPIVI basis as the result of a discourse diffusion 
process among the policy elite. The second section deals with the reforms at the 
macro-institutional level to see whether the NPM discourse or the actual 
formulation in the LOHC was implemented between 1990 and 1995. On the one 
hand, the reorganisation of the DHSS - including the creation of the CHS and the 
reforms of the CHI - is explored, both in terms of the assignment of competencies 
and budget structures. On the other hand, the reforms affecting the organisation 
and operation of the CHI in order to shift from a role of health authority to a role of 
provider are analysed, so as to assess the extent to which formal indicators of 
competencies and budget reassignments had a real impact on the previous health 
administration. 
5.1. Re-interpreting the legislation in 'new public management' terms. 
Arguably the widespread diffusion of the NPIVI discourse and concepts among the 
health policy elite in Catalonia can be dated in the second half of 1990. In the 
original bill for the LOHC, the alternative projects of two parliamentary groups, the 
Commission's report, the parliamentary debate and the final version of the LOHC 
passed in June 1990, there was no single mention of NPM terminology, not even of 
the stdct separation of roles which NPM implies and its impact on the 
CHI. This 
means that the NPIVI conceptual framework was not part of their mind-sets at 
that 
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time. By contrast, in the several conferences and congresses organised by the 
DHSS106 - with the participation of the UCH, the CHC, the CHI and academic 
figures - shortly after the passage of the LOHC, the NPIVI terminology and concepts 
were not only profusely used, but they were also explicitly assumed by all 
participants to be the clearest interpretation of the LOHC (DSSS, 1991a; IDSSS, 
1991b; IDSSS, 1992a; IDSSS, 1992e; IDSSS, 1993; IDSSS, 1994b). 
According to this prevailing NIPM interpretation, the LOHC established a 
separation between the financing and provider roles both of which the Catalan 
Health Institute had performed until then. To this end the LOHC created the 
Catalan Health Service (CHS) as an agency ascribed to the DHSS and endowed 
with the role of contracting services for the virtually universal public coverage 
existing in Catalonia as part of the Spanish NHS. Therefore, this new actor had to 
manage budgetary resources that until 1989 had been allocated by the Catalan 
Health Institute or CHI (the Social Security management entity in Catalonia) and 
channelled through it until 1990107. In turn, the provider side is composed not only 
of the public and private non-CHI providers, but also of the CHI itself. Thus, 
contrary to what the LOHC provided, the CHI was not to be integrated into the CHS 
but was to become a public 'provider-only' which, instead of receiving a budgetary 
allocation, would eventually contract with the CHS, just like any other provider. This 
process was supposed to require the CHI's transformation into a public enterprise 
and its further disaggregation into its member provider units (11 hospitals, of which 
ten were the highest technology, research and medical training hospitals in 
Catalonia, and over 90 per cent of all primary care centres). 
Therefore, the CHS had monopsonistic financing and purchasing roles. The 
former derived from its position as the single public insurer. The latter derived from 
its responsibility to contract/purchase the health services necessary for the 
population. The actual performance of these roles was subjected to the pursuit of 
the health policy objectives established in the Health Plan for Catalonia. In this 
framework, contracts were defined both as a tool for translating health policy 
1(rO These conferences themselves are evidence of a purposeful consensus-building process 
led by the DHSS among the policy elite. They were held in September 1990, November 
1990, November 1991, November 1992 and April 1994, and since the very beginning the 
NPM interpretation of the LOHC was taken for granted and unquestioned. 
107 Even after its allocation was a competency of the DG of Economic Resources of the 
Health System from 1989. 
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objectives into operational purchasing decisions, and as a tool for managing 
competition among providers. That is, contracts had to include incentives in order 
to induce providers to adapt their cost and provision structures to the health policy 
objectives and to improve their efficiency and effectiveness. 
Several provisions of the 1990 LOHC actually fitted this discourse. Thus, the 
CHS was to organise the provision of health services according to the criteria of 
equity, efficiency, territorial balance and quality. The need to follow these criteria 
was a recurrent argument for the CHS to use diverse management and 
organisational forms in dealing with the complex and diverse health care provision 
network in Catalonia. In this respect, the CHS was entitled to manage these 
resources either directly or indirectly, with the authorisation by the Catalan core 
executive. Such indirect management forms included: creating new providers such 
as public companies, establishing agreements for integrated management forms 
with other providers, creating public consortia which in turn could create 
instrumental bodies (quasi-autonomous providers), and creating or taking part in 
other public or private organisations (LOHC, article 7). 
Other principles central to the LOHC which fitted the NPM discourse were 
management decentralisation and deconcentration'06 (LOHC, article 2). 
Accordingly, as Figure 5.1 shows, the design of the CHS organisational structure 
included: (1) the corporate centre, which was responsible for resources planning, 
policy formulation, and contracts; (2) Health Regions, which were in charge of the 
execution and control of the CHSs policies, the management of resources through 
contract setting, and policy planning within the Region; (3) Health Sectors within 
Health Regions, which integrated and provided Health Basic Areas (HBA) with 
management infrastructure, and were in charge of resource management and 
evaluation, as well as having to participate in the planning process at Sector level 
(DSSS, 1992a: 13). According to the model, within the Health Basic Areas - first 
defined in Catalonia in 1985 - health care centre managers were responsible 
for 
the implementation of contracts and agreements. 
108 Decentralisation may be territorial or functional. In this case it means both, referring to 
an organisational technique which involves the creation by a territorial administration or 
authority of instrumental entities with their own legal personality -different 
from that of the 
parent administration-, for the exercise of specific functions or the provision of specific 
services. De-concentration is the process by which competencies are 
transferred on a 
permanent bases from a superior to an inferior organ, central of peripheral, of 
the same 
public entity (Parada, 1997: 40-47). 
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Figure 5.1. Organisation chart of the Catalan Health Service, 1995. 
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This structure was conceived of as being the base for a decentralised 
bottom-up planning process for the elaboration of the Health Plan for Catalonia 
(SCS, 1992; SCS, 1994a). According to the LOHC, the Health Plan was the 
indicative document and reference framework for all public interventions in the 
health sector in Catalonia. In the context of economic crisis in the early 1990s, in 
which the existing principles structuring health services were questioned, the 
Health Plan involved a different conception of resource allocation processes and, 
consequently, of organisational models (Via, 1994a: 60-1). The planning of health 
care resources was no longer to be based on the supply structure available, but 
on the health problems of the population defined as a matter of policy priorities. 
In fact, the health plan 'becomes policy' when being approved by the Catalan 
executive, after a bottom-up elaboration process in which the Health Plan 
'becomes a matter of politics ' as different social actors took part in its specification 
(Via, 1992: 49). In the policy formulation and monitoring processes the introduction 
of community participation mechanisms was also an innovative feature of the 
LOHC. In contrast to the INSALUD and other Autonomous Communities' health 
authorities, directive and participatory organs of the CHS were present at all levels 
of the deconcentrated structure of the CHS (see Figure 5.1). 
Efficiency and effectiveness in solving health problems were to derive from 
this process which was supposed to indirectly shape the business structure of 
providers. Within this framework, health care centres were required to develop both 
management by objectives and output control mechanisms so as to inform the 
CHS on the economic valuation of their activities including health and economic 
indicators (LOHC, article 50). These data were to be included in the budget of each 
centre, which was the base to elaborate the Health Region's budget. This 
decentralised budgetary process was expected to provide Health Region managers 
with information to decide on contracts, agreements and resource reallocations 
between providers within their Region, once the budgetary exercise has already 
started. Credit transfers between centres belonging to different Regions would be 
decided by the CHS's director, though. In this model, Health Region managers 
were supposed not to interfere with the management of health centres but to 
provide efficient and effective criteria and arguments to strategically assist health 
centre managers (Barea, 1991: 27-8). 
Arguably for this conception of the Health Plan to be effective an 
organisational change was necessary. In particular, a structural differentiation 
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between planning, evaluation, financing and purchasing functions on the one hand, 
and provision and management functions on the other was needed. The instrument 
which was intended to help translating health objective priorities into health 
services supply was the contract. The perfection of contracts was expected to 
facilitate the shift from a financing to a purchasing role by the authority responsible 
for the health policy (the CHS), through the introduction of elements to enhance a 
managed competition scenario. 
A report issued by the consulting firm McKinsey & Company early in 1991 
reinforced such a discourse and gave consistency to the 'Catalan model' (DSSS, 
1992a). This report was ordered by the DHSS at the end of 1990. Its 
recommendations stressed the need for clarifying ! responsibilities by splitting 
purchaser and provider roles, as well as for enabling the introduction of private 
sector management-style on both sides. The report asserted that managed 
competition would serve the objectives of efficiency and effectiveness as much as 
those of the better quality, consumer-oriented services set by the LOHC (DSSS, 
1992a: 4-5). 
Thus, on the one hand, the CHS had to take the purchaser role. The 
responsibilities this role involved were defining and assessing health needs (that is, 
planning) and ensuring coverage by allocating resources through contracts with 
providers. For the first aspect, the LOHC contemplated already a bottom-up 
planning process based on the deconcentrated structure of the CHS, where Health 
Sectors within Health Regions would play a key role. The latter required that the 
CHS set objectives and achievement indicators so as to supervise the 
accomplishment of contracts and evaluate the efficiency and quality of the services 
provided. Therefore, the CHS would not be responsible for inefficient providers but 
for wrong planning and competition management through the incentives of 
contracts (DSSS, 1992a: 4-8). On the other hand, providers had to compete for the 
CHS's contracts in terms of efficiency and quality of services. The CHI should 
undergo a reform process to become a public provider of services contracted by 
the CHS, just like any other provider, instead of receiving an 'as of right' budget 
allocation. Moreover, diversification of providers would also be fostered in primary 
health care, thus breaking the CHI's monopoly in this field. In general, providers 
should become more entrepreneurial and compefitive, developing their information 
and management systems and changing their organisational cultures (DSSS, 
1992a: 9-14). 
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An advisory commission within the DHSS itself suggested that a further 
differentiation could be made between financing and purchasing roles (DSSS, 
1992b: 7). Thus, resources should be allocated to purchasers on a per capita basis, 
and to providers on a service basis. Wider choice could also be given to citizens by 
giving providers the capability to charge for higher standards than those 
established and covered through contract by purchasers (DSSS, 1992b: 8,10). 
Altogether, clarification of responsibilities was supposed to increase the 
transparency of economic fluctuations, costs of services, and efficiency of both 
individual providers and the whole system itself. 
To summarise, the reinterpreted LOHC was aimed at clarifying and 
consolidating certain features of the governance structure of health care which 
were claimed to be intrinsic to the 'Catalan model'. In this sense, the 
purchaser/provider split was defined as the centrepiece for consolidating such a 
governance structure. To this end, three processes appeared to be interrelated: the 
reassignment of competencies within the DHSS, the subsequent reallocation of 
resource flows and the redesign of budget structures, and the internal reform of the 
CHI to become a provider only. 
5.2. The new structure of the Department of Health 
and Social Security. 
In this section, both the reallocation of competencies within the DHSS and the 
changes in the budget structure of the CHS and the CHI will be taken as indicators 
of the actual impact of the reforms implemented at this macro-management level 
109 
109 Ort6n (1995) defines the macro-management level as the venue where health policy is 
formulated and where regulation, intervention in the market or organisation of public 
services are dealt with. The meso-management level refers to the GO-ordination 
mechanisms between the macro-management level and the organisations (providers) 
which are actually implementing policies. Finally, the micro-management level defines the 
internal management of each organisation -which in the case of the health sector 
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a) Assigning competencies. 
The DHSS of the Catalan govemment underwent several reorganisations 
throughout the 1980s as a reflection of several processes of competencies 
reassignments. However, the reassignment of competencies derived from the 
prevailing interpretation of the 1990 LOHC and the creation of the CHS proved to 
be more consequential. The distdbution of key health functions were at stake: 
planning, organisation of the health provision, financing, organisation of physical 
resources, and contracting/purchasing with non-Social Secudty providers, that is, 
non-CHI providers. A precedent to this reorganisation process was relevant. As 
explained in Chapter 2, in 1989 a DG of Economic Resources of the Health System 
was created by decree and was made responsible for allocating and evaluating 
economic resources, accrediting physical resources, and for the budget 
management and financial control of both the CHI and the non-CHI providers 
holding contracts with the CHI. 
As a result, the CHI had, first, its powers to plan and negotiate contractual 
agreements with non-CHI providers removed, although not the budget to do so, 
which was channelled through its budget appropriation until the CHS was created 
in 1991. Second, the CHI had an internal restructuring mandated, by which the 
units holding managerial tasks were to be directly attached to the CHI's manager - 
a figure created in 1986 - thus breaking some hierarchical features of its 
organisation. To this end, the Under-DG of Administration of the CHI disappeared 
and the role of health area managers was reasserted - although they went through 
a high turnover rate in office, which was said to be concomitant to changes in 
organisational culture (Roma, 1994a: 127). 
However, the functions of the DG of Economic Resources of the Health 
System created by the 1989 decree were closely related to those held by the IDG of 
Health Organisation and Planning - created six years earlier in 1983 - which apart 
from several health programmes was responsible for planning and organising 
primary and hospital care and pharmaceutical services, as well as for the 
accreditation, evaluation and inspection of providers. This DG disappeared in 1991, 
when the CHS was created. In turn, the IDG of Economic Resources of the Health 
corresponds to the techniques of clinical management. 
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System was re-named as DG of Health Resources and concentrated most 
regulatory functions. As a result, the DHSS organigram was designed as Figure 5.3 
shows. By 1994, though, further changes included the disappearance of the 
Consellees Office, the incorporation of the DG of Public Health and the DG of 
Health Resources under the line of hierarchy of the Secretary General Office, and 
the location of the Health Studies Institute as a staff agency instead of a line 
bureaucracy of the Conseller (see Figure 5.4). 
Figure 5.2. Restructuring of the Department of Health and Social Security, 
1989-91. 
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Figure 5.3. Organisational chart of the Department of Health 
and Social Security, 1991. 
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*Political head of the Department and member of the Catalan executive. 
"Comprises under its line of hierarchy the four territorial delegations of the DHSS (Barcelona, Tarragona, Lleida and Girona). 
Source: DSSS (1992c: 13). 
These organisational charts, though, do not show the substantial differences 
between the organisational nature of the IDGs and the Secretary General's Office 
on the one hand, and the CHI and the CHS on the other hand. The CHI is the 
management entity of the Social Security (see Chapters 2 and 3) and was 
endowed with an autonomous administrative nature. The CHS represented an 
innovation in the field of structuring the health administration and managing health 
care. As explained in Chapter 4, the CHS was defined by the LOHC as a public 
entity which, in administrative law terms, has an 'institutional' character, that is, it 
has a differentiated legal personality and freedom to manage for the fulfilment of its 
objectives. In contrast to the 'autonomous organisms of an administrative nature' 
described in Chapter 2 (the INSALUD and the CHI being two examples), 
institutional public entities such as the CHS are usually subject to administrative 
law only in their internal functioning' 10, while they may operate under private law in 
110 Public law is the compulsory framework for these instrumental bodies when 
administrative powers are being exerted -relations with other administrations; heritage, 
financing, budgetary and accounting systems; contestation of administrative acts; and 
situations derived from the right to public health care coverage (Viflas, Lafarga, 1996). 
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their external relations. These 'instrumental organisabons' are usually of a 
commercial, industrial or financial nature, and are good examples of the trend 
towards 'escaping administrafive lavV (Parada, 1997: 243-54). 
Figure 5.4. Organisational chart of the Department of Health 
and Social Security, 1994. 
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Source: DSSS (1995c: 17). 
Two features framed the instrumental nature of these organisations. On the 
one hand, the political responsibility for their organisation and operation stays with 
the office holder of the administration parent agency. On the other hand, the 
relation between the latter and the former is not hierarchical but one of dependency 
and administrative supervision concerning budgets, appointments and creation and 
dissolution of the body itself (Parada, 1997: 243-54). In the case of the CHS the 
role of the parent agency belonged to the DHSS of the Catalan government. The 
DHSS kept for itself the definition of health policy, while devolving authority to the 
instrumental body - the CHS. As a result, the CHS was defined as an institutional 
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public entity 'consisting"" of all the health care providers which were public or of 
public coverage - irrespective of their ownership or legal nature, in Catalonia. 
Comparing the actual formulation of the LOHC and its NPM interpretation it 
appears that the role allocated to the CHS was initially defined in a complex way, 
having different kinds of functions assigned, while in its NPM interpretation its role 
was mainly to be concerned with purchasing/contracting. According to the complex 
and ambiguous role defined for the CHS by the LOHC, the CHS's responsibilities 
included: a) organisation, planning, programming, evaluation and inspection of 
health, socio-health and public health services; b) distribution of the economic 
resources for the financing of services provided by the health system (public and of 
public coverage) as well as the definition, management and up-dating of 
agreements and contracts (convenis, contractual agreements with public providers; 
and concerts, contractual agreements with private providers); and c) management 
and administration of infrastructures and services of the health system - those 
public and public coverage providers 'integrated"12 in the CHS -, as well as the 
provision of all services of the health system through either private or public law 
management forms. 
So the CHS had functions conceming the formulation of health policy, such 
as the organisation, planning, programming and evaluation of health, socio-health 
and public health services. It also had regulatory, functions such as the 
establishment of the general guidelines and the performance criteria which were 
binding for those health providers functionally assigned to the CHS. In addition, the 
enforcement functions of the CHS included the establishment, management and 
review of all kinds of quasi-contractual agreements held with health providers, as 
well as the inspection of health, socio-health and public health services. The CHS's 
funding functions concerned the distribution of the economic resources, 
appropriated through the annual budget, for the universal coverage provided by the 
Spanish National Health System in Catalonia. Finally, the CHS had management 
functions (that is, provision functions) such as the management and administration 
of those providers integrated in the CHS (those within the CHI), the management 
111 See the analysis of the LOHC in Chapter 4 for the discussion on the ambiguity of this 
term. 
112 See the analysis of the LOHC in Chapter 4 for the discussion and interpretation of the 
phrase 'integration of providers' into the CHS. 
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and implementation of health programmes, and the management of services and 
entitlements covered by the public health service. 
The explicit objective pursued by allocafing all these responsibilities to one 
single body was said to be to overcome the dysfunctions derived from the previous 
organisational model of the DHSS, where the organisation, planning and 
management of health services were split among different departmental Directions 
Generals of the DHSS, which made co-ordination difficult (Vallribera, 1994). In fact, 
when the DG of Economic Resources of the Health System was created in 1989, 
the DG of Organisation and Planning was not dissolved, thus leading to 
overlapping in the regulatory functions of the health administration. In 1991, when 
the CHS was stablished, this DG of Organisation and Planning was dismantled and 
its functions assigned to the CHS - except for the accreditation ones which 
remained with the new DG of health resources. 
Nevertheless, these developments were contradictory. First, the fact that the 
DG of Health Resources in Figures 5.3 and 5.4 kept the competencies over 
evaluation and accreditation from 1991 onwards contradicted the LOHC, which 
defined these competencies as concomitant to the CHS's functions regarding 
planning and organisation. Second, the concentration of all these functions in a 
single organism also contradicted the NPM postulate concerning the clarification 
and separation of function-based roles between different organisations. In fact, this 
concentration of powers in the CHS had initially been intended to include also the 
functions of the CHI, which would have ceased to be a Social Security 
management entity in order to be integrated into the CHS. In this respect, the 
explicit aim of getting rid of the rigidities derived from the CHI's structure and nature 
was to be achieved through the creation of a new instrumental body, the CHS, 
which was to assume both kinds of responsibilifies again. 
However, this interpretation only prevailed until the end of 1990. By the time 
the CHS was created in 1991, the reform policy actually implemented followed a 
NPIVI interpretation. Instead, the purchaser-provider split prevailed and the CHI did 
not'disappear' but underwent a profound internal reform process with the objective 
of becoming a competitive manager and provider of public health services. In this 
sense, a top official of the CHS distinguished between two different 'readings' of 
the 1990 LOHC: 
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'The separation of the financing and provision roles are not clear in the 
LOHC - the LOHC provisions are ambiguous. The separation of roles is 
a later interpretation ... The first reading was that the CHS involved financing and management of health centres. It was a new entity which included the CHI. The CHI has a different nature from the Catalan 
government but it is ascribed to the DHSS, it is a clear provider entity 
which before had also the functions of services financing and 
purchasing and planning allocated. Thus, [in the first reading of the 
LOHC] the CHI was absorbed by the CHS and then disappeared. But 
also the CHI's legal nature was transformed - it disappeared as a 
management body of the Social Security, it got incorporated into the 
CHS, and the latter adopted again this double role ... The good step this reading took was to make the CHI disappear and give it a different 
legal nature as a public body subjected to private law [that is, the CHS] 
- making a rigid legal nature [that is, the CHI] disappear. This first 
version lasts from July to December 1990. Afterwards we have a re- 
reading of the LOHC, based on a report by the consulting firm 
McKinsey: we have to go for the separation of roles, although it is not 
what the LOHC says. It was the same critique we did to the CHI, thus it 
is necessary not to repeat it again - the CHS continued to have direct 
management of services although it was a more agile [fle)dble] entity. 
With this second reading we went for the separation of roles. ' 
In this same sense, a former prominent political figure of the DHSS 
recognised that: 
'There were things in which we were wrong. When we designed the 
CHS, one of the possibilities we thought of was that the CHI would end 
up disappearing, and one year afterwards we realised that would be a 
mistake - the CHI had to get transformed but not to disappear. And the 
truth was that the CHI is an enterprise of a very important potential and 
what it has to do is to get the maximum turnout. Another thing is 
whether the hospitals within the CHI ought to have their own legal 
personality or not. An this is a transformation which has not yet been 
done. We had a design which we have been adapting according to the 
experience of how things have been working'. 
Therefore, the LOHC created the CHS as an instrumental body and provided 
not only that it was responsible for a complex blend of functions, but also that in 
order to perform them the CHS was free to resort to either public or private law 
management tools. In fact, the CHS 'consolidates the possibility of developing 
formulae of entrepreneurial management currently used by the Catalan health 
administration, such as the figure of managers and different management formulae 
(direct, indirect and jointly-led)' (DSSS, 1990: 19), which have proliferated since 
1986. Only the functions of regulation and finance of the health service were 
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subject to administrative law, that is, public law. In turn, the CHI would be 
transformed into a provider only, though different from the rest in that it was the 
most important one in terms of resources and it received a budgetary allocation 
directly from the CHS instead of having a contract with it. Thus, it appears that this 
reassignment of competencies had an impact in defining the CHI as a provider by 
shifting its contracting functions to the newly created CHS, while the latter was 
designed as a complex body concentrating formulation, regulatory, enforcement, 
funding and management functions. Whether this reassignment of competencies 
was in fact consequential for the role redefinition of each agency should be 
reflected in its impact on their respective budget structures. 
b) Allocating budgets. 
For this reassignment of competencies to be consequential in terms of clarification 
of roles and allocation of decision rights it has to be accompanied by an effective 
reallocation of budgetary resources among the organisations in question. Thus, in 
order to assess the extent to which this reform went beyond the formal allocation of 
competencies it is necessary to analYse from two different angles: first, the 
changes in the nature of resources flows between agents, and second, the 
resulting structure of such agents' budgets. 
Key resources flows at stake occurred between the DHSS, the CHS and the 
CHI. As the highest health authority in Catalonia, the DHSS received the health 
budget and transferred well over 90 per cent of it to another public agency - the 
CHI before the 1990 reform and the CHS afterwards. According to the new 
governance structure defined in the NPM discourse resources flows between the 
CHS as the monopsonistic financing/contracting agency and the CHI as a provider 
had to follow contractual channels - just as they did in the case of the non-CHI 
providers - instead of budgetary allocabons. However, despite the formal 
reassignment of competencies in this respect, the actual budgetary relations 
between them shown in Table 5.3 do not reflect a contractual relation - instead, 
the CHI received a conventional budgetary allocation from the CHS. 
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Moreover, for the sake of the discussion and approval of the CHS/CHI's 
consolidated annual budgetary appropriation, both the CHSs budget and the CHI's 
budget were the object of negotiations between the Department of Economy and 
Finance of the Catalan government, the CHS and the CHI. From 1992, though, a 
(mock' contract between the CHS and the CHI was annually formulated, as a 
training exercise for the further introduction of a real contract. As a senior official of 
the CHI put it: 
'From 1992 we have a 'fictional' contract with the CHS, in the same way 
contracted hospitals have. The difference is that we still have a 
budgetary appropriation insured. The CHI each year has an 
expenditure budget which we negotiate with the CHS and [the 
Department of] Economy and Finance, as the CHI's budget is still 
approved by the Catalan Parliament, and therefore it is a three-headed 
negobationi. 
Table 5.3. Budgetary relationship between the Department of Health and 
Social Security, the Catalan Health Service and the Catalan 
Health Institute, 1995 (in million pesetas). 
DHSS 
total budget (1995) 
541,294----> transfers 
to the CHS 532,830 
98% 
other 
incomes 13,222 other 
incomes 6,185 
CHS total 
budget 546,052 transfers 
to the CHI 197,259 
36% 
CHI total 
budget 
consolidated 
CHS/CHl budget 552,237 
Source: DSSS (1995c: 48). 
203,444 
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All this meant, first, that formally the CHI did not have an 'independent' 
budget as it is not a state-owned enterprise but a Social Security management 
organism, and second, that the CHI could not formally incur deficits or indebt itself, 
because it was financed through budgetary allocations. The deficit was held by the 
DHSS. That deficit could be inferred for the CHI, but it did not involve the risks of 
bankruptcy that non-Social Security providers run. However, as it will be explained 
below, the risk of the latter possibility has also been absorbed to a certain extent by 
the DHSS in what critics see as a distortion of the whole reform (see Chapter 6). 
The nature of these resources flows between agents indicates to some 
extent their individual potential roles. However, the analysis of the structure of the 
budgets which each of those agents managed gives a more accurate account of 
the functions they actually performed. In this respect, taking Dunleavy's (1991) 
agencies typology as a framework, two sets of budget structures and 
corresponding agency types could be expected to emerge from the analysis of the 
Catalan case. On the one hand, the types of agencies and corresponding budget 
structures derived from the actual formulation of the 1990 LOHC, and on the other 
hand, the types of agencies and budget structures derived from its NPM 
interpretation' 13. 
From the comparison of the budget structure of the DHSS before and after 
the creation of the CHS in 1991, in Tables 5.4 and 5.5, it is apparent that the 
reassignment of competencies within the DHSS did not have a relevant impact on 
its role114. In both cases, the DHSS's budget structure corresponded to that of a 
control agency according to Dunleavy's (1991) typology, with a small core and 
bureau budget and a large programme budget including transfers to other public 
agencies. The DHSS received a budget which represented a third of the total 
budget of the Catalan government, transferred well over 95 per cent of its budget 
(programme budget) to another public agency (the CHI until 1990 and the CHS 
from then on), and supervised how these transfers were spent and how policy was 
implemented. 
113 Dunleavy defines the four budgets in a nested way: the super-programme budget 
includes all other budgets, the programme budget includes the bureau and the core budgets, 
and the bureau budget includes the Gore budget (see Figure 1.2). In the analysis below, 
each of the four budgets will be taken as individual elements, without including any of the 
others, so as to identify the specific importance of their components. 
114 For a detailed disaggregation of these budget structures see Tables A. 10 and A. 11 in 
Appendix 1. 
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As a control agency, in 1990 the DHSS passed over to the CHI 92 per cent of 
its funding in i ntra-govern mental transfers and five per cent in concept of capital 
investments. A control agency's primary task is both to channel funding to other 
agencies, bureaux or levels of government, and to supervise how these transfers 
are spent and policy implemented. The core budget, comprising mostly 
administrative costs, was two per cent of the DHSSs total budget, and remained at 
such a low level since the consolidation of the DHSSs competencies over health 
policy, following the transfers of the Social Security health services from the 
Spanish government in the early 1980s. The bureau budget - that is, major capital 
works, contracts with private agents, and money going to client groups - was also a 
minor part of the money transferred and of the total budget (0.2 per cent), a pattern 
which is also characteristic of control agencies. As explained in Chapter 2, this 
control and supervision function was defined as central to the institutional and 
inter-organisational relationship between the DHSS and the CHI since the latter 
began managing the Social Security health services in Catalonia. This framework 
remained unchanged until the creation of the CHS in 1991. 
Table 5.4. Budget structure of the Department of Health and Social Security 
of the Catalan government, 1990 (in percentages over the total 
DHSS's budget)*. 
Cabinet of the DG of health DG of econ. DG of CHI Total % 
conseller organisation resources of public Of 
and planning the health health total 
system budget 
Core 
Budget 0.5 0.2 0.03 1.3 2.0 
Bureau 
Budget 0.03 0.00 0.2 0.2 
Programme 
97.0 97.1 Budget 0.06 
Super-programme 
Budget 
*All calculations are based on the initial budgetary appropriation (332,195 million pesetas). 
Source: Own elaboration based on Dunleavy (1991) and DEF (1990). 
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Table 5.5 shows the budget structure of the DHSS for 1995, four years after 
the creation of the CHS, when the reform had supposedly been consolidated in 
terms of budget reallocation in accordance with the redefinition of policy roles 
provided by the new legislative framework of the 1990 LOHC. From these data, it 
appears that the DHSS had kept the same role of control agency it had before the 
reform. Its core budget and its bureau budget each represented even a smaller 
share of its total budget (1.3 and 0.2 per cent respectively) than in 1990. Moreover, 
the DHSS transferred 98 per cent of its budget to the CHS (95 per cent as intra- 
government transfers, and four per cent in concept of capital investments). This 
means that the weight of the programme budget (98.8 per cent of the total budget) 
reveals again the DHSS's clear role as a control agency after the reform which, in 
this respect, remained unchanged. 
Table 5.5. Budget structure of the Department of Health and Social Security 
of the Catalan government, 1995 (in percentages over the total 
DHSS's budgetr. 
Cabinet of the 
Conseller 
DG of econ. 
resources 
of the health 
system 
DG of 
public 
health 
Territorial 
delegations 
CHS Total 
% Of 
total 
budget 
Core 
Budget 1.1 0.1 0.00 0.03 1.3 
Bureau 
Budget 0.1 0.02 0.1 0.00 - 0.2 
Programme 
Budget 0.1 0.00 0.00 - 98.7 98.8 
Super-programme 
Budget - - -- 
*All calculations are based on the initial budgetary appropriation (541,294 million pesetas). 
Source: Own elaboration based on Dunleavy (1991) and DEF (1995). 
By contrast, the redefinition of the role of the CHI from a financing, 
contracting and provider agent (a complex role) into a provider strictu sensu had a 
clear impact on the budget structure of this body. As expected from the LOHC 
221 
formulation and the NPM discourse alike, the CHI became a much purer delivery 
agency, in terms of Dunleavy's model, after the reform. From Table 5.6 it appears 
that the pre-LOHC CHI was a complex agency, because its budget structure 
reflected competencies involving different functions. First, the CHI had a strong role 
as a delivery agency. Because this kind of agency directly produces outputs or 
deliver goods (health care in this case) using their own personnel to implement 
policy, staffing costs represent an important share of its total budget. In 1990, the 
CHI's core budget (42.5 per cent) represented a substantial share of the bureau 
and the programme budget - staffing costs amounting to 34 per cent of total 
budget. Second, before the creation of the CHS, the CHI spent 35 per cent of its 
total budget on contracting with non-CHI providers. This implied a strong role as a 
contracts agency. Finally, the pre-LOHC CHI also had a role as a transfers agency 
because it also controlled the budget transfers for pharmaceuticals (16 per cent of 
its total budget), included in the bureau budget. Both the contracts and transfers 
roles were assigned to the CHS in 1991 by reallocating the corresponding share of 
the budget to it, and the CHI remained a delivery agency. 
Table 5.6. Budget structure of the CHI pre-LOHC, 1990 (in percentages over 
total budget)*. 
Central 
Services 
Specialised 
care 
Primary 
care 
Health 
profess. 
training 
Total 
% Of 
total 
budget 
Core 
Budget 2.4 21.9 17.3 0.1 42.5 
Bureau 
Budget 0.3 32.9 23.5+ - 56.7** 
Programme 
Budget 0.02 0.2 0.5 0.7 
Super-programme 
Budget - - - 
*All calculations are based on the initial budgetary appropriation (326,888 million pesetas). 
**: 35 per cent of total budget was spent on contracting with non-CHI providers (30 per cent with 
hospitals and 5.6 per cent with primary care). 
+: 16 per cent of total budget is transferred to pharmacies for the payment of 60 per cent of the price 
of pharmaceuticals sold to patients on medical prescription (40 per cent of the price is paid by 
patients). 
Source: Own elaboration based on Dunleavy (1991) and DEF (1990). 
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Table 5.7. Budget structure of the CHI as a provider, 1995 (in percentages 
over total budget)*. 
Corporate Specialised Primary Health Total 
centre care care profess. % Of 
training total 
budget 
Core 
Budget 2.9 49.3 44.3 2.5 99.0 
Bureau 
Budget 0.2 0.5 0.3 1.0 
Programme 
Budget 
Super-programme 
Budget 
*All calculations are based on the initial budgetary appropriation (203,444 million pesetas): 
Source: Own elaboration based on Dunleavy (1991) and DEF (1995). 
However, the identification of a contracts agency role was not straightforward 
in the case of the pre-LOHC CHI, that is, when it was the health authority. 
According to Dunleavy's (1991) model, contracts agencies' core budget should 
absorb only a modest part of the programme and core budgets (between 20 and 
30 per cent), which was not the case of the CHI in 1990. Moreover, according to 
the model, contracts agencies' main task is to work on research and development 
of equipment or service specifications, on capital projects for tendering, contract 
management and compliance, and letting contracts to either private agents or 
public organisations run on a commercial basis. However, as explained above 
these competencies were not held by the CHI. Instead, these competencies were 
shared by the DG of Organisation and Planning and the DG of Resources of the 
Health System in 1989 - both directly accountable to the Conseller (the political 
head of the Department), and by the DG of Resources of the Health System and 
the CHS from 1991 onwards. Therefore, this distribution of competencies in 1989 
did not have an impact on the budget structure of the CHI, as it had after the CHS 
was created. As Table 5.7 shows, in 1995 the CHI was a clear delivery agency in 
terms of budget structure. Its core budget represented 99 per cent of its total 
budget (78.5 per cent was spent on personnel and 20.5 per cent on the purchase 
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of goods and services - which included ancillary services in the health sector). 
Before the reform, the CHI received 98.5 per cent of its budget from the DHSS, 
and around the same amount (97 per cent) from the CHS after the reform' 15. 
Table 5.8. Budget structure of the CHS a the financing/purchasing agency, 
1995 (percentages over total budget)*. 
Corporate Specialised Primary CHI Total 
centre care care % Of 
total 
budget 
Core 
Budget 1.4 1.4 
Bureau 
Budget 0.6 35.6 25.5** 61.4*** 
Programme 
Budget 0.04 0.6 0.4 36.1 37.1 
Super-programme 
Budget 
*All calculations are based on the initial budgetary appropriation (546,053 million pesetas). 
**: 18.2 per cent of total budget is transferred to pharmacies in payment for 60 per cent of the price of 
pharmaceuticails bought by patients on medical prescription (patients pay 40 per cent of the price). 
***- 39.2 per cent of total budget in spent on contracts with non-CHI providers (33.5 per cent with 
hospitals and 5.7 per cent with primary care centres). 
Source: Own elaboration based on Dunleavy (1991) and DEF(l 995). 
In the same way that the pre-reform CHI was a mixture of agency types in 
terms of Dunleavy's typology, the new CHS arrangement after its creation in 1991 
did not convey a clear-cut identification based on its budget structure either (see 
Table 5.8)116. As pointed out above, the DHSS directly transferred 94 per cent 
(plus four per cent in concept of capital investments) of its budget to the CHS, 
which in turn represented 98 per cent of the CHS's budget. The CHS had a small 
115 For a detailed disaggregation of this budget structures see Tables A. 12 and A. 13 in 
Appendix 1. 
116 For a detailed disaggregation of this budget structure see Table A. 14 in Appendix 1. 
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core budget of just 1.4 per cent of the programme budget, so it was clearly not a 
delivery agency. The CHS's most important role in narrow share of the budget 
terms is that of a contracts agency, a role it completely took over from CHI before 
the reform. The CHS's bureau budget represented 61.4 per cent of the total budget 
- contracts with non-public providers amounting to 39 per cent. But the monies 
passed on to another public body, the CHI, also amounted to 36 per cent of the 
total budget, and hence implied a strong secondary CHS role as a control agency. 
Transfers to pharmacies accounted for 18.2 per cent of the CHS total budget and 
hence implied also a relevant role as a transfers agency. 
In sum, the mixed type of agency and the budget structure which 
characterised the CHS after its creation in 1991 did not conform to the NPM 
interpretation of the LOHC, which postulated a clear contracts role. Instead, this 
empirical analysis shows that the CHS actually adopted the complex mixture of 
functions the LOHC assigned to it, as reflected in its budget structure. However, 
among this complex blend of functions, the assumption by the CHS of the 
contracts function perforTned by the CHI before 1990 took on an increasing 
relevance. As explained above, the CHS spent 39 per cent of its budget on 
contracting with non-Social Security (non-CHI) providers to ensure universal health 
coverage. Contracts were particularly relevant for specialised care (33.5 per cent of 
the CHS's total budget). The trend from the early nineties pointed to introducing 
this contractual framework in the rest of the health sector in the form of 
4programme-contractsp - namely, with CHI hospitals and Primary Care Teams. This 
expansion of contracts was however conditioned by the fact that the CHI owned 
and managed, as a single provider, 11 hospitals (most of which were high- 
technology) and more than 90 per cent of the primary care providers in Catalonia. 
Thus, the reform of the CHI beyond the reassignment of competencies and the 
restructuring of the budget was a crucial issue once the CHS was created. A senior 
official of the CHS asserted in 1995 that the strategy was to eventually transform 
the legal nature of the CHI into a state-owned enterprise: 
'The CHI still has the same legal nature it had in 1983, when it was 
created as a recipient of the INSALUD's transfers. But now it is 
following a different process of transformation, innovation and 
modification. It is projected for the next legislative period that a bill be 
presented to parliament to transform the CHI into a holding company of 
public providers. This is necessary for the separation of the financing 
and provision roles to be effective. 
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Nevertheless, as another senior official of the CHI explained, the tactics were 
to gradually change its management culture as a necessary previous step to such 
a legal formalisation: 
'The impact of the LOHC on the CHI is that the CHI changes its 
mission. The CHI is no longer 'the health administration' but just 
another provider. It has to rethink its structure and culture a change in 
basic strategies. This needed two phases: first, to develop culture, 
tools, management styles, but without changing the legal framework; 
second, to give legal status to those developments. ' 
c) The role of the Catalan Health Institute. 
The CHI is the Social Security management entity in Catalonia and the largest 
employer (among both public and private sectors) in this Autonomous Community, 
with 17,000 personnel in primary care, 16,000 in the hospital sector and 400 in its 
corporate centre (ICS, 1995a: 56-7). By the late 1990s the CHI was still going 
through a profound reform process in order not only to become 'just' a provider of 
health services, but also to eventually transform its budget allocation into a real 
contract with the CHS. However, this reform process was being developed within 
an administrative law framework which constrained the CHI managerial freedom to 
improve its level of efficiency. According to a manager of a CHI hospital and senior 
officials of the CHI, some of the management tools defined by administrative law 
which were particularly burdensome were: the personnel regulations assimilated to 
the civil service regime (statutory personnel), the strict line-item budget 
management procedures (annual budget law), and the subjection to the State 
Contracts Law - which overburdens with ex-ante controls the purchase of goods 
and services and the contracting processes. In this sense, the manager of a CHI 
hospital argued that: 
'These three basic instruments for the management of the Social 
Security health services - statutory personnel regime, budget 
management, and purchase of goods and services under the State 
Contracts Law - apply to all CHI hospitals, and have not changed either 
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before or after the LOHC. This is different in the hospitals which are not 
directly managed by the public administration .... The reform of the health administration has not been done. The LOHC has certainly 
affected the debate on the role of the public administration but not the 
role of the public administration when managing hospitals. For example, 
the separation between financing and provision but the CHI continues 
acting subject to this management framework. The LOHC has given 
conceptual clarity so that the public administration can start this second 
reform. ' 
Within this framework, the CHI has gradually modernised its management 
systems in order to improve efficiency. In 1989 the CHI's corporate centre 
introduced information systems on the health activity of the hospital and primary 
care sectors, a computerised system of health care management indicators. This 
change allowed for the gradual codification of discharges, covering 99 per cent of 
cases in the 11 hospitals by 1994. This was the previous step for the introduction in 
1992 of case-mix toolS117. The tool developed was the Patient Management 
Category, a classification of patients according to medical panels in order to define 
the health care resources necessary for their diagnosis and treatment. This 
information (variables on basic activity and physical and human resources) was 
sent by hospitals to the corporate centre each month. The analysis of these data 
was on the one hand, the bases for calculating the intensity of necessary 
resources for the management of cases, and on the other hand, it was a tool for 
making decisions on the allocation of resources by the corporate centre (ICS, 
1995c: 173-5). Throughout the early nineties, an improvement in management was 
apparent from the evolution of costs indicators of the CHI hospitals: as Figure 5.5 
shows, costs substantially decreased between 1992 and 1994, with the exception 
of costs per bed, which, according to this report stemmed from the reduction of 31 
beds in 1994. 
117 Case-mix management comprises a series of patients management activities based on 
decision making about information on typologies of the patients treated. These tools are at 
the core of clinical management is based on information which allows for analysing the 
casuistry, functioning, quality and consumption of resources within a period and compare 
them with those of other periods, with the objectives set and with other hospitals (Casas, 
1994: 317). 
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Figure 5.5. Evolution of costs indicators of the CHI hospitals, 1992-94. 
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A number of debates inside the CHI characterised its situation in 1992. - there 
was no group or direction spirit and some management levels were considered 
superfluous; there was a lack of career incentive; quality was hardly measured 
(technical quality in hospitals seems good but services to users are poor); there 
was no 'provider culture'; the budgetary approach fell outside cost-efficiency and 
effectiveness measures; and CHI hospitals were disadvantaged in costs' terms 
compared with competitors (ICS, 1992: 6). Faced with this situation and the need to 
overcome these problems, the CHI defined its own strategic objectives as being: 
providing services of quality competitively and efficiently, focusing on 'client's, 
satisfaction within the contractual framework set by the CHS, and enabling 
professionals' and staffs self-fulfilment and involvement. In order to pursue these 
objectives the CHI defined the following management principles: independent 
management and responsibility over outputs - bearing in mind the eventual 
contractual relation with the CHS; entrepreneurial criteria incorporating quality 
standards and income and costs concepts; and the development of an 
organisational culture oriented to clients and based on internal meritocracy (ICS, 
1994a). 
From 1992 onwards the annual budgetary allocation to the CHI was 
'translated' into contract terms (a 'program me-contract'), a tool which was regarded 
as a prior necessary condition for further pursuing those objectives and enhancing 
those managerial criteria. Senior officials of the CHI viewed the introduction of 
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these program me-contracts as the origin of the cultural change they were trying to 
develop within formal rules which by mid-1998 have not yet been reformed. 
Programme-contracts were accompanied by the introduction of external auditing, 
cost and accrual accounting, financial control and billing systems. Thus, the CHI 
continued to be financed through an annual budget appropriation which was 
negotiated between the CHI, the CHS, and the Department of Economy and 
Finance of the Catalan government, and which had to be submitted to the Catalan 
Parliament (the CHS/CHI consolidated budget) to be passed as part of the annual 
Catalan budget law. The CHI allocated its budget among its provider units - 
hospitals and primary care units, which have no independent legal personality, 
because formally the CHI is a single provider. The innovation introduced in this 
process by the programme-contracts was that each hospital negotiated a 
programme-contract with the CHS - though previously agreed with the CHI's 
corporate centre - by which their budget allocation was explicitly linked to the 
services they provided. This meant that, for the first time, hospitals under the CHI's 
authority had to compulsorily bill all their services so that the budgetary allocations 
distributed to them by the CHI's corporate centre could be cost/activity related 
(Roma, 1994b: 48-9). This change was accompanied by the introduction of financial 
and cost accounting techniques in hospitals so that each hospital had an operating 
account. On this basis, the link between budget and activity was calculated in 
terms of prices or tariffs set by the CHS for different kinds of activity expressed in 
Basic Care Units (BCUs). These programme-contracts made providers aware of 
the level of self-financing they would achieve in case such contracts were not 
fictional but economically binding contracts. So this exercise revealed the level of 
deficit they would incur in case they had a real contract, by making explicit the 
difference between what they spent through the budget (cost of their activities) and 
what they would be paid for those activities through prices, if they were actually 
selling their services to the CHS. In this sense, a top manager of the CHI argued 
that, 
'When the contract is a real, valid instrument - not only for knowing 
what we do but also as a financing instrument - then there will be the 
possibility of signing a real contract. But this will have been a maturing 
process, not a traumatic change. Among providers - UCH, the CHC, the 
CHI - the CHI has been asked a tougher effort ... 
We have this vocation 
[to become a competitive provider], but we need to be given the 
necessary instruments to have the same management capacity than 
229 
the others. We want a fair deal, not a preferential treatment. But then 
we do not want dgid (management] instruments. ' 
A significant datum concerning an improvement in the self-financing capacity 
of the CHI was measured by the evolution of the 'coverage index' of its hospitals - 
the percentage of the income generated over the total cost of the services 
produced. This index included the income derived from the contract (budget 
allocation) with the CHS and the services sold to third parties. The 'coverage-index' 
or self-financing level of the CHI hospitals rose from 73 per cent in 1992 to 88 per 
cent in 1995 (see Figure 5.6). 
Figure 5.6. Evolution of the coverage-index of the 
CHI hospitals, 1992-94. 
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deficits. A senior official of the CHI explained that the negotiation process of the 
programme-contract started between the CHI's corporate centre and the 
CHS's 
corporate centre, which agreed on an overall provision level to be supplied (BCUs). 
230 
1992 1993 1994 
Real financial consequences could follow from the existence of 'fictional' 
Then, the Director of the CHI's hospital division negotiated with hospital managers 
the amount of BCUs they would provide. This was the offer which hospital 
managers then negotiated with the corresponding CHS's Health Region manager. 
Although the CHI only owned and managed 26 per cent of the hospitals beds of 
the HNPU, the relevance of this negotiation stemmed from the fact that most of 
these beds belonged to level C (high technology) hospitals. In fact, out of the CHI's 
11 hospitals, four were high technology and university medical training hospitals, 
five were the reference hospital of their respective CHS Health Region and two 
were basic hospitals (ICS, 1995b). Each programme-contract was eventually 
signed by the CHS director, the CHI manager and the hospital manager. With 
respect to this process, a former senior CHS official contended that the creation of 
a 'contracts unit' at the CHS's corporate cpntre level in 1995 showed a re- 
centralising trend within the CHS, which was not letting Health Region managers 
play the role they were supposed to have in a deconcentrated purchasing 
structure. 
In 1993 not only 'fictional' contracts 'but also evaluation mechanisms were 
also introduced in the CHI's reformed primary care sector - namely those Health 
Basic Areas where Primary Care Teams have been formed. In this case, the 
corporate centre of the CHS negotiated and signed a single framework protocol 
with the CHI for a three years period, and then additional clauses and specific 
annexes were added (and annually revised) for each Primary Care Team as a 
result of the negotiation between the corresponding CHS's Health Region, the 
CHI's Primary Care Division and the corresponding CHI's Direction of Primary 
Care. The main objective of this process was to gradually introduce the objectives 
of the Health Plan in the contractual negotiations concerning primary care (ICS, 
1995a). 
While the program me-contract became a central tool for the pursuit of a more 
efficient management in the CHI, two other strands of reform were being 
developed from the early nineties in order to fulfil the strategic objectives of the CHI 
(ICS, 1995c). First, as the CHI was no longer'the health authority/administration' I 
but a provider, it no longer needed a territorial structure. Therefore, 
its 
organisational structure was shifting from being based on geographical criteria 
(which became intrinsic to the health authority role the CHS played from 1991) to 
criteria based on the lines of services that the CHI produced. 
Thus, the divisions of 
corporate centre, hospitals, and primary care were allocated 
to the CHI's manager 
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responsibility. This shift is shown in Figures 5.7 and 5.8. In 1989 the restructuring 
of the CHI partly broke the hierarchical organisation by attaching the units holding 
managerial tasks under the manager figure, which had been created in 1986 as a 
co-ordinating figure between the territorial structure of the Management Areas and 
the corporate centre of the CHI. By contrast, in 1994, the role of health authority 
represented by the Director General disappeared, and a divisional structure with a 
corporate centre (Direction of Organisation and Human Resources and Economic 
Affairs) and two divisions (Hospital and Primary Care) was established. 
Figure 5.7. Organisational chart of the Catalan Health Institute, 1989-93. 
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Management 
and contract 
Hospitals PI Sectors 
Primary 
care centres 
Source: DSSS (1990b. 20), ICS (1994b). 
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Figure 5.8. Organisational chart of the Catalan Health Institute, 1994. 
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Human resources 
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Hospital Primary care 
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Planning and primary care 
management 
control unit 
Productive 
units*** 
+11 hospitals. 
++Centre of medical examination of social security benefit claimants. 
Tour territorial subdivisions. 
**36 Directions of Primary Care. 
'510 Productive units: 341 units of basic services (primary care teams, non-reformed primary care 
centres, emergencies services), 47 specialised units (primary care centres with specialists), 53 units 
of services of specialised support (women care programmes, units of rehabilitation, others), 49 units 
of intermediate products (laboratories, radio-diagnostic centres), 20 units of complementary services 
(care at home, others). 
Source: ICS (1994b) and DSSS (1995a: 28-9). 
A second type of reform saw a change in CHI's management style which 
intended to enhance professionals' and staff's participation and responsibility 
(Massaguer, 1994: 56). Figure 5.9 and Table 5.9 show the combination of new 
structures and management tools and style as viewed within the reform process. 
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The corporate centre negotiated with the CHS the global CHI budgetary 
appropriabon - though 'translated' into contract terms - and distributed it among 
health centres - hospitals and provider units of primary care (ICS, 1992: 36). The 
management of resources by the CHI centres would follow a decentralised pattern 
involving the flexibilisation of staff policies, and the development of output control 
systems. Unlike hospitals, the definition of operational units within primary care 
centres would revolve around flattening hierarchies and creating 'Primary Care 
Teams' of professionals within the ongoing primary care reform from the mid- 
eighties (ICS, 1993: 24). 
Figure 5.9. A projected divisional structure for the Catalan Health Institute. 
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Within this process of reorganisation of the CHI, its corporate centre was 
defining a new approach to the management of its provider units which was 
intended to evolve towards a model resembling a divisional structure for a near 
future (see Figure 5-9). However, as explained above, in terms of budgetary 
234 
structure such a new organisational approach was not reflected in a change of the 
'type' of agency (in Dunleavy's terms) the CHI still was. That is, by mid-1998 its 
legal personality and configuration have not undergone the 'holding-style' 
reorganisation which was considered to be the next major step to disaggregate it. 
Instead, hospitals and primary care centres do not have an independent legal 
personality and such key management functions as personnel (human resource 
management) and management of the budget allocations are still centralised at the 
corporate centre of the CHI. In sum, the formal and binding organigram of the CHI 
after being transformed into a provider - though a single one - in the early 1990s is 
as Figure 5.8 shows. These organigrams together with the budget structure 
analysed above shows the provider role of the CHI has as a delivery agency, as a 
result of the reforms. 
Table 5.9. The Catalan Health Institute's reformed approach 
to organisation and functions, 1992. 
Level Common elements Specific elements 
Corporate level Direction and organisation Operational support and 
of provider units centralised process 
execution for primary 
care 
Provider units of Output oriented Network approach to 
primarycare management primary careGentres 
Specific or general 
contracting units 
Hospitals ------- ---- - --------------------- Full time management Individual approach plus 
teams co-ordination 
Source: ICS (1992: 9). 
According to senior officials of the CHI and the CHS, the NPM model would 
be taken furthest by disaggregating the CHI - namely, by establishing a contract 
between each operational/provider unit (hospitals and primary care teams) and the 
CHS itself, rather than with the CHI centre. In this sense, a Health Region manager 
of the CHS argued that the CHI should become a stated-owned enterprise in the 
form of a holding company: 
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'We are interested in signing the contract as close as possible to the 
professional who does the work. We have defined in our information system 
two things: the providers' entity [the CHI] and the productive unit. We argue 
that we should sign the contract with the productive unit, where the allocation 
of resources should be established - it is necessary to define the contract 
well. The role of the provider entity would be to guarantee the logistic, 
financial and organisational support so that the productive unit could devote 
itself to the provision of the service. ' 
Conclusions 
The separation between purchaser and provider involved in the institutional design 
of the new Catalan health authority was the most innovative feature of the health 
reform launched in 1990. Nevertheless, its innovative character was more relevant 
in relation to the Spanish context, for which it was a pioneering experience, than in 
Catalonia itself, where the separation between health authority and most providers 
was clarified from 1985 with the creation of the HNPU and the consolidation of the 
contracting system. However, the explicit definition of this central NPM component 
was left ambiguous in the 1990 LOHC, and did not find its way into the political 
discourse of the reform until shortly after the law was passed. It was then that a 
number of conferences in which the main policy elites participated gave evidence 
of the diffusion of a NPM discourse which happened to fit central features of the 
Catalan model, and which easily became the prevailing interpretation of the LOHC. 
Thereafter the actual implementation of the new institutional design of the 
health authority had two different formulation sources: an endogenous legal source 
(LOHC), and an exogenous source (the NPIVI discourse). At least two different 
implementation scenarios could be expected. First, if the implementation had 
followed the actual formulation of the reform as established in the LOHC, then a 
complex role had to be expected for the CHS as the new health authority. 
According to the LOHC the CHS was endowed with competencies over health 
policy formulation, regulation, enforcement, financing, contracting and 
management. In turn, the CHI was redefined as a provider - that is, it had its 
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contracting competencies removed -, and was to be integrated into the CHS. By 
contrast, if the implementation had followed the NPM reinterpretation of the reform, 
then the separation of roles between CHS and CHI necessarily involved their 
organisational separation - the CHS should have become solely a purchaser 
agency, and the CHI should become just another (large) provider structurally 
independent of the CHS. 
The analysis of the actual restructuring carried out between 1991 and 1995 
shows first, that, the CHSs role was closer to the actual and ambiguous 
formulation of the LOHC than to the clear-cut role interpretation forwarded by the 
NPIVI discourse. Two indicators support this conclusion: the complex mix of 
functions formally assigned to the CHS and its budget structure, which clearly 
revealed a mixture of contracts, transfers, and control types of agency as defined 
by Dunleavy (1991). In the case of the CHI, the actual implementation process 
followed closely its redefinition as a provider both in terms of the competencies it 
was assigned and in the redesign of its budget structure. Thus, while the pre-LOHC 
CHI's role and budget structure revealed a mixture of contracts, transfers and 
delivery agency, the same indicators after the reform showed a clearly dominant 
delivery role. In the case of the DHSS, both the distribution of formal competencies 
and of budgets confirmed its control agency type before and after the reform. 
So the CHI is the agency upon which the implementation of the reform has 
had a clearer impact, since it has demonstrably shifted from being the health 
authority to being a large provider. Moreover, the CHI has undergone several 
processes of management improvement which are reasserting a more efficient 
orientation to the performance of that provider role. Thus, in this point, the 
implementation followed both the LOHC and the NPM discourse. Nevertheless, 
other indicators show a more ambiguous assessment of which of the two 
formulations was more closely followed. For example, the fact that the CHI 
remained as an organisation independent from the CHS fitted the NPM discourse 
rather than the LOHC. By contrast, the fact that the relationship between the CHS 
and the CHI is not based on a real contract but on a budget allocation - though one 
'translated' into contract terms - with no financial risk, fitted more closely the actual 
formulation of the LOHC than its NPM interpretation. 
However, the formal reallocation of competencies and the reassignment of 
budgetary resources are only static indicators of the extent to which an effective 
clarification and separation of roles has been implemented. That is, the actual 
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implementation of a NPM governance structure is by no means directly inferable 
only from such indicators. The reason is that the dynamic interactions between 
these institutional actors - the health authority (CHS) and a provider which is itself 
part of the public administration (CHI) - and the rest of the health policy elite 
representing a heterogeneous network of providers are based on resource 
dependence and exchange relationships. Therefore, the very use and impact of 
the policy tools which are central to a governance structure - for example, contracts 
in the case of NPIVI - may be shaped by these repeated interactions among 
mutually dependent actors. These issues will be examined in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
Implementation: relations between the Catalan 
Health Service and providers, 1990-95. 
Implementing a new institutional form of a public authority and its corresponding 
policy tools within a particular policy domain involves redefining the relations 
between public officials and both individuals and interest groups. Horn's (1995) 
definition of transactions costs was mainly of a political nature and concerned with 
the decision costs associated to the formulation stage of a new governance 
structure. His model was not clearly extended to consistently interpret the 
implementation process, which does not only involve political but also economic 
transactions costs. Thus, the nature of the implementation or agency costs defined 
by this author are bound to depend not only on political considerations but also on 
the economic and social nature of the policy domain in question - health care in this 
case. For this reason, Horn's model needs the complement of other theories which 
deal with this economic dimension of transactions, thereby helping identify how the 
political nature of the agency or implementation problem affects the economic 
dimension of policy. 
In Williamson's (1985) terms, a form of governance - whether market, hybrid 
or hierarchy - is supposed to be an efficient answer to a particular pattern of 
transactions frequency and to a certain degree of asset specificity of investments. 
Taking into account that in the health sector most investments are either highly 
asset-specific or mixed (asset specific to a relevant extent), a governance structure 
which is not to be unified but based on hard contracts could be expected to 
conform to the hybrid type rather than to a market type. This new form of 
governance should in turn be supported either by neo-classical contracting if 
transactions are occasional - where conflict is solved by resorting to a third party - 
or by relational contracting if transactions are recurrent, where adaptation is 
achieved bilaterally through the contractual relation. Thus, in principle, theory 
predicts that in the health sector, where transactions are recurrent and investments 
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are highly (or mixed) asset-specific, if hierarchy is discarded (as NPM prescribes) 
then the new governance structure should be hybrid and based on relational 
contracting. As will be shown, this expectation fits to a large extent the 
developments in the Catalan case. 
Apparently, both the policy precedents and the distribution of resources 
among different actors within the health policy subsystem in Catalonia provided a 
scenario structurally favourable to the introduction of NPIVI. In the Catalan case, an 
NPIVI discourse diffusion process came to legitimate on an ex-post basis a health 
care model which it happened to fit. That is, the Catalan government recognised an 
emergent strategy, in Mintzberg's (1987) terms, which had been reflected in the 
gradual setting and maintaining of policy priorities over a decade, and decided to 
give it a formal, legal status. This strategy was widely supported by a core 
institutional and non-institutional policy elite which had been highly stable 
throughout that period. However, one unintended result of this discourse diffusion 
process was that it opened a gap between the actual formulation of the reform in 
the 1990 LOHC and its NPM re-interpretation. Another was that the adoption of 
this new discourse led the policy elite to assess the subsequent implementation of 
the reforms in relation to the NPM discourse instead of in relation to its actual 
formulation in the LOHC. 
The repeated interactions among the different actors of the health policy 
domain are based on flows of resource exchange and mutual dependence, and the 
implementation of a new governance structure in the Catalan health sector inspired 
by NPM postulates involved a change in those flows patterns. The incentive-based 
contractual system which had channelled resources from the health authority (the 
CHI until 1990) to non-CHI providers was redefined in 1990. As a result, this 
contractual system was to be the main interrelation pattern between a new health 
authority (the CHS) and all providers alike, and the CHI had to gradually shift from 
depending on a budget allocation to having to negotiate a contract with the new 
health authority in the same terms as the rest of providers. Moreover, contracts as 
a tool for managing arms length relationships, were projected to be extended from 
the hospital sector, where it was almost the rule, to the primary care sector, where 
it represented an innovation. 
However, contracts are not only channels for arms length resources flows, 
but also tools for designing bridging strategies across organisational boundaries. 
Thus, for example, contracts may involve both incentives and hierarchical elements 
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in the relationship between contracting parties (Stinchcombe, 1985). Moreover, 
when contracts become the main tool of a system of external control of semi- 
autonomous organisations - such as health providers which depend on contracts 
with the health authority - inter-organisabonal power relationships come into play. 
According to Pfeffer and Salancik's (1978) resource dependence theory, an 
organisation may enter a boundary-setting strategy by shaping its relative influence 
and control over activities and resources which are critical for the survival of other 
organisations. In this respect, the shift from a hierarchical command-and-control 
system to a system of external control of autonomous organisations via contracts 
involve features such as resource importance, discretion over their allocation and 
use, concentration of their control, and asymmetric dependence. 
These features were central to the implementation of the new governance 
structure for the health sector in Catalonia. The distribution of key complementary 
resources between the health authority and a heterogeneous network of health 
providers was the basis for the development of such bridging and boundary setting 
strategies. However, these strategies led to divergences between the widespread 
NPM discourse which the policy elites had adopted as the prevailing interpretation 
of the 1990 LOHC and the implementation of the reform. Thus, the assessment the 
policy elites tended to make of implementation was guided by NPM discourse 
rather than by the 1990 actual formulation of the reform. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section analyses the 
impact of the new governance structure on the relationships between the health 
authority and the hospital and primary care providers. These relationships were 
mainly affected by the consolidation of contracts with the former and by the 
introduction of contractual relations with the latter. The second section focuses on 
how the content of the 1995 Law modified the LOHC and its relevance for the 
governance structure being implemented. The third section concentrates on the 
nature of the divergences between the NPM discourse and the implementation of 
the reforms between 1991 and 1995. 
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6.1. Developments in the contractual system 
and governance structure. 
The reforms implemented in Catalonia from the formulation of the 1990 LOHC to its 
modification in 1995 involved not only a redefinition of the purchaser/financing and 
provision roles at the level of the health administration by reassigning 
competencies and budgets, but also the further development of contracts and of 
private management tools for the governance of the health system. In the hospital 
sector contracts were consolidated as the main tool for shaping hospitals' service 
provision, extending its use also to the Social Security hospitals within the Catalan 
Health Institute (CHI). In the primary care sector contracts were introduced for the 
first time as a means to translate the objectives of the Health Plan into the actual 
provision of services. In this sector the contracting process was accompanied by a 
purposeful diversification of management forms, because in contrast to the hospital 
sector, the CHI was almost the only provider of public primary care in 1990. 
a) The regulated hospital network. 
One of the primary objectives of the LOHC was the organisation of the health 
system on the following principles: first, to create an integrated health system 
which consisted of all the health and socio-health providers whether public or of 
public coverage and which was based on an integral conception of health 
allocating the health planning and management functions to one single body, 18 - in 
contrast to the traditional dichotomy between public health and health care-; and 
second, to sustain a mixed health system, owing to the historical configuration of 
health providers in Catalonia (Tosas, 1993: 150). In this respect, a policy precedent 
on which the LOHC built was the 1985 creation of the Hospital Network of Public 
118 See Chapters 4 and 5 for the discussion of this ambiguous assignment of competencies 
which was afterwards modified by the NPM discourse. 
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Utilisation (HNPU), which involved an explicit two-fold policy option. On the one 
hand, it intended to reinforce the heterogeneity of provision management forms 
and ownership existing within the Catalan health sector. On the other hand, it had 
the long-standing aim of progressively transforming the Social Security providers 
included in the CHI (26 per cent of the HNPU-hospital beds, and over 90 per cent 
of primary care resources) in the line of such diversity. The implementation of these 
policy options required, first, a considerable investment effort and, second, the 
consolidation of contracts as the main tools for governing the relations between the 
health authority and hospital providers. 
Figure 6.1. Evolution of total investment in health care in Catalonia by the 
corresponding health authority*, 1982-95 (indexed 100 in 1982). 
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*From 1982 to 1983 the healthtfinancing authority is the DG of Social Security Health Services, from 
1984 to 1990 it is the Catalan Health Institute, and from 1991 onwards it is the Catalan Health 
Service. 
Source* Own elaboration based on DEF (1982,1983,1984,1985,1986,1987,1988,1989,1990, 
1991,1992,1993,1994,1995). 
243 
cl-i (n LC) (0 r- 00 m CD T-- r4 m Ln 
OD OD OD OD CC) 00 OD OD G) m 0) (7) m 
cr) m 0) C» C» C) 0) C) C) m a) C) 
Figure 6.2. Distribution of investments in the Catalan health sector, 
1982-95 (in percentages over total investment in health 
by the corresponding health authority*). 
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*From 1982 to 1983 the health/financing authority is the DG of Social Security Health Services, from 
1984 to 1990 it is the Catalan Health Institute, and from 1991 onwards it is the Catalan Health 
Service. 
NB- From 1982 to 1984 there is no item classified as 'investment in general administration', but as 
'other' and it includes urgent investments programmes for infrastructure and equipment, prices review 
and other (which was very important in 1982). 
Source: Own elaboration based on DEF (1982,1983,1984,1985,1986,1987,1988,1989,1990, 
1991,1992,1993,1994,1995). 
In order to achieve these two objectives a remarkable public investment effort 
was required in both non-Social Security and Social Security providers. As Figure 
6.1 shows, the investment index in 1993 was seven times that of 1986, after having 
followed an uninterrupted rising trend in that period. Only in 1994 did the 
investment effort decrease, to slightly rise again in 1995. Moreover, as it appears 
from Figure 6.2, the largest part of this public investment in the health sector was 
made in the hospital sector. After the passage of the LOHC in 1990, the 
investments share spent on hospitals rose from representing 58 per cent of total 
investments in health in 1990 to 66 per cent in 1993. By contrast, the investment 
share corresponding to primary care followed the gradual decrease it had started in 
1989, when it had reached a maximum of 38 per cent of total investment in health, 
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and fell to represent 26 per cent of total health investment in 1995. However: 
between 1993 and 1995 investment in both hospital and pdmary care lost relative 
weight within the overall share in favour of the investments classified as general 
administration' 19. 
Figure 6.3. Budgetary share spent on contracts with non-CHI providers, 
1982-95 (in percentages over the total budget of the 
corresponding health authority*). 
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*From 1982 to 1983 the healthtfinancing authority is the IDG of Social Security Health Services, from 
1984 to 1990 it is the Catalan Health Institute, and from 1991 onwards it is the Catalan Health 
Service. 
"Specialists services and other, in 1989 it also includes haemodialysis. 
***To families, and non-profit institutions (one-off regulatory payments, prostheses, vehicles for 
handicapped patients, and other). 
Source: Own elaboration based on DEF (1982,1983,1984,1985,1986,1987,1988,1989,1990, 
1991,1992,1993,1994,1995). 
The second requirement for reinforcing the heterogeneous network of non- 
Social Security (non-CHI) hospitals was the consolidation of contracts as the main 
tool for governing the relations between the health authority and those providers. 
119 For a more detailed disaggregation of these data see Table A. 5 in Appendix 1. 
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As Figure 6.3 shows, the weight of the budget share spent on contracts for health 
services with non-CHI providers by the corresponding health authority within the 
DHSS gradually increased from the early eighties, when the Social Security health 
services were transferred from the INSALUD to the Catalan government. Between 
1982 and 1995, there was an increment of eight percentage points in the budget 
share spent on contracts (from 31 to 39 per cent), which basically affected the 
hospital sector. In fact, the overall increase of the budget share spent on contracts 
with non-CHI hospital services by the corresponding health authority rose 13.5 
points from 1985 to 1995. Although the largest relative increase in the budget 
share spent on contracting with non-CHI hospitals took place between 1988 and 
1991, the trend continued to increase after the passage of the LOHC - but in a 
lesser way, having experienced a slight decrease in 1993. The overall trend of 
steady increase of the budget share spent on contracts with non-CHI providers 
appears to be more remarkable if this budget share is not calculated in relation to 
the total budget of the corresponding health authority within the DHSS but in 
relation to the total budget of the DHSS itself. In that case, the budget share spent 
on contracts with non-CHI providers - both in primary and hospital care - rose 12 
points between 1982 and 1995, and the budget share spent on contracts with non- 
CHI hospitals 14.5 points'20. By contrast, the budget share spent on contracts with 
non-CHI primary care providers remained remarkably stable excepting the 
budgetary exercise of 1989 - when the budget share for contracted hospitals 
registered its most important increase. 
However, the evolution of the budget share spent by the corresponding 
health authority in contracting with non-CHI hospitals does not necessarily imply 
that those contracted providers were actually providing a proportionally increasing 
percentage of publicly financed health services. In fact, the period 1991-95 showed 
the same pattern of distribution of resources and activity between CHI and non-CHI 
hospitals as did the period 1987-90 analysed in Chapter 3. That is, although the 
budget share spent on contracting with non-CHI hospitals rose substantially, the 
distribution of resources and activity between them and the CHI remained 
remarkably stable between 1991 and 1995. 
120 For a more detailed disaggregation of these data see Table A. 6 in Appendix 1. 
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Table 6.1. CHI hospital resources and activity, in percentages over total CHI 
and contracted non-CHI hospital resources and activity for acute 
care in Catalonia, 1991-95. 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
General 
Hospitals 16.4 16.4 17.6 18.1 18.3 
Beds* 26.3 26.0 26.3 26.7 27.3 
40 h. health personnel" 36.4 36.2 37.0 36.2 34.7 
Discharges 26.6 25.8 25.7 26.5 26.8 
Stays 27.3 26.9 27.5 27.7 28.5 
Outpatient visits 22.0 23.0 22.1 22.5 24.1 
Emergencies 23.2 22.6 22.6 22.9 23.0 
Discharges paid by Soc. Sec. 26.5 26.8 26.8 26.2 24.4 
Running costs 37.1 36.5 34.3 34.5 29.2 
Income 37.8 37.0 34.4 34.1 29.3 
Health personnellbed 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 
Occupation ratio 84.8 84,8 87.3 86.6 87.4 
Soc. Sec. dischar. lTotal disch. 84.7 95.0 96.2 87.9 81.1 
Acute care 
Beds 27.5 27.7 27.6 28.2 28,8 
Discharges 26.7 25.9 25.8 26.6 27,0 
Stays 28.8 28.7 29.1 29.5 30.4 
Occupation ratio (016) 84.8 84.8 87.2 86.5 8T3 
Rotation ratio 31.6 31.6 32.8 34.7 35,5 
Average stay 9.8 9.8 9.7 9.1 9.0 
% over total stays 99.3 100 98.2 98.2 98.2 
Long stay care 
Beds 4.0 0 7.3 6.9 7.0 
Discharges 17.7 0 10.9 9.7 8.0 
Stays 3.7 0 7.3 6.9 7.0 
Occupation ratio 88.9 0 93.2 94.7 94.9 
Psychiatric care 
Beds 0 0 0 0 0 
Discharges 0 0 0 0 0 
Stays 0 0 0 0 0 
*Includes incubators. 
"Personnel weighted at a timetable of 40 hours a week. 
Source: DSSS (1994c): 112,114; Service of Information and Studies of the Direction 
General of 
Health Resources of the DHSS of the Catalan government (Data base: Estadisitica 
d'Establiments Sanitaris en R6gim Ontemat, 1992,1993,1994,1995). 
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Table 6.2. Hospital resources and activity of non-CHI hospitals contracted 
for acute care services, in percentages over total CHI and non-CHI 
contracted hospital resources and activity in Catalonia, 1991-95. 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
General 
Hospitals 83.6 83.6 82.4 81.9 81.7 
Beds* 73.7 74.0 73.7 73.3 72.7 
40 h. health personnel" 63.6 63.8 63.0 63.8 65.3 
Discharges 73.4 74.2 74.3 73.5 73.2 
Stays 72.7 73.1 72.5 72.3 71.5 
Outpatient visits 78.0 77.0 77.9 77.5 75.9 
Emergencies 76.8 77.4 77.4 77.1 77.0 
Discharges paid by Soc. Sec. 73.5 73.2 73.2 73.8 75.6 
Running costs+ 62.9 63.5 65.7 65.5 70.8 
Income 62.2 63.0 65.6 65.9 70.7 
Health personnellbed 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 
Occupation ratio 80.8 81.0 82.2 82.3 82.3 
Soc. Sec. dischar. lTotal disch. 85.7 90.7 91.3 89.6 92.7 
Acute care 
Beds 72.5 72.3 72.4 71.8 71.2 
Discharges 73.3 74.1 74.2 73.4 73.0 
Stays 71.2 71.3 71.0 70.5 69.6 
Occupation ratio (116) 79.9 80.6 81.2 80.9 81.0 
Rotation ratio 33.0 34,5 36.0 37.4 38.9 
Average stay 8.8 8.5 8.2 7.9 7.6 
% over total stays 92.1 91,6 90.6 89.7 89.5 
Long stay care 
Beds 96.0 100 92.7 93.1 93.0 
Discharges 82.3 100 89.1 90.3 92.0 
Stays 96.3 100 92.6 93.1 93.0 
Occupation ratio 95.4 86,2 93.0 95.4 94.5 
Psychiatric care 
Beds 100 100 100 100 100 
Discharges 100 100 100 100 100 
Stays 100 100 100 100 100 
Occupation ratio 86.6 87,7 94.7 100 100 
Includes incubators. 
"Personnel weighted at a timetable of 40 hours a week. 
Source: DSSS (1994c): 112,114; Service of Information and Studies of the Direction General of 
Health Resources of the DHSS of the Catalan government (Data base: Estad[sitica 
d'Establiments Sanitaris en Rdgim Ontemat, 1992,1993,1994,1995). 
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As Table 6.1 shows, between 1991 and 1995 slight changes affected the 
weight of the CHI resources and activity within acute care: its beds percentage rose 
one point, its 40-hour personnel decreased nearly two points, its stays rose over 
one point, its outpatient visits rose two points and the discharges paid by the Social 
Security decreased two points. The most remarkable change affected the relative 
weight of its running costs and income as percentages within the total running 
costs and income of publicly financed acute care - both decreased around eight 
points. As in the period 1987-90, acute psychiatric care was provided by non-CHI 
hospitals, and long-stay care provided by the CHI increasingly lost weight within the 
system. The reverse of all these trends applied to non-CHI hospitals (see Table 
6.2). 
This distribution of publicly financed acute care resources and activity 
between CHI and non-CHI hospitals is part of a wider health system in which both 
publicly and privately financed resources and activity have a place. From Table 6.3, 
it appears that by 1995, the CHI hospital beds represented 15.5 per cent of total 
beds available - namely, 1.5 points more than in 1975 (see Table 3.1). Thus, the 
decision to confine the relative weight of the CHI resources to the size it had when 
those resources were transferred to the Catalan government in 1981 was clearly 
fulfilled. Most of the main general activity indicators show that the weight of the CHI 
within the health system represented between a quarter and a fifth of the total 
activity in 1995. In turn, the aim to consolidate the contracted acute non-CHI 
hospital network (HNPU) was also achieved. In 1995, those contracted acute 
hospitals bore 65 per cent of all outpatient visits and 68 per cent of all 
emergencies, and they registered 73 per cent of all discharges paid by the Social 
Security. Moreover, socio-health care (for long-stay patients) was also consolidated 
as a contracted sector, most of it as a de facto network apart from the acute HNPU. 
Finally, non-contracted, mostly private hospitals continued to have a relevant 
weight: for example, in 1995 they registered 21 per cent of total hospital 
discharges, while the CHI itself registered 20.4 per cent. 
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Table 6.3. Distribution of hospital resources and activity in Catalonia, 1991 
(in percentages). 
CHI 
hospitals 
Contracted 
acute non- 
CHI 
hospitals 
Contracted 
socio- 
health non- 
CHI 
hospitals 
Non- 
contracted 
hospitals 
Total 
General 
Hospitals 7.5 33.5 33.5 25.4 100 
Beds* 15.5 41.4 29.7 13.4 100 
40 h. health personnel" 27.7 52.2 9.3 10.8 100 
Discharges 20.4 55.7 2.8 21.1 100 
Stays 16.2 40.7 32.4 10.7 100 
Outpatient visits 20.7 65.1 0.9 13.3 100 
Emergencies 20.2 67.6 1.4 10.7 100 
Discharges paid by Soc. Sec. 23.4 72.6 3.0 1.1 100 
Running costs 23.2 56.3 7.5 13.0 100 
Income 23.2 55.8 7.7 13.3 100 
Health personnellbed 2.3 1.6 0.4 1.0 - Occupation ratio 87.4 82.3 91.2 66.7 - Soc. Sec. dischar. lTotal disch. 81.1 92.7 0.0 0.0 
Acute care 
Beds 23.6 58.2 1.4 17.0 100 
Discharges 21.0 56.8 0.8 21.5 100 
Stays 26.1 59.7 0.9 13.3 100 
Occupation ratio (016) 87.3 81.0 50.8 62.2 - 
Rotation ratio 35.5 38.9 23.0 50.6 - 
Average stay 9.0 7.6 8.1 4.5 - 
% over total stays 98.2 89.5 1.7 76.0 - 
Long stay care 
Beds 
Discharges 
Stays 
Occupation ratio 
1.4 18.9 76.7 3.0 100 
2.3 27.0 68.2 2.5 100 
1.4 18.6 77.2 2.8 100 
94.9 94.5 96.5 86.6 - 
Psychiatric care 
Beds 0.0 1.8 87.0 11.3 100 
Discharges 0.0 13.0 72.0 15.0 100 
Stays 0.0 2.1 87.0 11.1 100 
Occupation ratio 0 100 88.6 86.7 
*Includes incubators. 
"Personnel weighted at a timetable of 40 hours a week- 
Source: Service of Information and Studies of the Direction General of Health Resources of the DHSS 
of the Catalan government (Data base: Estadisitica dEstabliments Sanitaris en 
Rdgim 
Ontemat, 1995). 
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The development of this policy option to consolidate the heterogeneous 
provision structure eyisting in Catalonia had as a guiding tool the accreditation 
system introduced in 1981. Those hospitals passing the accreditation requirements 
for acute care gradually became members of the HNPU. The process of 
consolidating the HNPU involved the creation of several consortia, comprising 
e)dsbng health centres and public enterprises. All these providers had in common 
their subjection to private law instead of to the administrative law framework 
characterising the operation of Social Secudty health providers - namely those 
included in the CHI. Those centres which did not meet the accreditation 
requirements for acute care either disappeared or were accredited as eligible for 
socio-health and chronic care services - within the 'Life to Years' programme - or 
for psychiatric care. Some of these centres held relatively stable contracts with the 
CHS. This latter sector confronted dire financial difficulties in consolidating a 
network comparable to the acute care HNPU, because these services are not 
covered by the National Health System. 
The weight of the CHI, which is a provider with a single legal personality and 
comprises the Social Security providers, was not only relevant for the bed 
percentage it represented within the HNPU in 1994 (26 per cent), but also for the 
size of its hospitals (see Table 6.4). They concentrated high technology treatments 
and university medical research and employed over 30,000 people. These aspects 
reveal the importance of the debate which intensified after the passage of the 1990 
LOHC about the possible gains from disaggregating, managerialising and 
reorganising the CHI. These proposals were linked to suggestions concerning the 
need to change the procedural and bureaucratic regulations of personnel and 
budgetary p, rOcesses derived from the administrative law framework in which the 
CHI operated. The other most relevant providers were foundations and mutualities, 
as well as public and semi-public consortia (governance structures comprising 
owners, local councils and the Catalan government). The latter achieved ten per 
cent of the HNPU beds by 1994. Among the HNPU hospitals there were nine which 
were profit, non-charitable, comprising over 2,350 beds - that is, an average of 262 
beds per hospitals - and representing 13 per cent of the HNPU beds. 
251 
Table 6.4. Distribution of bed ownership in Catalonia for 
HNPU-member hospitals, 1994. 
Ownership Number Number of Mean number % of beds of 
of beds ofbeds the HNPU 
hospitals per hospital 
Private total 36 9,449 262 53 
Foundation 17 3 200 **188 18 
Mutuality 7 , 2,028 290 11 
Society 6 915 153 5 
Church 3 888 296 5 
Red Cross 3 610 203 3 
Consortium 5 1,808 ++362 10 
Public total 28 8,449 302 47 
Soc. Sec. /CHI 10 4,762 473 26 
Municipal +6 1,234 206 7 
govt. 
Other H 996 996 6 
Foundation -4 777 194 4 
Catalan govt. *6 586 98 3 
Diputaci6*** 1 130 130 1 
Total 69 17,878 282 100 
**l has 833 beds, the mean of the rest is 147.9. 
'Provincial admin. governing organ. 
++1 has 825 beds, the mean of the rest is 245.7. 
+4 are managed by consortia, and 2 by societies. 
-1 is managed by and individual firm, and 2 by societies. 
*2 are managed by public bodies, 2 by societies, 1 by a mutuality, and 1 by the CHI. 
Ns a consortia of only public administrations. 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from DSSS (1994b). 
As for those centres not included in the HNPU (see Table 6.5) those with a 
greater weight belonged to societies and the Church, not only in terms of number 
of hospitals and percentage of beds but also regarding the size of the centres. 
Among these non-HNPU hospitals, 59 were private non-charitable, of which 31 had 
some sort of contract with the CHS. These 31 hospitals had an average of 146 
beds each (over 4210 beds in total) and represents 32 per cent of this non-HNPU 
hospital beds. 
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Table 6.5. Distribution of bed ownership in Catalonia for non-HNPU member 
hospitals, 1994 (socio-health care for chronic and mental patients 
and acute private care). 
Ownership Number of Number of Mean number % of beds of 
hospitals beds ofbeds the HNPU 
per hospital 
Private total 103 11,004 107 83 
Society 45 5,830 130 44 
Church 16 2,783 174 21 
Foundation 15 931 62 7 
Mutuality 6 377 63 3 
Employer 5 223 45 2 
mutual. 
Association 7 213 30 2 
For-profit 1 360 360 3 
cooperat. 
Individual firm 5 127 25 1 
Other 2 103 52 1 
Red Cross 1 57 57 0.4 
Consortium 1 30 30 0.2 
Public total 12 2,166 181 16 
Municipal govt. 3 712 237 5 
Catalan govt. 3 682 227 5 
Diputaci6*** 2 584 292 4 
Foundation 3 112 37 1 
Soc. Sec. /CHI 1 76 76 1 
Total 116 13,200 114 100 
'Provincial administration. 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from DSSS (1 994b). 
A defining feature of this HNPU was that, although being internally diverse 
regarding ownership and management forms, its funding was public, based on 
contracts with the CHS. There was, however, an essential difference between the 
programme-contract signed between the CHS and the CHI as a provider and the 
contracts signed between the CHS and the rest of providers. Although both of them 
were formally the same written document, following the same pattern of activity- 
measuring and pricing, the former was not enforceable, because it did not involve 
financial risk. Instead, it was conceived of as a tool for helping improve efficiency 
and managerial awareness among its providers (see Chapter 5). By contrast, the 
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latter were in principle hard contracts. From 1986 the contracts with HNPU 
providers were based on a system of tariffs for the payment of the Basic Care Units 
(BCU) provided by each hospital. In these contracts there appeared, first, the 
global volume of activity to be provided, the number of BCUs; second, the tariff to 
be paid for each BCU, which varied according to the technological level of 
providers (A, A/B, B, B/C, C); third, the corresponding penalisation if the hospital 
did not provide the activity agreed; and fourth, a variable number of additional 
clauses for the financing of activities which were not classifiable into BCUs (health 
programmes) (Ramis et a/. 1997: 23). The calculation of BCU tariffs was based on 
the relative cost of providing different services: 
one stay (overnight and meal) 1 BCU 
one emergency visit 0.5 BCU 
first outpatient visit 0.4 BCU 
successive outpatient visits 0.2 BCU 
The tariffs to be paid per BCU depended on the level of technology 
complexity of each provider. This complex dimension was classified into three 
levels named A (Basic General Hospital), B (Reference Hospital), and C (High 
Technology Hospital), and two intermediate levels, A/B and B/C. This classification 
had a two-fold aim. On the one hand, it simplified the previous situation in which 
there were 21 levels, defined with a corresponding variety of tariffs and financing 
systems. On the other hand, it was intended to reflect the different cost structure 
each technological level had for the production of each BCU. The assignment of a 
level of BCU tariff was in principle dependent on the physical and human resources 
of each hospital, assuming them to be an indicator of their technological complexity 
and of the kind of patients treated. According to a senior official of the CHS: 
'A public payment system, when it fixes prices, it has to take into 
account the cost elements, otherwise they would throw themselves onto 
us. You cannot guarantee quality if you cause them [providers] deficit. 
The increment of the prices of the BCUs is made on the same criterion 
as the budget increment. But we cannot decrease activity in order to 
increase the tariff of the BCU. We can do less hospitalisation and more 
day surgery but we cannot reduce the total number of discharges. 
Contracts are revised annually. Now providers have contracts for three 
years and in the new regulations [in 1997] they will be for five years. j 
254 
The payment system of these contracts was based on two different transfers. 
First, a fixed 70 per cent of the whole amount resulting from mulbplying the activity 
contracted (BCUs) multiplied the price (tariff) set by the CHS was transferred 
monthly to each provider regardless of the activity it actually provided. Second, the 
remaining 30 per cent was variable and was paid monthly for the activity actually 
provided. That is, if they produced less BCUs than contracted providers did not 
receive the whole amount of payment agreed. And if they produced more than the 
activity contracted for, each additional BCU was paid only at 30 per cent its price 
(Artal, 1995). However, the tariff paid for each BCU did not cover the full BCU cost, 
which gradually contributed to an increasing accumulation of deficits in the 
contracted sector. Figure 6.4 shows the difference between the BCU tariff and 
actual costs in 1993 for different hospital sizes and levels of technological 
complexityl2l. Although in some levels and hospital size groups the tariff coverage 
of the cost was twice that of other levels and groups, activity was under-funded in 
all cases (see Figure 6.5). However, the very calculation of the level of BCU tariff 
applicable to each hospital was a matter of controversy, because there was a lack 
of relevant information122 such as the kind of patients treated by each hospital or 
the cost of each kind of patient (Ramis et al. 1997: 25). 
121 For a detailed disaggregation of these data see Table A. 7 in Appendix 1. 
122 From the early nineties the CHS has consolidated its Balance Centre (Centrai de 
Balangos) as an economic and financial analysis tool, together with the information system 
on hospital discharge basic data (Minimum Data Base of Hospital Discharges). Its objectives 
covered the analysis of the financial and economic situation of the HNPU, the elaboration of 
comparative analysis on providers' performance by homogenising the information data base 
collected by them, and giving provider's accounting technical support (DSSS, 1992d). The 
development of this information database, which includes costs per type of output, has 
provided the CHS with the necessary knowledge to potentially act as a purchaser by 
improving contract definition and planning with a view to further classify diagnostic related 
groups (DRG) and patient management categories (PIVIC). In this respect a new payment 
system was designed to be in force from 1997 onwards. This payment system could enable, 
for the first time in Spain, the introduction of patient management categories and diagnostic 
related groups in the contractual process with a view to endowing the CHS with 'purchaser' 
power. In fact, from 1997 a new contracting system was been implemented which weights 
four structural cost components of hospitals: hospitalisation (based on GDR calculations), 
outpatient visits (weighting first and subsequent visits), emergencies (distinguishing between 
infrastructure and activity), and techniques, treatments and ambulatory processes. 
Moreover, the possibility is included that additional payment may depend on specific 
equipment and activities (prosthesis, pharmacy and health programmes) (CTSP, 1996). 
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Figure 6.4. Difference between BCU cost and BCU tariff for 
difference hospital sizes and contract levels 
in Catalonia, 1993. 
45 
40 
35 
30 
4) 
12.25 
M 20 
15 
10 
5 
0 
ýO Sý ja 
8 
C13 !S -0 a -0 c4c: -- C: m C) M 0- to 
U') 
Hospital size and level 
0 CosUBCU 8 Most frequent tadffs 
Source: Ramis et at (1997-26) based on Estadistica dEstabliments Sanitaris en R6gim 
d'Intemat (EESRI) (1993). 
Figure 6.5. Percentage of BCU cost covered by BCU tariff for 
different hospital size and technological level in 
Catalonia, 1993. 
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In order to make up for this under-funding additional financing mechanisms 
were designed which were both internal and external to contracts. The main 
additional financing mechanisms internal to contracts were the additional clauses 
for the funding of specific health programmes, which were not classifiable in terms 
of BCU, and the additional clauses for the support of economic activity. The two 
main financing channels external to contracts were explicit subsidies to the 
operating accounts of hospitals and subsidies for capitalisation linked to the 
investment needs across the territory. The data on explicit subsidies to the 
operating accounts is one of the indicators collected by the DHSS of the Catalan 
government in the annual survey on the hospital sector it conducts from the mid 
eighties'23. However, the interpretation of this indicator may be misleading because 
the private or public sources of these subsidies are not specified. Thus, for 
example, while those subsidies transferred to the CHI and to other providers owned 
by other administrations - provincial and municipal administrations, for example - 
are mainly transferred from the general budget of the Catalan government, the 
subsidies that other providers of different ownership categories receive may be 
from private sources (for example, donations) to a certain extent. This difference is 
not reflected in the indicator in question. The fact that public subsidies for 
capitalisation (investments) and to the operating accounts of hospitals were not 
measured in terms of unitary pricing, as in the case of BCUs, led to some criticisms 
about the margin of discretion the DHSS and the CHS might have in their allocation 
124 (Ramis et a/. 1997: 29-31). 
Therefore, a direct consequence of the creation of the HNPU in 1985 was the 
progressive 'publicness' of providers, in the sense that they gradually increased 
123 The name of survey is Estadistica dEstabliments Sanitaris en R6gim Ontemat. The 
DHSS started to conduct it in 1983, but the data available covers from 1985 to date. 
124 This argument was pointed out by several key informants, such as former top officials of 
the DHSS and the CHS, the manager of an HNPU consortia, a leading figure of the Catalan 
Union of Hospitals, and three representatives of the unions CC. 00, CATAC and CTS. 
According to El Pals (2/7/95) Barcelona edition, the DHSS might have allocated services 
and set tariffs with discretion as it would not make this information public. This newspaper 
asserted that the budget allocation spent by the CHS on contracting health services was not 
subject to any regulation or objective criteria. Moreover, it contended, the DHSS kept as 
confidential the list of non-HNPU, private providers with which it signed contracts for the 
provision of intermediate products such as rehabilitation, haemodialysis, image diagnosis, 
clinical blood test and nuclear medicine. These products were purchased directly by the 
CHS, instead of by hospitals or primary care centres, from these private out-hospital 
providers which are proliferating as commercial societies. 
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their dependence on the funding derived mostly from the contracts with the CHS. In 
this respect, a former senior official of the CHS asserted that the result of creating 
the HNPU was that instead of having the CHI assimilated to the characteristics of 
the private providers within the HNPU, the latter have ended up adopting the same 
resource dependency that the CHI had on the public administration. So an 
entrepreneurial style of managing hospitals as efficient providers of services has 
not developed, because neither market pressure nor structural incentives were 
introduced by the health authority'25. 
At the same time, the drive for diversifying the provision forms in health care 
was deepened in the early nineties. From 1990 to 1995, five new consortia were 
created, always following the active initiative of the Catalan government. Among 
this second group of consortia - the first was created in the second half of the 
eighties - three were providers of intermediate products, such as diagnostic and 
laboratory analysis. In this period, a new management form was also introduced in 
the health sector: nine public enterprises were created for well defined activities, 
such as emergencies, diagnosis, cancer research, health centres management by 
contract, and evaluation of medical technology. In some cases, these were units or 
activities previously integrated in CHI hospitals or other public hospitals which 
thereby 'lost' them in terms of direct budget management. 
According to a senior official of the CHS, the reason for the creation of these 
two kinds of intermediate product providers was to introduce elements which would 
allow quasi-market relations to be developed in a near future. However, in the view 
of a senior official of Barcelona's local council and a top figure in a HNPU 
consortium, these developments of the Catalan model pursued a consolidation and 
an increase of contracted health services to the detriment of the CHI provision - 
125 In this respect, in the mid-1990s a debate emerged on the need to focus on the micro- 
management of hospitals, after having seen that the incentives derived from the macro- and 
meso-management structures had not led hospitals to change their cost structure. A central 
idea was that a private sector legal framework had to replace the existing administrative law 
regulations - namely the civil service status of health professionals and the subjection of 
resource management to administrative law. Another basic theme was the need to 
transform the vertical organisation based on specialities (Medical Direction, Nurses 
Direction), into a horizontal, matrix-like structure organised by process - that is, treatment 
packages for defined pathologies. Professional team work should be coupled with flattened 
hierarchies and professionals should be given responsibility for a rational use of resources, 
which required a participative managerial approach to the operation of each hospital or 
health centre (MonrAs, 1995; IES, 1994). 
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part of whose capacity was being left under-used126. This senior official thought 
that this policy was not rational in economic terms because resources were being 
unnecessadly duplicated, particularly in the case of intermediate products such as 
diagnosis, radiology, and analytics. 
In principle, the intention to create a quasi-market and to consolidate the 
contracted sector was hindered by the Public Administration's Contracts Law 
passed by the Spanish central Parliament in May 1995. This Law intended to 
counteract several corruption affairs which were affecting the public sphere at the 
state level, by extending the controls over the contracting and procurement 
processes carded out by public administrations to those entities which were mostly 
financed by the public sector. According to a senior official of the CHS this Law 
affected the contracting processes internal to the HNPU: 
'When there is no pre-established network (like the HNPU), the new 
contracting has to be done via public competition under this new 
contracts law. But public enterprises and the centres of the HNPU are 
affected by this law regarding the procedure they will have to follow in 
order to buy the services they sub-contract. For example, a hospital will 
not be able to buy diagnostic services from whomever it wants but will 
have to do a public offer. This constrains the idea of the direct 
contracting of the Catalan model. We had the ýidea of purchasing final 
products from hospitals and primary care centres, but not intermediate 
ones (analytic, radiology, diagnosis). We wanted to create an internal 
market between providers themselves, but this new law is a burden for 
them. If it is too burdensome they will think about doing it in-house even 
if it is more expensive than to externalise it - they save on transactions. 
The problem is for our providers to sell and buy services between them. 
Signing and cancelling contracts is more burdensome [with this new 
Law]. ' 
However, this 1995 law was modified in the 1996 budget law so as to include 
health provision contracting in the list of the exceptions to the rule of having to 
organise a public bidding, so that contracts with health care providers may be 
directly allocated (DSCD, 19/11/96, nO41: 1968). Later on, in June 1996, a royal 
decree-law of the Spanish central government further reasserted the possibility to 
contract directly or indirectly with entities of any legal nature for the provision of 
publicly financed health services, as well as the possibility to diversify management 
126 See for example El Pais (4/11/94) Barcelona edition. 
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and provision forms. These possibilities were further supported by a law passed by 
the Spanish central Parliament in April 1997127. 
The diversification of provision pursued in Catalonia in the early nineties 
involved contracting the management of both hospitals and primary care centres to 
public and private enterprises. A recent research found that different kinds of 
management contracting-out were taking place. In some cases the enterprise 
assumed financial risk. In other cases, the CHS assumed the enterprise's financial 
risk. And in other cases an enterprise engaged in contracts mixing both 
possibilities. This research concluded that in many cases, the analysis of the 
economic flows between the CHS, the enterprise and the hospital or primary care 
centre in question was extremely opaque. Income and expenditure structures were 
not clearly disaggregated, and the perception of the actual financial situation of the 
enterprise was misleading, because the payment conditions were based on 
bilateral agreements with the CHS (Ramis et aL, 1997: 37-41). 
b) Primary care provision and management. 
The reform of primary care formulated in the mid-eighties - in a 1984 decree of the 
Spanish central government, and a 1985 decree of the Catalan government - was 
reinforced as a central piece of the health system by the 1986 General Health Law. 
This reform defined a model characterised by homogeneous public provision 
structures. Primary care services were organised within Health Basic Areas (HBA) 
where a Primary Care Team of professionals had the responsibility for health care, 
health promotion and illness prevention. This team was formed by general 
practitioners, paediatricians, dentists, nurses, social workers and non-health 
personnel, who had a statutory, civil service-like status, and a working timetable of 
36 to 40 hours a week. Personnel were hierarchically organised under the direction 
of a medical co-ordinator and a nurse assistant, into a closed model of primary 
care centre. The reinforcement of this primary care level involved also the provision 
that emergency services had to be assumed by it on a day-long access bases. 
127 Royal Decree-Law 10/1996 of 17 June, and Law 1511997 of 25 April. 
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The implementabon of this model not only involved a massive restructuring of 
the personnel policy but also large investments in infrastructure. The reasons were, 
first, that the existing surgeries and equipment were insufficient and inadequate 
both in the rural and urban areas; and second, that the reform required a 
remarkable increase in personnel and in their tasks and working hours (Ris, Pan6, 
1997). However, in contrast to other Autonomous Communities, the implementation 
of the primary care reform in Catalonia was conditioned by the enabling character 
with which it was informed. The Catalan health authorities gave priority to the rights 
of professionals and developed a gradual reform process whose implementation 
depended on professionals being prepared to become members of Primary Care 
Teams and adopt the corresponding regulations. 
Table 6.6. Primary care Health Basic Areas in Catalonia - reformed and 
non-reformed primary care -, 1995. 
Health Region HBA HBA % HBA % primary 
created projected created population care 
covered centres 
Costa de Ponent 
Lleida 
Tortosa 
Centre 
Tarragona 
Girona 
Barcelon&s Nord 
i Maresme 
Barcelona City 
Total 
Source: SCS (1996a: 21) 
41 57 72 73 47 
22 29 76 72 26 
7 9 78 69 13 
49 69 71 68 63 
21 32 66 58 33 
20 36 56 so 31 
18 40 45 48 31 
23 66 35 29 52 
201 338 60 54 296 
From 1990 to 1995,63 primary care centres were built or had some part of 
them re-built. By 1995, the reformed primary care network represented almost 60 
per cent of the 339 Health Basic Areas (HBA) projected. Some 201 teams, one per 
area covered 54 per cent of the population (3,290,000 inhabitants approximately). 
The CHI manages over 90 per cent of these teams (180 teams), while ten per cent 
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(21 teams) are managed by non-Social Security providers. The Health Region of 
Barcelona City is an outlier, with the lowest implementation rate of the reformed 
network, covering only 29 per cent of its population. As in Barcelona, urbanisation, 
industrialisation and population density are also defining features of the other three 
health regions with low implementation rates in terms of population covered 
(Barcelon6s Nord i Maresme, Girona, and Tarragona) (see Table 6.6). 
According to senior officials of both the CHI, the CHS, the D, HSS, and some 
doctors who were directors of non-CHI primary care centres, there are several 
reasons why the primary care reform was not pursued to the same extent as in 
most of the other Autonomous Communities in Spain. First, this model was 
considered to be too expensive because it required big investments in 
infrastructure and large expenditures on personnel payroll - the model prescribed 
higher personnel ratios per population and longer working timetables. Second, a 
voluntaristic approach was adopted so that only those professionals wanting to be 
included in a reformed Primary Care Team might apply for it. Being a member of a 
Primary Care Team required longer working timetables than the previous provision 
model, which, not only hardened their working conditions but also prevented 
professionals from exercising private practice as a liberal professional to the same 
extent as before -a situation which is particularly relevant in Barcelona. Third, in 
Catalonia, the health policy priority had been the consolidation of a dense, 
territorially even network of basic level hospitals, which had absorbed huge 
investments. This latter argument is confirmed by the data in Figure 6.2 above. The 
investment trends did not show a shift of resources from the hospital sector to the 
primary care sector. However, the argument that the primary care reform as it was 
formulated was not economically viable is difficult to support only from the data 
available, because in principle the decisions involved were a matter of investment 
priorities. From 1993, the primary care sector was also affected by the introduction 
of contracts between the Catalan Health Service and primary care providers. 
Contracts were signed with each new HBA as they were created. As Figure 6.6 
shows, while in 1992 only 2 HBAs were contracted, from 1993 contracts affected 
all HBAs as a result of the introduction of the program me-co ntract (protocol 
framework) with all HBAs managed by the CHI. It does not mean, though, that all 
primary care was contracted, but instead that all the reformed primary care centres 
were contracted - that is, 60 per cent of the HBAs projected (see Table 6.6). 
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Figure 6.6. Evolution of the introduction of contracts between 
the CHS and HBAs in Catalonia, 1992-96. 
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As in the case of the hospital sector, the introduction of contracts in primary 
care was accompanied by an attempt to diversify provision and management 
forms. In primary care though, the CHI owned and managed over 90 per cent of 
resources. One of the characteristics of the CHI model which was usually 
mentioned as a hindrance to improving efficiency was the dissatisfaction of 
professionals. This was said to stem, on the one hand, from their lack of influence 
in the organisation and management of primary care centres, and, on the other 
hand, from the lack of individualised incentives related to the quality of the service 
provided or to the achievement of objectives. 
These arguments refiect the origin of the drive for diversifying the provision 
models of primary care in the early nineties. These new provision models involved 
pdvate management forms. Thus, while originally the CHI managed all public 
primary care in Catalonia, the reform process based on the demarcation of HBAs 
and the creation of Primary Care Teams was taken as an opportunity to contract 
out the management of new HBAs to providers other than the CHI - even if the CHI 
had been managing primary care in those particular areas. As Table 6.7 shows, in 
1992, there were three HBA whose management was contracted with providers 
other than the CHI, and by 1996 there were 22. That is, ten per cent of Pdmary 
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Care Teams were no longer under the CHI's authority or responsibility. Instead, 13 
HBAs were managed under contract by several consortia which also managed 
hospitals in the same area, three HBAs were managed under contract by public 
enterprises, three were managed by foundations and three by a mutuality. 
Table 6.7. Evolution of the introduction of contracts between the Catalan 
Health Service and the Health Basic Areas in Catalonia, 1992-96. 
Provider 1992 1993 1994 1996 1996 
entity 
HBA % HBA % HBA % HBA % HBA % 
Badalona 
Gesti6 Assist. 1 0.5 1 0.5 1 0.5 
Cons. Assist. 
Baix Llobregat 1 0.6 2 1.1 2 1 2 1 
Cons. Corpora- 
66 SanitAria 1 0.5 1 0.5 1 0.5 
Cons. Sanit. de 
Barcelona 1 0.6 1 0.5 2 1 2 1 
Cons. Sanit. de 
Matar6 1 0.6 1 0.5 1 0.5 1 0.5 
Cons. Sanit. de 
La Selva 1 0.5 1 0.5 1 0.5 
Cons. Sanit. de 
Terrassa 2 1,2 3 1.6 4 2 4 1.9 
EAP VIC-V SL 
1 0.5 
Fund. Centres, 
Assist. i Urg. 1 0.5 2 1 2 1 
Fund. Sant 
Jaume d'Olot 1 0.5 1 0.5 
Inst. d'Assist. 
Sanit6ria 1 0.5 1 0.5 
Catalan Health 
Institute (CHI) 154 95.1 168 92.3 180 89.6 186 89.4 
Witua de 
Terrassa 2 1.2 2 1.1 3 1.5 3 1.4 
SAGESSA 1 0.6 1 0.5 2 1 2 1 
Total HBAs 
with contract 32 162 100 182 100 201 100 208 100 
Total HBAs 
created 149 162 182 201 208 
Source: SCS (1996b: 3). 
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In primary care contracts were made at the level of HBA. However, in the 
case of the CHI a protocol framework was also signed between the CHI and the 
CHS, and the financing channel was the budget instead of payment based on 
tariffs per activity set on the contract. In the case of non-CHI providers contracts 
were allocated for a period of three years (objectives and tariffs were reviewed 
every year) and, in principle, it might be renewed for three more years if objectives 
were achieved to a reasonable extent. Both the program me-contracts signed with 
the CHI's Primary Care Teams within the CHI's protocol and the contracts signed 
with these new primary care providers were different from those signed with 
hospitals. Primary care contracts were not based on prices set for each unit of 
specific and quantified services to be provided. Instead they were contracts for 
services which established a global obligation to provide health care (Ramis et al. 
1997). Moreover, prices were calculated on previous costs rather than on 
population or activity criteria, and funding covered only care activity without 
responsibility over the generated cost (such as, radio-diagnosis, laboratories, 
pharmaceuticals, specialised care) (Castillejo et a/. 1993). The payment of these 
contracts was divided into a monthly payment of a fixed 95 per cent of the global 
amount set, and an annual variable part of five per cent which was paid depending 
on the achievement of specific indicators'28. 
The introduction of contracts in primary care helped bring about a qualitative 
improvement in the kind of information collected in this sector. Traditionally, this 
information concerned quantitative aspects of the health care activity collected on a 
routine basis in each centre. The introduction of contracts and the evaluation 
process of the Health Plan for Catalonia involved the need to collect information 
also on the content of the health care activity and on its results in terms of health 
and users' satisfaction with the service. Moreover, some HBAs developed cost 
accounting by analysing costs per product and processes. After the first evaluation 
of contracts in 1993, a system of 39 indicators was agreed between the Central 
Services of the CHS and the Health Regions. These indicators gave information on 
population coverage, use of records, quality of services concerning specified 
priorities, availability of protocols on preventive activities, users' satisfaction, the 
1-"8 There were five indicators: realisation of 100 -per cent of the activities contracted, 
percentage of open medical records, number of patients derived to hospitals (maximum of 
200 per 1,000 inhabitants), percentage of hyper-tens controlled (minimum of 65 per cent), 
and children vaccination coverage (GervAs, Ort6n, 1995: 26). 
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content of the health care activity of the centre, and achievement of the Health 
Plan objectives (SCS, 1994b). As the Health Regions are the direct interlocutors of 
providers in the contracting process, they were made responsible for the evaluation 
of individual contracts through standardised questionnaires. On a complementary 
process, the central services of the CHS were made responsible for monitoring this 
evaluation by integrating all the information collected by Health Regions, so as to 
provide a global analysis which could orient the purchasing priorities (SCS, 1995b). 
However, according to a recent CHS's report, the widespread interest in 
evaluating contracts placed an excessive demand on the system, both on 
professionals and on the health administration. In some centres there were not 
adequate information systems for collecting and processing the data required, and 
the analysis of the information collected appeared burdensome and with a lack of 
clear objectives (SCS, 1998). Professionals found themselves having to provide 
different data for different evaluation processes - the evaluation of the Health Plan, 
the evaluation of contracts, the evaluation of the providers' entity. Moreover, as a 
result of the increase in the services contracted to Primary Care Teams, the 
indicators system was burdened with an increasing demand on information, which, 
according to this report, was based on the wrong assumption that the focus on 
individual contracts evaluation could make up for the lack of other more general 
evaluation instruments'm'. So it became apparent, first, that new tools were 
necessary to complement the evaluation of each individual contract and to provide 
more global assessments in order to inform the strategic decisions on the purchase 
of services. Second, it was acknowledged that it was necessary to set priorities 
concerning the information needed by clarifying the objectives of the evaluation 
process and by accordingly consolidating the information systems in every single 
health care centre. 
Although information systems were an essential tool for efficient and effective 
contracting by the health authority, some directors of non-CHI primary care centres 
acknowledged that when a new reformed HBA was to be created and the explicit 
DHSS will was not to have the CHI manage it but to introduce a different provider, 
129 For the 1996 contracting process three different groups of indicators were defined based 
on how long the Primary Care Teams had been operating and on how urgent the information 
was in relation to its availability: group A (11 indicators per Team having operated for less 
than one year), group B (11 indicators per Team having operated for longer than one year, 
urgent information), and group C (35 indicators per Team having operated for longer than 
one year, non-urgent information) (SCS, 1996b). 
266 
the contract was implicitly allocated to the main private or non-CHI public or para- 
public provider in the area. And in most cases, this was a HNPU-member hospital 
sector provider'30. Contracts were agreed on a bilateral basis, as the usual case 
was that such a provider had a long trust relationship both with the population in 
the area and with the DHSS itself, having usually emerged as a private inifiative 
where the presence of Social Security services had historically been scarce. 
According to a manager of a mutuality: 
'When the public bidding for the allocation of this Health Basic Area 
was announced nobody else presented an offer for consideration. All 
this is agreed on in advance, even more when it is a pilot experience. In 
a public bidding the contact with the DHSS is crucial, its philosophy, the 
credentials of the prospective provider ... This public bidding was the DHSS's idea to try a new management formulae although the CHI was 
already there. Before the contract this mutuality had been providing 
primary and hospital care here for twenty-five years. These were the 
only health infrastructures here - two primary care centres which used 
to agree contracts with Madrid, they were ours. Others are the CHS's ... The local council gave the site, our Director General presented the 
project, and the D, HSS financed it ... We have to follow the same legal framework as any other private enterprise, both in labour relations 
aspects and in financial aspects. ' 
According to its supporters, this diversification of providers gave an element 
of contrast and reflection on the prevailing CHI organisational model by facilitating 
comparison between different experiences (Ris, Pan6,1997). Thus, for example, in 
1993 and 1995 two teams of an associative basis were created for the 
management of two HBAs. These alternative (non-CHI) providers had freedom to 
design their organisational and operational arrangements. They were not subjected 
to the detailed regulations stemming from the 1985 decree on primary care, which 
required a specific staff ratio per population, a weekly working timetable of 36 
hours, and specific internal organisation provisions. According to some 
professionals of these non-CHI primary care providers were critical with this 1985 
model (that of the CHI Primary Care Teams). The actual implementation of that 
primary care model was leading to half the projected time being spent on actual 
130 The direct allocation of management contract to these providers was the object of 
controversy. While unions rejected the legality of direct contract allocation, the CHS insisted 
that it is legal as they consider these cases to be pilot experiences (see, for example, El 
Pais 2/12/92, Barcelona edition). 
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health care activity as a result of 'too many useless co-ordination meetings where 
nobody has decision-power - as the medical director of a non-CHI Primary Care 
Centre and former CHI general practitioner put it. The features of the CHI model 
they tried to avoid were the lack of freedom to reallocate personnel and to have 
fleyjble timetables and personnel ratios, and the impossibility of introducing 
individual payment-on-performance. According to the medical director of a non-CHI 
primary care centre: 
'What makes our model different from the CHI is the management 
capacity regarding resources, organisation. We are not obliged - despite having to meet the quality and equity standards of the CHI - to follow its same organisational and structural criterion (personnel ratio 
per population) ... We try different initiatives and then evaluate their 
efficacy and efficiency ... 
The utilisation rate and workload depend on 
the distribution of pathologies ... It is necessary to agree this programme with the professional because he [sic] is who knows best 
the amount and kind of work he has. Thus, we have clinic session every 
day, which may deal with some aspects review, activity analysis, 
organisational analysis, prescriptions, specialities. They are either 
evaluative or formative ... The key of this 'managed care' is that the 
exercise of the medical profession involves criteria for co-responsibility 
in the management of resources, in the rationalisation of resources. ' 
In this respect, a senior official of the CHI's primary care division argued in 
1996 that the CHI model was going through a process of culture change which was 
intended to transform it into a viable provision option within the Catalan model, 
which wasevolving towards a diversity of provision forms: 
'[In 1992] we started to be contracted by the CHS, we were asked for a 
series of objectives and internally we implemented management by 
objectives: an agreement between the enterprise (the CHI) and the 
Primary Care Team of each HBA on what you expect from them 
according to both the contract with the CHS and to our own objectives 
... It is necessary to go 
beyond this fiction and make this management 
by objectives operative, something that links it to the professional it is 
necessary to change the remuneration model ... 
We are thinking about 
a model in which each member of the Team is paid differently 
depending on whether this person does things better or worse. A 
remuneration model which pays, on the one hand, a fixed amount and, 
on the other hand, an amount on capitation (according to the number of 
people you cover). But a third thing is needed: pay on results, on 
objectives ... which 
implies incentivisation for rationalising 
pharmaceutical prescriptions, tests, etc. ) 
268 
From the end of 1996 a new form of non-CHI provision established by the 
1995 modification of the LOHC (see below) was implemented in one HBA as a pilot 
experience. This new management form, namely self-management by stake-holder 
professionals, applied to CHI professionals wanting to opt out and constitute an 
association legally entitled to hold a contract directly with the CHS. Their statutory 
place in the CHI was safeguarded for three years in case they wanted to go back 
to it. Furthermore, there were two basic differences between this new model and 
the CHI model. First, there was the possibility to distribute profits to share-holders 
instead of being obliged to invest any savings - in such a way, though, that only the 
professionals working in the centre were allowed to be share-holders, that is, 
owners. Second, they had the same flexibility for personnel policy and self- 
organisation which characterised the other non-CHI providers. In this sense, a 
professional of this self-management pilot experience argued that: 
'First of all [in our model] there is an important change in the labour 
status of professionals, which involves a change in the involvement of 
health professionals in the job they carry out within the team .... The job is much more important... there is a reorientation of the time spent on 
health care activities. In the CHI it is 36 hours a week in theory but, in 
reality, the time spent on care was much less. Instead, our contracts are 
for 40 hours a week which have to be spent on care tasks, and when 
there are common spaces they tend to be devoted to technical aspects 
rather than organisational. In the CHI system, teams waste a lot more 
on organisational dynamics, decision-making was not well regulated - it 
is dealt with through assembly methods, and there is no clear directive 
role. ) 
However, the way this pilot experience was implemented was strongly 
criticised. The formal requirement of having a public tender process for allocaUng 
contracts to non-CH I providers for the management of primary care within HBA was 
upset by the DHSS in 1996 in this particular case of self-management. The DHSS 
directly allocated a contract to the team managing this first pilot experiencel3l. 
Widespread criticism focused, first, on the non-publicised financial support given to 
this experiment by the Official Medical College of Barcelona (apart from its explicit 
support to the self-management model) and by the DHSS - these professionals 
had the infrastructure paid and build from new. Second, criticism focused on the 
131 In this respect see El Pais (11/2/95) Barcelona edition; and the opinion article by Marti, 
E. in El Pats, 22/2/95, Catalunya supplement: 2. Barcelona edition. 
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better funding conditions this pilot experience enjoyed in the contract they held with 
the CHS compared to other primary care teams. And third, the security financial 
clauses of the contract allocated to the team in question wereattacked'32. 
Finally, regarding this drive for diversifying provision and contracting out 
management there was an argument which was around since the mid-eighties and 
which gained new strength in the early nineties (Carreras, Balaguer, 1988). It 
emphasised the need to revitalise the role of mutualities in the provision of health 
services, by maintaining the level, which was slightly declining, of double public and 
private health insurance coverage present in Catalonia, which affected 21 per cent 
of the population. The argument was that the public compulsory system would be 
too under much strain if it had to actually cover those people who were contributing 
to financing the public system but were using the private system. For this reason, it 
was argued that a new role for private insurance companies should be defined in 
the field of health services provision (DSSS, 1995b: 32) in such a way that citizens 
could choose having either public or private insurance'33. 
6.2. Further legislative changes in 1995. 
In contrast to the long negotiation process which led to the passage of the 1990 
LOHC, a Modification Law was sent to Parliament by the Catalan executive in July 
1995 to be handled under an urgent procedure. It was finally passed in September 
1995, two months before the autonomous elections in which the governing 
132 These criticisms were expressed by the medical director of a non-CHI primary care 
centre, a senior directive of the CHC, a senior directive of the UCH, and a member of the 
class-based union CC. 00. 
133 It should be noted that only seven insurance companies cover 73 per cent of the market 
in terms of premiums collected, and that, for example, the second in the ranking owns a 
chain of six hospitals of which four regularly hold contracts with the CHS as members of the 
HNPU (DSSS, 1995d). It is apparent that the pursuit of this kind of reform would involve the 
end of the monopsonistic power of the CHS. In the theme concerning the need to give 
mutualities and insurance companies a more relevant role in health and pensions see 
EFE 
news agency in Catalonia, report (19/3/96); the opinion article by Antrýs, J. in 
La Vanguardia 
(24/10/96: 23); and El Petiftco (9/10/97). 
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Convergence and Union (CiU) lost its absolute majority in Parliament. As in the 
case of the formulation process of the LOHC in the previous legislative period, CiU 
counted again on a disciplined absolute majority in Parliament and, therefore, it 
had the same formal power as in that occasion. However, its relationship with the 
Party of the Catalan Socialists (PSC), which had not been very fluent throughout 
the negotiation of the LOHC, was mediated in 1995 by CiU's relationship with the 
Spanish Workers' Socialist Party (PSOE) at the Spanish central government level. 
The PSOE had lost its absolute majority in the central Parliament in the 1993 
general elections and had reached an agreement with CiU, which supported the 
PSOE on a per-issue bases. This situation conditioned the extent to which the PSC 
could exercise its opposition role in the Catalan autonomous Parliament. This time, 
the strongest (and only) opposition came from the. leftist coalition Initiative for 
Catalonia-The Greens (IC-V), and the PSC obtained a much criticised concession 
from CiU (see below). 
The parliamentary debate leading to the passage of the 1995 modification 
law of the LOHC, following the negotiation at the Commission level, showed a 
consensus between all political parties on what the main characteristics of the 
health governance structure designed by the 1990 LOHC had been. The actual 
ambiguity of the LOHC had finally given way to a clear NPM interpretation. 
According to the Conseller of the DHSS who spoke on behalf of CiU, such 
characteristics were: 
'On the one hand, the separation between the financing and purchasing 
of services, which is the health administration's function, and the 
provision of services, which is carried out by a diversity of health care 
centres, adequately accredited, either of public or private ownership-, 
thus following the trend in the most developed countries of using all 
health resources and respecting, on the other hand, the health reality in 
our country. The other characteristic of the Catalan health model 
established by the LOHC has been the introduction of mechanisms of 
private management, particularly in the publicly owned centres. In this 
line, we have created 11 health consortia and nine public enterprises, 
with the aim of improving the degree of effectiveness, efficiency and 
quality in the provision of health and socio-health services of public 
management' (DSPC-P, 20/9/95, n0128: 7162, my emphasis). 
Later on in the debate CiUs spokesman for health policy rejected IC-V's 
criticisms of what they interpreted as a privabsing reform. First, he asserted that the 
introduction of pdvate management practices in public entities had nothing to do 
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with privatisation and that CiU was not supporting the latter. Second, he argued 
that: 
'... by means of the LOHC, we confirmed the mixed health system of Catalonia and ratified a health policy based on the separation between 
financing and purchasing of services and their provision. This is the 
policy which is becoming predominant ... in the health debate in the context of developed countries ... where the use of all existing health resources, regardless of their ownership, is the main priority. ' (DSPC-P, 
20/9/95, n0128: 7170). 
The 1995 Modification Law of the LOHC introduced both some re-assertions 
and some contradictions in the LOHC principles. The main modifications introduced 
concerned the legal nature of the CHS, the management forms used for the 
provision of primary care services, an ambiguous provision concerning the 
possibility to change the legal nature of the CHI, and a modification of the 
organisational structure of the CHS. The first three were the object of debate 
among the policy elite as suggested by the draft bill presented by CiU. The last 
element was not part of the draft bill, but the result of a negotiation process which 
further originated a debate on the distortion of the 'Catalan model'. 
The first draft bill CiU elaborated provided two main modifications of the 
LOHC. First, the legal nature of the CHS was changed from a public entity of an 
institutional nature to a public enterprise as defined by the 1985 law of the Statute 
of the Catalan Public Enterprise. Thus the CHS now had its own legal personality 
and was attached to the DHSS. In its external relations (contracts, procurement of 
goods and execution of public works, under the principles of publicity and free 
competition) the CHS was subject to private law. The supporting report of the bill 
argued that this modification clarified any ambiguities about the legal nature of the 
CHS and its subjection to private law, and that this clarification was necessary in 
order to avoid the legal insecurity that may exJst when creating public enterprises 
dependent on the CHS. Second, CiUs draft bill extended the private management 
contracts for the provision of primary care by giving health professionals the 
possibility to opt out of the CHI and form associative entities for contracting with the 
CHS, while preserving their statutory post for three years in the CHI in case they 
wanted to go back. 
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However, the final version of the Modification Law passed by Parliament 
defined the CHS's legal nature in a more ambiguous form than as a public 
enterprise. The CHS was defined as a 'public body of an institutional character, 
endowed with a legal personality of its own and full capacity for the fulfilment of its 
ends, ascribed to the DHSS [ ... ]. With respect to its extemal legal relations, it is 
subject in general to private law'. That is, there was an explicit mention of the 
CHS's entitlement to act, as a rule, within private law provisions in its external 
relations - within the framework established by the Law regulating Catalan public 
companies -, a point which had been established by a 1994 Decree specifying the 
CHS's core structure, organisation and regulations (Vifias, Lafarga, 1996). 
Moreover, this final version of the Modification Law widened the possibility for 
private contracting in primary care to include personnel of other public and pdvate 
providers and health professionals in general - not only doctors. So Health 
Regions may now sign contracts for the management of primary care centres with 
entities of an associative basis formed totally or partially by CHI personnel opting 
out of the CHI with reservation of their post for three years, and by other personnel 
from local health technical corps of the state, civil servants of the autonomous 
administration attached to the CHS, and personnel transferred from other 
administrations. 
According to the only parliamentary force that opposed the reform, namely 
IC-V, this legislative initiative was meant to give legal status to the private 
contracting which the CHS had been developing by decree and without the 
required legal base. According to El Pals (21/6/95; 15/7/95; Barcelona edition), the 
1991 and 1993 decrees regulating the CHS after the LOHC did not fulfil the 
requirements stated by the Legal Commission of the Catalan government. Those 
decrees regulated the private contracting of the CHS, while, according to this 
Commission that could only be regulated by law. 
The stances taken by the main policy elites in relation to these two 
modifications of the LOHC were made explicit before the passage of the final 
version, and were initially directed at CiUs draft bill, Thus, in the UCH's view, giving 
the CHS the legal nature of a public enterprise implied a greater control over the 
CHS by the Department of Economy and Finance of the Catalan government and 
'therefore, maybe, what will be gained in terms of more legal security will 
conversely be lost in autonomy and flexibility' (UCH, 1995b: 1). In any case, though, 
the UCH did not think it necessary to change the legal nature of the CHS, because 
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a public entity of an institutional nature is also legally empowered to create public 
enterprises. As for the CHI, the Catalan Union of Hospitals (UCH) argued that its 
reform should be the object of a specific law which transformed it into a public 
enterprise and made it a more independent agent. According to the UCH, instead 
of approaching it in an clear and comprehensive way, the 1995 bill adopted an 
ambiguous an piecemeal stance. Moreover, the UCH (1995b: 2) contended that at 
that time there was no consistency in the Catalan health 'model. For example, they 
claimed, the implementation of the Health Regions structures and functioning 
according to the CHS interpretation of the decentralisation principle had made 
apparent the need to centralise the definifion of the basic criteria for planning and 
evaluation. The reason was the lack of homogeneity they observed between the 
criteria set by different Health Region managers. And the assignment of 
competencies between the central services of the CHS, Health Regions and 
Sectors was not sufficiently clear. 
The Hospital Consortium of Catalonia's (CHC) arguments contesting the 
CiUs 1995 draft bill of modification of the LOHC mainly referred to what they 
viewed as an attempt to change the health system 'model' approved by the LOHC. 
They claimed that there was a contradiction between the intention to reinforce the 
CHI as a provider stated in the supporting report document of the bill, and the 
transitional situation defined for this organisation by the LOHC - with a view to its 
eventual integration into the CHS. In relation to the provision that the CHI 
personnel could opt out of the CHI and form private associations for contracting 
with the CHS, the CHC thought there was no need to regulate in such a detailed 
way the working conditions of these CHI personnel (those to which the bill referred 
originally) because, in fact, the CHS was already legally empowered to contract 
with private or public health care providers. In any case, the compliance with 
accreditation norms should also be required for primary care. In sum, the CHC 
argued that: 
'it would be a good moment to debate again on the Catalan health 
model based on the differentiation between providers and planners and 
financers, which was a model that nobody had in mind at the time the 
LOHC was passed in 1990, and to carry out a wider reform in order to 
adapt the legal framework to the actual performance being developed, 
redefining as well the future role of the CHL' (CHC, 1995: 2, my 
emphasis). 
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However, the groups which most strongly opposed this reform of the CHI 
were those which until that moment had been at the outskirts of the core process 
leading up to the definition of the Catalan 'model'. These grouping embraced the 
trade unions, whose arguments focused on labour relations, working conditions 
and the professional careers of health professionals. Thus, in the view of CC. 00 
and UGT, the two main modifications of the LOHC were an example of a selective 
attempt to redress the ongoing reforms in a specifically privatising direction, five 
years after a vague consensus had been reached in 1990 through the LOHC 
(CC. 00,1995a, 1995b; UGT, 1995). They interpreted the redefinition and 
clarification of the legal nature of the CHS as a signal of a definite will to deep the 
process of privatisation of this body. The aim was to escape the control 
mechanisms of public law in the activities of the CHS. As for the second main 
modification of the Law concerning the possibility that the CHS would contract with 
associative entities managed by professionals, they interpreted it as a further step 
in the process of increasing the presence of labour contracts to the detriment of 
civil service contractual relations or statutory regime, and as a drive for the 
commodification of the relationship between professionals and the CHS through 
the delegation of management. 
These trade unions argued that this modification came at a time when the 
objectives set by the LOHC were clearly out of reach by the deadlines approved in 
1990 and, moreover, did not tackle the main problems of the system. Concerning 
deadlines, the reform of primary care was projected to cover all the population by 
mid-1996 but by mid-1995 only 52 per cent of the population was covered by the 
reformed network of primary care. Also, by 1995 the participation organs of the 
CHS's Health Sectors had not been created yet and this Modification Law was 
suggesting a change in their directive bodies when the participation machinery had 
not yet been developed'34. Moreover, the deadline of mid-1993 was established by 
the LOHC to achieve the standardisation of the collectives which were members of 
the CHS or of organisations dependent on it, and for ' 
the equalisation of the 
working and professional conditions of the CHI personnel and of the HNPU. Two 
134 The Catalan 1993 Budgetary Law for 1994 changed the organisational structure of 
Sectors from having a Hospital and a Primary Care units to have a Programming and 
Analysis and a Clients' Service units. This 1995 Modification Law, moreover provides that 
chiefs of operational units (health professional teams within health centres) will be members 
of their Health Sector Directive Council -an aspect relevant enough as the Health Sector 
has a crucial role in the health planning process. 
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years after the 1993 deadline neither of these provisions had been accomplished. 
Even so, the modification bill provided the opposite, that is, for further 
diversification of health workers' situations instead of their homogenisation, by 
professionals opting out and forming associated private teams. In addition to the 
Modification Law ignoring these implementation deficit, it did not tackle the main 
problems of health in Catalonia either, which they identified as being: insufficient 
and unreal budgets, inequitable financing of Autonomous Communities' health 
services, lack of exertion of the CHS's functions of planning and organisation, 
insufficient socio-health care, lack of transparency in the assignment of contracts 
for the provision of health services to non-CHI providers. 
This concern with the transparency of the system was further deepened by a 
third main modification which was not in the original CiUs draft bill but which was 
introduced as a result of the negotiation process with a political party in the 
opposition, the PSC, and which became part of the final version of the Modification 
Law. This point concerned the organisational structure of the CHS. The functions 
of the CHS's Health Region of Barcelona City (Health Regions are deconcentrated 
levels of the CHS) were transferred to the Health Consortium of Barcelona. This 
consortium was a provider itself which had been founded in 1987 by the local 
council of Barcelona and which was jointly re-founded in 1992 by the municipal 
government of Barcelona and the Catalan government. This modification clearly 
upset the principle of separating the purchasing and provider functions'35. 
However, according to a senior executive of the Health Consortium of Barcelona: 
'Giving the role of CHS Health Region authority to the Health 
Consortium of Barcelona was a political agreement: there was a 
situation of duplication of functions which needed to be solved. ... The 
Consortium had been initially created in 1987 (Hospital Consortium of 
Barcelona) to plan and co-ordinate all health care services in Barcelona 
as a single area. In 1992 it is re-founded as Health Consortium of 
Barcelona, after an agreement between the mayor of the local council 
and the president of the Catalan government to solve the financial 
problems of the health services in the city. When the LOHC was 
passed there appeared two organs with planning and organisation 
functions over Barcelona - the CHSs Health Region and the 
Consortium. This duplication was unnecessary'. 
1-35 The relevance of this decision in contradicting the model is apparent, as Barcelona's 
local council is governed by the PSC, which is in the opposition in the Catalan Parliament. 
Although the Consortium's administrative board is controlled 40 per cent by the local council 
and 60 per cent by the Catalan government, the political visibility for the municipal health 
policy is associated with the. local council, and therefore with the PSC. 
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The argument prevailed, though, that power relations between political 
spheres of influence were at stake in giving the Health Consortium of Barcelona 
the status of a Health Region authority within the CHS structure. This argument 
was based on the fact that the PSC had a prevailing influence in this consortium as 
the governing party in the local council of Barcelona, while this same party was in 
the opposition in the Catalan Parliament. According to El Pais (14/9/95, Barcelona 
edition) CiU agreed to give the Health Consortium of Barcelona the authority of the 
CHS's Health Region of Barcelona City in exchange for the PSC's support for 
passing with a wide consensus one of the two main modifications initially proposed 
in CiUs draft bill'36. This provision established that the CHS was entitled to 
contract health services not only from health care centres, but also directly from 
health professionals constituting associative teams (enterprises, anonymous or 
limited societies). The PSC accepted the clause but demanded that such provision 
covered not only CHI professionals, but also non-CHI professionals. A controversial 
point was that this model of professionals' self-management introduced the 
possibility for them to make profit. As a member of the first 1996 pilot experience 
on this model explained: 
'if we have a surplus balance from the contract with the CHS that is 
profit that stays with the enterprise. There are no intermediaries, the 
contract is with the CHS. This is the first case of an enterprise of 
professionals in which there are no intermediaries, because in the 
cases of ... and ... which are part of the consortium .... the contract 
is 
established by the CHS and the consortium, and then the consortium 
sub-contracts the service to a group of professionals. In that group, not 
all the stake-holders are workers, but they would be, in a more strict 
sense, capitalists. Here, all the stake-holders have to be workers 
devoted to the enterprise'. 
This case was an example of the diversity of management forms the CHS 
was entitled to develop for ensuring the provision of health services, which was one 
of the most innovative aspects of the LOHC when compared to other Autonomous 
136 Referring to this provision, the director of a non-CHI primary care centre expressed that: 
'I very much doubt that this initiative would have been passed under another government. 
They [the PSCI voted in favolur of it in exchange for the Health Consortium of Barcelona 
and the Health Region'. Also, a top figure of the class-based union CC. 00 suggested that: 
'The PSC did not exercise any opposition to this measure, now they [the Catalan 
government] give the Health Consortium of Barcelona the management of the Health 
Region of Barcelona City'. 
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Communities' Laws creating their respective Health Services. The 1995 
Modification Law reasserted such an innovation and explicitly enabled the Catalan 
government to create any public enterprise of the kinds defined in the Law 
regulating Catalan public enterprises. However, according to a former senior figure 
of the DHSS, a top-official of the CHS, a leading representative of the UCH, a top 
managerial figure of the CHI and a manager of a CHI hospital, deepening the 
diversification of health providers might eventually require the change of the legal 
nature of the largest single provider - the CHI - from a management entity of the 
Social Security into a public enterprise. This change might in turn require that the 
CHI's responsibilities for managing public health services were not hindered by the 
CHS's supervision responsibilities (SCS, 1996a). 
The post-LOHC clarification the 1991 McKinsey Report made of the CHS's 
role as a financing and purchasing body had two interrelated consequences for the 
CHI: not only were the its functions not to be absorbed by the CHS, but also the 
CHI was to be redefined as a 'provider'. In this respect, the 1995 Modification Law 
set out that that the CHI had to develop its functions within the CHS general 
guidelines - following the legal framework applicable to a Social Security 
management entity - as long as such a legal nature is not modified. This possibility 
depended on the DHSS's decision, which, according to the key informants above, 
might be on the line of transforming the CHI into a multi-divisional public enterprise 
with its production units (hospitals and primary care centres) as autonomous units. 
However, according to a former high official of the DHSS and former manager of 
the CHI, 
'Over many years the Catalan government has gone ahead of the 
central government in the reform of and innovation in the health system 
in the line of international trends of managerialism, partly because of 
the comparative advantages derived from the heterogeneous provider 
network on which it counted. However, the Catalan government 
stopped its gradual progression in health policy at a point around 1992- 
1993. The next step necessary to give consistency to the Catalan 
model and to the spirit of the [1990] LOHC is, first, the transformation of 
the legal nature of the CHI, a management body of the Social Security, 
into a public enterprise. Second, this transformation would also involve 
giving legal personality and management autonomy to each of the 
providers presently integrated in the CHI. Taking this step would mainly 
mean confronting the opposibon of the unions, and thus, the whole 
statutory civil service personnel employed by the Social Security 
administration 
278 
6.3. Divergences between implementation and 
'new public management' discourse. 
The 1990 LOHC was aimed at clarifying and consolidating certain features of the 
governance structure of health care which were claimed to be intrinsic to the 
'Catalan model. Shortly after the LOHC was passed, this reform formulation was 
reinterpreted in NPM terms, a discourse which was widely assumed by the policy 
elite to be the content of the LOHC. So in the prevailing climate of assessment 
among the policy elites the reference point was not the actual formulation of the 
reform in the LOHC, but its NPM reinterpretation. However, for an assessment of 
the implementation of these reforms to be meaningful, it is necessary to distinguish 
between policy displacements, implementation deficits and unintended 
consequences. This analysis traces the extent to which the divergences between 
NPM discourse and implementation stem from attempts to manage the same 
transactions costs which influenced the definition of the 1990 Law. The same 
transactions costs had to be faced during the implementation process and the way 
the health authority dealt with them partly explains the actual implementation of the 
reforms. 
a) Policy displacements. 
Policy displacements involve taking steps in a different direction from the 
model/policy formulated. In Horn's (1995) terms, the policy displacements 
characterising the Catalan reform process were traceable to both agency costs 
derived from controlling and monitoring providers and to the costs derived from the 
uncertainty associated with assigning risk to providers. 
The first policy displacement in the Catalan reforms distorted the 
purchaser/provider split by affecting the relationship between the macro- and the 
meso-management level, that is, between the purchasing/political authority and the 
providers' management and directive boards. In the view of some former senior 
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officials of the CHS, this relationship reflected a pervasive administrative 
interventionism which was justified at a discursive level by the positive effects of a 
'functional collusion. Power relations between these two levels of management 
were mediated by the composition of administrative boards, where political 
appointment to posts prevailed (Via, 1996). For example, in 1996 the CHS owned 
100 per cent of nine public enterprises and held a share in another, all created 
between 1986 and 1995, and was a member (as one of the owners) of the 
administration board of ten consortia which had been created during the same 
period. That membership was represented by the Health Region manager, a figure 
who therefore represented two roles - financing and provision. The CHS's answer 
to this criticisms was to maintain the owner role of the CHS in those providers but 
through different persons (except in the case of public enterprises, where there 
was no change). That is, the CHS's member of those administrative boards would 
not be the health region manager but another official from the CHS (Dialio Wdico, 
1/10/96,9/4/97). 
As early as 1990, the highest representatives of the UCH explicitly wondered 
in a conference organised by the DHSS what concessions might have been given 
to reach such a consensus on the approval of the LOHC in 1990. They warned that 
if the further regulative developments of the LOHC showed an interventionist 
character impeding the management autonomy of providers, the spirit of the reform 
would be distorted. The LOHC was seen by the UCH as an opportunity for de- 
bureaucratising health in Catalonia. However, they feared that both the health 
authority's interventionism and the foreseeable resistance of civil servants (namely 
the CHI providers) to this project might jeopardise such an opportunity - because 
they might try to preserve their share of power, their corporatist privileges and their 
vested interests. They claimed that if there was no definite will to de-bureaucratise 
the public sector (the CHI) in the first place, other organisations might end up 
becoming bureaucratic themselves and adapt to the dynamics of the institutions on 
which they depended financially - namely the health administration (CHS) (Marti, 
1991b). 
The UCH regretted the results of the process developed from 1986 onwards 
by which some hospitals which were owned by foundations, trusts or mutualities 
had modified their statutes and had been 'municipalised formally or informally 
through, for example, the creation of consortia. As a result they had become de 
facto 'public' bodies and fully dependent on the health authority. The UCH claimed 
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that this process had two main consequences. First, it involved to some extent a 
bureaucratisation of such providers, more administrative intervention, and a loss of 
their management autonomy (UCH, 1995b). Second, the UCH argued that this 
I municipalisation' of some providers had led to their politicisation, evidenced by the 
appointment of managers on political criteria rather than because of technical or 
qualification considerationS137. A consequence of this situation was also the 
excessive turnover of the directive/managerial personnel of hospitals, which made 
health professionals view managers as temporary personnel. This situation was 
also reinforced by other factors such as the difficulty of managing so complex an 
organisation, the financing system of hospital contracts, and the lack of realism in 
the management of both the system and the hospitals (Marti, 1993). 
In answer to criticisms about political intervention in the management of the 
health care network - particularly about the appointment of managers of the 
contracted providers -a former senior official of the DHSS argued that regardless 
of the extent to which such an intervention may or may not have taken place, 
'There has not been, either, any trust or foundation which has made the 
decision to appoint a manager without having made sure that the 
Conselleria'3B approved of him [sic]. And this is understandable in this 
sector where interpersonal relations and constant negotiations are the 
rule for maintaining consensus. I would say that from 1980 to date the 
list of people who somehow have been around in this sector are 80 or 
90 people, and we all know one another and we all know one 
another's weak and strong spots and origins. And when a hospital has 
had to appoint a manager, it has always wanted this manager to have 
more or less the blessing of the Conselleria. I 
However, the most visible policy displacement in the Catalan reforms was 
formulated in the 1995 Modification Law when the financing/purchasing role of the 
Health Region of Barcelona City was allocated to a provider, the Health Consortium 
of Barcelona. This example was important both in terms of the resources involved 
137 This point was acknowledged by several key informants: a former member of the Abril 
Commission, a former senior official of the CHS, and a senior official of the CHI. 
138 The Consefietia is the political level of any Department - namely, the counterpart of a 
Ministry in the Spanish central govemment. The Conseller is the counterpart of a Minister in 
the central govemment, that is, the highest political head of a Department and member of 
the core executive. 
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and in terms of political/power relations'--39 (see Section 6.2). In order to counteract 
the criticisms of policy displacement, the Health Consortium had its internal 
organisation re-designed to differentiate internally a purchaser structure and a 
provision structure'40. 
b) Implementation deficits. 
Implementation deficits include reforms initiated on the line of the policy formulated 
but which were not fully accomplished. The first implementation deficit affecting the 
Catalan reforms concerned the actual endowment of Health Regions with an 
effective purchasing power. This relates to agency costs concerning their 
discretionary power and autonomy and the costs derived from devolving to them a 
wider margin of managerial freedom. An in-built centralising tendency driven by the 
central services of the CHS curtailed the devolution of the purchasing role to Health 
Region managers. Thus, although Health Region managers were in principle 'free 
to manage' their total budget for contracts, they had to give priority to achieving the 
degree and nature of coverage defined as health policy - even if that hindered the 
achievement of economic objectives. As acknowledged by a Health Region 
manager, they are not entitled to determine priorities as for financial processes 
timing - they could order payments but not their timing, which falls under the sphere 
of authority of the Department of Economy and Finance of the Catalan government 
(Gallego-Calder6n, 1996). According to a senior official of the CHS, the degree of 
'freedom to manage' is necessarily constrained as much by budgetary and 
economic condifions as by equity considerations: 
139 Concerning the allocating the role of Region Health Authority to the Health Consortium 
of Barcelona and its consequences for the purchaser/provider split see the article by health 
economist 1-6pez , G. in La Vanguardia 
(19/10/96: 2), supplement 'Health'. In this respect 
see also Diario Wdico (10/4/97), where the CESM - referred to as Medical Union of 
Catalonia - opposed this modification of the CHS's structure. 
140 According to an internal auditor of the Health Consortium of Barcelona this change was 
not consequential for the internal structure of this providers because it had already 
developed a quasi-divisional structure, by distinguishing between the hospitals and primary 
care centres it is composed of, on the one hand, and a managerial level which distributed 
economic resources and allocated workload, on the other. 
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'it is meant to be a free market but planned. The Regions could have a 
double role: they could be delegates, with clear directives and ample 
powers to act as purchasers; or they could just be decentralised levels 
from an operative point of view ... 
Now the first option is not possible ... It is necessary that the corporate centre of the CHS ensures its 
presence in the Regions within a framework: maxmum budget for 
contracUng, kind of coverage, ... and degree of accessibility, territorial equilibrium and equity ... The degree of freedom to manage depends on the environment we are in - it can be a dynamic model, rather than a 
static one. At present the budgetary environment is very hard, thus the 
maximum strictness is required - and this involves centralisation and the 
control of the maximum levels of resource allocation within Regions ... This may have implications for the principle of separating purchase and 
provision, and it is also an argument for continuing interference with the 
supervision of management. ' 
However, the implementation deficit concerning the purchasing function of 
Health Region authorities also applied to the CHS as a whole. Although the 
diversity of management forms allowed by the LOHC facilitated putting some of the 
1991 McKinsey Report's recommendations into practice, the CHS evolved to adopt 
an insurer/financing role rather than the 'selective' purchaser role it was supposed 
to take on. In this respect, efforts were made at a discursive level to explain the 
model pursued as one of 'managed competition' (Moreu, 1994: 23). The reason for 
this implementation deficit was the awareness that the CHS could not do without 
providers' services in most cases. In fact, as a former senior official of the CHS 
asserted, the purchaser had to be co-responsible for the viability of providers so as 
to ensure that it could meet the needs of its clients, namely, the population whose 
needs were to be covered. As pointed out by a Health Region manager, the 
principle underlying this 'compromise' was equity, which was explicitly 
contemplated in every piece of the legal framework. In sum, there was not an 
effective risk-shifting process either to managers in health centres or to 
professionals. Instead private providers transferred risk to the purchasing authority 
(namely, the public administration), sure in the knowledge that being members of 
the HNPU made them eligible for subsidies where they were required. 
In this respect, the degree to which contracts were effectively used to 
gradually shape providers' productive capacities towards the objectives established 
in the Health Plan was openly questioned and identified as a second 
implementation deficit. The driving idea of this model of governance structure was 
the need for the CHS to manage demand. That is, rather than proceeding with 
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provision in terms of the supply structure available, the CHS had to plan according 
to needs assessments, and design contracts in order to cover those needs (Roma, 
1994c). Since 1993 contracts were conceived of as a tool to operationalise the 
guidelines specified in the Health Plan (first edition 1993-95, second edition 1996- 
98). However, as an interviewee involved in managing a HNPU consortium 
explained, there were dysfunctions derived from combining this outcome-oriented 
planning with the output-oriented financing system based on contracts. As a result, 
it became apparent that the restructuring of hospitals' productive capacities had not 
been accomplished - while a dense network of basic hospitals had been 
consolidated throughout the 1980s. Most controversially, the extra-contractual 
financing channels of HNPU providers (such as subsidies to operabng accounts or 
subsidies for capitalisabon), and the financing mechanisms which despite being 
internal to contracts were not classifiable in BCUs (such as additional clauses of 
support to economic activity and special health programmes), both cast doubts on 
the NPM foundations of the contractual modell4l. In sum, according to a senior 
representative of the UCH and some former top officials of the CHS itself, the CHS 
as the financing/funding authority took too powerful a role by accumulating the 
competencies of planning, financing and arbitrating. Instead, they argued, the 
DHSS should exercise those competencies, and the CHS, within that framework, 
should effectively purchase (Diario Wdico, 9/4/97,19/4/97). 
In this respect, in a conference organised by the DHSS in April 1994 both the 
the UCH and the CHC insisted that the contracting system based on bilateral 
negotiations between providers and the health administration was not transparent. 
The criteria for allocating contractual and extra-contractual financing were not 
explicit, which made that, in practice, each hospital got paid a different price for 
BCUs. Moreover, they claimed that there had been a lack of evaluation of results of 
the health services provided, which should have been necessary in order to defend 
contractual and extra-contractual financing. However, these associabons differed in 
some of their proposals. The UCH supported a gradual shift towards the 
liberalisation of patient movements based on a free choice of providers. In fact, the 
UCH made explicit that it intended to help those centres and institutions which 
141 This latter point was acknowledged by the following experts interviewees: three 
managers of non-CHI hospital providers, a leader of the union CC. 00., a leader of 
the 
hospital association UCH, a senior official of the CHS, two former senior officials of the CHS 
and a senior official of the CHI. 
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competed in the free market so that they found a place among providers and 
purchasers (Marti, Ruiz, 1995; Salazar, 1995). By contrast, the CHC was mainly 
concerned with the planning role of the health authority and the equitable 
distribution of resources across the territory according both to the production 
structure of providers and the health needs of the population. They supported 
capitation criteria for distributing economic resources between sub-sectors - 
primary, specialised, hospital, socio-health care'42. In addition, providers should be 
enabled to direct the movements of patients between levels of care (care 
continuum and vertical integration of resources) and between territories (through 
fusion, groups, collaboration agreements) (Bag6,1991; Abe116,1994). 
The third implementation deficit was two-fold and concerned the reform of the 
health administration after the creation of the CHS and the transformation of the 
previous health authority (the CHI) into a provider only. First, both the CHC and the 
UCH agreed that it was necessary to simplify the administrative structures of the 
health system and reduce the expenditure derived from duplication of posts, 
proliferation of organisations and procedural burdens. Second, a main issue on 
which not only the CHC and the UCH agreed but also the DHSS and the CHI itself, 
was the need to transform the legal structure of the CHI (the management body of 
the Social Security and the largest health provider in Catalonia) into a more de- 
bureaucratised and independent agent. (Mant6,1994; Marti, 1994; ). 
This view was also shared by the directive figures of the CHI right after the 
passage of the LOHC. In a conference organised by the DHSS in 1991, the 
manager of the CHI regretted that, at that time, the survival of an organisation in 
the publicly financed health sector and the professional status of its personnel did 
not depend on the efficiency and quality of its service, but on the negotiating ability 
and on the power position the leaders of the organisation enjoyed within the 
existing institutional framework. In this respect, a qualitative change in the 
management culture and techniques was necessary not only in the publicly 
financed health sector in general but particularly in the CHI. According to this CHI's 
representative it was necessary to increase the risks borne by managers and 
professionals. Economic responsibility should be assigned to the person who 
makes the decisions which generate expenses and income. This kind of measures 
would be most effective, he concluded, if competitiveness mechanism were also 
142 On this CHC's proposal see El Pais (20/11/93, Barcelona edition). 
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introduced with the objective of changing behavioural patterns in the process of 
service provision. In this sense, the CHI had to pursue balanced budgets, that is, 
finance itself by adjusting the cost of their activity to the value of the programme- 
contract signed with the CHS. The tools to do so included the establishment of 
clear and quantified objectives, a system of indicators and information on costs, 
management control systems and the introduction of suitable incentives in the 
financing system. However, those tools could only yield results if a change in the 
value system was also driven forward by giving more priority to efficiency and 
productivity. In fact, he claimed, the politics of diversification of management forms 
different from that which the CHI had developed from the mid-eighties had 
embodied a basic policy option not to enlarge the CHI and the management model 
it represented (Garcia-Prat, 1991). 
Nevertheless, four years later another top manager of the CHI pointed out 
that there were some reasons why these reforms were bound to be a matter of 
disagreement and conflict. The CHI was a complex organisation which was not 
only the first employer in Catalonia in terms of personnel (over 30,000 employees) 
but also a very particular provider. The legal nature of the CHI as a Social Security 
management body with a single legal personality entailed that its personnel had 
statutory, civil service-like contractual relations, and that ! its economic operating 
regime followed the budgetary process and regulations, the procurement and 
contracts regime, and the procedural rules of the administrative law framework. 
Moreover, nine of the 11 CHI hospitals were the reference hospitals for their 
respective geographical area of influence. Only in one Health Region did the 
reference hospital not belong to the CHI. In addition, seven CHI hospitals had a 
university category for research and training of specialists, with the corresponding 
costs. And finally, the CHI undertook the provision of health care programmes of 
high cost and technology (Gorricho, 1995). 
However, this CHI's manager stressed that during the late eighties and early 
nineties some steps had been taken to improve the CHI's management. Horizontal 
services had been created by the CHI's corporate centre concerning contracting 
out and procurement policy. New legal forms were defined for disaggregating part 
of the organisation into self-contained units of specific services which could 
operate under private law. And new modes of service delivery had been developed 
(such as ambulatory surgery, non-hospitalisation treatments at home). As a result, 
there had been an efficiency improvement reflected in the budgetary coverage 
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index (see Chapter 5), beds reduction, and rationalisation of human resources 
(Gorricho, 1995). Nonetheless, the expected and much announced reform of the 
CHI was not tackled comprehensively, but rather in a piecemeal way by the main 
legal initiative, the 1995 Modification Law. 
c) Unintended consequences. 
The combination of policy displacements and implementation deficits led to a 
general unintended consequence: the de facto 'publicness' of the HNPU derived 
from its dependence on the contracts financed by the health administration. While 
the initial objective of the 1980s reforms was to keep the HNPU at arms length 
from the health authority, the objective of the early 1990s was to induce providers 
to be efficient in response to the 'selective purchasing' policy of the CHS. However, 
the main result of these reforms was that contracts with the health authority 
became the major source of financing for most HNPU members. According to 
Horn's theory, the costs behind this gradual increase in the 'publicness' of health 
providers were the transactions costs derived from the uncertainty associated to 
the assignment of (financial) risk to those providers. 
The main policy elites acknowledged that the lack of transparency of the 
contracting system, which involved discretion in the allocation of subsidies to 
operating accounts and for capitalisation, lay behind this gradual trend towards 
increasing 'publicness'. However, during a parliamentary session, and in answer to 
a question by IC-V on the criteria for the allocation of these clauses, the Conseller 
of the DHSS argued that: 
'The need to guarantee homogeneous services to the population 
involves taking into account the reality and environment of each of the 
hospital centres, therefore the resources assigned to the different 
centres cannot, in some cases, be the same. For this reason, ... the 
CHS channels different specific payments through the concession of 
additional clauses of economic support to different centres of the 
HNPU, which allow for their redistribution in an equitable way'. (BOPC, 
14/6/94, nO239: 15158). 
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In this same answer, the Conseller mentioned four criteria for the concession 
of this economic support which are not taken into account by the system payment 
based on BCUs. These were, first, the 'geographic isolation or unproductive 
dimension' of a centre including cases of redevelopment of infrastructures; 
second, the need to ensure the economic viability of some centres which have 
encountered problems stemming from the restructudng process of the health 
system; third, the introduction of new technology; and fourth, the expenditure 
increase for a hospital (in terms of patients flows, services and technology) when it 
is upgraded to the level of 'reference hospital' of its area. However, the 
interpretation and application of these cdteda is in itself a matter of controversy 
which has been particulady stressed by one opposition political force in the Catalan 
Parfiament - IC-V, the only party which voted against conceding financial support to 
bankrupt private hospitals'43. 
Although the lack of transparency of the system was acknowledged by most 
of the policy elites, only the leaders of the unions CESM, CC. 00, CATAC and CTS 
and the leader of the leftist IC-V interviewed for this research asserted that this 
situation was an intdnsic result of the health model implemented throughout the 
eighties and nineties. Several key informants including those interviewees, a top 
representative of the UCH, a top representative of the CHC and two former top 
officials of the DHSS, pointed out the argument that the NPM contractual model 
143 Two outstanding cases were given relevant media coverage and were a matter of 
question time and debates in the Catalan Parliament. The first case concerned a non-HNPU 
hospital which had its origin in a private initiative launched in the 1970s. Its promoters 
intended this hospital to have high technology services and to offer ancillary non-care 
services of a higher quality than the average. However, when the hospital was opened in 
1985 it was apparent that it was not financially viable. By 1992-93 the financial crisis in 
which it was immersed was taken to the fore in the Catalan Parliament. To tackle this 
situation, two economic endorsements were passed by the Catalan Parliament (with the 
opposition of IC-V) as part of bills introduced by the Catalan executive extending public 
credit for the maintenance and support of productive sectors of the economy. Second, a 
special collaboration agreement for the provision of health services was established 
between the Catalan executive and the hospital in question. Third, this agreement required 
that patients in the waiting lists of the Health Region in which this hospital is located, were 
assigned to that hospital for treatment (DSPC-P, 25/9/96, nOl 39: 27-65). The second case of 
controversy related to the economic support given to private hospitals by the Catalan 
government concerned a mutuality, four hospitals of which are HNPU-members. In 1995 
this mutuality was the second in the ranking of the 72 entities of insurance in Catalonia, both 
in terms of premiums (13 per cent of the market), and people covered (over 180,000 people 
-13 per cent of the people with double coverage). (The first in the ranking covers 14 per cent 
of people with double coverage but represents 26 per cent of the premiums collected by the 
72 entities, and is linked to the Spanish Collegial Medical Organisation. The first four of the 
ranking represent more than 50 per cent of all the premiums collected) (DSSS, 1995d). In 
neither case the crisis situation has been solved. 
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could not possibly be implemented unless the pending problem of the deficit of the 
health sector was given a political solution. All of them agreed that the origin of the 
debt in the Catalan health sector was, in the first place, the miscalculation of the 
value of the transfers negotiated between the Catalan and the Spanish central 
government in the early eighties. At that time the deficit in Catalonia was already 
large as a result of a comparatively lesser amount of per capita investment on 
infrastructures and equipment by the Social Security there compared with other 
parts of Spain. In this context, the strategy of the Catalan government from 1980 
was to gradually recover this financing deficit depending on the evolution of the 
electoral political in Spain as a whole and the need to exchange political support 
through i nter-govern mental relations. Also, political clientelism was pointed out as a 
distortion of the model. This aspect was said to have affected decisions such as 
defining the level (A, B, C) at which a specific hospital was to be categorised as a 
HNPU member - that level involves higher or lower prices to be paid for the BCUs 
which they contract to provide for the CHS144. 
By the mid-nineties, the economic crisis in the hospital sector was 
characterised as being similar to its situation in 1984-85. From 1992 to 1996 the 
public health system spent 240,000 million pesetas more than budgeted, of which 
130,000 millions corresponded to the deficit accumulated by the DHSS and 96,400 
millions were bome by the contracted providers as at 31 December 1994 (El Pals, 
7/9/95,11/2/96 Barcelona edition; El Penodico, 7/9/95). Leading figures in IC-V, 
the DHSS and the union CC. 00 agreed that the debt of the Catalan health sector 
was an indicator of the health model's wrong approach to management. In their 
view, the authority in this model no longer had a command-and-control role over 
providers, whose decisions might run counter the planning needs. Moreover, deficit 
was being transferred to the periphery of the system, that is, it was being dispersed 
across providers. In this system expenditure was more difficult to control; the 
principal-agent problem increased as a result of bilateral processes of contractual 
negotiations; and the reliance on private initiative created and maintained more 
provision than was necessary. This kind of situation, they contended, jeopardised 
144 In fact, this clientelism - or the role of power relations in the operating of these decisions 
- was documented for a specific 
hospital case (Via, 1994b). 
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the aims of planning and rationalising of the public authority as well as its role in 
constraining deficits'45. 
Conclusions 
In the early 1990s the implementation of new governance structures in the Catalan 
health sector involved the introduction of policy tools which are central to the NPM 
reform trend - namely, expanding the use of contracts between purchaser and 
providers into new areas such as CHI hospitals and primary care, and the 
widespread introduction of private management techniques. These policy tools are 
supposed to link the health authority and hospital and primary care providers in a 
way that meant purchasers could shape providers' behaviour. The health authority, 
the CHS, was supposed to design and use an incentive-based contract system in 
order to purchase the required services for covering the population health needs, 
taking for granted that providers would gradually be induced to alter their cost and 
productive structures to come into line with the CHS's health and purchasing 
policies. 
However, the actual operation of the new system revealed considerable 
continuity with earlier systems operated in the 1980s. What was defined as a 
hierarchical contract system for a hybrid form of governance turned out to perform 
as a relational contractual system where adaptation was to a considerable extent 
decided on a bilateral basis between the health authority and each provider. In 
Stinchcombe's (1985) terms, there were various hierarchical features in the 
contracting system implemented in the Catalan health sector. They included: the 
overall control of the incentive system by the health authority; the health authority's 
145 The creation of the Agency for Health Technology Assessment in 1994 -as a public 
enterprise dependent on the DHSS- had the purpose to promote that the introduction, 
adoption or diffusion and utilisation of medical technology follows criteria of effectiveness, 
reliability, efficacy and efficiency (Rius et a/. 1995). This agency built on precedents which 
were the first of its kind in Spain such as the Advisory Commission of High Technology 
(1984), the High Technology Programme (1988), and the Technical Office of Evaluation and 
Medical Technology (1991) (Granados, 1995). 
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specification of binding operating procedures that went beyond the indicative 
setting of health objectives; the relative isolation from the market or the court 
system of dispute resolution procedures; and a non-market pricing system which in 
practice tended to be related to providers' costs. Thus, for example, the contract 
negotiated by the CHS with the CHI amounted to a translation of the latter's 
budgetary allocation into contractual terms, without involving real financial risk 
either in the case of hospitals or of primary care. Moreover, where real contracts 
were held with non-CHI hospital providers, the persistent funding of the activity 
contracted at below its real cost led the health authority to complement the 
contracting system with additional financing mechanisms. Some of these channels 
were internal to contracts in the form of additional clauses for the financing of 
health programmes which were difficult to translate into BCUs. Other channels 
were external to contracts, such as subsidies to the operating accounts of 
providers, and subsidies for capital investment. In contrast to hospital contracts, 
primary care contracts were not based on quantified units of service delivered for a 
set price, but were contracts for services with a global obligation to provide them 
and with prices calculated on previously incurred costs. 
These hierarchical features of the contractual system extensively conditioned 
the repeated interactions among actors which were mutually dependent in terms of 
resources. On the one hand, these interactions were influenced by asymmetric 
power relations: for example, the CHS had discretion over the allocation of scarce 
financing resources within the system, which gave it leverage over the governance 
of the health sector (Pfeffer, Salancik, 1978). On the other hand, the bridging 
mechanisms between the CHS and health providers (contracts and private 
management tools), and the resources flows based on exchange and dependency 
relations between them, conveyed a picture close to a relational market where 
long-standing, trust relations with a stable number of asset-specific agents were 
crucial (Ferlie et a/., 1996). 
So in the Catalan case relational contracting emerged as the contract law 
supporting a bilateral, hybrid governance structure, which, in principle, conformed 
to the hypotheses suggested by transactions costs economics (Williamson, 1985). 
However, according to the theory, bilateral governance is most suitable for 
recurrent transactions which are based on mixed asset-specific 
investments. In 
health care, transactions are recurrent between the health authority and providers, 
but investments are to a large extent idiosyncratic, that is, highly specific. In this 
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situation, theory suggests a unified governance structure as the most suitable 
arrangement. Thus, the question remains as to why hybrid forms of governance in 
the form of NPM found their way into a sector like health care. 
A tentative answer may derive from the characteristic market failures of 
health care itself and from the emerging divergences between NPM discourse and 
implementation in practice. The analysis of the actual use of NPIVI policy tools in 
the Catalan case reveals a number of such divergences. Implementation deficits 
included: the incompleteness of primary care and CHI hospital contracts, which 
were not really enforceable because they did not involve financial risk; and, in the 
case of real contracts with non-CHI providers, the existence of additional 
contractual and extra-contractual financing mechanisms. Policy displacements in 
the mid 1990s, such as the allocation of the role of Region Health authority to a 
very important provider (both politically and in terms of resources) cast doubts on 
the separation between purchasing and provision functions. Finally, unintended 
consequences included the increasing 'publicness' of a health care network which 
had been intended to be clearly separated from the health authority and in an arms 
length relationship with it. 
These divergences between implementation and the NPM interpretation of 
the 1990 Law for the Organisation of Health in Catalonia (LOHC) had their origin in 
the enacting coalition's attempt to promote the consolidation of a heterogeneous 
health care network. In order to solve the possible commitment problems involved, 
and to face the transactions costs derived from them, a particular institutional form 
was designed for the new health authority (the Catalan Health Service), as part of 
a hybrid governance form based on relational contracting. Thus, in Horn's (1995) 
terms, the need to reduce uncertainty and risk assignment costs led the enacting 
coalition (CiU in the Catalan government) to commit itself to the economic survival 
of both CHI and non-CHI providers, regardless of whether they had a real or a 
'fictional' contract. The difficulties in dealing with principal-agent relations affected 
both the internal operations of the CHI (between the corporate centre and its 
provider units) and the relations between the CHI and the CHS. The costs derived 
from those principal-agent relations were at the origin of the difficulty in formulating 
a change in the CHI's legal nature (maybe leading to its disaggregation) and in 
establishing a real contract between the CHI and the CHS. Finally, the participation 
costs borne by agents external to the health administration in the a vaguely 
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formulated CHS structure were exemplified by the decision to give the role of 
Region Health authority to a provider. 
Thus, the implementation of the reforms could be interpreted as being 
relatively close to the actual vague formulation contained in the 1990 LOHC and to 
the relational contract law predicted by transactions cost theory for a hybrid form of 
governance. Nonetheless, the policy elite tended to assess the reform's success or 
failure in relation to an imported NPM discourse. This discourse happened to fit 
both the policy precedents and the distribution of resources among the policy elites 
in the Catalan case, and easily became the prevailing reinterpretation of the vague 
reform legislation , assed in 1990. In fact, the analysis of the implementation of the ,P 
reforms shows clear divergences from the NPM formulation, though far less in 
relation to the LOHC and to transactions cost theory itself. The explanation of such 
divergences between implementation and NPM discourse is traceable to the 
institutional form chosen by the enacting coalition for the Catalan Health Service as 
the new health authority. This institutional form was designed to face the 
transactions costs derived from the commitment problem of the enacting coalition. 
Those transactions costs arose again in the implementation process and were 
accordingly dealt with within the relational contracting framework inherent to the 
hybrid governance structure designed. But this design and the very concern with 
solving those commitment problems and with reducing those transactions costs 
through relational contracting were incompatible, not only with NPM's defining 
postulates, but also with the health care sectors characteristic features. 
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Chapter 7 
Transactions costs, institutional choices 
and policy change. 
The 'new public management' (NPM) reform trend represents a shift in the 
governance structure of the public sector, that is, in the institutional form of the public 
authority and in the policy tools on which it may rely for setting policy in each domain. 
This analysis of the Catalan health care reforms between 1985 and 1995 shows how 
transactions costs played a key role in the political processes by which public officials 
and interest groups made decisions about institutional reforms and policy tools for the 
governance of health care. Although these reforms turned out to be in line with new 
public management ideas, their gradual design over the 1980s did not follow an 
explicit NPM discourse. The Catalan health policy elite did not adopt a NPM view of 
the world until it was given consistency as a new governance 'paradigm' by both the 
international academic and political communities in the early 1990s. The definition and 
labelling of NPM came on a ex-post basis for all countries experimenting with it. Thus, 
the analysis of the actual formulation and implementation of the reforms in each case 
is a necessary step both for characterising NPM and for assessing the extent of policy 
change that it has brought about. The reason is that the emphasis on particular 
components of NPM, such as incentivisation - including economic and non-economic 
incentives, and asset ownership -, disaggregation and competition, is influenced by 
both exogenous and endogenous stimuli in each reform case. 
The first section of this chapter draws conclusions concerning these main 
themes through the analysis of the Catalan case. These include: the characterisation 
of NPM, the extent of change derived from the reforms, the role of transactions costs 
in the institutional design of the new health authority and the role of transactions costs 
in the choice of policy tools to be used by it. The second section uses the evidence in 
this case of divergences between the 'formalised' NPM discourse and implementation 
in practice as a basis for briefly re-thinking present and further developments of NPM 
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in the health sector in the light of broader trends. Finally, the third section examines 
the theoretical lessons drawn from the use of a transactions costs approach for the 
analysis of institutional change processes in the public sector. 
7.1. Continuity, consensus and change 
in the Catalan reforms. 
The gradual introduction of NPM components in the Catalan health sector was based 
on a structurally favourable distribution of key resources among relevant policy elites. 
However, the development of the reforms not only built on the consolidation and 
expansion of existing features but also on the introduction of innovative changes. In 
both cases, the reforms were incremental and based on a wide consensus built up 
throughout the 1980s. At the same time, the emerging characterisation of NPM as a 
new governance structure for health care in Catalonia was conditioned by two main 
exogenous variables: the decentralisation process of the Spanish state generally, and 
the creation of an integrated NHS-type of health system by the Spanish central 
government level. Interpreting the first as an enabling factor and the second as a 
constraint for the development of the Catalan 'model' of health care governance helps 
understanding of the policy outputs analysed in this case study. 
Spain in the 1980s was characterised by a profound political reforrn which 
involved a large scale institution-building process. This process was launched by the 
democratic transition of the late seventies and involved not only the democratisation 
of all political institutions, but also a shift from a highly centralised to a quasi-federal, 
highly decentralised state structure through the creation of Autonomous Communities. 
Decentralisation was conceived of as an open process operating at different speeds 
in various parts of the country and for the achievement of different competency 
ceilings. In a few cases, such as the Communities of Catalonia and the Basque 
Country, the institution-building process of their respective legislative and executive 
institutions paralleled in time the institutional reform process of the same insfitutions at 
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the central government level. In the case of Catalonia the negotiations for the transfer 
of health competencies as early as 1980 were explicitly driven by the political will to 
assert autonomy. 
These transfers started the gradual decentralisation of competencies allowed by 
the 1978 Spanish Constitution and assumed by the respective Statutes of Autonomy. 
Within this legal framework the Spanish central Parliament had the competency to 
pass the basic legislation on health care. The Autonomous Communities with a higher 
level of competencies, and with their health transfers agreements accomplished, had 
the powers to develop and implement such legislation and to organise health care 
provision in their territory. Only Catalonia met both criteria in the early eightieS'46. It 
was not until 1984 that Andalusia accomplished its transfers agreement - followed by 
five other Communities from 1987 to date (mid 1998). Thus, by 1981-82 Catalonia 
had, in principle, both the resources and the formal powers to organise health care in 
the absence of a basic legal framework, which was not passed by the Spanish central 
Parliament until 1986. 
The long and controversial formulation process which led up to the 1986 
General Health Law revolved around the political will of the governing PSOE to create 
a National Health Service model of health care, involving universal coverage and 
publicly-owned and managed health care providers. This provision model did not fit 
the policy options which the Catalan government had taken up since the health 
competencies were transferred. In contrast to the rest of Spain, Social Security 
hospital beds in Catalonia represented less than a fifth of total available beds - and 
less than a third of acute beds - of a network which was heterogeneous in terms of 
ownership and management forms. To ensure coverage ! in Catalonia, the Social 
Security had been contracting with the remainder of existing providers, although on a 
precarious basis, because these providers were not considered as substitutes for 
Social Security hospitals but as providing a possibly temporary complement to its 
services. 
146 However, fully meeting these two criteria was not a necessary condition for Autonomous 
Communities to create their respective health services as part of the institution building process 
of their administrative apparatus. Moreover, because the process of negotiating the transfers 
tended to be long and complex, legislation by Autonomous Communities might be passed 
before the end of the process - or even before it started. That was the case of the Basque 
Country, which passed a health law creating its regional health service in 1983 - some months 
before Catalonia -, and of Madrid, which created its health service in 1984 (Rico, 1997: 232-4, 
280). 
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In 1981 the Catalan government created an accreditation system which aimed to 
reverse this approach and to give non-Social Security providers the same status as 
Social Security providers in the public system. This option involved, first, confining the 
eAsting Social Security model (namely, the embryo and basic component of the 
projected NHS at the Spanish central government level) to the size it had at that time. 
Second, this option required investing in the rest of the providers, which were in a dire 
economic and financial situation. A further and clearer diversion from the NHS-type 
being discussed in the Spanish central Parliament was deepened and consolidated in 
1985 with the creation of the Hospital Network of Public Utilisation (HNPU), which was 
composed not only of the eyisting Social Security providers, but above all of an 
accredited, heterogeneous group of non-Social Security-owned providers, which 
provided the majority of hospital care and had freedom of organisation and 
management. 
Apart from these exogenous stimuli, there were endogenous factors which also 
influenced the eventual characterisation of NPM in this case, mainly concerning the 
stability of the policy elites' leadership throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s and 
the distribution of key resources among them. While the Catalan government had 
both the competencies (the formal authority) and the economic resources (the budget) 
to exercise the governance of health care, the political or ownership representation of 
providers was to a large extent distributed among local governments and profit and 
non-profit private owners. Moreover, both the apparent split voting by Catalan electors 
between the autonomous and local governments - the former controlled by CiLl and 
the latter controlled mainly by PSC and in some cases by PSUCAC in the most 
urbanised areas - and the location of managerial expertise among private providers 
configured a choice situation in which co-operation became a rational strategy. 
In the Catalan case co-operation was ensured by giving every relevant policy 
elite a stake in the system in terms of control of resources. However, the success of 
this strategy as a basis for consensus-building was crucially facilitated by the 
compatibility of policy preferences and interests among the main policy elites. The 
central NPM theme in Catalonia during the 1980s was asset ownership in the hospital 
sector. In contrast to the prevailing stances being debated at the Spanish central 
government level, the main policy elites in Catalonia agreed that the ownership of 
providers should remain in their initial local or private hands. Thus they rejected any 
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form of integration into an NHS-type structure which might involve a loss of 
managerial and organisational autonomy for providers. 
In fact, when the autonomous government refused to assume responsibility for 
the management of providers dependent on local governments during the economic 
crisis of the mid-1 980s, it was apparent that the Catalan government intended to keep 
the health authority (the public administration) separated from the non-Social Security 
providers with which it contracted. On their part, local governments and private 
providers defended their ownership and managerial position concerning their assets, 
but required from the Catalan government an explicit and definite commitment to their 
survival. This support came in the form of the HNPU created in 1985 and in the 
subsequent increasing investments and creation of local public-private consortia for 
the rationalisation and reinforcement of the network. Moreover, in the second half of 
the decade the health budget share spent on contracting with these non-Social 
Security providers steadily increased, while the distribution of resources and activity 
between them and Social Secudty and providers (those integrated into and managed 
by the Catalan Health Institute) remained remarkably stable. This same trend in 
investments, contracts and distribution of resources and activity characterised the first 
half of the 1990s (see Tables 3.5,3.6,6.1,6.2, and Tables A. 5 and A. 6 in Appendix 
1). 
In sum, the introduction of NPM components in the Catalan reforms throughout 
the 1980s involved disaggregation and incentivisation. The disaggregation of the non- 
Social Security hospital sector was consolidated by maintaining the managerial and 
organisational autonomy of the private and local hospitals and their contractual 
relationship with the health authority. This policy option involved reinforcing the status 
quo in terms of asset ownership, which is itself an element of the NPM incentivisation 
component. In NPIVI discourse keeping asset ownership in private and public local 
hands was considered to be an in-built incentive for potential efficient behaviour. In 
the first half of the 1980s, incentives were also channelled through the implementation 
of an accreditation system which became the basis for the further creabon of 
the 
HNPU. The definition of Basic Care Units as the foundation for the contractual pricing 
system in 1986 and the further introduction of a penalisation mechanism, 
(a 30 per 
cent variable payment part for either falling short of or exceeding 
the amount of 
activity contracted), were also central elements of the incentivisation component. 
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However, these developments of the 1980s did not affect the primary care 
network, which was overwhelmingly owned and managed by the Catalan Health 
Institute or CHI (the decentralised Social Security health management entity in 
Catalonia). From the mid-1980s to date it has by contrast been the object of the same 
NHS-type of reform as in the rest of Spain. As Table A. 6 of Appendix 1 shows, the 
percentage of the health budget spent on contracting with non-CHI providers has 
followed a gradual and clear upwards trend. However, the origin of that increasing 
trend is in the hospital sector. Contracting with non-CHI primary care providers slightly 
increased in the second half of the 1980s, only to decrease in 1989 and stabilise 
between 1990 and 1995 at around 5.5 per cent of the health authority budget -a 
lower level than before. However, even this NHS-type of primary care reform did not 
follow the same pace as the reform and consolidation of the hospital sector. In fact, by 
1995 and after ten years since its formulation, the reformed primary care network only 
covered 54 per cent of the population (see Table 6.5). An indicator of these different 
speeds and intensity of reform in the hospital and primary care networks is the share 
of investments received by each of them. As Table A-5 of Appendix 1 shows, the 
largest share of investments were made in the hospital sector (including both CHI and 
non-CHI hospitals). The share of investments spent in primary care, which has been 
undergoing an allegedly expensive reform, was kept at a fairly constant level 
(between 36 and 38 per cent of total public investment in health) and even decreased 
by ten points during the first half of the nineties (from 36 to 26 per cent). 
The institutional design of the Catalan health authority of the 1980s involved a 
two-fold policy. On the one hand, the CHI created in 1983 inertially replicated the 
organisabon from which it was decentralised - the Spanish Social Security health 
authority (INSALUD) - in terms of organisation and management form. That is, 
CHI 
hospitals (less than a third of HNPU beds) and primary care providers (over 90 per 
cent of primary care resources) were cost units of the CHI, without any autonomous 
legal personality or managerial freedom - despite the introduction of the Area and 
hospital manager figure in the early 1980s. The CHI itself went on contracting with the 
non-CHI hospital providers, thus having both provider and purchaser/financing roles. 
On the other hand, the non-CHI hospitals, that is, the non-Social Security hospital 
sector was expanded and consolidated. The second half of the 1980s saw continuity 
in the institutional design of the CHI - except for the introduction of the manager figure 
at its corporate level - and inertia in the primary care reform, which closely 
followed 
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the NHS model being implemented in the rest of Spain from the mid-1980s. At the 
same time, the expansion and consolidation of the non-Social Security hospitals were 
intensified through investments and the creation of consortia between public and 
private actors. 
In contrast to the continuity and inertia in the institutional design of the Catalan 
health authority, the design of the policy tools it was entitled to use did involve 
innovation. In 1981 the Catalan government created the first accreditation system in 
Europe. In the early 1980s contracts were regulated by clarifying and simplifying 
technological and complexity hospital levels. And in 1986 the measurement of Basic 
Care Units was defined as the foundation for assigning unitary prices to the health 
services contracted. Finally, as a precedent of a complete separation between a 
financing/contracting health authority and providers, the CHI lost its contracting 
functions in 1989, which were allocated to the Direction General of Economic 
Resources of the Health System. Thus, although the corresponding budget share for 
contracts was still channelled through the CHI, their negotiation was no longer in its 
hands. 
The separation between the financing/contracting health authority and both CHI 
and non-CHI providers became the main reform theme characterising NPIVI from 
1990. In the early 1990s Catalonia's health policy elites were no longer concerned 
with the incentives derived from the allocation of asset ownership, but with the need to 
induce managed competition among providers through a contract- based incentive 
system. The emphasis on these NPM components was meant to enhance the 
efficiency of providers and of the whole health system - although the government's 
commitment to providers' survival was not questioned. This new characterisation of 
the reforms derived from a remarkable rhetorical change in the second half of 1990, 
shortly after the passage of the Law for the Organisation of Health in Catalonia 
(LOHC), and as a result of fully adopting the NPM discourse being elaborated in 
international academic and political venues. 
The definition of this new governance structure was central to the formulation 
process of the 1990 LOHC. The innovative institutional design of a new health 
authority (the Catalan Health Service or GHS) subjected in its external relations to 
private law, emerged as the main thrust of the reforms. For the first bme the 
government view clearly emerged that the CHI was an unsatisfactory institutional 
design for governing the health system on the basis of a contractual network. 
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Although the meaning of this assertion was not made more explicit until shortly after 
the law was passed, and the legislation's ambiguity was clarified in a new managerial 
discourse, the main tenet of the LOHC was that the CHI had to become a provider 
only. Less immediately apparent was that contracts as policy tools used by the CHS 
had to be extended also to the CHI providers, including both its hospitals and its 
primary care centres - in the latter case linking health objectives to those set by the 
Health Plan for Catalonia. The reform was initially presented as a matter of 
institutional modemisation that was necessary to further develop the model created 
throughout the 1980s. 
In the formulation process of the LOHC, considerations about transactions costs 
played a central role in the politics of institutional choice in the public sector. The main 
dimensions of discussion and negotiation between the coalition in government and 
the opposition parties involved: first, the margin of discretionary power of the CHS - 
including its legal nature, its political independence from the executive, and its 
managerial autonomy for the use of private management policy tools -; second, the 
participation rights for political and social actors in the organisational structure of the 
CHS; and third, the degree of autonomy of non-CHI providers in relation to this new 
health authority. The stances taken by the main political parties in relation to these 
themes depended on their commitment problem (in the case of the governing 
coalition) and on their policy priorities and interests (in the case of the parties in the 
opposition). The respective policy preferences derived from both their ideology and 
their resources and mainly concerned the functions for which, in their view, the health 
authority should be responsible. The stress on different public functions implied an 
emphasis on different transactions costs and, therefore, led different political parties 
to advocate different institutional forms and policy tools for the new health authority. 
The discussion about the margin of discretion of the CHS revealed concern with 
the transactions costs derived from the principal-agent relations involved in the 
implementation of health and contracting policies. While the governing coalition (CiU) 
advocated a CHS which was highly dependent on the executive and with a wide 
margin of manoeuvre to use private management tools, the opposition advocated a 
more politically independent CHS which clearly acted within a public 
law framework. 
Over this point, QU used its absolute majority in parliament by not allowing any 
important change to its bill. By contrast, the main point open for negotiation was the 
theme of participation rights for political and social actors in the CHSs structures and 
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the transactions costs derived from them. While the coalition in government had not 
planned for any significant participation by other political or social actors in its bill, the 
alternative project of the largest party in the opposition (the PSC) with a large political 
stake in local governments centred on giving local administrations participation rights. 
The alternative project of the second largest opposition force (the coalition IC) also 
demanded participation rights for social actors, such as trade unions, among some of 
which this coalition had considerable support. The parties in the opposition saw this 
point as an opportunity to mitigate the impact of the discretionary power of the health 
authority - which had moreover been ambiguously defined. The debate on the degree 
of autonomy of non-CHI providers directly pointed to the transactions costs derived 
from the uncertainty involved in assigning risk to private and local interests. On this 
point all parties agreed on the commitment to the economic survival of providers - 
although IC alone supported an effective transfer of ownership to the CHS as a pre- 
condition for such a commitment. The PSC made a big theme of clarifying the non- 
integration of providers, with a particular emphasis on preserving local governments' 
role in their management, ownership representation and in public health policy. As in 
the case of the discretionary power of the CHS - including both its legal nature and its 
managerial autonomy - the CiUs bill was vague in relation to the degree of providers 
'integration or functional attachment' to the CHS, even though its commitment to the 
separation between them and the health authority was clear. 
The extent of change derived from this institutional design involved the effective 
split between fin a ncing/contracti ng and provision, by defining the CHI as a provider 
which was organisationally and managerially autonomous and separated from the 
new health authority (the CHS). The CHS was allocated the planning, financing and 
contracting functions, as well as the budget to perform them. The use of contracts 
was expanded in 1992 to the eleven CHI hospitals and to the Primary Care Centres 
responsible for health care in Health Basic Areas. In the latter case, the introduction of 
contracts only affected the reformed primary care - every new Health Basic Area was 
subjected to a contract. From 1993 all existing Health Basic Areas held a contract. 
However the actual role developed by the CHS in terms of policy tools use did 
not turn out to follow the 'selective purchaser role postulated by the NPM 
discourse 
for the public authority, which was supposed to induce competition through a contract- 
based incentive system. In the case of the CHI providers, contracts are still (in mid- 
1998) a training exercise with no enforceability as real contracts. In all other contracts, 
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although price incentives were included for closely meeting the volume of activity 
agreed, extra-contractual financing channels - such as subsidies to operating account 
or for capital investments - revealed the CHSs commitment to the survival of 
providers despite their actual level of efficiency and effectiveness. Contracts 
themselves included clauses of activities such as specific health programmes, which 
were not classified in terms of Basic Care Units by the corresponding price. One of 
the main difficulties in making contracts hard and binding documents stemmed from 
the historical under-funding of the Catalan health system, which was in turn the main 
reason for the difference between the prices set for each Basic Care Unit contracted 
and the real cost of each Basic Care Unit produced (see Table AY of Appendix 1). 
These implementation deficits were in fact a feature of continuity from the 
policies developed in the 1980s, and were at the origin of an unintended 
consequence which the strongest supporters of the NPM discourse among the 
Catalan policy elite regret: the de facto 'publicness' of the HNPU. That is, in their view 
the public actors not only include the CHI but now crucially also the non-CHI 
providers, which receive over 90 per cent of their income from the contractual and 
extra-contractual financing channels linking them to the CHS. Therefore, genuine or 
'hard' competition as a component of NPM was clearly down-played as not viable - at 
least as defined in NPM discourse terms. Moreover, disaggregation, which already 
characterised non-CHI providers, could only appear as an innovating NPM feature if it 
affected the CHI (covering 26 per cent of acute hospital beds and over 90 per cent of 
primary care centres). So far, this remains as just a proposal within academic and 
political forums. 
While the implementation of the institutional design of the CHS and the use of 
contracts as a policy tool between 1991 and 1995 were characterised by 
implementation deficits in relation to the NPM discourse, in 1995 a more explicitly 
intended policy displacement was introduced. The functions and role of health 
authority in the CHS's Health Region of Barcelona City was allocated to a large 
provider, the Health Consortium of Barcelona. Shortly afterwards this Consortium 
modified its statutes to separate out purchasing and provider functions within its own 
structure to fit the new role, and to avoid the emerging criticisms about the distortion 
of the NPM model entailed by its dual role as purchaser and provider. However, the 
same blurring had also been present since the creation of the CHS in 1991, because 
the health authority created several public enterprises (providers) in which it was the 
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largest or even the only owner. CHS was also present in numerous administration 
boards of public and semi-public consortia, which were supposed to be providers 
clearly detached from the health authority with whom they contracted. 
However, these divergences between the NPM discourse and the governance 
structure actually implemented bear a clear relationship to the transactions costs 
considerations that drove the institutional design of the CHS in 1990. A common 
commitment of the main policy elites was to ensure the economic survival of the 
heterogeneous hospital network consolidated through the 1980s, taking for granted 
both the existing asset ownership distribution and its financing by the health authority. 
However, the need to reduce the transactions costs derived from the uncertainty 
involved in assigning risk to providers conditioned to a large extent the implementation 
of the new health governance structure. Thus, providers were not integrated into the 
CHS and contracts were the main tool for shaping their production of services. 
Nonetheless, at the same time, extra-contractual financing mechanisms were also 
part of the system, and the 'fictional' contracts signed with CHi providers were just 
tools for inducing performance improvement. 
Arguably, the ambiguous formulation of the LOHC implied also uncertainty in the 
principal-agent relations between the health authority and providers, which was 
counteracted by the discretionary power given to the executive branch. The enacting 
coalition's concern with the implementation costs derived from principal-agent 
transactions led it to use its absolute majority power and design a CHS which was 
highly dependent on the executive and which at the same time had managerial 
freedom to operate to a large extent within a private law framework. Principal-agent 
problems were also at the origin of the difficulties in changing the legal nature of the 
CHI and implementing the repeated recommendations by the academic and political 
elite to disaggregate it into its provider units. Finally, social and political actors 
relatively close to the parliamentary opposition bore the transactions costs derived 
from participation in the structure of a health authority which, against their first 
preferences, had been ambiguously designed and given a wide margin of 
discretionary power. 
Radical NPIVI supporters tended to assess the extent of change brought about 
by these reforms as a distortion of the governance structure formulated in 1990, while 
radical NPM opponents defined the reforms as a privatisation strategy. However, the 
analysis of this case shows that the reforms between 1990 and 1995 represented a 
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blend of both continuity and innovation. Continuity affected the policy tools available 
to the health authority, the reassertion of the asset ownership status quo, and the 
commitment of the health authority to the economic survival of the heterogeneous 
network of providers. Innovation affected the institutional design of the health 
authority - including its legal nature and its managerial autonomy - and the idea that 
the Health Plan should guide health and contracting policies. Lastly, competition 
among all providers and disaggregation of the CHI were innovative ideas in relation to 
the main NPIVI components of the 1980s. Nevertheless, the former was first redefined 
as 'managed competition' and eventually not implemented, and the latter has not 
even been formally proposed yet. 
Therefore, the extent of change brought about by the NPM health reforms in 
Catalonia was of an incremental nature, even though the starting situation was 
structurally favourable to the creation of such a governance structure. The clarification 
of the Catalan 'model' in NPM terms was gradual and consensual through a process 
of mostly endogenous partisan mutual adjustment. Although the policy developments 
in the rest of Spain were also characterised by a mixture of continuity and change, 
they built on a clearly different model - an integrated NHS. The main developments in 
the Spanish NHS over the 1980s were basically characterised by continuity in the 
hospital sector, and by change in the primary care sector. In the hospital sector, the 
creation of the NHS from 1986 mainly involved the co-ordination and consolidation of 
the existing network of Social Security providers owned and managed by the 
INSALUD with the rest of providers owned by other public administrations, together 
representing over 70 per cent of hospital beds available. The achievement of 
universal coverage was more of a qualitative than of a quantitative nature because by 
1986, when the General Health Law was passed, 96 per cent of the population was 
already covered by the public health system (see Table A. 4 of Appendix 1). Big steps 
towards a financing model based on taxes instead of on social security contributions 
was taken in 1989, when the percentage of the INSALUD's budget financed by 
general taxes increased from 25 to 70 per cent, and in 1997, when taxes financed 92 
per cent of the INSALUD's budget. 
By contrast, the creation of the Spanish NHS required change in primary care 
through a massive reconversion of the exisbng primary care services. This process 
involved an increase in the number of professionals and of their working timetables as 
well as investments on physical resources, with the aim of reinforcing the role of 
305 
primary care in the health system. Even so, the main share of public health 
expenditure was made in the hospital sector: in 1982 this represented 55 per cent of 
total health expenditure, and in 1990 it rose to 63 per cent (see Table A. I of Appendix 
1). Finally, the decentralisation of the INSALUD's competencies was characterised by 
a very gradual process - still unfinished -, which itself led to little innovation in health 
governance structures in most of the Autonomous Communities receiving the 
transfers until the mid-1990s. 
In contrast to the Catalan reforms, the introduction of NPM in the Spanish NHS 
was brought about suddenly and as a result of exogenous pressures - namely, the 
1992 Convergence Plan derived from the Maastricht Treaty'47. An early explicit NPM 
reform proposal, the 1991 Abril Report had to be side-lined in the public arena to cool 
down political and social contestation. So far, though, the extent of NPM change in 
the Spanish NHS has been confined to a few cases in which programme contracts, 
prospective budgeting and the calculation of activity measures were being used for 
making managers aware of the results of their performance. Also, under the new PP 
government, a 1996 Royal Decree-Law and a Law of April 1997 established the 
possibility to contract directly or indirectly with entities of any legal nature for the 
provision of publicly financed health services, as well as the possibility to diversify 
management and provision forms. In any case, introducing NPIVI in the whole Spanish 
NHS in a comprehensive way would involve a radical change, because the use of 
contracts as a policy tool is new to the system. 
In September 1997 a Sub-Commission of the Spanish central Parliament for the 
Consolidation and Modernisation of the Health System issued a report recommending 
rationalisation measures for the use of resources. This report had the support of the 
governing conservative PP, the Catalan nationalist CiU, the lBasque nationalist PNV 
and Canary Coalition, and was rejected by the socialist PSOE and the communist- 
leaning coalition United Left (IU). According to this report, a law had to define the 
selective financing of the services which the NHS should cover as a matter of right, 
and the criteria of need, health and social utility, and cost/effectiveness. Second, 
technology assessment and evaluation had to be sine qua non conditions for the NHS 
to finance new treatments or the treatment of new illnesses. Third, a clear disfinction 
between health and socio-health services had to be made, the latter not being 
147 For an analysis of the impact of external pressures (European Community membership, 
MaastriGht Treaty) on the Spanish ecomomy and politics from the mid-eighties to the early 
nineties, see Heywood (1993). 
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financed by the NHS but by patients. Fourth, the role of mutualities should be made 
clearer. Fifth, priority criteria and time-span limits should be introduced in the 
management of waiting lists. And finally, there should be free election of doctor and 
health provider (El Pefi6dico, 1/10/97). 
Table 7.1. 'New public management', transactions costs and institutional 
design in the Catalan and Spanish health care systems. 
Reform Extent of change Transactions Transactions 
stimuli costs (TC) and costs and policy 
institutional tools 
_design 
1980S Endogenous 
Spain stimuli: Lefts 
political 
commitment to 
NHS. 
Conflictual, 
ideological debate 
on deep 
(normative) core. 
TC focus: 
risk assignment 
(universal 
Goverage, tax- 
finanGed NHS), 
implementation 
(no managerial 
autonomy, 
hierarchiGal 
integration). 
Continuity. 
incremental 
budget allocation 
to INSALUD, 
which has single 
legal personality. 
Administrator's 
instead of 
NHS model: 
incrementalism 
and 
continuity in 
hospital sector, 
innovation in 
primary care. 
Only 
complementary 
role for private 
providers. 
managers in its 
providers. 
Govemance 
structure: unitary. 
1980s Exogenous Implicit NPIVI: Inertial: Innovative: 
Catalonia stimuli. incremental in CHI mimics in contracted 
democratisation, structural terms: INSALUD. sector -first 
decentralisation, reinforcement and Innovative: accreditation 
Spanish NHS. consolidation of giving the system in 
Endogenous contracted contracted Europe, re- 
stimuli: hospitals and sector the status classification of 
asset ownership creation of the of public hospital levels, 
distribution, HNPU. providers as BCU measure of 
split voting, Innovative in substitute for the activity and price 
compatible primary care insufficient CHI's setting process, 
interests and though following resources, manager figure 
preferences, Spanish NHS choosing to in both CHI and 
strategic model. expandthe contracted sector, 
consensus. NPM: designing former instead of creation 
incentives, the latter. of consortia for 
consolidating TC focus: rationalisation 
disaggregation. risk assignment of hospital 
to non-CHI network. 
providers Governance 
(commitment to structure: unitary 
their survival). (CHI) and hybrid. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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Reform Extent of Transactions costs Transactions 
stimuli change (TC) and costs and policy 
institutional design tools 
1990 reform Endogenous NPM: TC focus: Innovative. 
formulation stimult several CHI became a legislative vagueness, Health plan as a in internal CiUs bill provider, new participation rights, framework for 
Catalonia drafts, law health authority implementation, contracts, 
proposition by (CHS) finances, risk assignment extension of PSC, 1980S contracts and to providers. contracts to 
consolidation of plans, private law Themes: CHI's hospitals 
the Catalan as framework for discretion and and reformed 
model. CHS's external managerial autonomy primary care. Exogenous relations. of health authority, 
stimuli: 1986 Focus on: innovation in 
GHL mandate, contract-based participation rights. 
NPM in other incentives for Innovative: 
countries. competition and private law 
Long negotiation efficiency, and framework for 
and strategic suggestions of health authority. 
consensus. possible CHI 
disaggregation. 
Operating Exogenous Complex CHS's Centralisation in Govemance 
the new stimuli: role: transfers, the CHSs structure: hybrid 
governance historical under- control and corporate centre bilateral. 
structure funding of contracts of contracting Contract law. 
in Catalonia both Spanish and agency, also processes, to the Relational, 
Catalan health regulatory detriment of contracting. 
care, but deeper and planning Health Region Both contract and 
in the latter, functions. Managers' purchasing extra-contractual 
which together CHI: provider functions. financing sources. 
with large agency role, 'Fictional'-contracts Promotion of 
investments, and but no with non-CHI 
delays in disaggregation. CHI providers. providers. 
INSALUD's Incentivisation Health Plan Actual publicness 
annualbudget through objectives in of HNPU- 
transfers, have contracts, but no primary care members 
led to increasing competition. contracts. 
debt. 
Early 1990s Endogenous Experimental, Continuity Programme 
Spain stimuli: 1991 selective and in INSALUD's contracts, 
Abril Report, limited change. organisation, prospective 
1996 decree and Great difficulty management, legal budgeting, activity 
1997law, 1997 with opening a nature, and measures, 
report by a public debate on role in the health providers viability 
parliamentary a reform which system, despite plans, agency for 
Sub- would involve programme, fictional the evaluation of 
Commission. radical change if contracts with its technology, 
Exogenous it followed providers since selective 
stimuli. 1992 international 1992. financing of 
Convergence NPM lines. medicines. 
Plan, NPM 
recommended by 
OECD. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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7.2. The evolution of 'new public management' 
strategies in health care. 
The divergences between the NPM discourse and the actual implementation of the 
reforms identified in the Catalan case as policy displacements, implementation deficits 
and unintended consequences have continued to characterise the governance 
structure of the health sector from 1995 to date (mid-1998). The interventionist stance 
taken by the DHSS reveals a higher profile in times of budgetary constraints, such as 
the present year. The 1998 budget froze the share to be spent on the health services 
contracted, and the Conseller made it clear that the existing financial deficit would 
eventually require rationalisation measures for the use of health resources. However, 
the Conseller first of all reasserted the politics of consensus and incrementalism w, hich 
has characterised the development of the Catalan model: the DHSS would negotiate 
with the Catalan Union of Hospitals and the Hospital Consortium of Catalonia about 
the selective application of the necessary rationalisation measures for the present 
year, reviewing the situation of hospitals on a case-per-case basis (La Vanguardia, 
28/5/98, my emphasis)148. That is, consensus will be the result of bilateral 
negotiations which, moreover, will only focus on the short-term. 
Despite these implementation short-falls it could be argued that the Catalan 
health care reforms have been driven by the political will to shift from a public 
integrated model of health system to a public contract model by reinforcing the 
existing contracted sector. According to international reports on current health care 
reforms this is the model to which quasi-market reforms seem to be shifting. Each 
generic model of health system has its own inherent problems. The reimbursement 
model (in both its compulsory and voluntary versions) has problems of cost- 
containment. The public contract model has problems of lack of competition between 
providers and excessive regulation. And the public integrated model has problems of 
management deficit (micro-economic objectives) and of citizen-orientation (OECD, 
1992). However, while the present institutional designs of the financing function of 
148 1 want to thank Mireia Grau for pointing out this reference on hftp: //www2. vanguardia. es/cgi- 
bin/hrp_ccl_new? 
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third party payers adequately perform the insurance and access functions of these 
health systems, none of them satisfactorily performs the agency function. Thus, the 
aim of current reforms is to find adequate incentives so that the financing body 
monitors and purchases health services under criteria of efficiency and equity. 
The health care reforms of the 1980s and early 1990s aimed to improve both 
the macro- and micro-economic efficiency of health systems. Macro-economic 
measures on the demand side included initiatives such as cost-containment (services 
catalogues, cost-sharing) and stabilisation of the proportion of health expenditure in 
relation to the GDP. On the supply side the main macro-economic measures were 
control of the total volume of activity, global budgets for hospitals and capitation 
payment for primary care providers. In turn, the measures adopted for the 
. 
improvement of micro-economic efficiency included elements of quasi-markets, such 
as competition-led incentives and regulations for providers and insurers. Thus, 
managed competition has been introduced between physicians (in Germany and in 
United Kingdom), between pharmaceutical products (in Germany, and in the 
Netherlands), between hospitals (in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the 
Netherlands), and between insurers or 'fundholders' (in the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands) (OECD, 1992). Nonetheless, a number of common problems derived 
from quasi-market reforms which are directly related to the introduction of contracts 
have emerged. These are: the definition of indicators and activity measures; cost- 
based versus price-based payment systems; monitoring and ex-post control as 
mechanisms for bridging the information asymmetry in relation to contractors as policy 
implementors; ensuring accountability for management; defining the scope of political 
responsibility; and designing and implementing participation channels in the 
management and evaluation of public services. 
According to Propper and Le Grand (1996) the evolution of quasi-markets is 
making apparent the need to redefine the role of government. 
In a quasi-market 
government collects taxes and allocates resources to purchasing agents 
for them to 
cover the population's health needs. However, apart 
from its budget setting and 
allocation function, the intervention of government in a quasi-market 
faces a challenge 
to make two other public functions compatible: promoting competition and achieving 
effective planning. The reason is that health care quasi-markets are 
far from perfectly 
competibve, so that the contracting process may not 
be a suitable mechanism for 
making relevant planning and investment decisions - either 
because they may be 
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beyond the funding capability of purchasers, or because co-ordination and 
collaboration for obtaining economies of scale may be hindered by competition itself. 
However, these authors point out that while the promotion of competition in the 
United Kingdom has been important in sectors such as privatised utilities, in the case 
of health care this government function has encountered recurrent difficulties. For 
example, regulation of monopoly providers through the rule of price equals average 
cost has not only been criticised for not providing incentives to long-term economic 
efficiency, but such a rule has also been widely broken. Similarly, in the United 
Kingdom the introduction of some pro-competition tools (such as the elaboration of 
league tables and the Private Finance Initiative) has not been enough to overcome 
political and social pressures against one of the consequences of a contestable 
market - namely, the difficulty of closing inefficient hospitals. Moreover, governmental 
intervention in the United Kingdom has directly hindered competition and managerial 
freedom - for example, providers' pricing, investment and cash flows decisions are 
limited by the financial regime within which they have to operate. And purchasers 
(except General Practitioner fundholders) have to stick to the priorities set at the 
central government level, often lacking the required adaptation to local needs. 
Propper and Le Grand (1996) argue that underlying these developments in the role of 
government in relation to quasi-markets is the tension between the drive to give 
managers a wider margin of manoeuvre in a competitive environment and the need to 
ensure political control (and accountability) over the policy outputs of quasi-markets. 
Other recent studies on the evolution of quasi-markets in health care reveal the 
emergence of new concepts such as transformational change, which being top-down 
and power-led have had an apparent impact on organisational culture and conceptual 
mind-sets. Power shifts induced by the reforms are making administration boards and 
their effectiveness more important (in terms of accountability, balanced membership, 
and non-executive members' role). Also important is the emergence of renewed 
professional roles, which are the result of adaptation or appearance of hybrid new 
individual roles. In health care this is tending to favour groups such as public health 
directors, clinical and medical directors, General Practitioner fundholders and 
entrepreneurial clinicians launching new commercial products. Finally, the concept 
and reality of relational markets as an agency system based on long-term contractual 
relations between hybrid forrns of organisation (financed by both budgets and 
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commercial activities) may be replacing the NPIVI idea of quasi-markets (Fedie et a/., 
1996). 
It could be argued that the introduction of NPM/quasi-market reforms in the 
public sector was initially aimed to gradually change the nature of incentives by 
replacing internal political control over implementation processes by external 
economic control of outputs. That is, organisation and structural reform (namely 
disaggregation) came to facilitate competition, which was in turn expected to make the 
most of incentivisation. Therefore, incentives as opposed to administrative controls, 
would no longer increase political control costs, but would be 'spontaneously' 
generated by competition (Gallego-Caider6n, 1996). However, the analysis of the 
evolution of these reforms to date shows that different emphasis on different 
components of NPIVI have led to the emergence of different variants of NPM and 
different possible scenarios (Ferlie et al. 1996; Lane, 1997). In these contexts, 
aspects such as locating the lever of change on the demand side or on the supply 
side (purchasers versus providers), and clarifying the role given to citizens in a system 
which is supposed to enhance their voice and exit possibilities within the public 
services system, appear as crucial questions to be answered in any further 
development of the public sector reforms. 
7.3. Implications for wider debates 
about transactions costs. 
The initial theoretical assumption made in this research was that explaining 
the 
adoption of NPM reforms did not require a tailor-made 
theory, but a general theory of 
institutional choice in the public sector, which aimed to explain not only why 
NPM as a 
particular reform trend came about, but also might address questions 
about why any 
public sector reform comes brought about. 
Public sector reform was defined here as 
the redesign of the governance structure of any policy 
domain. And governance 
structure was defined as the set of rules governing 
the relationship between the 
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relevant actors in a policy domain. Two main components of a governance structure 
were identified: the institutional form of the public authority and the policy tool mix with 
which it was endowed for the fulfilment of its responsibilities. 
The second main theoretical assumption made in this study was two-fold. On 
the one hand, institutions were conceived of as purposeful policy outputs of vital 
political concern (Moe, 1990a), resulting from the interactions and negotiations 
between boundedly rational individuals facing structure-induced constraints and 
opportunities (Dowding, 1996). On the other hand, an analytical differentiation 
between group or individual interests and institutions is not only possible but 
necessary in order to search for a causal link between institutional design as a 
purposeful policy option and the interest-based strategies of groups or individuals 
(Lane, 1993; Dowding, 1994). 
This theoretical stance is at odds with the sociological strand of new 
institutionalism (March, Olsen, 1984,1989; Meyer, Rowan, 1977), which rejects the 
idea that institutions are explicable in terms of purposeful strategies developed by 
actors. And it is also at odds with the economic version of new institutionalism 
(Shepsle, Weingast, 1981; Williamson, 1975,1985), because this latter approach 
conceives of politics as a domain dominated by an economic rationale -a stance 
which confines their explanations to a limited understanding of the politics of 
institutional choice as a voluntary exchange process. Moreover neither the 
sociological nor the economic approaches integrate the organisational and political 
dimensions of the public sector governance structure into a theory of institutional 
choice (Moe 1990a, 1990b, 1991). 
Horn's (1995) account of the variables driving legislators' decisions on the 
structure of the public sector tries to overcome this dissociation of the organisational 
and political dimensions of the public sector. He argues that legislators will design the 
institutional form which best helps them address the transactions costs they face, 
most of which deriving from the need to overcome their commitment problem. These 
transactions costs stem first, from the decision costs involved in the negotiations and 
conflicts associated with refining legislation, and the trade off with the likely agency 
costs implications of leaving legislation vague, or the other main trade off of allovAng 
greater participation rights to civil society interests in the structure of the new 
institution. Second, transactions costs derive from the costs of monitoring 
implementation and maintaining control of agencies to whom powers are delegated. 
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Third, transactions costs are involved in assigning risk to private actors who may or 
may not be able to control or insure against them. 
The perception of these transactions costs by legislators depends on the 
functions they expect the public sector to perform. I took this hypothesis as a starting 
point and reformulated it by arguing that depending on their ideology and resources, 
different actors should be expected to be concerned with different functions to be 
performed by the public sector and should therefore be expected to care about 
different kinds of substantive transactions costs. As a result, they will support different 
institutional forms for the public sector. Moreover, this reasoning and the final 
institutional design of the new public authodty is expected to be influenced by the 
pattern of relationships between political and social actors. 
Building on this theoretical framework, the research questions asked were why 
legislators chose NPIVI structures in health care, and why NPM policies were not fully 
implemented (despite favourable initial conditions)? These questions were answered 
for a specific case, by analysing the political processes by which public officials and 
interest groups made decisions on the governance structure of the health care in 
Catalonia from the early 1980s to the mid 1990s. The analysis shows that the actors 
involved in this process did take into account such transactions costs when 
formulating their preferences about the governance structure of the health sector, and 
accordingly negotiated with the rest of relevant actors. Moreover, not only did those 
transactions costs have an impact on the institutional choice finally agreed, but they 
also conditioned the actual implementation of the reforms. 
However, the role of political transactions costs in Horn's theory are 
circumscribed to both the decision-making stage of the policy process and to the 
specific institutional design which is the object of legislation. However, the way 
political transactions costs are perceived and dealt with reflects also the impact of 
policy precedents concerning other institutions and other policy domains. In order to 
complement Horn's model, this study resorted to examining how other external policy 
processes had a cross-influence on the decisions made on the 
Catalan health policy 
subsystem. In this sense, relevant concepts from 
Sabatier's and Jenkins-Smith's 
(1993) advocacy coalition theory were taken as heuristic tools. 
First, two sets of 
factors -exogenous and endogenous 
to the policy subsystem - were examined and 
were shown to create constraints and opportunities 
for the policy elite to elaborate 
and redefine their preferences and arguments. 
Second, this research analysed the 
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interaction between public officials (legislators and bureaucrats) and non-institubonal 
actors (interests groups) throughout a decade-long policy incubation period, in which 
both the development of key policy tools and the participation of interest groups in 
their formulation and implementation played a strong role. 
In Horn's model legislators are defined as forward- loo king, that is, the 
insfitutional design and the policy tools they formulate are intended to solve their 
commitment problem throughout the further implementation process. Nevertheless, 
the model was not clearly extended to consistently interpret how political transactions 
costs affected the implementation process through which the enacting coalition 
intended to solve its commitment problem. The formulation of an institutional design 
may not necessarily be clear and explicit, but rather ambiguous and prone to be 
reinterpreted as a result of either discourse and/or practice. Therefore, the analysis of 
the implementation process of this study resorted to Dunleavy's (1991) bureau- 
shaping model, which complemented Horn's decision analysis with concepts that are 
relevant for the specific kind of reform studied -namely, 'new public management' 
(NPM). Moreover, the implementation process does not only involve political but also 
economic transactions costs whose nature depend not only on political considerations 
but also on the economic and social characteristics of the policy domain in question - 
health in this case. For this reason, Horn's model was complemented with other 
theories which deal with this economic dimension of transactions, thereby helping 
identify how the political nature of the agency or implementation problem affects the 
economic dimension of policy. These theories included Williamson's (1975,1985) 
governance structure models and Pfeffer and Salancik's resource dependence theory. 
The analysis showed that, while theories about the variables inducing the 
adoption of particular governance structures in economic organisations define useful 
concepts for analysing public sector structural reforms, they fail to explain why 
economic theories' predictions are not confirmed in the political domain. The reason is 
that political transactions costs are different from economic transactions costs. In the 
world of economics transactions are defined as a matter of voluntary exchange, and 
transactions costs derive from writing, enforcing and monitoring 'hard' contracts. By 
contrast, in the world of politics transactions are mediated through relations of public 
authority - that is, they are not voluntary 
but compulsory -, and transactions costs 
derive from agreeing 'soft' contracts, where commitments and contingency are seldom 
specified in detail. The commitment problem of legislators, 
the costs derived from the 
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actual legislative process (vagueness as opposed to refinement of legislation), from 
participation rights for social actors in the structure of government, from 
implementation monitoring, and from uncertainty and risk assignment to private 
actors, are all explanatory variables characterising the governance structure actually 
implemented. 
For example, for a situation in which investments are highly asset-specific and 
'transactions recurrent, transactions costs economics predicts a unified governance 
structure. Unified governance involves forward or backward integration of purchasers 
and providers into a hierarchical or vertical mode of organisation, so as to economise 
on the costs derived from negotiating and monitoring long-term contracts which are 
complex because they cannot completely cover all contingencies associated with 
uncertainty and opportunism (Williamson, 1985). The health care sector is 
characterised by highly asset-specific investments, by recurrent transactions between 
financing authorities (purchasers) and providers, and by market failures such as 
uncertainty and information asymmetry leading to moral hazard, adverse selection, 
supply-induced demand and opportunism. But NPM does not postulate a unified 
governance structure for the sector, but instead the creation of hybrid forms of 
governance - namely, quasi-markets. 
Quasi-markets involve a comprehensive development of the NPM components 
of incentivisation, disaggregation and competition and are close to the hybrid forms of 
governance defined by transactions costs economics: trilateral governance supported 
by neo-classical contracting, and bilateral governance supported by relational 
contracting. Theoretically, the former is most efficient when investments are either 
mixed or idiosyncratic (namely, medium or highly specific) and when transactions are 
occasional. Bilateral governance is supposed to be more efficient when the asset- 
specificity of investments is mixed and transactions are recurrent. The shift from the 
soft contracting involved in unified governance arrangements to the hard contracting 
involved in these hybrid forms of governance is central to the development of quasi- 
markets. The main argument for this line of reform is the need to break the lock-in 
situation which commonly affects unified/hierarchical forms of health systems. 
Hierarchical integration has had the unintended effect of intensifying asset specificity, 
without eradicating the opportunism, uncertainty and information asymmetry inherent 
in health care (Perrow, 1986). Thus the aim of the NPM reforms is to break these lock- 
in effects by making contractual relabons explicit and binding, and by introducing 
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incentives to induce providers to improve efficiency and prevent opportunistic 
behaviour. 
The governance structure actually implemented in the Catalan health care 
reforms turned out to be hybrid, that is, something pitched between a unified and a 
market governance structure. Although these NPM reforms involved a deviation from 
theory, because highly asset-specific investments no longer determined the choice of 
a unified governance structure in a situation of recurrent transact. ions, they did fit 
theory in the choice of the contractual law which supports the new hybrid governance 
form. That is, the contractual law chosen was not the neo-classical contracting 
required for occasional transactions (trilateral governance), but the relational 
contract. ing defined as the theoretically most efficient regime when transactions are 
recurrent (bilateral governance). Relational contracting means that adaptation 
between contracting parts rests on bilateral negotiations for mutual interest, and on 
mutual resource dependence. 
In the Catalan case, structural disaggregation of functionally defined roles 
(financing, purchaser, provider, consumer) was clarified for different organisations and 
actors. And hard contracts started to make principal-agent relations explicit for some 
actors, and continued to do so for other actors, on the assumption that each part has 
and will press for its own interests, which may or may not coincide with the other's. At 
the same time, though, these hard contracts were acknowledged to be incomplete for 
the coverage of all contingencies. As a result, extra-contractual financing sources 
were used, which were subjected to bilateral negotiations between the purchasing 
health authority and each provider. This relational contracting is the basis of a process 
of co-ordination and adaptation between mutually dependent parties. Despite being a 
monopsonistic purchaser, the health authority needs the services of all the providers 
of the Hospital Network of Public Utilisation. And these providers have in turn come to 
fully depend on the contracts with the health authority for their survival. 
The enacting coalition's commitment to the persistence of the heterogeneous 
and mostly privately managed provision network coincided with the preferences of the 
main interests groups. The governing coalition was concerned with the transactions 
costs derived from uncertainty and risk assignment to providers, and with the costs 
associated to the principal-agent relations derived from controlling 
implementation. All 
these factors conditioned the governance structure actually implemented. In essence, 
these concerns are incompatible with central NPM postulates, such as competition, 
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contestable quasi-markets and its ultimate economic consequences. in a situation of 
mutual resource dependence, contracts have become bridging strategies between 
purchaser and providers, and boundary setting instruments for the health 
administration itself (Pfeffer, Salancik, 1978). On the one hand, the purchaser formally 
controls the whole incentive and financing system - including, therefore, elements of 
hierarchical contracting (Stinchcombe, 1985). The effective use it has made of these 
powers has in some cases raised criticisms about the blurring of boundaries between 
the health administration and providers. On the other hand, providers have not only 
kept their managerial and organisational autonomy, but they have also ensured the 
commitment of the health authority to their economic survival as effectively almost 
'quasi-public' bodies. 
Thus, relational contracting is the basis of the new hybrid, bilateral governance 
structure of the Catalan health care system. However, the fact that these contracts 
are financed through the public budget, and that both padiament and the courts are 
entitled to supervise the use of public money, means that this govemance structure 
could be defined as formally trilateral - in the sense that third-parties exist which are 
entitled to make binding decisions on the operation of the system. All this confirms the 
theoretical prediction that in a hybrid form of governance both incentive intensity and 
administrative controls have a semi-strong role as instruments, and that both 
autonomous adaptation and co-ordination become semi-strong performance aftdbutes 
(Williamson, 1991). 
In sum, while the new economics of organisation does define useful concepts 
and variables for explaining choices about governance structures, it fails to predict 
central features of such choices in the public sector. The very concept of 
seconomising' on transactions costs is not fully suitable for the political domain. 
Rather, adequately 'facing' or 'dealing with' transactions costs, as suggested by Horn 
(1995), better captures the idea that legislators' decisions on institutional choices are 
driven by whatever their commitment problems are. Solving such problems may 
require managing greater transactions costs in a way which is favourable to 
legislators' political objectives, instead of economising on transactions costs for 
society as a whole. The reason is that political transactions are not defined in 
economic, voluntary exchange terms. Instead, public officials and interest groups 
reason and pursue strategies which need a political explanation, that is, a theory that 
integrates the organisational and political/public authority dimensions of the process 
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of institutional choice. The main implication of this political rationale is that the 
institutional choices aimed at overcoming particular commitment problems may be 
incompatible with associated reform programmes, such as that postulated by the 
market-led NPM discourse. 
What are now seen as recurrent inconsistencies between a NPM discourse 
advocating competition-led quasi-markets and new forms of governmental 
intervention, have to a large extent their origin in in-built tensions of this governance 
form: how to make compatible political control and planning on the one hand, with 
managerial freedom and competition on the other hand. In addition, both the market 
failures inherent in health care and health insurance and the kind of transactions 
involved partly explain the divergences between the market-led NPM discourse and 
the actual operation of quasi-markets. In short, the emergence of actual relational 
markets does not represent a clear theoretical puzzle, but rather a relative theoretical 
reassurance. 
NPIVI as a new governance structure for the public sector is still an evolving 
reform trend. Different reform sequences and variable emphasis on the introduction of 
NPM components in different countries are not only traceable to particular sets of 
exogenous and endogenous factors in each case, but also to different solutions given 
to the emergence of those recurrent tensions. In essence, both problems and 
solutions are concerned Wth the allocation of decision rights about the rationalisation 
of resources in society. And the most important challenge any governance structure of 
the public sector has to meet is to gain legitimacy - that is, the trust of citizens - for the 
performance of that function. 
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Appendix I 
Data appendix 
Table A. I. Structure of public health expenditure in Spain, 1982-95 
(in percentages). 
Primary health Specialised Other 
Year care and pharmacy health care expenditure+ 
1982 40.7 54.8 4.5 
1983 40.2 55.2 4.6 
1984 40.4 54.8 4.8 
1985 39.6 55.5 4.9 
1986 37.9 57.1 5.0 
1987 37.0 60.0 3.0 
1988 37.0 60.0 3.0 
1989 35.6 61.0 3.4 
1990 32.8 62.7 4.5 
1994* 33.2 61.7 5.1 
1995* 34.8 60.0 5.2 
+: Health care provision for seamen; health research; researcher 
training programs and general services administration. 
Sources: CAENS, 1991: 18; *: Guill6n and Cabiedes (1998: 189) cited from Oficina 
de Economia de la Salud, 1994: 5. 
Table A. 2. Population coverage by the Spanish public health care system. 
Years Population % of Coverage 
covered 
(hundred thousands) 
1945 5,912 22.1 
1952 8,767 30.9 
1960 13,292 43.3 
1964 16,066 50.6 
1967 18,200 55.5 
1970 21,374 63.8 
1971 23,952 70.0 
1973 28,020 80.3 
1978 30,000 81.8 
1982 32,170 84.5 
1983 33,067 86.4 
1984 35,876 93.2 
1985 36,930 95.4 
1986 36,974 96.1 
1987 37,348 96.0 
1988 38,052 96.3 
1989 38,433 96.1 
1990 39,453 98.0 
1991 38,789 99.8 
Source: Freire, 1993: 85-6 (based on data from reports by the INP and the INSALUD). 
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Table AA Health expenditure in Spain as a percentage of GDP. 
Year Public Non public Total Public/Total 
1965 1.3 1.3 2.6 51.0 
1970 2.4 1.3 3.7 65.5 
1975 3.8 1.1 4.9 77.3 
1980 4.5 1.1 5.7 80.0 
1981 4.6 1.2 5.8 78.7 
1982 4.7 1.2 5.9 79.4 
1983 5.1 0.9 6.0 84.5 
1984 4.7 1.1 5.8 81.6 
1985 4.6 1.1 5.7 80.8 
1986 4.4 1.2 5.6 79.0 
1987 4.5 1.2 5.7 78.3 
1988 4.9 1.1 6.0 82.2 
1989 5.1 1.3 6.6 80.5 
1990* 5.4 1.5 6.9 78.7 
1991 5.5 1.2 6.7 82.3 
1992+ 6.0 1.5 7.5 80.5 
1994* 5.7 1.6 7.3 78.6 
1995* 5.9 1.7 7.6 78.2 
Source: OECD (1994: 72-73); *C. Gest. (1997: 26), +-. (OECD: 1994b) 
Table AA Financing sources of INSALUD's budget: state contributions 
versus Social Security contributions, 1989-96 (in percentages). 
Year State Social Security Others 
1986 23.8 74.3 1.9 
1987 24.7 69.9 5.4 
1988 25.2 69.6 5.2 
1989 70.1 27.2 2.7 
1990 68.8 27.2 4.0 
1991 67.8 27.2 5.0 
1992 69.0 27.2 3.8 
1993 68.8 28.0 3.2 
1994 70.2 27.1 2.7 
1995 77.3 20.4 2.3 
1996 82.8 15.1 2.1 
1997 91.9 6.0 2.1 
Source: C. Gest (1997: 26). 
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Table A. 5. Distribution of investments in the Catalan health sector, 1982-95 
(in percentages over total investment in health). 
Real 
1982 1983 1984 
Primary Hospital Other* Primary Hospital Other* Primary Hospital Other* 
care care 
I 
care care 
I 
ca re carp 
investment 8.3 56.6 35.0 19.2 79.9 0.8 34.9 64.5 
Capital 
transfers -------- 
TOTAL (100) 8.3 56.6 35.0 19.2 79.9 0.8 34.9 64.5 
Total 
investment" 6,979,760,000 4,824,000,000 3,593,100, OOC 
INDEX+ 100 69.1 51.5 
*Includes: urgent investments programs for infrastructure and equipment, prices review and other. 
**In pesetas 
+Indexed 100 in 1982. 
1985 
Primary Hospital Gral. 
care care Admin 
Real 
investment 
Capital 
transfers 
TOTAL (100) 
Total 
investment" 
INDEX+ 
35.3 64.3 0.5 
35.3 64.3 0.5 
7,186,200,000 
103.0 
1988 
Primary Hospital Gral. 
care care Admin 
1986 
Primary Hospital Gral. 
care care Admin 
26.3 63.8 9.9 
26.3 63.8 9.9 
3,300,000,000 
43.3 
1989 
Primary Hospital Gral. 
care care Admin 
0.6 
0.6 
1987 
Primary Hospital Gral. 
care care Admin 
35.5 57.8 6.6 
35.5 57.8 6.6 
7,187,000,000 
103.0 
1990 
Primary Hospital Gral. 
care care Admin 
Real 
investment 36.2 60.6 3.2 35.8 54.2 6.0 33.4 53.1 5.9 
Capital 
transfers --- 4.0++ 
2.6 5.0 - 
TOTAL (100) 36.2 60.6 3.2 37.8 56.2 6.0 36.0 58.1 5.9 
Total 
investment" 10,578,000,000 11,370,000,000 15,150,000,000 
INDEX+ 151.6 163.0 217.1 
++To public enterprises and other public entities, without specifying whethe r 
they belong to primary or 
hospital care. 
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Real 
investment 
Capital 
transfers 
to CHIA"' 
to non-CHI 
providers 
TOTAL (100) 
Total 
investment" 
INDEX+ 
1991 1992 1993 
Primary Hospital Gral. Primary Hospital Gral. Primary Hospital Gral. 
care care Admin. care care Admin. care care Admir 
23.8 40.5 
12.1 22.5 
35.9 63.0 
18,197,999,000 
260.7 
0.0 
0.0 
1.1 
1I 
Primary 
care 
1994 
Hospital 
care 
Gral. 
Admin 
Real 
investment 17.2 25.1 16. 
Capital 
transfers - - 0. 
to CHI*** 2.4 6.6 0. 
to non-CHI 
providers 7.6 24.3 
TOTAL (100) 27.2 56,0 16. 
Total 
investment" 20, 818,142,0 00 
INDEX+ 298.3 
17.8 18.1 
6.2 28.5 
8.8 19.2 
32.8 65.8 
21,313,999,000 
305.4 
1995 
0.9 
0.5 
1.4 
Primary Hospital Gral. 
care care Admin. 
- 
19.4 30.6 15.5 
- - 0.0 
2.4 4.9 0.4 
4.3 22.5 - 
26.1 58.0 15.9 
21,448,500,000 
307.3 
16.3 20.1 
3.3 14.3 
9.1 23.2 
28.7 57.6 
24,808,264,000 
355.4 
13.1 
0.0 
0.6 
13.7 
**In pesetas. 
*** Spent as real investment by the CHI on its own providers. 
NB: Real and capital investments were a share of the budget of the IDG of Social Security Health 
Services between 1982 and 1983, of the Catalan Health Institute's budget between 1984 and 1990, and 
of the Catalan Health Service's budget from 1991. 
Source: Own elaboration based on DEF (1982,1983,1984,1985,1986,1987,1988,1989,1990,1991, 
1992,1993,1994,1995). 
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Table A. 6. Budget share spent on contracts with non-CHI providers in Catalonia, 
1982-95 (in percentages over the total budget of the DHSS of the Catalan government and over the total budget of the corresponding 
health authority within the DHSS). 
1982 
DHSS DGofSS 
Heafth 
Services 
TOTAL 27.7 31.4 
1983 
DHSS DG of SS 
Health 
Services 
Catalan 
Health 
Institute 
30.2 34.4 
1984 
DHSS 
30.1 34.0 
NB: The budgets for the years between 1982 and 1984 do not specify the distribution of the contracting 
expenditure among primary and hospital care. 
1985 1986 1987 
DHSS Catalan 
Health 
Institute 
DHSS Catalan 
Health 
Institute 
DHSS Catalan 
Health 
Institute 
Primary 
care 5.4 6.1 5.9 6.7 6.2 7.0 
Hospital 
care 18.3 21.0 19.0 21.9 19.0 21.6 
Other* 5.0 5.7 3.3 3.8 3.7 4.2 
Current 
transfers" 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.7 
TOTAL 29.3 33.4 28.5 32.8 29.6 33.5 
*Specialists services and other, in 1989 it inc ludes specialist services, haemodialysis and other. 
**To families and non-profit institutions (one-off regulatory payments, prostheses, vehicles for 
handicapped patients, and othe r). 
1988 1989 1990 
DHSS Catalan 
Health 
Institute 
DHSS Catalan 
Health 
I nstitute 
DHSS Catalan 
Health 
Institute 
Primary 
care 7.1 8.0 0.4 0.4 
5.5 5.6 
Hospital 
care 17.7 20.1 27.3 28.2 
29.2 29.7 
Other* 3.5 3.9 4.4 4.6 -- 
Current 
transfers" 0.5 0.6 0.1 0.1 
TOTAL 25.8 32.6 32.4 33.5 
34.7 35.3 
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1991 1992 1993 
DHSS Catalan DHSS Catalan DHSS Catalan Health Health Health Service Service Service Primary 
care 5.5 5.6 5.3 5.4 5.5 5 5 Hospital . 
care 31.2 31.3 31.8 32.1 30.8 30.9 
TOTAL 36.7 36.9 37.1 37.5 36.3 36.4 
1994 1995 
DHSS Catalan DHSS Catalan 
Health Health 
Service Service 
Primary 
care 5.6 5.5 5.7 5.7 
Hospital 
care 32.4 32.2 33.8 33.5 
TOTAL 37.0 37.7 39.5 39.2 
Source: Own elaboration based on DEF (1982,1983,1984,1985,1986,1987,1988,1989,1990,1991, 
1992,1993,1994,1995). 
Table A. 7. Difference between Basic Care Unit (BCU) cost and tariff* for 
different hospital sizes and contract levels in Catalonia, 1993. 
Size 
(nlO of beds) 
Cost/BCU Most frequent 
tariffs 
% of BCU cost 
covered by BCU 
tariff 
>800 45,320 C 29,480 0.65 
401-800 29,870 B/C 25,060 0.84 
201-400 29,320 B 22,190 0.76 
101-200 26,350 B 22,190 0.84 
A/B 19,490 0.74 
51-100 20,720 A/B 19,490 0.94 
A 16,410 0.79 
<50 20,430 A/B 19,490 0.95 
A 16,410 0.80 
*In pesetas. 
Source, Ramis et al. (1997: 26), based on Enquesta dEstabliments Sanitaris en Rdgim d'Intemat, 
elaborated by the DHSS of the Catalan government. 
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Table A. 8. Unions electoral results in the health sector, 1987-90. 
1987 1990 1990 1990 
CHI Catalan Health HNPU HNPU Institute (CHI) non-CHI providers non-CHI providers (common collective (individual enterprise 
agreement) agreements) Unions % representatives % representatives % representatives % elected elected elected 
CEMSATSE 38 84 37.7 17 6.6 28 14 0 MOO 34 70 31.4 138 53.7 100 . 50 0 UGT 8 26 11.7 24 9.3 31 . 15 5 USTECATAC 22 9.9 0 0.0 16 . 8 0 USO 2 7 3.1 46 17.9 19 . 9 5 Other" 1 14 6.9 3 1.2 6 . 3 0 Non-affiliated 15 29 11.3 0 . 
Total 100 223 100 257 100 200 100 
1990 
Private providers 
1990 
Psychiatric 
providers 
1990 
Elderly 
residences 
Unions representatives 
elected 
% representatives 
elected 
% representatives 
elected 
% 
CEMSATSE 3 0.8 
CC. 00 186 50.1 26 65.0 31 57.4 
UGT 131 35.3 14 35.0 19 35.2 
USTECATAC 
USO 1 ý6 4.3 
Other" 7 1.9 
Non-affiliated 28 7.5 4 7.4 
Totai 371 100 40 100 54 100 
"The unions included in this category are not specified in this internal report, which does point out 
that none of them reached the level of ten per cent of the elected representatives and, therefore, 
cannot be considered as being among the'most representative unions in the health sector. 
NB: In 1990 there were 30,000 workers in the CHI, 7,000 in the members of the HNPU with the same 
HNPU collective agreement, 11,000 in the rest of members of the HNPU -which have their own 
enterprise collective agreements-, 5,900 in the private sector, 500 in the psychiatric providers, and 
540 in the providers for elderly people care. In the CHI only those having a statutory, civil service-like 
contract -namely 93 per cent of its workers- were entitled to vote. In the rest of the HNPU and in the 
private sector these electoral results are the aggregation of the results of two different electoral 
colleges: on the one hand, medical staff, nurses and administrative personnel, and on the other hand, 
nurse assistants and non-health personnel. The number of representatives each electoral college may 
elect is proportional to the number of workers in each college. 
Source: CC. 00. (1991) based on the certificates of elections of the Department of Labour of the 
Catalan government. 
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Table A. 9. Unions electoral results in the health sector, 1994-97/8*. 
1994-1997 1994-1997 1994-1998 
Catalan Health HNPU HNPU 
lnstitute(CHI) non-CHI providers non-CHI providers 
(common collective (individual enterprise 
agreement) agreements) Unions representatives % representatives % representatives % 
elected elected elected 
CEMSATSE 134 42.8 
CEMSAT 3 0.7 
SATSE 55 12.1 
AMIC 8 1.7 
APF 8 1.7 
MOO 75 24 171 37.5 87 46.8 UGT 37 11.8 79 17.3 39 21.0 USTECATAC 31 9.9 
CTSC 48 10.5 
SAE 9 2.9 3 0.7 
CGT 8 2.6 4 0.9 
CSIF 8 2.6 
uso 4 1.3 44 9.6 
CTC 3 1.0 
SAC 2 0.6 
APAIL 2 0.6 
SPAS 0 0.0 
INDEP 12 2.6 
smc 12 2.6 
API 9 2.0 
Non-Affiliated 7 3.7 
Other **53 **28.5 
Total 313 100 456 100 186 100 
1994-1997 1994-1998 
Private providers Psychiatric*** 
providers 
Unions representatives % representatives % 
elected elected 
CEMSATSE 
MOO 182 50.7 33 70.2 
UGT 95 26.5 14 29.8 
USTECATAC 
uso 10 2.8 
ýOther 38 10.6 
Non-affiliated 34 9.5 
Total 359 100 47 100 
*The union elections follow a dynamic time pattern as they are not held at the same point in time in 
all providers. The data shown in this table represent the results obtained by the different unions in the 
health sector as accumulated between 1994 and 1997. 
"This category 'Others' involve some associations standing for election within AMIC and others in 
1998, but which have not been classified into AMIC in this report. 
NB: The membership of the HNPU varies over the years as new providers sign contracts with the 
Catalan Health Service on a regular basis and are included in the HNPU by decree. 
Source: MOO. (1998) based on the certificates of elections of the Department of Labour of the 
Catalan government. 
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Table A. 10. Budget structure of the Department of Health and Social Security of 
the Catalan government, 1990 (in percentages over the total DHSS's 
budget)*. 
Cabinet of DG of DG of DG of Public Catalan Total % of the Health Economic Health Health total budget 
Conseller Organisation Resources Institute 
and of the Health (CHI) 
Planning System 
Core 
Budget 
Personnel 0.4 0.1 0.03 1.2 1.7 
Purchase of goods 
and services 0.1 0.1 0.00 0.06 0.3 
Total Core Budget 
0.5 0.2 0.03 1.3 2.0 
Bureau Budget 
Investments 0.05 0.00 0.2 0.07 
Capital transfers to 
private agents -- --- 
Current transfers to 
private agents 0.03 - 0.03 
Financial assets 0.00 - --0.00 
Total Bureau 
Budget 0.03 0.00 0.2 - 0.2 
Programme 
Budget 
Current transfers to 
public agents 0.06 92.4 92.5 
Capital transfers to 
public agents 0.00 4.6 4.6 
Total Programme 
Budget 0.06 97.0 97.1 
Superprogramme 
Budget 
Total SP Budget - 
*All calculations are based on the initial budgetary appropriation (332,195 million pesetas). 
Source. Own elaboration based on DEF (1990) and Dunleavy (1991). 
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Table A. 1 1. Budget structure of the Department of Health and Social Security of 
the Catalan government, 1995 (in percentages over the DHSS's total 
budget)*. 
Cabinet of DG of DG of Public Territorial Catalan Total % of 
the Resources Health Delegations Heafth total budget 
Conseller of the Health Service 
System (CHS) 
Core 
'Budget 
Personnel 1.1 - - - 1.1 
Purchase of goods 
and services 0.1 0.1 0.00 0.03 0.2 
Total Core Budget 
1.1 0.1 0.00 0.03 1.3 
Bureau Budget 
Investments 0.02 0.1 0.00 0.1 
Current transfers to 
private agents 0.03 0.02 0.00 - - 0.1 
Capital transfers to 
private agents 0.04 - - - 0.04 
Financial assets 0.00 - -- - 0.00 
Total Bureau 
Budget 0.1 0.02 0.1 0.00 - 0,2 
Pr(>gramme 
Budget 
Current transfers to 
public agents 0.1 0.00 0.00 94.6 94.7 
Capital transfers to 
public agents 0.00 - 0.00 4.1 
4.1 
Total Programme 
Budget 0.1 0.00 0.00 98.7 98.8 
Superprogramme 
Budget 
Total SP Budget 
*All calculations are based on the initial budgetary appropriation 
(541,294 million pesetas). 
Source. Own elaboration based on DEF (1995) and Dunleavy 
(1991). 
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Table A. 12. Budget structure of the Catalan Health Institute pre-LOHC, 1990 (in percentages over the total CHI's budget)*. 
Corporate Specialised Primary Health Total % of Centre care care Professionals total budget 
Training 
Core 
Budget 
Personnel 1.6 15ý3 15.9 0.9 33 7 Purchase of goods . 
and services 0.8 6.6 1.4 0.02 8 8 Total Core Budget . 
2.4 21.9 17.3 O'l 42.5 
Bureau Budget 
Contracts with non- 
CHI providers - 29.7 5.6 - 35.3 Investments 0.3 2.5 1.5 - 4.3 Capital transfers to 
private agents - - 0.06 - 0.06 Current transfers to 
private agents 0.00 0.5 16.3** - 16.8 Redemptions 0.00 0.2 0.06 0.3 
Financial assets 0.03 - - - 0.03 Total Bureau 
Budget 0.3 32.9 23.5 - 56.7 
Programme 
Budget 
Capital transfers to 
public agents - 0.2 0.06 0.3 Current transferst ot 
public agents 0.02 - 0.4 0.4 
Total Programme 
Budget 0.02 0.2 0.5 0.7 
Superprogramme 
Budget 
Total SID Budget - - - - 
*All calculations are based on the initial budgetary appropriation (326,888 million pesetas). 
**94 per cent of this amount is transferred to pharmacies in payment for 60 per cent of the price of 
pharmaceuticals bought by patients on medical prescription (patients pay 40 per cent of the price). 
Income sources of the CHI's budget: 
Transfers from the DHSS: 98.5 % 
Service provision: 1.2% 
Heritage income: 0.3% 
Financial assets: 0.03% 
Source: Own elaboration based on DEF (1990) and Dunleavy (1991). 
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Table A. 13. Budget structure of the Catalan Health Institute as a provider, 1995 
(in percentages over the CHI's total budget)*. 
Corporate 
Centre 
Specialised 
care 
Primary 
care 
Health 
Professionals 
Training 
Total % of 
total budget 
Core 
Budget 
Personnel 2.3 34.1 39.6 2.5 78.5 
Purchase of goods 
and services 0.6 15.2 4.7 - 20.5 Total Core Budget 
2.9 49.3 44.3 2.5 99.0 
Bureau Budget 
Investments 0.05 0.5 0.3 0.9 
Financial assets 0.1 -- 0.1 
Current transfers to 
private providers 0.00 -- 0.00 
Total Bureau 
Budget 0.2 0.5 0.3 1.0 
Programme 
Budget 
Total Programme 
Budget 
Superprogramme 
Budget 
Total SP Budget 
*All calculations are based on the initial budgetary appropriation. 
Income sources of the CHI's total budget (203,444 million pesetas). 
Transfers from the CHS: 97% 
Provision of health services: 2.9 % 
Financial assets: 0.1 % 
Source: Own elaboration based on DEF (1995) and Dunleavy (1991) 
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Table A. 14. Budget structure of the Catalan Health Service as the financing 
and purchasing agency, 1995 (in percentages over the CHS's 
total budget)*. 
Corporate 
Centre 
Specialised 
care 
Primary 
care 
Catalan 
Health 
Institute 
(CHI) 
Total % of 
total budget 
Core 
Budget 
Personnel 0.6 - 0.6 Purchase of goods 
and services 0.8 - 0.8 Total Core Budget 
1.4 - - - 1.4 
Bureau Budget 
Contracts with non- 
CHI providers - 33.5 5.7 - 39.2 Investments 0.6 1.2 0.8 - 2.6 Current transfers to 
private agents 0.04 0.00 %0 - 19.0 Capital transfers to 
private agents 0.00 0.6 0.00 - 0.6 Financial assets 0.00 0.04 0.02 - 0.06 Total Bureau 
Budget 0.6 35.3 25.5 - 61,4 
Programme 
Budget 
Current transfers to 
public agents 0.04 0.3 0.2 35.8 36.3 
Capital transfers to 
public agents 0.00 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.8 
Total Programme 
Budget 0.04 0.6 0.4 36.1 37.1 
Superpr(>gramme 
Budget 
Total SP Budget - - - - - 
*All calculations are based on the initial budgetary appropriation, 
**: 96 per cent of this amount is transferred to pharmacies in payment for 60 per cent of the price of 
pharmaceuticals bought by patients on medical prescription (patients pay 40 per cent of the price). 
Income sources of the CHS's total budget (546,053 million pesetas): 
Transfers from the DHSS: 97.6 % 
Provincial administrations: 1.4 % 
Financial assets: 0.00% 
for patients' displacements: 1.0% 
Source: Own elaboration based on DEF (1995) and Dunleavy (1991). 
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Appendix 2 
Methodology 
The choice of the reforms of the Catalan public health sector from the early 
eighties to the mid-nineties is based on the criterion of 'inform ation-rich case' 
(Patton, 1990: 181). On the one hand, this case is part of an international trend of 
public sector reforms which has generated a considerable volume of publications. 
So far, though, the Catalan case had not been the object of analysis from a 
political science perspective. On the other hand, it has the added-value of including 
structural and contingent variables which theories of institutional choice seldom 
integrate - namely, the territorial organisation of the state, the distributon of political 
power between different levels of government as a result of democratic elections 
and a complex distribution of complementary resources among a heterogeneous 
policy elite. 
The methodology used in this research combines qualitative and 
quantitative approaches in the analysis of data from both primary and secondary 
sources. The primary sources used here include thirty-eight in-depth and semi- 
structured interviews with key informants, non-published internal reports from major 
organisations and an annual survey of all health providers carded out by the 
Department of Health and Social Security of the Catalan government"'. The 
secondary sources include official publications, relevant academic journals and 
books on the subject and newspapers. 
The sampling criteria for the collection of the data used in this study has 
been qualitative, purposive, theory-driven and guided by the research questions 
formulated (Miles; Huberman, 1994: 27). The analysis of the role of the policy elites 
in terms of advocacy coalitions required not only the collection of non-published 
internal reports by both institutional and non-institutional actors, but also the 
realisation of face-to-face interviews (Sabatiers; Jenkins-Smith, 1993). The 
149This survey title is Estadistica dEstabliments Sanitaris en Rdgim Ontemat, and has been 
carried out by the Service of Information and Studies of the Direction General of Health 
Resources of the DHSS of the Catalan govemment. Although the survey stated to be 
conducted in 1983, the data available only covers from 1985 to date. 
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selection of interviewees was based both on purposive and snowball sampling, 
with the aim to contact at least two representatives of each collective actor defined 
as relevant within the health policy domain (see Chapter 3 and Appendix 3). The 
interviews conducted combined features of the semi-structured and in-depth types, 
and were recorded and transcribed. They intended to cover a small sample of key 
informants, nested in their context and studied in depth when they showed the 
initiative to expand their answers. In all cases, though, interviews were initially 
designed as semi-structured and covered the following themes: 
What they understood by 'Catalan model' of health care, 
Whether they thought there might have been other 'feasible' alternatives 
(both in political and economic terms), 
How they perceived their role in the policy-making process within the 
Catalan health system from the early eighties to date, 
How they perceived other relevant actors' role in the policy-making process 
within the Catalan health system over the same period, 
How they perceived their relations with these and other relevant actors, 
How they perceived their interests to have been affected by the evolution of 
the Catalan health system from the early eighties, 
What views and beliefs they had about the Catalan health system. 
The need to identify the arguments of the different Catalan political parties 
when deciding on a new institutional design for the health authority in 1990 
required analysing official publications, such as the transcripts of parliamentary 
debates leading to the passage of the new legislation (see Chapter 4). The 
analysis of these documents was driven by the transactions costs concepts defined 
by Horn (1995). The different arguments defended by each party were classified 
into Horn's analytical categories by associating the meaning of the indigenous 
wording to sensitising concepts which bear a direct identification with those defined 
by the theory (Patton, 1990: 390-1). This is a process of inductive abstraction. The 
indigenous wording in which the main arguments of political parties were 
expressed were classified into two different levels of sensitising concepts: 
1. at a more concrete level: the legal nature of the health authority, its 
managerial autonomy and independence from the executive, participation rights for 
political and social actors, providers' functional attachment to as against integration 
into the health authority, the role of local administrations, and the policy tools 
available to the health authority; 
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2. at a more abstract level into which the concepts above were classified: 
margin of discrebon of the health authority, participabon rights, and providers 
autonomy. This classification turned out to be meaningful, resilient and directly 
related to Horn's model. 
Finally, the analysis of the actual operation of the new governance structure 
formulated for the health sector required both qualitative and quantitative data. The 
former was taken mainly from interviews and from the contracts prototypes. The 
latter was taken from the annual budget of the main public agencies of the health 
authority and from the annual survey conducted by the DHSS. In Chapter 5, the 
analysis of the budget structure of key public agencies was shaped by the 
analytical categories defined by Dunleavy's (1991) bureau-shaping model. The 
objective was, to assess the extent to which their roles had actually been re-defined 
in accordance with the new governance structure formulated. In Chapter 6, the 
budget share spent on investment and contracts by the health authority, the 
distribution of resources and workload among different providers as shown in an 
annual survey carried out by the DHSS, and interviews were analysed to clarify the 
actual operation of the governance structure of the Catalan health system. The 
analytical construct that guided this analysis were Williamson's (1985) combined 
types of governance form and contract law. 
The use of these different types of data from different sources has allowed 
triangulation of the evidence obtained from them (Patton, 1990: 267). Thus, for 
example, the discourse prevailing among the policy elite, as reflected in official 
publications, internal reports and interviews, was that the 1990 reform had 
introduced the purchaser/provider split within the health authority or administration. 
However, neither the formal and actual distribution of competencies nor the 
analysis of the budget structure of the relevant public agencies confirmed an 
effective implementation of these roles. In sum, the purposive selection of these 
quantitative and qualitative data was guided by the analytical variables defined in 
the theoretical framework. The aim was to empirically test whether the nature of the 
relations between specific variables as established by the theory held in this 
particular case study. That is, this research did not attempt to describe a particular 
state of affairs and its preceding evolution in the Catalan health reforms, 
but to 
understand why this particular state of affairs prevailed over other possible ones. 
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Appendix 3 
List of key informants intervewed 
Expert interviewees recorded, posts and date of interview: 
Mr. Simo Aliana, former high official of the Department of Health and Social Security 
(DHSS) of the Catalan government, former Catalan Health Institute (CHI) hospital 
manager, and present director of the Public Administration School of Catalonia 
(23/10/96). 
Mr. Miquel Argent6, Head of the Area of Economic Resources of the Catalan Health 
Service's (CHS) corporate centre (13/11/96). 
Ms. Roser Artal, Head of the Payment Systems Unit of the Health Area of the CHS's 
corporate centre (4/12/96). 
Mr. Joan Josep Artells, member of the Abril Commission (1991) and Health Economist of 
the Cabinet Econornia y Salud, S. L. (15/4/96). 
Mr. Jaurne Aubia, Doctor, Vice-President of the Official Medical College of Barcelona 
(COMB) (17/4/96). 
Mr. Juan Jos6 Avendaho, Doctor, Medical Director of the Primary Care Centre Barceloneta 
(4/11/96). 
Mr. Ricard Bosch, Manager of the HNPU-member Health Consortium of Barcelona 
(30/10/96). 
Mr. Miquel Bruguera, Doctor, President of the COMB (20/10/97). 
Mr. Xavier Casas, member of the Party of the Catalan Socialists (PSC), local councillor for 
Public Health of the Barcelona's Local Council, President of the HNPU-member 
Municipal Institute of Health Care (IMAS) of Barcelona's Local Council, and Vice- 
President of the CHS's Health Region of 'Barcelona City' (20/11/96). 
Mr. Joan Castillejo, Head of Primary Health Care of the Health Area of the CHS's corporate 
centre (22/7/96). 
Mr. Jordi Codina, Director of the Parc Tauff Foundation of the HNPU-member Consortium of 
the Parc Tauli of Sabadell (10/4195). Present Director of the Foundation Uni6 of the 
Catalan Union of Hospitals (UCH). 
Mr. Jordi Colomer, Manager of the HNPU-member Health Consortium of Matar6 (4/11/96). 
Ms. M6nica Corominas, Doctor, Head of the Planning and Management Control Unit of the 
CH 1 (9/9/96). 
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Mr. Josep Cuervo, Manager of the CHI hospital Vail d'Hebr6 (12/4/96). 
Mr. Ramon Espasa, Doctor, former Consefler of the Department of Health and Health Care 
of the provisional Catalan Government (1977-1980), and doctor at the CHI hospital of 
Belivitge (20/1/98). 
Mr. Antoni Garcia Prat, former high official of the former Direction General of Health Care of 
the DHSS (1981-1983), where R was responsible for contracts with hospitals and 
primary care, Administrator of the Hospital Clinic (1983-1986), Manager of the CHI's 
Health Area of Barcelona City (1987-1990), and present Manager of the Foundation 
Josep Cameras (10/11/97). 
Mr. Josd Andrds Gorricho, Director of the Hospital Section of the CHI (19/11/96). 
Mr. Josep M8 Grego, Doctor, Director of the Primay Health Care Section of M6tua de 
Terrassa, most of whose providers are HNPU-members (8/11/96). 
Mr. Manuel Guerrero, Lawyer, President of the insurance company ARESA, and Vice- 
president of the insurance employers' association UNESPA (25/11/97). 
Ms. Elvira Guilera, former Director General of the Direction General of Health Care of the 
DHSS of the Catalan government (1981-83) and director of the private consulting 
cabinet CODEH (19/11/96). 
Mr. Manuel Jovells, Manager of the CHI (12/4/95). 
Mr. Albert Ledesma, Doctor, former CHI primary care doctor, Director of the professionals 
self-managed Centre of Primary Care Vic S. L. (Primary Care Centre del Remei) 
(19/10/96). 
Mr. Caries Mant6, former Director of the Hospital of Mataro in the late seventies, Health 
Councillor in the Local Council of Matar6 (1979-1985), Director General of the Hospital 
Consortium of Catalonia (CHC) from 1985 (20/1/98). 
Ms. Esperanga Marti, collaborator of the former Direction General of Health Care of the 
DHSS of the Catalan government (1981-83), President of the UCH and manager of the 
private hospital Institut d'Urologia, Nefrologia and Andrologia (IUNA) linked to the 
Fundaci6 Puigvert, member of the CHS's Directive Council (6/11/96). 
Mr. Patricio Martinez, President of the Spanish Confederation of Medical Unions 
(CESM -CEM/SATSE coalition with a nurses'union in Catalonia), member of 
the CHS's 
Directive Council (5/11/96). 
I Ms. Victoria Martorell, Doctor, Health Director of the Primary Care Centre Badalona Gesti6 
Assistencial S. L., dependent on the HNPU-member Hospital Municipal de Badalona 
(14/11/96). 
Mr. Ramon Massaguer, former Manager of the CHI and Director of the CHS (12/7/95). 
Mr. Pere MonrAs, Manager of the HNPU-member Hospital Consortium of the Parc Tauli in 
Sabadell (24/10/96). 
Mr. Francesc Moreu, Manager of the CHS's Health Region 'Centre' (4/4/95). Present 
manager of the CHC's enterprise Consultoria i Gesti6 S. 
A. 
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Mr. Albert Oriol-Bosch, Director of the Institute for Health Studies of the DHSS of the 
Catalan government (4/4/96). 
Mr. Adolf Rod6s, Internal Auditor of the Municipal Institute of Health Care (IMAS), member 
of the Health Consortium of Barcelona, which is itself a HNPU-member (21/10/96). 
Mr. Manel Santal6, Director of the Primary Health Care Division of the CHI (24/7/96). 
Mr. Ramon Sema, Nurse at the CHI Hospital of Girona and representative of the Catalan 
public sector union CATAC in this hospital's workers' commitee (18/3/98). 
Mr. Joan Sintes, Manager of the CHS's Health Region 'Barcelona City' (2517/95). 
Mr. Pere Torrabadella, Doctor, Manager of the Catalan Association of Health Centres 
(ACES), member of the CHS's Directive Council (11/3/98). 
Mr. Xavier Trias, former Director of the CHI (1984-88), former Conseller (counterpart of a 
Minister in the Spanish central government) of the DHSS of the Catalan government 
(1988-95), and present Conseller of the Presidency Department of the Catalan 
government (22/10/96). 
Mr. Antoni TuA, Head of the Health Policy Area of the Catalan branch of the trade union 
CC. 00, member of the CHS's Directive Council (30/10/96). 
Mr. Miquel Turner, Administrative Secretary at the HNPU-member Hospital of Matar6 and 
representative of the CTS health union in this hospital's workers' commitee (18/3/98). 
Mr. Josep Ma Via, former Secretary General of the CHI, former Director of the Health Area 
of the CHS' corporate centre, and Director of the International Division of the CHC 
(18/11/96). 
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